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

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

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Donald N. Wilber

Afghanistan

its people its society its culture

in collaboration with

ELIZABETH E. BACON CHARLES A. FERGUSON
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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

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PREFACE

THIS VOLUME represents an extensive revision of *Afghanistan* (ed. Donald N. Wilber, Human Relations Area Files, 1956) and differs in a number of respects from the earlier volume. In view of the emphasis in the present series on producing comprehensive, reliable works for the general reader, there is less specialized material in the sociological and anthropological fields and a less detailed treatment of the economic situation and background. On the other hand, the discussions of economic planning, of internal political and social developments, and of aspects of the foreign relations of the country have been expanded and brought up to date through the spring of 1962.

This revised study continues to owe an important debt to the contributors to the first volume and I wish to thank each of these again. Dr. Elizabeth E. Bacon, an anthropologist with field experience in the Middle East and author of a comprehensive study of the Hazaras of Afghanistan, submitted drafts of material on ethnic groups and the family. Dr. Charles A. Ferguson, then of Harvard University and now Director of the Center for Applied Linguistics in Washington, D.C., supplied a draft of the material on languages. Dr. Peter G. Franck, economist with publications on economic development of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, as well as specialist on international law and business organization, had been Economic Adviser to the government of Afghanistan from 1948 to 1950 and was therefore particularly well qualified to draft the economic chapters. Dr. Pieter K. Roest, anthropologist and sociologist, traveled in Afghanistan and was active from 1949 through 1955 as an area specialist for the United States government. His contribution included a draft of the political chapters and drafts of more than half the sections on sociological subjects.

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In preparing the new volume I had the invaluable help of Aloys A. Michel, Assistant Professor of Geography, Yale University, whose field work in Afghanistan was concerned with the relation of the Kabul, Qunduz, and Helmand valleys to the economic development of the country and who undertook to revise and rewrite the material now found in chapters 14 through 20 and to supervise the preparation of the maps.

Grateful acknowledgment is extended to M. Baqui Yusufzai, Vice President in Charge of Research, Ministry of Planning, Royal Government of Afghanistan, for reading the chapters concerned with the Afghan economy and for offering a number of helpful comments, corrections, and suggestions.

The United Nations kindly made available to us the photographs so identified in the photographic section. The rest were taken on my own travels in Afghanistan.

DONALD N. WILBER

June 1962
Princeton, New Jersey

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Afghanistan

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CHAPTER *I*

The Culture and the Society

AFGHAN SOCIETY is based primarily on agricultural and pastoral traditions, and these remain the mainsprings of its life. Subsidiary but important are its martial traditions, strongest among the dominant ethnic group, the Pushtuns; its handicrafts based on home industries; and, more recently, its developing commercial enterprises and its factory-type industry. The latter is still in its infancy. Fundamentally, modern Afghanistan is a nation-state relatively recently forged from a variety of ethnic groups and feuding tribes. Many parts of the country are in transitional stages between nomadic pastoralism, seminomadic agriculture and animal husbandry, and the settled agricultural ways of life only now being altered by modern methods of irrigation and cultivation. The Afghan nation-state, created in 1747 under a ruler who took advice from a council of chiefs, emerged in 1931 as a constitutional monarchy, and the presence of a modern form of government and authority has had an ever growing impact upon the forms and expressions of traditional society.

Afghan society is built on family and tribal units. With the gradual settling down of the tribes the village community has become increasingly important; in one ethnic group, the Tajiks, the traditional tribal organization has all but disappeared. Among all settled communities the tribal factors are dwindling away or, as in the case of the Hazaras, have been discouraged by government action.

The family has not yet lost its primeval and primary importance in Afghan life, although the extended family system, as elsewhere in the East, is weakening under modern economic stresses and shows a tendency to break up into individual families, particularly in the cities. Nevertheless, family tradition and cohesion are still at the

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core of Afghan life. Loyalty to the tribe persists only in those groups which have preserved tribal organization and functions. Loyalty to the ethnic group is weakening and persists mainly among the dominant Pushtuns. Loyalty to the nation is a more recent concept which the government attempts to promote by explaining to the people its policies and goals relative to the general welfare.

The structure of Afghan society is relatively loose, and bears little comparison to a highly integrated, interdependent industrial society. As Afghan economy is primarily a subsistence economy, its population is composed of a large number and variety of self-contained small groups and semi-independent communities. The government is the one powerful centralizing and organizing force in this loosely built society, and through its administration, its laws, and its services is forging link after link between them, making the whole increasingly interdependent. It seeks to replace tribal organization, administration, and defense by its own centralized systems, and tries to convert nomads to a seminomadic or settled life, and tribal communities to regional, local, and village loyalties and activities.

Towns have always existed in Afghanistan within the memory of man, as trading centers and seats of power, from the earliest high civilizations through periods of chaos and destruction and amidst tribal warfare, until the present stage of their development as industrial centers. These towns, as everywhere else in the world, are highly interdependent within, and in relation to, their hinterland.

The rise of factory-type industry, and of the use of power-driven tools, even in smaller shops, is causing the emergence of a class of industrial laborers—a class very small so far and new to Afghan society. Technological change has its effect outside the towns. Motor traffic is replacing the age-old traditional methods of transportation by camel caravans and by other pack animals, and bringing in foreign goods unheard of before. The telephone aids mightily in unifying the country administratively, and the radio brings the views of the government, together with its selection and version of the world's news, to every part of the country. A new class of intellectuals is emerging also, as hundreds of Afghans have returned from study abroad, eager to apply Western concepts of economic development and social progress and possessing Western skills so needed in their country. As a result their present and potential influence is out of all proportion to their numbers.

Afghan society has no politicoeconomic doctrine of its own,

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although the structure of relationships between producer and consumer has resemblances to capitalism. It is a traditional, tribal and Islamic, agricultural and pastoral, settled and nomadic, peaceful and warlike society, with its own unique characteristics and a minimum of political and economic theory. It is fully alive, but has not yet defined its motives and theories of society in precise intellectual terms. It is too busy growing up to spend much time in reflecting on its activities.

Afghan society is individualistic rather than collectivistic, but its individualism is family-centered rather than self-centered. It has developed, so far, very little of the competitive spirit so strong in Western commercial and industrial life, although it enjoys competitive sports of skill and daring. It is cooperative in a primitive, in-group kind of way, but has not yet developed cooperative societies. Even in its economic organization it has experimented with organized enterprise for only a few decades and on a very small scale. However, change is in the wind. Increasing Westernization and modernization brings both a shift from a cooperative to a competitive society and a change from a vertical structure of society to one marked by horizontal economic classes. This competitive existence fosters insecurity, rootlessness and restlessness, and a questioning of the validity of the traditional values of society.

Ownership of property cannot be described with one word; it is both concentrated and diffused. A relatively small group of *khans* hold vast amounts of land, yet a host of small individual farmers own their own plots in many areas. Nomads rarely have any real estate, but graze their herds and raise crops on public or private lands at nominal fees. Land, water, cattle, seed, and labor—each may have distinct owners, or be combined under one. Private property is one of the sacred features of this society, yet the state owns and controls a larger part of the country's resources and of its economy than in many Western countries.

The cultural themes and goals of Afghanistan are unique, even to this general region of the world. Sometimes called "the crossroads of Asia," the country has been a mixing bowl and a battleground for a great variety of Central Asian, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and even European invaders and settlers, and continues today to be composed of a variety of dissimilar ethnic groups speaking different languages. In spite of this heterogeneity of population it is a nation, with distinct qualities of its own. The forces that created

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this unity were: Islam, a tribal tradition of leadership and love of liberty, a turbulent but stirring history, a glorious ancient past, the rivalry between great neighboring empires, and, finally, the recent emergence of decisive rulers and leaders.

The most striking qualities of the Afghan people are their toughness, their poverty, their self-respect, their religious devotion, their conservatism, and their frugality. As a nation they have an intense love of freedom. As individuals they resent external control and restraint, yet have learned to accept an extraordinary amount of both from their rulers. To visitors who come in a friendly and open-minded spirit they show a remarkable hospitality. Yet their tribal background and war-scarred past have made them suspicious of the *ferangi,* or foreigner, and wary of his wiles and intentions. This same background can make them dangerous enemies of those who try to bully or deceive them. In the Afghan people Central Asian, Persian, Indian, and some Western influences have been blended, and grafted on a tribal base. The result is a mixture of what may seem to be incompatible traits, such as cruelty and kindness, courage and cowardice, industry and laziness, truthfulness and deceit, ingenuity and illiteracy, calmness and passion, rashness and patience, pride and submissiveness—each and all on display in such situations and circumstances as call them forth, especially in reference to kin or outsider, friend or enemy.

Unquestionably religion plays a vitally significant role in the Afghan mind. Those not educated in the West, and even many who are, are generally devout Moslems, scrupulously observing the prescripts of their religion. While, as elsewhere, there are many who practice the forms rather than the spirit of religion, the number of people who are sincerely devout is very large, and the respect in which piety is held indicates that religion is a real force in Afghan life, permeating the whole social structure.

Probably equally strong is family honor and prestige. To disgrace one's family is one of the blackest of crimes. Of class consciousness there is surprisingly little, although class mobility remains low. Economic motives are incentives to effort; the family must eat, and to gain wealth honorably is a legitimate ambition. But stronger as a rule is the desire for prestige, for recognition as a man of character, ability, piety, learning, or courage. And—among the simple folk no less than among the people of privileged status—the desire for response, especially for the love and respect of one's children, parents, and friends, is very strong.

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The Afghans appear to be a singularly carefree people, and in their own environment seem to be well-adjusted and free from complexes. Such anxieties and complexes as there are have been culturally induced. Among these must be classed the fear of being considered disloyal to one's family, tribe, or religion, and the widespread fear of spirits (*jinns*) and the "evil eye." Educated Afghans show great concern for the future of their nation as a whole, and often express anxiety about its backwardness, its hemmed-in position, its reactionary tendencies, and its poverty. The common people are apt to be preoccupied with ensuring proper observance of the forms of religion, attaching great importance to the enforcement of fasting during daylight throughout the month of Ramazan and the arrest of people found swearing or giving offense to a *mulla*.

Although many Afghans live on a very slim diet and half starve during the winter months, there is no evidence of any fear of starvation, and Afghanistan boasts of never having had a famine. When a particular crop fails or partly fails, other foods are substituted. When wheat runs out, barley or dried mulberries provide meal for bread. In the country, people do not worry too much about food. However, as certain areas specialize increasingly in the production of commercial crops, such as cotton and sugar beets, concern over the ability of the government to transport food crops to regions of scarcity grows.

The pervading authority of the government and the relative lack of channels for political protest to the central authority bring on tensions. As yet there is no organized outlet for such tensions, which represent local opinion at the communal level rather than the beginnings of revolution. Landlords and tenants generally get along well. Their relations are semifeudal but also patriarchal, and one bad landlord does not incriminate the whole class. Wherever there are fears, people seek ways to protect themselves, and in Afghanistan the protection against the "evil spirits in the air" is found in religion or magic. Charms, spells, and incantations are provided by *mullas* and *fakirs* and represent a profitable business. Afghans do not fear death, as a rule, but worry about what is done with their body after death. The paramount importance of being buried in the family cemetery leads them to return home when ill rather than wait for a cure before journeying back.

The mainsprings of Afghan culture are Islam, the tribal code of the Pushtuns (*Pushtunwali*), Persian and Pushtu literature, colored with Sufi mysticism, and the country's illustrious antiquity. The

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latter is only gradually being discovered by archaeological research, but already enough is known about the ancient civilizations in the Sistan, in Bactria (Afghan Turkistan), in the Kabul plain, and in the Nangrahar province to make educated Afghans proud of the past and provide the government's publicity literature with fascinating material.

Sufi-inspired literature has been accessible to only a few of the small literate class, but its themes, ballads, and odes have found their way into the lives of the people through bards and literate *mullas,* and by oral transmission from generation to generation. Hero tales and love songs, proverbs and wise sayings, fairy tales and ghost stories, epic and even ribald war songs, some fanatic and some superb poetry—all these form the folk-literature on which the imagination of the people is fed. Of this wealth of material very unequal amounts are absorbed by different sections and layers of the population, but some of it percolates almost everywhere. The general trend of the unwritten literature is romantic rather than realistic, glorifying war rather than peace, and more inclined to breed and perpetuate prejudices than to illumine the mind. However, it is a vital element in the popular consciousness and influences the latter's orientation, scale of values, and goals. Being conservative and emotional in character, Afghans do not adjust easily to Western rationalism and objectivity. It is not correct to say that the Afghan people are militaristic, but the tribal elements think more readily of solving problems by war than by discussion and are unaware that the heroics of mountain warfare are outdated by the techniques of modern war.

The same difficulty appears in their adjustment to a world run by clocks. The ancient pastoral and agricultural ways of life are built around the rhythms of nature, and there is rarely need for hurry. Besides, some days are long and some are short, some are pleasant and some are bad for work outside. If one travels, or goes visiting, delays are bound to occur, so why count on definite dates of arrival, or on a specific hour for seeing someone? Time-bound life seems slavery to them, and this is one of the chief obstacles in getting Afghans accustomed to regular office or factory hours. Only the Westernized Afghans are time-conscious. They are impatient because they believe that Afghanistan must make extremely rapid economic progress if it is to draw abreast of the modern world, and that the ultimate responsibility for such progress falls upon them. The mass of the people like to keep the good

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old ways, with a profitable change now and then, here and there, which does not upset the basic structure. Some, among the more influential of the clergy, would even like to go back to the earlier and "purer" ways.

Afghans like to think of their culture not only as stable, but as representing an ideal balance between the spiritual and material aspects of life. It is their considered opinion that the West is lacking in the former, and that a false religious philosophy has led Hindus to ignore the latter, while Islam gives what is due to both. There are some facts to support this view, but it takes a little Afghan astigmatism to accept it fully. Indeed the life of the people in the country has dignity and harmony, and even in the towns there is a sort of unconscious integration of the medley of moving parts, which makes friction and clashes rare. No doubt, also, the complete acceptance of religious direction in all the details of life makes for well-oiled social functioning. Likewise the acceptance of authority and leadership from the chief, the *khan,* or the ruler limits individual and group assertiveness which might lead to friction. But this does not mean that tension and friction are absent. They occur mainly in three areas: economic, political, and cultural. The poverty of the common people, especially in the towns and in the inhospitable wastelands inhabited by nomads, is only too apparent. The perpetuation of traditional methods of cultivation continues to work against efforts to increase production. With these methods manpower still needed in the fields must be drawn off to operate the new factories, while potentially productive labor is wasted in idleness among many nomadic and seminomadic tribes and among the farming communities during the long winter months.

Until very recent years when a strong, central army with modern weapons was built up, a government could stay in power only as long as it enjoyed the support of the warlike Pushtun tribes. Those were among the tribes with the poorest economy, and subsidies to their chiefs served to insure their loyalty and to deter them from armed brigandage at the expense of their neighbors. This unproductive system of subsidies continues, although now it is more concerned with the foreign policy of the government than with internal security. Concern for internal stability leads to official hostility toward liberal and critical political thought, given the lack of institutions and organizations through which such feelings could be channeled and controlled. Only individuals who un-

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critically support the policies of the government are permitted to rise to positions of authority, even within the elected legislature. Some of the intellectuals chafe under this control, but are unwilling to risk their jobs and positions of prestige by protesting on behalf of a more responsive government. Nevertheless, it is within this group that the ferment for political change exists and waxes in intensity.

There is also friction in cultural areas. After decades of resistance to foreign and progressive influences, members of the Moslem clergy are beginning to realize that worldly science and technological improvements do not endanger religion itself. They now acknowledge that the Prophet encouraged study and the intelligent use of natural resources, but they have not yet grappled with the problem of social and ideological conflicts between East and West, the old and the new worlds. Afghan law and jurisprudence are still largely in the hands of theologians, although Islamic religious law is utterly inadequate for the modern, complex, world society in which Afghanistan is seeking to be integrated. The ancient religious learning and authority cannot cope with the problems of the new urban civilization. Only a reorientation of Afghan theology and philosophy can provide the sound foundations for a changing and progressive, yet Islamic Afghanistan. Meanwhile there is much inner unrest, much soul-searching: in some cases, a rejection of religious customs and ritual in favor of a compromise between religious principles and foreign-inspired humanism. Where ideals do not dovetail with reality, it is usually the ideals that suffer, and a cynical outlook results in opportunism and loss of that most important social cement, moral standards and ethical conduct.

Most Afghans feel that change is inevitable, but the vast majority want only such change as will make their own life a little easier, a little more comfortable and interesting. So the automobile, the truck, the power pump, the telephone, the radio, electric light, drinking water, effective medicine, and better education for their children are welcomed by the people. Anything, however, that upsets time-honored ways and notions rooted in religion or tradition is resisted.

Afghans are no exception to the rule that all peoples are ethnocentric in their thinking. However, this applies to Afghanistan as a whole rather than to its ethnic subdivisions. Evidence is insufficient to indicate whether Afghans of all types and stations in life

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feel that they belong to a nation called Afghanistan. Such a feeling of national ethos is perhaps weakest among the nomadic tribes that have lived in Afghanistan only part of each year, and strongest in the political and intellectual leaders of the country. National unity and patriotism are not, in Afghanistan, matters of allegiance to a flag, an anthem, or a feeling of national identity. Rather, the Afghans coalesce when Islam and other traditional beliefs and patterns are threatened. After the overthrow of Amanullah in 1929 the Afghans rallied around Nadir Shah as the man who gave most promise of keeping the state intact, and eddies of rebellion against his government were due to personal spite, ambition, or grievances, and not to the desires of any elements to secede from the nation.

Only a few articulate Afghans express a sense of national mission, and these views may differ. Irredentists envisage union with the Pushtuns now within Pakistan, and economists consider that the country has the resources required for internal prosperity. Still others feel that Afghanistan should become the Switzerland of Asia, or that Afghanistan should demonstrate the perfection of Islam to the world. Such views are held by a few intellectual Afghans and not by the masses of the people. The latter feel that they have an established way of life, a religion which is true and perfect, and a national independence too priceless to be abandoned for any foreign blandishments or pressure. They ask no more for their country than its place in the sun, although the leaders' dreams of future grandeur may at times excite their minds. Toward foreigners and foreign ideas in general they show a friendly curiosity, but no uncritical acceptance. To foreigners with whose governments they have had bitter experience—like the British and Russians—they show a keen distrust. To foreigners who show disrespect for their beliefs and ways of life, they show aversion.

Summing up, popular responses are based on tradition, steeped in religion, and colored by tribal relics of romance, war, and magic. There is little logic or pragmatism in Afghan thought, with a few exceptions among the educated. Practice has softened the legalistic approach of Islam with a humane attitude, which seeks to keep peace within the vertical progression from family to nation by sensible discussion and compromise. Arbitrary decisions are usually resented, but accepted if there is powerful religious or secular authority behind them. Thus, Afghans are not easy to influence, except by their own leaders, and even then only within limits

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which no leader can ignore, since the tribal tradition is in the main democratic and respects the rights of the individual.

The basic personality structure of the Afghan remains thoroughly traditional. To communicate with him, one must understand and appreciate his Islamic soul and his firm identification with what custom and tradition have taught him as right and proper. In his heart he is a romanticist, easily aroused to approved traditional emotions: love of family and pride of origin, religious fervor, belligerence, and desire for revenge. As a person, when properly approached, he is friendly and open as a child. When hurt or offended he reacts strongly. As in similar societies it remains to be seen whether the ethos and ethics of this society will survive the impact of imported ideas and techniques intact, whether a satisfactory compromise and adjustment will be worked out, or whether traditional values and virtues will give way to new "causes" which provide a different orientation and a sense of belonging to the wave of the future.

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CHAPTER 2

Historical Setting

PTOLEMY and other geographers of his time applied the name "Aryana" to what is now Afghanistan with the addition of the province of Khorasan, but there is abundant evidence, both archaeological and historical, for placing Afghanistan among the areas of more ancient civilization. Kabul, according to one source, figured in history as early as 2000 B.C. The oldest Iranian chronicles record Turanian (or Scythian) races as the inhabitants of a region west and north of the Helmand river and a non-Aryan group with an admixture of Indian blood as living in eastern Afghanistan.

Iranian tribes occupied the country during the Aryan migrations in the second and first millennia B.C. and Cyrus (559-529 B.C.) ruled the region as part of the Achaemenid empire. A kingdom to the north, Bactria (Afghan Turkistan), had gained renown as the home of Zoroaster, or Zarathustra, the "Bactrian sage" and founder of a great religion. (Zoroastrianism survives today among small groups in Iran, Pakistan, and India as well as among a few hill tribes of the Hindu Kush.) Zoroaster, who probably lived in the sixth century B.C. and who is believed to have died in battle at Balkh during a Turanian invasion, converted the ruler of Bactria and Drangiana, King Vishtaspa, and his queen, Hutaosa, the paternal grandmother of Darius the Great. Cyrus conquered the Bactrian kingdom about 540 B.C. and proceeded to cross into Kapisa (in the Kabul valley) and finally to invade the Punjab. One of the most important borderlands of the Achaemenid empire, the area of Afghanistan at the time of Darius the Great comprised seven satrapies (given here with their modern geographic equivalents): Bactriana (Bactria), Aria (Herat), Margiana (Merv), Gandaria (Kabul valley), Drangiana (Sistan), Arachosia (Qandahar), and Sattagydia (the Hindu Kush to Indus valley region).

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The area re-entered the limelight of history with the conquests of Alexander the Great in 330 B.C. Having taken Artacoana (Herat) Alexander spent the winter in Sistan, then moved east, founded Alexander-in-Arachosia at the site of Qandahar, turned north to the Kabul river, crossed the Hindu Kush and took Bactria, which he made his base of operations against both Turkistan and India during the ensuing few years. In 325 B.C. he had reached the Indus delta from which he marched back, through Baluchistan and southern Iran, to Mesopotamia and his death at Babylon in 323 B.C. Meteoric though their appearance had been, Alexander and his relatively small band of Greeks made a profound impression upon the language and cultures of the region, which lasted for several centuries during which Afghanistan was disputed among the Seleucids, the Graeco-Bactrians, the Parthians, and the Indians of the Mauryan dynasty. Under Menander (130 B.C.) Afghanistan was part of an Indo-Greek empire, whose ruler accepted Buddhism and established his capital in the Punjab. After Menander's death the Bactrian kingdom fell into decay, and by 50 B.C. the Greeks in Central Asia had been almost completely submerged by other races.

In the first century B.C. there was a fresh influx of Iranian tribesmen under the leadership of the Kushan tribe of the Yueh-chis, probably a Turanian horde from Eastern Turkistan. They drove out the Sakas, who had conquered Bactria in 125 B.C. and had briefly held most of Afghanistan. One of the five tribes of the Yueh-chis became dominant and founded the Kushan empire. Kanishka, its most famous king, ruled in the second century A.D. from Bactria to Benares, and from Kashmir to Sistan. The Kushan kings adopted Buddhism, and took over whatever remained of Graeco-Indian culture. In the first century B.C. Greek as an official language had begun to disappear and was replaced by Iranian tongues. Kushan power was greatly reduced by the expansion of the Sasanian empire, and finally destroyed by the Hephthalites, or White Huns, at the end of the fourth century. Petty local dynasties, notably that of the Ratbil kings, alternated in the Kabul valley from the fifth to the seventh centuries, while other areas were held by minor princes who were vassals of the Sasanids.

Shortly after the middle of the seventh century the Chinese Tang dynasty crushed the Western Turks. For a century (659-751) sixteen kingdoms north and south of the Hindu Kush recognized the authority of the Chinese emperor. The Arab invaders, who so

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rapidly overran Iran, were checked in Afghanistan by the tenacious resistance of these last kinglets, and by the civil wars and dissensions among themselves. It was not until near the end of the ninth century that Islam finally triumphed south of the Hindu Kush. The Hephthalite element, however, did not disappear without leaving its traces in the ethnic composition of modern Afghanistan, in the Haytals of Badakhshan.

It is a curious fact that Islam was able to make headway against Buddhism in Central Asia while Christianity, which appeared at Merv and Samarkand two or three centuries earlier, was not. Apparently not a single Christian of that period ever penetrated into Afghanistan, while within a generation of Muhammad's death the Arabs under Caliph Othman had brought Islam to the heart of the country. However, the first Moslem attempts to conquer Afghanistan were unsuccessful in spite of the temporary occupation about 672 A.D. of Kabul, Herat, and Balkh. For several centuries Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and various forms of pagan worship continued to be practiced in Afghanistan. In 870 A.D. Yacub ibn Layth as-Saffar, a military leader, took Ghazni and in the following year occupied Kabul. The Saffarid dynasty controlled the region south of the Hindu Kush until the end of the century when they were replaced by the Samanid rulers who also controlled Transoxiana and Khorasan.

In the mid-tenth century an able Turkish commander called Alptegin assumed control of the town of Ghazni, and his heirs extended their rule over most of Afghanistan as well as the Punjab and Sind. The most famous ruler of this Ghaznavid dynasty, Mahmud of Ghazni, came to power in 997 A.D. and shortly thereafter was recognized by the Caliph at Baghdad as the temporal heir of the Samanids. With his armies, composed mostly of Turks, he led seventeen expeditions into India between 1000 and 1029 A.D., amassing enormous plunder. Known as a conqueror and devastator he did establish the first Moslem empire in the area and set a pattern of Sunni ascendancy, successfully preventing the Shi'as from acquiring a dominant position in Afghanistan and India.

He also conquered most of the Iranian plateau, and tried to subdue some of the wild "Afghan" mountain tribes (1024-25) now for the first time referred to as such by Iranian historians. At his death his rule extended from Kurdistan to Kashmir and from the Amu Darya to the Ganges. He was a patron of the arts and of

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writers, and founded a House of Learning. Ghazni was said to have four hundred resident poets, the most famous of whom were Ansari, Biruni, and the renowned Firdawsi.

About a dozen Ghaznavid rulers followed Mahmud during the next century and a quarter but their power was soon overshadowed by the Seljuk Turks and by another Afghan principality, the Ghurid, southeast of Herat. Khorasan and northern Afghanistan were lost to the Seljuk and Turkoman hordes, and in 1149 Ala ad-din of Ghur conquered and burned Ghazni. The Ghurids stemmed from the Souri and Taimani tribes. They soon lost their power in their native land but succeeded in building up an empire in India, which was inherited by their Turkish slaves. Afghanistan was now overrun by Chengiz Khan and his Mongol hordes. The last descendent of the Ghurid kings was killed in 1223 and the greater part of Afghanistan was soon incorporated into the Mongol empire. A grandson of Chengiz, Hulagu, took the title of Il Khan and ruled over Armenia, Iraq, Iran, and Aryana (Afghanistan). Under the sovereignty of these Mongol Il Khans, a Tajik dynasty, named Karts, came into power and for nearly two centuries ruled, as vassals and independently, over the greater part of the country. The great Turkish conqueror Timur, or Tamerlane, put an end to this dynasty, which represented the last effort of the indigenous elements in Ghur and Herat to establish an independent state in their country. From this time on until the rise of the Pushtuns in the eighteenth century, no native dynasty held rule in Afghanistan. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the wandering hordes of Mongols, Turks, and Uzbeks poured in seemingly inexhaustible numbers into the country from the heart of Asia. Timur took Herat, Kabul, and Qandahar, destroyed the Sistan cities, and in 1398 fought against "Awghans" (Afghans). Timur went on into India, and when he died in 1405 had mastered the lands as far west as the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. His cultured successors, such as his son Shah Rukh and grandson Ulugh Beg, made Herat the intellectual center of Asia before the empire disintegrated under the attacks of the Tartar Shaybanids.

However, a young descendant of Timur, Zahir ad-din Muhammad, brought vast renown to that line under the much briefer name of Babur, or the tiger. Babur (born 1483) was driven from Samarkand by the Uzbeks and after failing to retake it moved south to Balkh, took Kabul in 1505, and laid claim to the empire of Tamerlane, who had died exactly one hundred years before. Herat sub-

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mitted to him, Qandahar resisted until 1522, but his attempt to reconquer Turkistan from the Uzbeks ended in failure.

This lack of success in the north probably turned his attention to India. Ibrahim, the Ludi Afghan who ruled as Sultan of Delhi, had made himself obnoxious to his Afghan grandees, and the latter invited Babur to oust him. Babur invaded India and in 1526 captured and sacked Delhi. He then established the long-lived Moghul dynasty in India. He died in 1530 and, in obedience to his desire, was buried in Kabul, which he loved better than the Indian plains.

Afghanistan now entered upon a period in which it was fought over by the two great empires of India and Iran. Each Moghul ruler was seriously concerned over the mastery of Kabul and Qandahar, and a firm control over the turbulent tribes between these towns and the Indus valley was considered essential to the safety of their dominion. (Many years later the British in India held the same view.) Herat and Sistan remained with Iran, although occasionally troubled by Uzbek raids. Kabul remained part of the Moghul empire, while Qandahar belonged sometimes to Iran, sometimes to India. The north, however, became semi-independent, as Sulayman Mirza, established by Babur as governor of Badakhshan, founded something like an independent dynasty, successfully defending the area from the Uzbeks, who contested its possession.

Babur's son Humayun was continually troubled by Afghan rebellions and in 1539 was driven out of Delhi. Regaining his capital in 1555, he died of an accident a year later. Akbar, his son, had completed the reconquest of India, and the Persians used this opportunity to seize Qandahar. Akbar, determined to establish full control over the unruly Afghan chiefs, first broke their power in India, where many had established little principalities of their own and then attacked them in their mountain strongholds. He subdued the eastern Pushtuns and instituted a system of allowances to the Afridi tribe, to keep the Khyber Pass open and under his control, before tackling the Persians in the southwest. In 1595 he recaptured Qandahar and held on to this city until his death in 1605. Shah Abbas of Iran meanwhile succeeded in driving the Uzbeks out of Herat, which remained in Persian hands until it was captured by the Abdali Afghans in 1716.

Under Akbar's son Jehangir (1605-27) the struggle for control of Qandahar was resumed; the Persians again captured it in 1622.

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Kabul was lost in 1611, but retaken in 1615. Jehangir's favorite wife, Nur Jehan, was an Afghan foundling for whom he laid out a splendid park at Nimla (between Kabul and Jalalabad). His successor Shah Jehan, under whom the Moghul empire reached its greatest brilliance, retook Qandahar in 1638. From the beginning of his reign he had difficulties with Afghan uprisings, first in India and later on the border. Peshawar was saved only with great difficulty, and thereafter Shah Jehan ruled the Afghans with an iron hand. His son Murad retook Badakhshan in 1639.

Balkh was captured in 1641 and thereafter both Balkh and Termez remained in Moghul hands until 1647. In 1648, however, the imperial armies withdrew from the Amu Darya valley and retired to Kabul. This weakening of Moghul power was not lost on the Iranians. The Safavid dynasty had gradually absorbed western Afghanistan (Herat and Sistan), and in 1648 the enterprising Shah Abbas II captured Qandahar and threatened Ghazni. Thus southern Afghanistan passed from Moghul hands, in spite of several attempts under Aurangzeb to oust the Persians. In 1658 the border tribes rebelled again and had to be subdued. The death of Shah Abbas II in 1666 removed the immediate menace of Iran, but the tribes around the Khyber proved unmanageable. A great rebellion, started in 1672, obliged Aurangzeb personally to conduct a two-year campaign (1674-76) against the border Pathans. After several serious reverses to the Moghul armies, the revolt was quelled and the country was kept quiet by a number of able governors and a system of subsidies to the tribes which, with slight modifications, has survived to this day.

Throughout this period of Moghul-Iranian rivalry the Pushtun tribes were steadily increasing in numbers and influence, and it was probably during this time that the Abdalis and Ghilzais spread from their mountains over the more fertile lands of Qandahar, Zamindawar, and the Tarnak and Arghandab valleys. Their rise in power was facilitated by the decline in the position and influence of the Tajiks who had borne the brunt of the Mongolian invasions and whose mountain fortresses in Ghur had been occupied by a semi-Mongolian population, the Hazaras. The Pushtuns in their eastern mountain strongholds had been but little affected by invaders, whose eagerness to reach India caused them to avoid the mountain tracts and press on through the passes. The need for grazing land led the expanding pastoral tribes to spread westward from their mountains, while those remaining behind continued

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practically independent of all rule. The Moghul authority at Kabul ruled them nominally, but its actual power was confined to the valleys and plains. Even under Aurangzeb the governor of Kabul had to bribe the tribes to keep open the road between Kabul and Peshawar; one of his commanders with all his troops had been killed when trying to pass from Khost to Kabul in 1702.

In Qandahar the frequent shifts from Persian to Moghul suzerainty and back again fomented dissensions and intrigue, enabling the powerful tribes to play off one suzerain power against the other. Thus the Abdalis near Qandahar succeeded in obtaining concessions from Shah Abbas the Great, and had one Sado recognized as chief. His descendants, the Sadozais, became the ruling family, and in 1716 drove the Persians from Herat. This removal led to the ascendancy of the Ghilzai tribe near Qandahar, and their power increased until the accession of the Moghul emperor Shah 'Alam I, when the Ghilzais of Qandahar province began to intrigue with him against the Persian government. This plot was discovered and Mir Ways, the Ghilzai chief, was arrested. During his imprisonment Mir Ways succeeded in gaining the confidence of the Safavid ruler, Shah Husayn, and was freed. Mir Ways now seized Qandahar and defeated all attempts to subdue him. He died soon thereafter, and was succeeded by his son Mir Mahmud ibn Mir Ways, who offered to recover Herat for the Safavids. However, the Ghilzais went on to conquer south and central Iran, including Isfahan where Shah Husayn abdicated the Persian throne in favor of Mir Mahmud. The Ghilzais had overextended themselves and soon lost not only Persia but Qandahar itself to Nadir Shah, and Afshar tribesman of Khorasan, who, after defeating the Abdalis in 1729, secured their support and succeeded in breaking the Ghilzai power. Many Ghilzais fled to Kabul province, which gave Nadir Shah an excuse to capture Qandahar and Kabul in 1738. Founder of the Afshar dynasty, he moved on to plunder the fabulous riches of India, using Abdali, Ghilzai, and Persian troops. One Abdali chief, Ahmad Khan Sadozai, rose to a high position in Nadir Shah's army. When the king was killed by his Persian officers, Ahmad Khan with a strong contingent of Abdali troops seized a treasure convoy and marched to Qandahar, where, in 1747, he had himself elected as the ruler of all Afghans. He obtained possession of the whole eastern portion of Nadir Shah's empire, to which he added Kashmir and most of the Punjab by conquest. Ahmad Shah made Qandahar his capital and took the title

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of Dor-i-Durran (Pearl of the Time), which caused his tribe (the Abdalis) henceforth to be known as Durranis. He was easy on the tribes, relying on foreign war rather than taxation for revenue, and the Durranis followed him willingly. The Pushtuns were hard to govern, however, and his son Timur Shah therefore moved his capital to Kabul where the population was mainly Tajik. Timur Shah reigned for twenty years (1773-93) over an extensive but insecure empire. He lost Multan temporarily to the Sikhs, whose power was growing, and Sind, Merv and other parts of Turkistan fell into the hands of the Amir of Bokhara. While the Sadozai Durranis declined in power and prestige as a result of internecine warfare and intrigue, the Barakzais, especially the Muhammadzai subdivision of this clan, gained in strength and finally emerged as governors of important sections of the area ruled by Mahmud, a son of Timur Shah. In 1818 a Muhammadzai chief, Dost Muhammad, defeated Mahmud near Kabul.

Although the Barakzais continued to acknowledge a purely nominal suzerainty to the Sadozais, except for Herat which Mahmud and later his son Kamran held until 1842, they gradually assumed full control and in 1835 Dost Muhammad proclaimed himself Amir of Afghanistan. The outer provinces of the former Sadozai empire were all lost to the Sikhs between 1818 and 1834, including Peshawar. Qandahar was held by a brother of Dost Muhammad who defeated the ousted Sadozai, Shah Shuja, in his effort to recover it (1834). Shuja then turned to the British for assistance, which he eventually obtained with the help of coincidental political events. During the First Afghan War (1838-42) he was placed on the throne at Kabul, while Dost Muhammad first fled to Bokhara, then submitted to the British, and finally was called back as ruler to Kabul, where he set to work consolidating his power. From 1850-55 he reconquered northern Afghanistan, and shortly before his death in 1863 recaptured Herat from the Persians. His persistent efforts had resulted in the conquest of an area almost equal in extent to the realm of Ahmad Shah.

Dost Muhammad was succeeded by his third son, Shir Ali, at a time when external pressures were building up which were to prove most detrimental to the interests of Afghanistan. The expansion of the Russian empire through Tashkent and Samarqand and to within striking distance of the Amu Darya had thoroughly aroused the British in India. Negotiations to establish a common policy with the Afghans failed, and in 1878 the arrival of a Russian

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mission at Kabul resulted in the dispatch of a British envoy who was halted by Afghan troops at the Khyber Pass. As a result, war was declared and British columns entered Jalalabad and Qandahar. The Treaty of Gandamak provided for British supervision of Afghanistan's foreign relations, for an annual subsidy to the Afghans, and for maintenance by the British of a mission at Kabul. In 1879 all members of this mission were murdered and Kabul was quickly occupied by British troops. Anxious to evacuate the country but determined to leave behind a man capable of establishing internal security, the Viceroy of India offered the amirship to Abdur Rahman, a grandson of Dost Muhammad.

Amir Abdur Rahman soon proved to be the forceful, shrewd, and tireless figure for whom the country had long been waiting; the ruler who, in his own words, "had to put in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers, and cutthroats. . . . This necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule." Not only did he manage to establish control over the warlike Pushtun tribes, but the central authority was extended to the infidels of Kafiristan.

Continued British concern over the Russian presence led to the conclusion of a Russo-British protocol of 1887 which delineated the frontier between Afghanistan and Russia; in 1888 the Afghan-Iranian frontier was defined. Both these boundaries are those of the present day. Along the eastern and southern limits of the country turbulent tribesmen raided into India across an uncertain boundary and in 1893 Abdur Rahman and Sir Mortimer Durand met to establish a line drawn on a map as the definite frontier. Named after the British envoy, the line cut between ethnically related tribal groups.

Abdur Rahman labored to improve the organization of the courts and of the army, consistently stressed the need for a national religious faith, and sought to inform himself of aspects of modern progress suitable for introduction into Afghanistan. In training his son and heir, Habibullah, he emphasized the value of unity, stated that he had laid the cornerstone of a constitutional government, and insisted that reforms and modern innovations should be introduced gradually.

In 1901 Habibullah succeeded to the throne, and ordered the construction of the first power projects, industrial plants, and modern roads. He felt that close and friendly relations with England were to the best advantage of Afghanistan and in 1905 concluded

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a treaty which increased the subsidy received from England, provided for munitions from India, and kept the country's foreign relations in British hands. In 1907 Russia and Great Britain signed a treaty which contained provisions relating to Afghanistan: Russia declared that the country lay outside its sphere of influence while the British promised not to occupy or annex any part of Afghanistan. Habibullah refused to recognize the validity of these provisions, which he learned of not long after a state visit to India at a time when he was founding Habibiya College, the first modern school in the country.

The outbreak of World War I brought internal stresses to Afghanistan. Habibullah declared his country's neutrality and restrained Afghan tribes from raiding into India. In this conflict many Afghans at his court favored the Moslems of Turkey and the ruler had difficulty in refusing proposals made by a Turko-German mission to Kabul. Not only did his policy of neutrality alienate powerful forces within the country, but his own encouragement of the modernization of Afghanistan tended to go beyond his intentions. He placed more authority in the hands of the Musahiban family, called home from India, and named Nadir Khan the commander of the army.

At Kabul members of the Young Afghan party and others, including Mahmud Tarzi, who had witnessed reform movements in Turkey and Iran, were convinced that the government of Afghanistan should undertake similar political reforms, and should escape from its position of a vassal of the empire of India. In 1918 a shot was fired at the ruler in Kabul, and in February 1919 he was slain while on a hunting trip in the vicinity of Jalalabad. The death of Habibullah marked the end of an ancient way of life, and the beginning of a new era in which progress toward modernization of the country was the goal of successive governments.

Amanullah, the third eldest son of Habibullah, was recognized as amir, and immediately embarked upon an aggressive policy. Informed that Britain was war-weary and India on the verge of revolt, he foresaw the opportunity to win complete independence and, possibly, of detaching the Pushtun tribes across the Durand Line. Afghan tribal elements crossed the frontier and early in May the British declared war. Initial Afghan successes were followed by reverses and in June Amanullah asked for an armistice. Early in August negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Rawalpindi which guaranteed the sovereignty of Afghanistan in its foreign re-

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lations and which was followed, in 1921, by a comprehensive Afghan-British treaty.

Very soon after the Bolshevik revolution the Russians sought the favor of Afghanistan as a step in an effort to stabilize the situation along the frontiers of the former empire, with Amanullah welcoming this gesture as representing a possible counterbalance against future British intentions. At the end of February 1921 an Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was concluded; one of its terms guaranteed the independence of the amirate of Bokhara, but by 1923 the Soviet Union had absorbed this area. Throughout his reign the Bolsheviks strove to obtain close access to Amanullah and to guide his actions in the direction of a rudimentary kind of socialism.

Determined to initiate reforms, Amanullah sought advice from his father-in-law Mahmud Tarzi. In 1923 he promulgated the country's first constitution and soon instituted measures of tax reform, of control over the Moslem theologians, and of educational development. In 1924 a movement of affronted Pushtun tribes approached Kabul where they were dispersed by planes supplied by the Russians. At the end of 1927 the ruler, now with the dignity of shah rather than amir, and his queen made a six-month tour to a number of Middle Eastern and European countries. Returning to Kabul full of new ideas for social reforms and economic progress, he decreed that women should go unveiled at Kabul and men wear European clothing and hats. To the bewildered members of a *loya jirgeh* he explained his plans in detail; most of them were partisans of the traditional way of life and sided with the Moslem religious leaders and tribal elements who were strongly opposed to these foreign innovations.

In November 1928, the Shinwari tribe of Pushtuns took Jalalabad, and to the north of Kabul, Bacheh Saqqo, a Tajik brigand, assembled numerous followers. At the end of December he attacked the outskirts of Kabul, and on January 14, 1929 Amanullah abdicated and fled to Qandahar. A few days later Bacheh Saqqo (royal name, Habibullah) entered the capital, proclaimed himself amir, and abolished the reforms and innovations of the ex-ruler.

Foreign intrigue and internal opposition soon entered the field. The Soviets, who had always favored Amanullah, were convinced that the British had backed Bacheh Saqqo, and took active steps to try to restore Amanullah to the throne. Amanullah's ambassador to Moscow crossed the Amu Darya at the head of a Russian force,

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disguised as Afghans, accompanied by Russian planes which attacked Afghan villages. This force reached Mazar-i-Sharif, but its advance toward a pass over the Hindu Kush was stopped. At Qandahar, Amanullah had assembled forces which moved north toward Ghazni before encountering powerful opposition. As a result he fled the country, and when this news reached the north the Russian force withdrew to the Soviet Union. The British did permit Nadir Khan and two of his brothers to pass through India to Afghanistan where they were joined by the fourth brother. Slowly, these members of the Musahiban family collected tribal units, and moved on Kabul which was taken in October. Nadir Khan was proclaimed as ruler and his coronation as Nadir Shah took place in November 1929. His brothers supported the new regime: Muhammad Hashem was Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud was Minister of War, and Shah Wali and Muhammad Aziz were named ambassadors to the major European countries.

Nadir Shah's chief accomplishments included the restoration of order throughout the country, a shift in emphasis from rapid social reform to economic development, and the promulgation in 1931 of the present constitution. Relations with the Soviet Union cooled, while there was some internal resentment over the warmer relations with Great Britain. In November 1933 Nadir Shah was shot and killed by a member of the family of the man who had led Russian troops into the north in support of Amanullah.

His eldest son Muhammad Zahir, then nineteen years old, succeeded him and relied upon the experience and authority of his uncles during the early years of his reign. In addition, his first cousins, Muhammad Daoud and Muhammad Naim, were trained to fill Cabinet posts. Throughout this decade several new features reflected the policy of the government: a final end to the earlier attitude of deliberate isolation from the rest of the world; the establishment of facilities to process raw materials within the country; a determined effort to expand foreign trade; and, the planned extension of the authority of the central government over all the tribal elements. Remarkable progress was made in the field of education, with the construction of hundreds of primary schools throughout the country and of secondary level institutions at Kabul.

The period of World War II worked to slow the economic development of the country. Upon its outbreak, the government declared neutrality in the conflict, and in 1941 yielded to British

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and Soviet requests that all nationals of the Axis nations who did not enjoy diplomatic status should be expelled from Afghanistan. The failure of materials to arrive from Germany and other countries halted the construction and equipment of new factories, but, on the other hand, the export of karakul continued and a considerable balance of foreign exchange was acquired.

In 1946 Afghanistan joined the United Nations and Shah Mahmud took over as prime minister from his brother Muhammad Hashem who had held the post since 1929. In that same year the Afghan government began to express its strong concern for the future of the Pushtuns to the east of the Durand Line, following the announced withdrawal of the British from India.

Under Shah Mahmud consideration was given to the advisability of permitting the expression of liberal opinion and of the growth of a freer press, and of transferring some of the authority held by the royal family to responsible officials. Experiments held along these lines in 1950 and 1951 brought out a too active response, and the government reinstated previous controls.

In 1953 Muhammad Daoud moved up from his concurrent posts of Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior to become prime minister and from that year he and his brother, Minister of Foreign Affairs Muhammad Naim have dominated the government. The policies of this government have found four major expressions: a shift from the encouragement of private enterprise to state controls over finance, commerce, and industry; a determined drive for economic development, financed largely by foreign grants and loans; continuing concern with the Pushtunistan issue; and, a foreign policy of neutrality and nonalignment.

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CHAPTER 3

Geography and Population

AFGHANISTAN lies in central Asia, between 29 and 38 degrees North Latitude, and between 61 and 72 degrees East Longitude, with a strip in the northeast, the Wakhan corridor, that reaches to the 75th degree East Longitude. It is within the same latitudes as Tibet, or as northern Egypt, Israel, and Syria taken together, or as Texas. It is bounded on the west by Iran; on the north by the USSR; on the extreme northeast, at the tip of the Wakhan corridor, by the People's Republic of China; on the east and south by Pakistan. Completely landlocked, it has an estimated area of 245,000 square miles, less than the size of Texas. Its extreme length from west to east is 770 miles, its greatest width from north to south over 350 miles.

In the absence of railroads, access to the country is by pack animals, by motor vehicles, or by airplane. Because Afghanistan has few navigable rivers, most transportation is by land, except for a limited amount supplied by a few flat-bottomed boats and rafts used in the flood season.

Afghanistan has had a strategic position throughout history. Centuries ago it was the crossroads of Asia, when the main east-west trade routes passed through its northern and southern plains and over its mountain passes before the development of waterborne trade between Europe and the Far East. Later it formed a highway of conquest for powers to the east and west as well as for the Mongols and Turks from the north. During the nineteenth century it became a prize sought by the expanding Russian and British empires. Toward the beginning of the twentieth century, it served both these powers as a buffer state. Today it is involved in the cold-war battle between the USSR and the United States.

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The ravages of war upon war, the wholesale destruction of its cities and irrigation works, and the massacre of large sections of its population by Mongol hordes reduced Afghanistan, once the seat of important civilizations, to poverty and obscurity. It became an isolated country, closed and forbidden to all except a few persistent adventurers, and withdrawn from the comity of civilized nations. Its landlocked position has always made it dependent on other countries for the movement of its import and export traffic.

Afghanistan's present boundaries are of relatively recent origin, having been formed about a century ago as the British and Russian empires approached each other in their expansionist periods. Before that time Afghanistan frequently included Persian, Turkistan, and Baluch territory. The greater part of the border with the USSR and a small section of the border with Pakistan are marked by rivers; the remaining boundary lines are political rather than natural.

In tracing the present border with the Soviet Union, one may begin in the Pamirs, south of a small village called Qizil Robat, where the USSR, China, and Kashmir meet. From here the border passes through Lake Victoria, follows the course of the Amu Darya as far as Kham-i-Ab, and then turns southwest across the Kara Kum desert and the Panjdeh hills until it strikes the Hari Rud river and the border with Iran at Zulfiqar. Straddling the northern boundary are, from east to west, the Kirghizes, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkomans—all groups with Central Asian names and characteristics.

The border with Iran, running south from Zulfiqar, crosses the swamp and the desert regions of Persian Baluchistan and western Afghanistan, going to the top of the Siah Kuh peak. There it turns sharply east through the marshes and the Hamun lake of the Helmand river, and after following the river a short distance, runs southwest to the Kuh-i-Malik Siah range.

Beginning in the Kuh-i-Malik Siah the border with Pakistan first runs east through the Chagai hills and the southern end of the Registan desert, then due north to the Khwaja Amran range to a point near New Chaman, the terminus of the railroad from Quetta. It then runs in a generally northeasterly direction, finally reaching the Gumal river and the region of the former North-West Frontier Province. North of the Gumal river it becomes the Durand Line, running from Domandi on the upper Gumal almost due north through Waziristan, along the crest of the Safid Kuh range eastward to Landi Khaneh on the Khyber Pass, and, a little to the

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north, crossing the Kabul river. Beyond the latter it quickly rises to the crest of the Hindu Kush, which it follows at altitudes varying between 14,000 and 25,000 feet to the Pamirs. The last section runs roughly parallel to the easternmost end of the northern border, forming with it the Wakhan corridor, which at its narrowest point is only seven miles across.

These ranges form internal natural boundaries almost as important in their effect as Afghanistan's international boundaries. The Hindu Kush, with peaks up to 25,000 feet, presents a major barrier to communications and commercial relations between the northern and southern regions of the country and there is considerable local fragmentation from the lesser ranges. The influence of these mountain barriers on the life of the country manifests itself in many ways, including the historic tendency of older ethnic elements to withdraw into remote mountain areas as more aggressive settlers move into the plains and valleys, and the development of close ties between people on both sides of purely political borders with Iran, the Soviet Union, and India. Kabul itself, centrally located and the traditional seat of government, has in recent centuries relied predominantly on contacts with India as against contacts with Iran or Russia.

On the map, Afghanistan looks like an irregularly shaped leaf hanging from the Wakhan corridor as its stem. Its main orientation is from northeast to southwest, following the general thrust of the Hindu Kush massif from the Pamirs to the Persian border and the southern desert. This vast mountainous conglomeration may be divided into two parts: the Hindu Kush proper, descending from the Pamirs and losing itself in the low Paropamisus range (a name applied by the ancient Greeks to the Hindu Kush) which ends near the Persian frontier and separates the Hari Rud from the Murghab valley; and the Kuh-i-Baba range, which is the continuation of the Hindu Kush into the heart of Afghanistan, sending out spurs in several directions.

On the north the main mass of mountains is bounded by the steppes of the Amu Darya valley, the lowest point of the country which, at Kham-i-Ab is still 500 feet above sea level. In the area between the Murghab and the Soviet border rises a subsidiary range, the Band-i-Turkistan. South of the main massif lies a maze of ridges, plateaus, and valleys—an area known as the Taimani country and the Hazarajat—which forms the main watershed for

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the Helmand and Farah rivers. From the Kabul river near the Khyber Pass to Ghazni runs an important spur known as the Safid Kuh range. Between it and the highlands of Baluchistan in the south is the Sulayman range. Between the latter and the desert of Registan is the southernmost offshoot of the Afghan mountain system, the Khwaja Amran range, forming the geographical boundary between Qandahar and Quetta. The remainder of the country (some 40,000 square miles) consists of the desert areas north and south of the lower reaches of the Helmand river, known as Dasht-i-Margo and Registan, respectively. Here loose red clay, sand, or coarse gravel alternate with fine clay or loam, and violent southwesterly winds sweep over the vast area. The average elevation of this wilderness is about 2,000 feet.

In summary, Afghanistan displays four principal topographical regions, characterized by as many descending levels of altitude. First, the Hindu Kush and its auxiliary ranges; second, the generally barren and rugged foothills of these ranges; third, gently sloping plains and steppes watered by rivers flowing from the ranges; and, fourth, the unproductive wastelands.

Although the average annual rainfall is low, the areas above 14,000 feet, which receive heavy snow, and those above 4,000, which get a combination of snow and rain, provide most sections with an abundant water supply in the spring of each year. Merciless deforestation has reduced the usefulness of this supply, however, as much of the water rushes down in torrents instead of being retained and passed on gradually to the valleys. Even the big Helmand river system loses itself in the sandy desert of the Sistan, while dozens of minor streams are quickly lost in barren soil.

In order to utilize the available supply for cultivation, man-made systems of irrigation are in use throughout most of the inhabited areas of Afghanistan. Wells are used for irrigation in several parts of the country and provide drinking water where streams are absent. The depth of the subsoil water varies greatly; in Kabul it is six feet, in Qandahar five, in Herat ten to thirteen, in Farah sixty-five or more, and in the steppes of Maymaneh province as much as two hundred. In the regions south of the Hindu Kush wide use is made of the *kariz* or *qanat*, a hand-dug subterranean channel that directs water from the permanent water tables at the base of mountains or hills to the surface adjacent to a village and its fields. In some dry areas, water is stored in deep

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masonry tanks built in natural depressions and often fed by springs. These are seldom used for irrigation, but serve to water the herds and flocks when all other sources of water fail.

The uneven history of Afghanistan underscores the importance and the potential of carefully planned water use in the country. Sistan, for example, was long known as one of the garden spots of Asia and other western and southern deserts once supported flourishing civilizations—a period brought to an end by the destruction of irrigation systems and the massacre of populations by invaders. To restore these deserts to full productivity will take time, but the current Helmand river project represents a good beginning.

Afghanistan's main drainage systems are those of the Helmand, the Amu Darya, and the Kabul rivers, but only the Kabul and its tributaries reach the ocean, by way of the Indus river which it joins at Attock in Pakistan. From its source near the Unai Pass, some fifty miles west of the capital, the Kabul river flows through the Chahar Deh plain, past Kabul, Jalalabad, and Dakkeh, finally breaking through the mountains north of the Khyber Pass. About 380 miles long, this river runs mostly through fertile and highly cultivated areas but is largely unnavigable. Only below Jalalabad does it become navigable and then only for rafts and flat-bottomed barges. Its most important tributaries are the Logar which joins it eight miles east of Kabul; the Panjshir, coming from the Hindu Kush; the Surkhab, from the Safid Kuh; and, at Jalalabad, the Kunar, from Chitral.

The Amu Darya, which for 700 miles constitutes a boundary of Afghanistan, rises among the glaciers of the Pamir plateau where the Ab-i-Panjeh, as the river's upper reaches are called, flows through deep gorges in tablelands as high as 14,000 feet. Navigable after 550 miles, the Amu Darya widens to 1,500 yards at Termez with depths between 10 and 30 feet depending on the season and is used by Soviet vessels and local Afghan traders. There are only two tributaries from Afghan soil after the river enters the plains—the Kokcha and the Qunduz—all other streams from the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush being completely consumed in the irrigation of land. Finally, having traveled about a thousand miles from the Pamirs, the Amu Darya empties into the inland sea of Aral.

The Helmand, over 700 miles long and the largest river of its latitude between the Tigris and the Indus, rises near the source

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of the Kabul river at an altitude of about 10,000 feet, and flows southwest for some 200 miles through the gorges of Hazarajat. In the Zamindawar district it enters the desert of Registan, curving gradually westward until it turns sharply north and empties into the Hamun, an inland lake astride the Afghan-Iranian frontier. The Helmand and its tributaries drain all of southwestern Afghanistan. The largest tributary is the Arghandab which joins the Helmand from the east and which, in its turn, receives the waters of the Tarnak, Arghastan, and Dori rivers in the province of Qandahar. Below Girishk the Helmand is over 300 yards wide and as much as 10 feet deep.

There are several other important rivers. The Hari Rud, from which Herat derives its name, emerges from the Kuh-i-Baba range and flows past Herat to the west, finally turning north to form the frontier with Iran. The Murghab river rises south of the Band-i-Turkistan range, enters more open country as it passes the village of Bala Murghab, and for a short distance serves as the Russo-Afghan border. The Farah river, some 400 miles long, drains a large area south of the Hari Rud valley; flowing past the town of Farah it is finally absorbed in the Hamun, and in the summer dries up completely.

Afghanistan has few lakes of any considerable size. Along the northern edge of the Wakhan corridor is Lake Victoria, some ten miles long and situated at an altitude of 13,800 feet. In this general region is the smaller Shira Kol. Between April and November the Hamun appears as an inland sea, especially when it overflows into the great marsh south of it. The Hamun is, however, only 3 or 4 feet deep at most, and in winter large portions of it dry up completely or form shallow lagoons and swamps. Its borders consist of marshes, with reeds growing 10 to 12 feet high. These reeds are used by people living in the area to construct long, cigar-shaped rafts. The marshes also provide fish and ducks, which have become primary articles of local diet, and the water, only slightly brackish, is potable in case of need. Halfway between Ghazni and Qal'at-i-Ghilzai and some twenty miles southeast of the main road is the Ab-i-Istadeh, its water salty and bitter, and there are five lakes, known collectively as the Band-i-Amir and famed for their deep blue color, about fifty miles to the west of Bamiyan.

Being cut off from the monsoon system of the Arabian Sea by its eastern ranges, Afghanistan has a typical continental, dry climate,

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with seasonal extremes of heat and cold, very marked differences between day and night temperatures, and rapid transitions from one season to the next. Except for summer showers in the southeastern area, rainfall and snow occur between October and April, brought by westerly and northerly winds. Summer rain is rare, although there may be local showers and thunderstorms sometimes accompanied by hail and often quite severe for a day or two. The average annual rainfall for the country as a whole is estimated to be less then twelve inches.

North central Afghanistan, with its high ranges, has winter snow cover at altitudes of over 7,000 feet. Above 15,000 feet the peaks retain this cover for ten months of the year, closing mountain passes for weeks at a time. Summers are very hot in the sun, but cool and fresh in the shade and rather cold at night. The northern Piedmont, represented principally by the steppes which flank the Amu Darya, is affected in winter by an Asiatic high which brings rain, snow, and frigid winds, while in summer temperatures may reach 105°. Sistan and the southwestern Piedmont receive no snow and scanty rain in winter. There is, in fact, almost no precipitation in the extreme southwest. It is oppressively hot in summer, warm in winter, and pleasant in spring before the sun burns off the wild vegetation. The area suffers from the "wind of 120 days" which blows from June to September at velocities up to 110 miles an hour, sweeping great dust storms along the flat plains.

The Kabul valley system and the southeastern regions receive moderate rain and snow in the period from November through April, with snow remaining on the ground for several weeks during the coldest months. Summers are cloudy and hot, but the nights bring cooler weather. The average mean temperatures for Kabul are 32° in January, 68° in May, 72° in July, and 51° in November. Fog is almost unknown. Within this general climatic region the different river valleys may display rather distinctive climates. For instance, local winds are stronger in the west where the valleys lead to interior basins than in the east where they are blocked by mountain ranges. Another distinctive local climate is that of the subtropical steppe found at Jalalabad, while snow rarely falls as far south as Qandahar, or to the east of this town.

To a considerable extent the successful amalgamation in Afghanistan of mountain, steppe, and desert systems in a stable political unit stems from the economic interdependence of these systems within the country. The mountains provide the water without

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which steppe and plain remain wilderness. And while the narrow mountain valleys themselves offer too little room for the development of large communities, the water they carry to the lower, more open regions has permitted the growth of oases of cultivated land in areas subject to the cultural crosscurrents of the world. Natural conditions of this sort produced the principal settlements of present-day Afghanistan.

How decisive these geographic conditions have been is evident in the fact that since the time of Alexander the locations of most of the principal communities—Kabul, Qandahar, Ghazni, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and a subsidiary town, Jalalabad—have remained unchanged. All but Kabul had rather exposed positions from a military point of view, since they lie close to the borders and could quickly be occupied by invading enemy forces. In Kabul the roads from east and west, north and south meet. Here is the most secure collection center and trading focus in the country. Furthermore, the well-irrigated plains of the Kabul river and its tributaries, together with the proximity of other food-producing areas, guarantee subsistence to a considerable population. Jalalabad is the center of an extensively cultivated area whose lower altitude, protected by mountains on all sides, gives it a subtropical climate in which orange groves and even palm trees thrive. The Logar valley south of Kabul is another subsidiary center, especially important as a grazing area for nomads. Kabul, with its milder climate and easy access to fertile valleys in several directions, has succeeded Ghazni, with its more limited water supply and bitterly cold winters, as the nation's capital, although Ghazni is still an important staging point for nomadic tribes moving to and from the plains of the Indus.

The vast southern section of the country is dependent on the Helmand river system for its water supply, and the most important of its cultivated oases are grouped around Qandahar. Most of southern Afghanistan's population is enclosed in the area bounded by Qal'at-i-Ghilzai, Qandahar, Qal'eh Bist, Musa Qal'eh, and Qal'at-i-Ghilzai. This area is far more fertile than the southwest, with its brackish swamps fed by small, quick-drying rivers from the north. Qandahar is also an assembly point of nomadic tribes. Its chief orientation is east, since its agricultural commodities move to Pakistan and India.

In the northwest, the Hari Rud created one of the most populated and richest provinces of Afghanistan, Herat. Favorably located for

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contact with Iran as well as with Russian Turkistan, the city of Herat has always recovered quickly from military devastations. It was long a trading center for the commerce between China and Bactria on the one hand and Iran on the other. It also became an art center in the early fifteenth century.

The upper Murghab valley northeast of Herat has long been a subsidiary ecologic center, serving mainly as a transit area through which the Turko-Tartar tribes found their entrance into Afghanistan, and through which nomads now trek from the Turanian lowlands to their summer pastures in the mountains and back again.

North of the mountains the Amu Darya valley area, from the lower reaches of the river to the mountains of Badakhshan, is of rather uniform character: a steppe country which blooms where it it watered and which provides the conditions for moderate settlement and civilization. Thus, not far from the northern foothills we find towns such as Shibarghan, Balkh, Mazar-i-Sharif, Tashqurghan, Qunduz, and Khanabad. In the extreme west of this region lies Andkhui, a karakul-raising center. The rich civilization of ancient Bactria flourished in this northern belt of steppeland, and the restoration of the early irrigation systems which supported it might in time make it a heavily populated area. Here, at Mazar-i-Sharif, is the largest Islamic shrine of Afghanistan, and here too the trade from north and south is growing in volume and importance.

The remainder of the country is mountainous. Badakhshan, large parts of Qataghan, and all of the Wakhan and Nuristan are settled only in the valleys, which are isolated among the tangled ranges. Of recent importance is the fertile basin of Baghlan and Pol-i-Khumri, fed by the Qunduz river and fast becoming a center of sugar, cotton, and textile production. Badakhshan's population is of settled, peaceful character, the descendants of the older inhabitants and of the peoples who sought refuge in the mountains from invading barbarian hordes. A relatively modern town, Fayzabad, thrives here, but the narrow valleys, the harsh climate with long winters, and the relatively inaccessible nature of their habitat keep most of the people in this area on a primitive level of culture. The rich minerals of the eastern Hindu Kush—rubies, lapis lazuli, gold, and salt—used to attract merchants from far and wide, but future development of its natural resources depends largely on

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political factors. The central mountain mass of the country, the Hazarajat, is sparsely populated. Cut through by numerous river valleys and fairly rich in local pasture lands, its development must await an extension of modern roads and transport facilities.

Afghanistan has never had a complete, comprehensive census. Estimates of the population range from 7 to 15 million, the latter being the government's favored estimate. The most detailed figures released by Afghan officials gave a total of 12 million people. This figure, provided by the Ministry of the Interior, represented the sum of totals for each province down to the unit digit plus exactly 2 million for the nomadic tribes to make an even 12 million.

The figure of 12 million yields a population density of 49 persons per square mile for Afghanistan compared with 24 for Iran, 29 for Texas, 50 for the United States. Anyone who has traveled extensively in Afghanistan or flown over large areas of it by plane would agree that the country is very sparsely settled. Not only are there vast barren lands in the south and southeast, as well as extensive mountainous areas that defy settlement, but even in the populous valleys and river basins, towns and large villages are few and far between. Given this situation and the comparisons made just above, it seems more appropriate to estimate the population of the country at 9 million, giving a density of 30 per square mile. It may be noted that a recent Soviet estimate gives the population of Afghanistan as 9.5 millions. Within this figure may be distinguished a suggested urban population of about 900,000 and a nomadic population of 2 million.

Specific difficulties stand in the way of carrying out a thorough census. Not only would the authorities be confronted with the task of penetrating to thousands of hamlets, accessible only by pack and caravan trails, but the task of enumerating the nomads would be extremely difficult. In addition, in both villages and urban centers only the males could be counted, since religious feeling and an intense concern for family privacy make it impossible to inquire how many women there are in a household.

In the section of this book devoted to ethnic groups estimates are given as to the number of people in certain of the groups. Since, however, these are only informed guesses and are not complete for every one of the ethnic elements, there appears to be no point in drawing up a table which would seem to suggest validity. It is possible to say that the Pushtuns appear to number something

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over a half of the total population, the Tajiks about a third, the Uzbeks and Turkomans about an eighth, and the others smaller fractions.

Regions of fairly heavy population density are few in number. They include Kabul and its vicinity, the river valleys in the general region of Qandahar, the Hari Rud valley and Herat, and the strip between the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya valley. No official rural-urban breakdown is available and the reliability of figures on the towns and larger villages is very doubtful. Assuming an urban population of 900,000, *i.e.*, one-tenth of the total, it can be estimated that Kabul now holds some 250,000 people. The urban centers fall into three general groups: towns of more than 75,000 people (Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif); towns of between 25,000 and 75,000 (Andkhui, Jalalabad, Maymaneh, Tashqurghan); and some 15 or 20 towns of about 10,000 people.

The larger urban centers owe their size to their location on the bank of a stream or river at a major intersection of trade routes. With few exceptions, the population levels of these trading centers have remained unchanged for decades. Kabul has grown steadily in size but this growth is largely attributable to the steady expansion of government services. Similarly, intensive industrial development has brought the mushrooming of such places as Pol-i-Khumri, Baghlan, and Sarobi.

This stability of one section of Afghanistan's population is offset by the high mobility of another—the nomads and seminomads. A sizable group, the nomads are completely footloose the year round, having no permanent abodes. Some groups travel great distances and used to winter in Pakistan. Most of the other nomadic and seminomadic tribes stay closer to specific areas, moving to uplands in spring and to even higher pasture on the mountains as the snows melt, to return to the warmer plains before the cold season sets in.

There is only a modest amount of migration from the rural areas to the towns. The severe winters and poor economic conditions lead many Hazaras to go to the towns in the fall, where they earn a living as servants and laborers, returning to their families in spring. Some of them bring their families along and settle in the towns—most often in Kabul.

External migration is negligible and, due to government policy and control, very difficult. This does not apply, of course, to the

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seasonal emigration of the nomads, for whom special border arrangements are in force.

The population of Afghanistan has ample room to increase, even to double, without economic danger, provided the resources of the country are developed. There is a large amount of land in the Qunduz river valley that can be brought under irrigation and the same is true for large sections in southern and southwestern Afghanistan. In the Qandahar and Girishk areas a beginning has been made with large-scale reclamation, and in the north uncultivated lands have been brought into production.

The policy of the government has been to settle such new lands with Pushtuns, often planting Pushtun colonies in the midst of other ethnic groups. As a network of irrigation canals spreads over the areas around Qunduz, Khanabad, and Talaghan, large numbers of settlers are brought in. In the past wholesale transportation of people was a device of powerful rulers to break tribal resistance. The removal of a section of the Abdali tribes from the Qandahar area to the far west of the country by Shah Abbas in the seventeenth century was one instance of this practice; Abdur Rahman employed the technique to a minor extent with Hazaras and Kafirs. Today no such forced migrations are imposed on the people. Actually the lack of a considerable rural-urban migration is one of the country's big problems, for it is already very difficult to find workers for the new plants and factories. Rural Afghanistan is still underpopulated and can hardly afford to lose too many workers to the towns.

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CHAPTER 4

Ethnic Groups and Languages

THE PRESENT POPULATION of Afghanistan contains diverse elements which in the course of time have become absorbed into an older stock to form various more or less homogeneous types. The original inhabitants of Afghanistan are unknown. The Indo-Aryans thousands of years ago found Dravidians in possession, and probably elements of an even older race. On them were superimposed Greeks and Scythians, Yueh-chis, Kushans, Hephthalites, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, and Iranians. But in spite of the many peoples who have contributed to Afghanistan's ethnic identity, the differences in cultural patterns are not as great as one might suppose. The Central Asian tribes had similar cultures, and when they established themselves in the mountains and plains of Afghanistan the culture they encountered does not seem to have differed too greatly from region to region. Behind the surface heterogeneity of the Afghan population there is considerable cultural continuity.

It is possible to indicate only in the most general way the origin, physical type, present location, and numbers of the several peoples who comprise the Afghan nation. The country that is now Afghanistan has always been on the edge of history. Only rarely, as in the *Tabakat-i Nasiri* written by an officer in the army of Ghur, and in the Memoirs of Babur, is historical documentation produced in Afghanistan itself. Thus, Persian, Arabic, Chinese, and European writers provide most of the information on the historical backgrounds of these peoples (see the map, Distribution of Ethnic Groups).

Because of the paucity of historical documentation, the origins of the several ethnic groups can be traced only by a process of rigorous detection involving a comparative study of languages,

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

Source: Adapted from map in *Sovetskaya Etnografiya,* No. 2 (1955) as reprinted in "The Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia: Afghanistan," *Central Asian Review, 4,* No. 2 (1956), 186.

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physical types, and customs. Some of the regional languages of eastern Afghanistan have been carefully studied, but many of the languages and dialects of central and western Afghanistan await careful linguistic analysis. In the same way, scattered samples of several population groups have been studied from the point of view of physical anthropology. Studies made late in the nineteenth century and in the early decades of the twentieth century, before modern anthropological techniques had been developed, are of limited usefulness in classifying the peoples of Afghanistan according to physical type and it is still necessary to rely on descriptions made by travelers. A careful study of the distribution of Turkish peoples in northern Afghanistan has been made and several works on the tribes of eastern Afghanistan were published earlier. Two recent publications in Persian describe the life, customs, and artifacts of the people of Nuristan, and the results of foreign expeditions to west-central Afghanistan help to define the habitat and social structure of the Hazara, Pushtun, and Tajik elements in this area.

Around the middle of the second millennium B.C. a stream of people began to spill out of Central Asia into the lands to the south. Some of them passed through Afghanistan on their way to India; some passed to the west of the great Hindu Kush range and settled in Iran, or moved southeastward toward India; some remained in Afghanistan itself. The first of these waves was that of the Indo-Aryans, who are believed to have crossed the mountain passes of the Hindu Kush on their way to the fertile plains of northern India where they eventually settled. A few centuries later the Persians arrived on the Iranian plateau. The presence of Persian speech among village dwellers in many parts of Afghanistan, and of an archaic Persian speech among isolated mountain valleys of Badakhshan and Wakhan, suggests that peoples closely related to the Persians moved into Afghanistan at perhaps the same time that the Persians settled in Iran. After the Persians came Scythians, Hephthalites, and Baluchi, to name a few of the peoples whose names are known to history. For two thousand years the immigrants from Central Asia—from the Indo-Aryans to the Baluchi—spoke languages belonging to the eastern branch of the great Indo-European language family. Then, around the seventh century A.D., peoples of a different speech began to appear, first the Turks and later, in the thirteenth century, the Mongols. The last great migration from Central Asia was that of the Turko-Mongol Uzbeks, who

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in the fifteenth century A.D. formed a tribal confederation and gradually established themselves as rulers of the city states of Turkistan, along the river plains of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya.

After the coming of the Uzbeks there were no large-scale migrations into Afghanistan. The Afghan, or Pushtun, tribes gradually expanded until, today, they cover a much larger territory than they originally occupied. Among other ethnic groups, tribal groups have voluntarily changed their places of residence, or have been resettled by order of some ruler. Many of the Kafirs in the northeastern part of the country are believed to have fled long ago to their present home from other parts of Afghanistan in order to escape conversion to Islam, although some modern Afghan scholars assert that they descend from colonies left by Alexander. The Persian conqueror Nadir Shah is said to have relocated a number of tribal peoples in western Afghanistan in the middle of the eighteenth century, and at the end of the nineteenth century Afghan nomads were sent north to settle the territory along the northwestern border.

Although the Turks and Mongols spoke languages unrelated to the peoples who had come before them, their way of life was very similar. The earliest immigrants already practiced some agriculture when they appeared in south Asia. Later groups however, were tent-dwelling pastoral nomads, who depended on their animals for a livelihood. But each nomadic group, upon entering Afghanistan, would come into contact with settled people and gradually begin to cultivate some crops.

The traditional tent of nomads living to the north of the Hindu Kush range is markedly different from the tent of those who dwell south of the mountains. The Turkic and Turko-Mongol tribes to the north occupy the *yurt*, which is characteristic of Central Asia. This is a dome-shaped tent consisting of a dismountable wooden frame covered with pieces of felt. The tribes to the south of the mountains use a tent characteristic of the Iranians—a rectangular pavilion formed by draping lengths of black goat's hair cloth over supporting poles.

Chief among the peoples of Afghanistan are the Pushtuns, who are often described as the "true Afghans" and to whom the name "Afghan" was applied exclusively before it came into use to denote any native of the present land area of Afghanistan. These Pushtuns constitute an estimated fifty to sixty percent of the present population of Afghanistan, although the government has never given

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figures in support of any estimate. The origins of this people are obscure. According to legend a certain King Sarul married into the tribe of Levi and had a daughter Iramiah whom he married to Daoud, and their son was called Afghana. Afghana helped his father Daoud (David) in the building of the temple at Jerusalem. When misadventure befell the children of Israel, Afghana trekked to the hills of Ghur with his forty sons, and thence to the Afghan hills. This story thus connects the Afghans with the Lost Tribes of Israel.

This belief probably arose from the engrafting of the Afghan tribal genealogy onto an Islamic and Biblical one after the conversion of the Afghans to Islam, a fairly common practice among tribes of Central Asian origin in southwest Asia. For example, the Mongols, fifty years after their settlement in Iran, had extended their genealogy to include Noah as one of their ancestors. Actually, the Afghans appear to be descended from various tribes who moved from Central Asia into the Indus valley during the centuries just before and after the beginning of the Christian era. Their ancestry probably also includes earlier inhabitants of southeastern Afghanistan, whoever these may have been.

Historically, the Afghans are first mentioned by name (Avagana) by the early-sixth-century Indian astronomer Varaha Mihira in his *Brhat-samhita.* A little later the Chinese traveler Hiuen-Tsang mentions a tribe of A-p'o'kien, located in the Sulayman mountains. The earliest Moslem works mentioning them are the *Hudud al-'Alam* (982 A.D.), the *Tarikh-i Yamini,* and those of Biruni. The Indian appellation Pathan does not occur till the sixteenth century, but the change into Pathan (from the plural of Pushtun: Pushtana) indicates that it must have been used at a much earlier date. Biruni places the Afghan tribes in the western frontier mountains of India. No Afghan settlement west of Ghazni is mentioned by early authors. The origin and early history of the westernmost Pushtun tribe, the Abdalis, remains obscure.

In warfare at the end of the twelfth century between Moslems and Hindus, Afghans are represented as fighting on both sides, which suggests that although legend places their conversion in the early Islamic period they had not yet all been converted to Islam. Repeatedly they are referred to as a rebellious and turbulent people. Timur considered them brigands and is reported to have ravaged their strongholds in the Sulayman mountains. Their reputation as a fierce race of mountain robbers and, occasionally, soldiers of fortune

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turned to fame with the rise to power in India of the Afghan adventurer, Daulat Khan Ludi of the Ludi clan of Ghilzai. His successor Baklul Ludi occupied the throne of Delhi in 1450, but the dynasty was finally overthrown in 1526 by Babur.

The immigration into India during this period of large numbers of Ghilzais and other Pushtuns was part of a great expansion of Pushtun tribes during the late Middle Ages. It was accompanied by great intertribal pressures, which resulted in a chain reaction of movements, one tribe pushing another until the various contending units were settled, more or less, in the areas that the majority of them now occupy. A first attempt to rally the Pushtun tribes in the Indian frontier area to a common fight for independence from the Moghuls was made by the warrior-poet Khushhal Khan Khattak in the latter part of the seventeenth century. However, a national grouping of Afghans did not occur until the rise of the Ghilzai chief Mir Wais, and only under Ahmad Shah Durrani did it achieve real permanency. Despite the movements from the original homeland of the Afghans in the Sulayman mountains, the Pushtun tribes also continued to occupy this homeland and the area extending northeast of the mountains toward Kabul and Peshawar.

Because the Afghans are a mixed group, there is some variation in physical type from tribe to tribe and even within tribes. In general, the Afghans are tall and well built. Their skin, light tan in color, darkens with exposure, so that nomads and peasants, who work out of doors, are several shades darker than city-dwelling people. Their hair, which ranges from straight to wavy, is usually dark brown or black, although one sometimes encounters Afghans with lighter tints. Frequently one sees blond-haired children in families where the adults have dark hair, apparently a hereditary trait among some of the Afghan tribes similar to that found among western Europeans, in which the light hair of childhood slowly changes to dark brown hair in adulthood. Other characteristics also defy fast rules: brown eyes are usual but hazel or blue eyes are not uncommon; the majority are longheaded but broadheaded individuals can be found; long, straight noses are most common but, particularly in sections of eastern Afghanistan, aquiline noses are also evident.

Any extended discussion of the Pushtun tribes would be of doubtful value, given the present paucity of reliable information. The names and locale of many such groups are well known, but whether such groups are to be described as tribes, subtribes, large

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clans, or even large subclans defies determination. Afghan writers tend to distinguish two major divisions: the Durranis and the Ghilzais. The Durranis are said to consist of two principal subdivisions, the Panjpais and the Ziraks; smaller groups within these divisions include the Papalzais, Achakzais, Barakzais, Mohmands, Shoranis, and many others. The Ghilzais break down into the major divisions of the Burhans, also called Ibrahimkhels, and the Turans, also called Sodis; smaller groups within these divisions include the Sulaymankhels, Alikhels, Hotaks, and Dotannis. Still other groups, not identified with the Durranis or Ghilzais, whose names are widely known because of their prowess as warriors include the Shinwaris, Afridis, Yusufzais, Wazirs, Mahsuds, and Safis. In these names the endings *zai* and *khel* mean "son of" or "descendant of."

As Pushtu-speaking tribesmen, the Ghilzais are usually classed as of "true Afghan" race. This is doubtful. Nor does their tradition substantiate this. It is related, in a story which first appeared about 1620, that the Ghilzais are descended from Noah through Feridun, a legendary Iranian hero, one of whose sons settled in the mountainous area of the Hari Rud. An illicit relationship between Shah Husayn, a descendant, and the daughter of a Ghur chieftain resulted in a son who, being the offspring of a clandestine love affair, was named Ghilzai (*ghil* in Pushtu meaning "thief" and *zai,* "born" or "son of"). Ghilzai was recognized in their subsequent marriage and became the direct ancestor of the present tribe.

It is far more probable that the Ghilzais are descendants of a Turkish tribe, the Khalaj or Khilij, described by Istakhri in 930 A.D. as "cattle breeders of Turkish appearance, dress, and language." Again, in 980 A.D. the author of the *Hudud al-'Alam* described Khalaj Turks as occupying grazing lands around Ghazni near the Amu Darya.

Modern scholars believe that the Khalaj moved southward across the Amu Darya in the seventh and eighth centuries and spread across Afghanistan in the middle of the tenth century. Some moved into Ghur, others settled near Ghazni, while a few passed on into India and in 1288 founded the Khilji dynasty of Delhi. Those who remained in the Ghazni area and annually passed through the Pushtun districts of the Sulayman range gradually assimilated the Pushtun language and characteristics. The Ghilzais came into prominence near Qandahar when, in the seventeenth century, Shah Abbas transferred a large section of the Abdali tribe to Herat

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province because of their turbulent behavior. This removal of the Abdalis led to an increase in power and influence of the Ghilzais of the Qandahar area. Early in the eighteenth century they emerged as conquerors of Qandahar and, briefly, as masters of Persia. Driven out of Persia shortly thereafter, in 1729, the Ghilzais began a decline in political importance and, with their submission to Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747, lapsed into relative obscurity.

Among the Afghan Pushtuns there is a range in culture all the way from sophisticated, highly educated urban dwellers to tent-dwelling nomads who plant a few crops before going off on their seasonal migrations between winter pastures in the warm plains and summer pastures in the highlands. Members of some tribes have settled on the land and are village-dwelling agriculturists although during the summer months they sometimes revert to their nomadic ways and live in tents outside the village.

Among some tribesmen, called *powindehs,* stockbreeding is secondary to merchandising. Indeed, the name derives from the Persian word *parvandeh* which means "bundle (of merchandise)." These *powindehs* move with their camel caravans down the Indus valley where they exchange skins, wool, and rugs for sugar, tea, textiles, and manufactured goods. Along the eastern border of Afghanistan, some of the mountain valleys inhabited by tribesmen are so infertile that stockbreeding and cultivation combined do not offer an adequate living. These tribes traditionally supplemented their income by raiding caravans that came their way or robbing travelers who refused to pay for "protection" while in their territory. The Afridis, through whose territory the Khyber Pass runs, were notorious for this practice, but other tribes in the area, although less favorably situated for preying on travelers, took advantage of whatever opportunities came their way. Among these eastern tribes every small group is autonomous, resisting governmental direction from above, accepting leadership within the group only when the leader has proved his strength, and regarding other tribes with suspicion. The harshness of their habitat may explain in part the harshness of some of their customs, such as their interminable blood feuds.

Afghan tribes, having spread over much of Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush, are now gradually filtering into northern Afghanistan, where they describe themselves as *qandahari,* or as from Qandahar. (Purely nomadic elements, regardless of their ethnic origin, are called *kochis.*) The Afghan tribes are Sunni Moslems

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except for a few tribes or parts of tribes on the eastern border near Waziristan. In this region the Turi tribe is Shi'a Moslem, as is the Muhammad Khel branch of the Orakzai group.

The Tajiks of Afghanistan fall into two principal groups. In the high mountain valleys of Badakhshan and in the Wakhan corridor are the mountain Tajiks, who speak an archaic Iranian language. The other group dwells in the plains throughout several areas of the country. The Tajiks may have been the original Iranian inhabitants of the country. A Chinese envoy, Chang-Kien, who visited the Oxus region in 128 B.C., describes the people of Bactria—whom he calls Ta-hia—as a nonnomadic people who lived in walled towns and were shrewd traders but poor fighters. Other accounts derive the name Tajik from the Arabic *taz* or *taj*, which was the name given to their mixed descendants by the Arabs after they conquered Iran.

The Tajiks, though gradually conquered, continued to hold their own in the mountainous area of Ghur and even provided the Ghurid dynasty of Delhi. In the fourteenth century the relaxation of Mongol control permitted a Tajik dynasty, the Karts, to establish themselves for a period in Herat and for some time (1332-70) to attain virtual independence. Physically they are above average in height and slender in build; the skin is light and turns reddish brown with exposure; the hair, which varies from straight to curly, is usually black, but may be red or even blonde; the eyes are brown, or, frequently, blue or gray; the nose is aquiline; the head form is very broad.

The ancestors of the mountain Tajiks may have been much more widespread in Afghanistan than their descendants are today. In an area that is predominantly Sunni Moslem, the mountain Tajiks are Shi'a Moslem; perhaps because of their religion they have been pushed back into the isolation of their present homes. They are village-dwelling cultivators, and are extremely poor. The mountain Tajiks represent only a very tiny part of Afghanistan's population. A much larger ethnic group, estimated at over thirty percent of the total population, is also known as Tajik or Parsiwan. This element is Sunni Moslem. These Tajiks are plains dwellers; originally they may have been one people with the mountain Tajiks. Their language is quite similar to the Persian spoken in eastern Iran.

It seems probable that when the Scythian, Turkic, and Mongol nomads moved into Afghanistan, they found there a settled village-

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dwelling population which was essentially Iranian in character as well as in speech. Indeed, it would appear that until the Afghan tribes began their northward movement from the Sulayman mountains around the tenth century, and the Uzbeks established themselves in Afghan Turkistan around the sixteenth century, the Tajiks constituted the chief population of Afghanistan. As the immigrant tribesmen settled in Afghanistan, they appear to have intermarried with the Tajik population at the same time that they adopted Tajik culture. The Hazaras of central Afghanistan had become Persian-speaking village dwellers by the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Uzbek towns in Afghan Turkistan are essentially Tajik in form; although the Uzbeks retained their Turkic speech, Persian is widely spoken in the towns. Herat has always been Persian, and Kabul is essentially Persian. Qandahar, after having been setttled for two and a half centuries by Afghans, is Persian in appearance, and while Pushtu is the main tongue, the Persian-speaking traveler has no communication difficulties in the bazaar.

The Tajiks are town-dwelling cultivators. They are also skilled artisans and traders. In nearly every town one finds bazaars where these craftsmen work and where both craftsmen and merchants sell their goods. Although the plains Tajiks constitute an important part of the population of Afghanistan, very little has been written about them. One can learn a certain amount about their culture from accounts of life in Kabul and other cities, and there are two recent descriptions of life in a Tajik village community.

The Hazara Mongols constitute the third largest distinctive ethnic group in Afghanistan. For some forty years the Hazara Mongol population has been estimated at a little over half a million; presumably each writer has copied the estimate of earlier writers. The traditional location of the Hazaras is in the Hazarajat, an area which extends from the Unai Pass some fifty miles west of Kabul, west to about two-thirds of the distance between Kabul and Herat; and from the Kuh-i-Baba range on the north (one tribe, the Yek Aulang, occupies a valley just north of the range) down to a line between Ghazni, Mukur, and a point some distance north of Qandahar. However, Afghans have been gradually moving into Hazara southern territories and Afghan nomads range far into the interior of the Hazarajat during the summer.

It is frequently stated that these people are descendants of garrisons of Chengiz Khan, although when Chengiz Khan returned

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to Mongolia after his invasion of this region, he left no troops behind him. It is more probable that the ancestors of the Hazaras were Mongols who came into the area between the middle of the thirteenth century and the fifteenth century. A majority of the ancestral Hazaras appear to have come from the territory which Chengiz Khan bequeathed his son Chagatai, an area which included present southern Kazakhistan in the Soviet Union, northeastern Afghanistan, and the adjacent part of Chinese Turkistan, and which was largely populated by Turks before the Mongol invasion. During the last decades of the thirteenth century the Chagataians sent armies at frequent intervals to attempt the conquest of India. They established garrisons and, when Chagataian power in Central Asia weakened, many of the Mongol troops settled down. When Babur established himself in Kabul at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a Mongol people known as Hazaras were dwelling in the region of the Hazarajat.

The Hazara Mongol language has been described as an "archaic" Persian. No linguistic studies have been made to determine the relationship of this language to the Persian current in Iran in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries, nor are data available for a comparison with the language of the Tajik kingdom of Ghur. While the Hazara language is basically Persian, it contains many Turkish words; some of them are specifically identifiable as Chagataian Turkish. There are, in addition, some Mongol words which can be equated with thirteenth-century Mongol terms.

Few anthropological measurements have been made of the Hazaras, but observation indicates that the Hazaras are Mongoloid in type with high cheekbones, "slant" eyes, and sparse beards. They are broadheaded, but their faces are not as broad as those of the Turko-Mongol elements in northern Afghanistan. Each Hazara tribe is said to have distinctive physical characteristics, so that one can readily identify a Besud, a Jaghuri, or an Uruzgani by his appearance. Presumably all of the tribes intermarried to some extent with the earlier inhabitants of the region, but there are tribal variations in the amount of admixture. The Besud, the one Hazara tribe which bears the name of a medieval Mongol tribe, was protected by its isolated location from close association with other ethnic groups, and the Besud are considered to be of "pure" descent by the other Hazaras. Tribes on the southern border of the Hazarajat, such as the Jaghuri, have obviously intermarried with Tajik and Afghan neighbors, as is evidenced by

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their less Mongoloid appearance. This intermarriage is recognized by Hazara traditions. Little information is available concerning the physical type of the Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi, tribes west of the Besud.

In the 1880s, when the Amir Abdur Rahman was attempting to unify Afghanistan, the Hazara tribes, always independent, rebelled. At the end of the rebellion, many Hazaras, particularly those belonging to the Uruzgani and Jaghuri tribes, fled to Quetta in Baluchistan and to Mashhad in Iran, and Afghan tribes moved into their territories north of Qandahar. At the beginning of the twentieth century Amir Habibullah offered amnesty to the Hazara refugees and allocated land for them in Afghan Turkistan between Maymaneh and Sar-i-Pol. According to recent reports, several thousand Hazaras are to be found in this area.

The Hazarajat is not a fertile country. In the north, the average elevation of the mountain peaks is fifteen thousand feet. Toward the south, high peaks separated by narrow valleys gradually give way to hills and upland plateaus. The Hazaras dwell in fortified villages of mud or stone houses set at the edge of the valley fields which they cultivate. Water is often brought through miles of carefully constructed channels to irrigate the narrow fields of barley, wheat, and field peas. Sheep are grazed on the slopes which rise above the cultivated valleys. The Hazara Mongols are Shi'a Moslems; it is probable that they acquired their religion together with their Persian language and agricultural practices from the Tajiks whom they replaced in the Hazarajat.

There are other Hazaras in western Afghanistan and in the adjacent areas of Iran who are usually referred to as Western Hazaras. These people are Mongols, but their history probably differs from that of the Hazaras of the Hazarajat. At the end of the nineteenth century some communities in the area still spoke Mongol. These Western Hazaras are Sunnis, and until recently were tent-dwelling nomads, some of whom migrated seasonally across the Afghan-Iranian border.

To the north of the Hindu Kush Turkic and Turko-Mongol groups are found. From the beginning of the Christian era, Turkish tribes have infiltrated into Afghanistan. The Yueh-chis are believed to have been of Turkic origin. In the tenth century Khalaj Turks were present in southern Afghanistan, and names of the divisions and clans of the Ghilzai tribe such as Turans, Burhans, Tokhis, Hotaks, Andars, and Tarakis testify to a Turkish linguistic origin.

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Between the seventh and thirteenth centuries, Turkish tribes established themselves in, and gave their name to, Turkistan, the region that comprises the plains flanking the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers. Some of these Turks moved southward and merged with what were eventually to become Afghan tribes; others moved west and founded the empire of Turkey; still others remained in the area which now includes northwestern Afghanistan, northeastern Iran, and Soviet Turkmenistan. Many, who came to be known as Turkomans, remained nomads and, since the region they inhabited was arid even for grazing, supplemented their income by raiding caravans and Tajik villages. As Russian armies pushed southward toward the Afghan border in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the Turkomans moved ahead of them, devastating the peaceful Tajik villages in northeastern Afghanistan. After the Russo-Afghan boundary was delimited in 1887, many Turkomans moved to the Russian side of the boundary. Those who remained in Afghanistan are no longer raiders to be feared by all peaceful people. Some, though they still dwell in dome-shaped tents, supplement their stockbreeding by cultivation.

After the Soviet revolution, hosts of Turkomans fled to Afghanistan, most to various places in northern Afghanistan but one group, the Sariq tribe, to southwestern Afghanistan. The Turkomans in Iran and in Soviet Turkmenistan are Caucasoid in physical type, with long heads, long straight noses, and luxuriant beards. Those in Afghanistan are described as Mongoloid in physical type. There are believed to be 200,000 Turkomans in Afghanistan and these, like all Turkomans, are Sunni Moslems.

When Mongols filtered westward into Turkistan in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, some groups intermarried with the Turks whom they found in possession. In the fifteenth century these Turko-Mongols formed the Uzbek tribal confederation. Shortly thereafter those tribes living to the north of the Syr Darya separated from the confederation and became known as Kazaks. The Uzbeks in the south came under the influence of the Tajik sedentary people of Turkistan and settled down to rule the city-state khanates of Turkistan. Although originally nomads, the Uzbeks of Afghan Turkistan are now for the most part sedentary village dwellers occupied with agriculture and trade. Their mother tongue is still Turkic but a majority appear to be bilingual, speaking Persian as well. Until the end of the nineteenth century Afghan Turkistan was governed by a number of independent Uzbek rulers.

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The Uzbeks in Afghanistan have been estimated to number 820,000 and are, like the Turkomans, Sunni Moslems. Although Uzbeks in Afghanistan are usually described as Mongoloid, no actual physical data are available. In Soviet Uzbekistan a majority of the Uzbeks are Mongoloid, but some are Caucasoid, probably as a result of intermarriage with the Tajik population. The Kazaks, northern cousins of the Uzbeks, were usually not found as far south as Afghanistan, but many fled there following the Soviet revolution. No information is available as to the number of Kazaks in Afghan Turkistan today. Since they are seldom mentioned in the recent reports of travelers, it is possible that the Kazaks have been assimilated into the Uzbek community, as is reported to have occurred in Soviet Uzbekistan.

In the far northeastern tip of Afghanistan, the Wakhan corridor, dwell the Kirghizes, who, like the Uzbeks and Kazaks, are Turko-Mongols—Turkic in speech, Mongoloid in appearance. Unlike their cousins in the plains, the Kirghizes have remained nomadic, and move freely in their seasonal migrations across the mountain borders of Afghanistan, Soviet Kirghizia, and Chinese Sinkiang. A recent source has estimated the Kirghizes in Afghanistan at around 30,000.

The Karakalpaks are a Turkic tribe represented chiefly in the Soviet Union. In 1935 colonies of Karakalpaks were reported in several parts of Afghan Turkistan, speaking a language quite different from that of the Turkomans and Uzbeks. They may have come to Afghanistan after the Soviet revolution. It was also reported that some 2,000 Karakalpaks had been moved from Afghan Turkistan to Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan.

In the nineteenth century several other Turkish groups were reported in northern and eastern Afghanistan. Probably in the intervening years these groups have been absorbed into the Tajik, Uzbek, or Afghan population. However, one identifiable Turkish group, the Qizil Bash, remains. The Qizil Bashes, or redheads, so named because of their red caps, are descended from Turkish tribesmen who were brought in by the Persian ruler Nadir Shah when he invaded Afghanistan in the middle of the eighteenth century and were stationed as garrison troops in the towns he captured. After the death of Nadir Shah, the Qizil Bash garrison remained in Kabul; their descendants, who are Shi'a Moslems, now occupy a separate quarter in the city. Many Qizil Bashes hold positions as clerical officials in government offices; others are traders or craftsmen. In the middle of the nineteenth century they

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still spoke Turkic among themselves, but were already Persianized. Very likely they are Persian-speaking today, although no specific information is available. A colony of Qizil Bashes has also been reported in the high valleys of Foladi at the western edge of the Hazarajat. The Qizil Bash population in Afghanistan has been estimated at anywhere from 60,000 to 200,000 individuals.

The Nuri tribes, who live in the high mountains of northeastern Afghanistan, speak languages belonging to the Dardic group and today may number 60,000. These people, whose origins are unknown, were referred to as Kafirs or infidels for centuries until their forced conversion to Islam in 1896. To mark the coming of the light of Islam, their territory was renamed Nuristan, or land of light, and the people became known as the Nuris or Nuristanis. The people themselves, along with many other small Afghan groups, claim descent from the Arabs—a fashionable fiction. In earlier days they were believed to be descendants of a once powerful people who came from the west. Anthropological data suggest that they are a remnant of the original population of their area, which some suggest to have been Dravidian, others Indo-Aryan. They appear to be the decadent descendants of a more civilized race and a mixture of three elements: an extremely ancient element, related to the oldest known population of the central Himalayas; an element with resemblances to the Kurds; and a type that shows a combination of Dinaric and Nordic traits and may go back to the most ancient prototype of these races, preserved in the midst of an Indo-Aryan ascendancy. It is quite certain, at any rate, that the Nuristanis are among the oldest ethnic elements composing the Afghan people, and unique in their record of having remained unaffected by any of the major religions until the end of the nineteenth century.

Parts of Nuristan formed a portion of the Greek satrapy of the Paropamisadae in the fourth and third centuries B.C. The people were then called Kambojas and described as of mixed Indo-Iranian descent. Possibly they occupied a much larger area then and were gradually forced from central Afghanistan into their present mountains by the Moslem onslaught. One of their principal tribes is still called Kam or Kamtoz.

The Moslem appellation of Kafirs is mentioned in 1020 A.D. by the historians of Mahmud of Ghazni. Other references to them were made by writers in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries and during the Moghul period. In 1839 the Kafirs sent a

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deputation to Sir William Macnaghten in Jalalabad, claiming relationship with the fair-skinned British troops who had invaded the country.

Since few Westerners have visited Nuristan, the account of George Robertson, who spent two years from 1889 to 1891 with the Kafirs, is still widely quoted. The Kafirs are divided into two main groups: the Siah-Push, which is subdivided into five tribes; and the Safid-Push, which consists of the Prasungeli, Waigeli, and Ashkun. Dialectic variations of Kati, the language spoken by the five tribes of the Siah-Push, appear to be comparatively slight, whereas Kati, Waigeli, Prasun, and Ashkun are mutually unintelligible.

In physical type, most Kafirs are of slightly above average height, with a slender build, black hair ranging from straight to wavy, and a skin color described as resembling that of residents of the Punjab, and presumably similar to that of the Afghans. The nose is slender and straight, or sometimes aquiline in shape. Only the Prasungeli are noticeably different—powerfully built, with a very low forehead, close-set eyes, a broader nose, a receding chin, a darker skin color—and it is possible that the Prasungeli represent the aboriginal inhabitants of the area.

The Kafirs, who differ culturally from the other peoples of Afghanistan, live in wooden houses two or three stories high, with a veranda-like top story ornamented by carving. They keep goats and cattle, but no horses, and until recently sacrificed cows and goats to their gods. When an individual died, his body was placed in a wooden coffin set up without burial at the outskirts of the village. A carved wooden effigy of the deceased was set up in the cemetery amid feasting and dancing that continued for two or three days.

The Kafir tribal structure described by Robertson was similar to that of other tribes in Afghanistan, but in addition to the tribesmen there were two nontribal classes, the poor freemen and the slaves. The slaves were usually war captives, although they might be purchased from other Kafirs. House slaves lived with the family which owned them and enjoyed a higher status than did the artisan slaves, who were treated much as members of the occupational castes were in India. All craftsmen among the Kafirs—such as wood carvers, bootmakers, and weavers—were slaves, as were drummers. Blacksmiths were considered to be of lower caste than other slaves, but all slaves were "impure" and were prohibited

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from approaching a shrine or the house of a priest. All artisan slaves occupied a special quarter in the village. The slave worked for his master without receiving payment, but he charged other members of the community for his services, and so could acquire property. He might also be elected to the council of magistrates.

Individual tribesmen achieved status through wealth. In order to reach the highest status, a man or woman would give a series of elaborate feasts for the whole tribe. The individual who had given a prescribed number of such feasts became a member of the inner circle, called *jast*, and commanded great respect. But because of the great expense involved, only three or four, perhaps as many as five, people in a tribe ever attained *jast*.

One also received status in the tribe by killing Moslems, and the man who had killed four or five Moslems earned the right to wear a special kind of shawl. In raids upon the Moslems, with whom there were constant blood feuds, the killer took an ear or a scalp lock for a trophy, in addition to whatever booty could be seized. When the raiding party returned to the home village, a victory dance was held. There were usually no feuds within a tribe but if a fight did start it was the duty of all witnesses to intervene at once. In the event a man was killed, his murderer had the choice of paying compensation or going into exile.

In western Afghanistan there are several tribes usually referred to as the Chahar Aimak, or the four tribes. The names of the four tribes vary, those usually listed being the Firuzkuhis, Taimanis, Jamshedis, and Taimuris (the last described as Sunni Hazaras). Some accounts would make all of the Chahar Aimak Mongol in type, while others describe all but the Hazaras as Persian in appearance. Actually, Mongol, Persian or Tajik, and Turkish elements appear to be present in varying degrees among all these tribes.

No anthropological measurements are recorded for any of these tribes and no studies have been made of their languages. One statement claims that most of them are Shi'a Moslems. The only population estimate encountered is that made in 1815 of between 400,000 and 450,000 people. Nineteenth-century reports indicate that all except the Taimuris, who dwelt in black tents of the Iranian type, occupied dome-shaped yurts or mud dwellings in the shape of yurts. This suggests Turkish or Mongol origin or influence for most of the Chahar Aimak.

The Baluchi may have come out of Central Asia in the early

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centuries of the Christian era, moving southward into Iran, then eastward through Baluchistan toward the Indus. If this is the case, their line of migration never passed through the heart of Afghanistan. Baluch pastoral nomads, dwelling in black tents, are found near the Afghan border in east central Iran and in northern Baluchistan, and some of them cross over into Afghanistan from these two directions in the course of their seasonal migrations. Since the western and southern parts of Afghanistan in which the Baluchi migrate have been little described, figures on the Baluch population are unavailable; there may be 20,000 Baluchi within Afghanistan.

In Baluchistan the Baluch tribes encountered a group speaking a Dravidian language akin to that spoken in southern India. These Brahuis by and large retain their mother tongue but in other respects have adopted the culture of the Baluchi. It appears that some Brahuis, in the course of their seasonal migrations, move into southern Afghanistan.

In eastern and northern Afghanistan there are a number of Hindus, some of whose ancestors have been settled in the area for several centuries. Most are traders, herbalists, and bankers in the towns; a few, as in the Kuh-i-Daman district just north of Kabul, are horticulturists. These Hindus speak Lahnda, a language spoken in the western Punjab. For many centuries there have been small Jewish colonies in Afghanistan, particularly in Herat, Kabul, and in the towns of Afghan Turkistan.

In the eighth century A.D., Arab armies, intent on the promulgation of Islam, conquered Turkistan, and their descendants appear to have been absorbed into the Afghan, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek populations, as attested by the number of Sayyids to be found in Afghanistan. In the nineteenth century there were separate communities of ethnic Arabs in Afghan Turkistan. Along the eastern frontier of Afghanistan there are a number of Afghan tribes who have always been notoriously indisposed to accept authority, even from their own tribal leaders. In the area east of Kabul and north of the Kabul river, there are tribes who speak non-Pushtu languages—Pashai and Parachi. Although little information is available as to how their culture differs from that of the Afghans, if at all, it appears that they do not always identify their interests with those of the Afghan government.

The Tajiks, peaceful folk with a high rate of literacy and of skills in the trades and crafts, contribute largely to the govern-

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mental bureaucracy and to the urban economy. Although the status of the Tajiks is not as high as that of the Afghans, the Tajiks are respected members of the Afghan national community and there is some intermarriage between Afghan men and Tajik women in the towns and cities.

The Uzbeks have accepted Afghan rule and are in turn accepted by Afghans. Little information is available concerning intermarriage between Uzbeks and Afghans but Uzbeks appear to have intermarried freely with Tajiks, Kazaks, and other ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan. Uzbeks, like Tajiks, are often accepted in the schools for higher education in Kabul, and even, on occasion, are sent abroad for advanced training.

Little information is available concerning interrelationships of ethnic groups in peripheral areas. The mountain Tajiks and the Kirghizes of the Wakhan corridor dwell in isolation, their contacts with the outside world limited to a few Afghan government officials and military outposts along the frontier. The Hazara Mongols of central Afghanistan stand low in the social scale. An independent people, who demonstrated a forceful resentment of government tax collectors from the early fifteenth century until the end of the nineteenth, the Hazaras are industrious, frugal, and ready to care for their own in need. But because the mountainous terrain of the Hazarajat offers few means for producing a livelihood, many Hazara Mongols must go seasonally or for a period of years to Kabul, Qandahar, or even outside Afghanistan in search of employment to supplement the income of the family at home. Since the Hazaras are unskilled except at agriculture and sheepbreeding, they find work in the cities as porters and at other menial tasks, and so are accorded a low position in the socioeconomic scale.

A majority of the ethnic groups found in Afghanistan are also represented in neighboring countries. Thus in the farthest corner of northeastern Afghanistan the mountain Tajiks are represented not only in Afghanistan but in adjacent regions of the Soviet Union. In fact, Tajiks are sufficiently numerous on the Soviet side of the border to have given their name to the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan. But because the mountain Tajiks are village dwellers who seldom travel far from the home valley, there is little or no intercommunication between Tajiks of the two countries. The nomadic Kirghizes who occupy this same Pamir area are more mobile, wandering back and forth between Afghan, Soviet, and Chinese territory in their seasonal migrations. The territory occupied by the

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Kafirs extends across the border into the Pakistani country of Chitral. The Kafirs in Chitral, like those in Afghanistan, have been converted to Islam. Whereas in Turkistan the political boundary between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union is marked by the Amu Darya in the east, in the west there is no physical mark to separate the plains of Afghanistan from those of Soviet Turkmenistan, with the result that Uzbeks have for centuries lived on both sides of this line. Similarly, the Turkomans, congregated chiefly in Soviet Turkmenistan, also occupy adjoining areas in Afghanistan.

Along the western border of Afghanistan, nineteenth-century writers reported a constant movement of peoples between Afghanistan and Iran. Some of these movements were a normal part of the seasonal migrations of nomads. In other cases, tribes or fractions of tribes shifted their territories; often a group might move to Iran, live there for a few years, then return to its former territory or to another in Afghanistan. A considerable amount of trans-border movement still occurs. Along the southern borders of Afghanistan, numbers of Baluch tribesmen, and some Brahuis, regularly move across the border in the course of their seasonal migrations.

The presence of ethnic groups which extend across political boundaries in northern, western, and southern Afghanistan does not pose any serious political problems. The Uzbeks, the most numerous people having relatives in an adjacent country, accept the established government of Afghanistan, and seem to have no nationalist interest in uniting with the Uzbeks to the north of the Afghan border. Smaller ethnic groups seem to be content enough where they are. If they should be unhappy they may, following the immemorial custom of pastoral nomads, move across the border in the hope of finding greater independence or prosperity on the other side. If they do not attain this ideal they may return to their first territorial allegiance. Some of these nomads move from summer to winter pastures without concern for the political boundaries they cross in the course of normal seasonal migrations. Each small group follows its own interest and is unconcerned with nationalist ambitions.

Along the borders of southeastern Afghanistan, however, the Afghan tribes extend without interruption deep into the hills of Pakistan. All of them speak the same language, Pushtu. There are two main dialects, but the distribution of these dialects does not

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follow political boundary lines. Most of the tribes are Sunni, a few are Shi'a. It is in this area that the tribesmen are most resistant to authority, even to that of their own tribal leaders. When tribesmen run into difficulties with the law, they slip across the border out of reach of the law of the country in which their crime was committed and are protected by friends on the other side until it is safe to return home. For three-quarters of a century the British paid these border tribes to maintain some sort of peace among themselves and to refrain from attacking and robbing travelers. After withdrawal of the British in 1947 the tribes, seeking some other source of subsidy, turned to the growing rivalry between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the area called Pushtunistan by the Afghans. Although Afghanistan and Pakistan now function as national governments of modern states, the tribesmen are behaving as tribesmen have done since the Hiung-nu accepted gifts from the Chinese as persuasion against raiding the frontier cities of China. By playing off one government against another, the border tribes hope to maintain their traditional independence.

From the nontribal viewpoint, there is no doubt that the excessive blood feuds and tribal disorders of the border result from the economic distresses of the hillsmen. It was not by accident that the Durrani tribesmen, after they moved into the fertile plains of southwestern Afghanistan, achieved a greater tribal solidarity than other Afghan tribes, and that in their plenty hospitality became more important than vengeance. The territory of the border tribes provides no such opportunity for relaxation. Tribal and subtribal independence, which often approaches chaos, is not consonant with the peace and prosperity possible under a unified government, and unless the border tribes receive assistance they will remain an impoverished anachronism in the modern world.

At first glance the language situation in Afghanistan seems very complex: there are about twenty languages spoken in the country; the areas of the various languages overlap; and there is no single national language spoken by an overwhelming majority of the people. A closer look, however, shows that most of these languages are spoken by relatively small numbers of speakers; that two languages, Persian and Pushtu, account for about four-fifths of the population; and that Persian predominates in the capital and is understood and spoken by many people in every town of any size.

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Most of the languages of Afghanistan belong to one of the three linguistic groups: Iranian, Turkic, or Dardic (see Table 1). Of these, Iranian and Dardic are closely related subbranches of the large family of Indo-European languages, and Turkic is an important branch of the large Altaic family. Both Persian and Pushtu are Iranian, so that the other groups, Turkic and Dardic, are represented in Afghanistan only by numerically less important languages.

Languages of the Iranian branch of Indo-European have been spoken in the region of the Iranian plateau and territory north and northeast of this for several thousand years. For the ancient period, two languages—Old Persian and Avestan—are known, the former chiefly from the cuneiform inscriptions of the Achaemenian kings and the latter from the text of the Avesta, the holy book of Zoroastrianism. From the Middle Iranian period (roughly first century B.C. to the ninth century A.D.) a number of languages are represented in a variety of scripts, with literature mainly of a religious nature—Buddhist, Christian, or Manichean. Today the major Iranian languages in terms of number of speakers are Persian, Kurdish, Pushtu, and Baluchi, all spoken in Iran, Afghanistan, Soviet Tajikistan, and the northwestern part of Pakistan. In addition to these there are about fifteen languages spoken by smaller groups of people, scattered through this same general region. When these languages are written, modified forms of the Arabic script are used outside the USSR and modified forms of the Cyrillic alphabet within the USSR. Most of the languages are not written at all and texts exist only in the transcriptions of linguistic scholars. In Afghanistan, Iranian languages are spoken in over two-thirds of the country, in all areas except Nuristan and sections of Afghan Turkistan. As a convenient, rough approximation it may be considered that somewhat more than half the population of the nation speak Pushtu, a third speak Persian, and another seventy thousand speak other Iranian languages.

In Afghanistan, Persian is the language of the capital, Kabul, of the majority of the population of the towns except for Qandahar, and of sedentary peasant populations in the western and central parts of the country, in Badakhshan, and in small communities elsewhere. Most Persian speakers in Afghanistan are referred to as Parsiwans or as Tajiks. Besides the Tajiks, the Hazaras speak Persian. Outside Afghanistan, Persian is spoken in most of Iran

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and in most of Soviet Tajikistan; in both these countries a form of Persian is the standard official language. As in all languages spoken within large areas for a long time, there are marked dialectal differences and Afghan Persian differs both from the standard Persian of Iran and from the newly constituted standard Tajik of Soviet Tajikistan. However, all these varieties may be regarded as one language and the differences are scarcely greater than those found between different kinds of English.

Persian-Tajik is generally regarded as an important cultural language in the area and many people whose native language is something else speak Persian as a second language. This is notably true, for example, among the Durranis, the speakers of Pamir languages or of Pashai. Many speakers of Turkic languages know some Persian. It is worth noting that Pushtu rarely is learned as a second language, except as required in the schools, and does not serve as a *lingua franca* in the country.

Pushtu is spoken in southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan by some ten million people, over half of whom are nomadic or seminomadic. Two cities in the Pushtu area are important centers of Pushtu language: Qandahar in Afghanistan and Peshawar in Pakistan. Dialect variation is very great throughout the area and there is no completely unified standard language, but literary works tend to avoid dialectal peculiarities and to use forms of the language common to the urban centers. In Afghanistan the dialect of Qandahar seems to enjoy the greatest prestige, and the orthography of Pushtu in general seems to suggest a Qandahar base for the literary language. Speakers of Pushtu are often called Afghans, Pathans, or Pushtuns, terms which are also used to designate ethnic groups.

Since Pushtu is the nearest thing Afghanistan has to a national language there is some feeling that it should replace Persian and serve both as a distinctive feature of the nation and as a unifying force internally. It was declared the official language of Afghanistan in 1936 and efforts have been made to encourage its use in governmental circles and in literary production and to use it in primary school instruction in many areas, but Persian remains the language of Kabul, of the court, and of the government offices.

Another Iranian language of Afghanistan is Baluch. This is spoken by thousands of nomadic tribesmen in the western and southern border areas. In addition, the Pamir languages are spoken by a small number of people in villages of the extreme northeast

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of the country, and the remnants of two other Iranian languages are spoken in several speech islands. Pamir languages are also spoken in Soviet Tajikistan and one of them (Yidgha) in Pakistan.

Turkic languages are spoken by many millions of people in a broad band which extends from Turkey and Azerbaijan through Soviet Central Asia to the Sinkiang province of China and in fairly large areas of European Russia. There are about ten major languages now spoken, most of which are very similar to one another. The most important one is the language of Turkey, and the most important one in Afghanistan is Uzbek, which is spoken by hundreds of thousands of people in the northern part of the country. Some of these are nomadic but many are also settled in villages and towns. The Uzbek of Tashkent has become the standard literary language of Soviet Uzbekistan and is the only form of the language in which publications now appear. Kirghiz is spoken in the extreme northeast of Afghanistan.

Dardic languages are spoken in northeastern Pakistan, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. They show similarities both to Indic and to Iranian languages and their exact linguistic status is unclear, one theory being that they constitute an independent group midway between Indic and Iranian, or, more exactly, a split-off from the non-Indic part of the Indo-Iranian group:



Whether or not this is correct, it seems likely that these languages constitute a distinct grouping. Kashmiri is the only Dardic language which could be called major on the basis of number of speakers or importance of written literature. Most of the Dardic languages of Afghanistan are spoken in the Nuristan area; in terms of numbers of speakers, Kati is the most important.

In addition to the languages mentioned above, several others are spoken by small groups of people in various parts of the country. There are reports of speakers of Kurdish in the west, of

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Arabic near Balkh, of Lahnda by merchants from India, and of Mongolian at three points in west central Afghanistan. No reliable information is available for any of these. Published notes on Mongolian suggest that there are no more than several thousand speakers and that Mongolian is being replaced by other languages.

Persian, one of the principal languages of the Middle East, has a reputation for being one of the easiest in which to acquire conversational fluency and a command of the basic structure. Its sound system offers few problems, its grammatical system is relatively simple, and there is no great gulf between the spoken language and the language of books as there is in some other oriental languages. It nevertheless requires long, hard study to achieve a full mastery of the language and an appreciation of its literary values. The spoken Persian of Afghanistan varies considerably from that of neighboring Iran, more than do their literary languages. The language is called *farsi darwi* by the Afghans, with *darwi* deriving from *dariush,* the Iranian name of the Achaemenid ruler Darius. Afghan spoken Persian may have more Arabic words, more older Persian words, and different names for common objects. In part, the difference comes from the fact that in Iran some thirty years ago there was an intensive attempt to replace words of foreign origin with Persian words, if necessary by creating new words based upon old roots. The pronunciation of the language also varies from one country to the other. Three published works deal at some length with the differences between the Persian of Iran and that of Afghanistan.

The reputed differences in the characteristics of the two peoples —Persians and Afghans—may be reflected in their use of the language. The cultivated and somewhat effete Persians are much given to polite expressions of speech, while the hardy, rougher Afghans make very little use of such expressions. On the other hand swearing seems to be far more prevalent in Iran than in Afghanistan where an insult may be answered by a blow. It is true that politeness tends to wane as one moves across the Middle East and into India. The statement made about the Persian of Afghanistan is paralleled by the lack of polite expressions in Pushtu.

The Persian consonants are in general very similar to English consonants, with only three that are strikingly un-English. Also, there are very few difficult consonant combinations. The three un-English consonants, with the letters usually employed to represent them are:

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Persian Alphabet	Latin Alphabet	
خ	kh or x	voiceless velar spirant, the *ch* of German *ach*
غ	gh or ġ	the voiced counterpart of *x*
ق	q	a *k* pronounced far back in the mouth

In the standard Persian of Iran the last two, ġ and q, have fallen together so that they function as one phoneme, and this may be true for some Persian spoken in Afghanistan, but in the Persian of Kabul, as in Tajik and some local dialects in Iran, the two are distinct. They are spelled with two different letters in all Persian no matter how pronounced.

All varieties of Persian seem to have six basic vowels, *ae, a, e, i, o, u,* although some dialects have additional ones. Two vowels are about the same everywhere, *ae,* which is much like the English *a* of "hat" and *a,* which is like the vowel many Americans have in "law." The remaining vowels vary from place to place and the importance of vowel length also varies greatly. But all this variation is less than the variation in the vowels of different kinds of American English, and it causes very little difficulty for mutual understanding.

The noun in Persian has no gender (there is not even any gender in the pronoun, no separate words for "he" and "she") and about as much declensional machinery as English. The verb has two stems which are the basis of two more tenses, a participle, and two infinitives. The past stem always ends in *-d* or *-t* and may be regarded as the present stem plus this suffix, but the changes undergone by the present stem in this combination are so varied that, for learning purposes at least, the two stems might just as well be considered independent. The forms listed above constitute the core of the verb system but other compound tenses exist and there are a few rarer forms. One of the most characteristic features of Persian verbs is the frequency of the compound verb, which consists of a noun or other word plus a colorless verb such as "do," "go," "take," the whole having the function and meaning of a simple verb. Thus "forget" is "forgetting-do," "speak" is "letter-hit," and so on.

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Four features of Persian word order are worth noting here since they are so much at variance with English word order. All but the first are typical of modern Indo-Iranian languages in general, as is also the feature of compound verbs just mentioned.

(1) The adjective normally follows its noun instead of preceding it as in English.

(2) There are postpositions after the noun corresponding to English prepositions.

(3) The verb normally comes at the end of the sentence instead of between the subject and object as in English.

(4) Interrogatives come just before the verb, not at the beginning of the sentence as in English.

One outstanding feature of Persian vocabulary is the high proportion of Arabic loanwords. As many as half the words on a page of ordinary Persian may be Arabic in origin. Basic words such as pronouns, numbers, most kinship terms, primary verbs, and so on are Iranian and sometimes are transparently cognate with English (*to* "thou," *do* "two," *madar* "mother," *aest* "is") but the vast majority of Persian words are loanwords from Arabic and are Semitic in form with the Semitic root system fairly evident (*ketab* "book," *maektub* "letter," *maektaeb* "school," *kateb* "clerk," *mokataebe* "correspondence"). In spite of the great influx of Arabic loanwords, however, the basic structure of Persian remains typically Iranian.

Persian is written in the Arabic alphabet with four additional letters representing Persian consonants not present in Classical Arabic, *p, c, g, z,* bringing the total number of letters to thirty-three. The special Persian letters consist of Arabic characters plus diacritics and are placed in the alphabet after the letters they resemble. Arabo-Persian writing goes from right to left and is primarily consonantal in that each letter normally represents a consonant, and the vowels are only partially indicated. The letter *'aelef* is used to represent the Persian, *a,* and the letters *ye* and *vav* represent the Afghan Persian vowels *i, e,* and *o, u,* respectively, but all three of these letters also have other uses so that the representation of these vowels is by no means unambiguous. The vowel *ae* and many instances of *i* and *u* are not normally indicated at all although special marks written over or under the preceding consonant sign are available and are occasionally used in some kinds of publications.

Persian orthography is basically sound in that, given the spell-

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ing of a word, the consonant part of the pronunciation is clear and the vowels are to a considerable extent inferable. Apart from the inadequate representation of the vowels the chief difficulty of Persian spelling is the retention of the original Arabic spelling in Arabic loanwords. Since Arabic has about ten consonantal distinctions that Persian lacks, the speaker of Persian must learn to spell his own phonemes in different ways depending on the original Arabic pronunciation. For example, Persian *z* may be spelled four different ways, *s* three ways, and so on. Thus, although the consonant pronunciation is generally clear from the spelling, the spelling cannot be predicted from the pronunciation, and the Persian student—native speaker or foreigner—simply has to memorize the spelling of many words. On the whole, however, Persian orthography is superior to that of English or French in terms of the relationship of spelling to pronunciation.

Pushtu shows a clear family resemblance to Persian, but this does not mean there is a high degree of mutual intelligibility. The difference between the two languages is roughly of the order of the difference between English and German. Qandahar Pushtu has twenty-nine consonant phonemes and seven vowels as against Persian's twenty-three and six. Pushtu lacks the *f* and *v* of Persian but has a whole series of retroflex sounds ṭ, ḍ, ṇ, ṛ, ṣ, ẓ, and the affricates c̣, ẓ pronounced *ts* and *dz* respectively. The seventh vowel is a central vowel something like the *a* of "sofa" symbolized here ə. The presence of additional sounds, together with the fact that the consonants occur in numerous combinations, makes Pushtu considerably harder than Persian for an American to learn to pronounce satisfactorily.

Pushtu appears to have certain limitations as a medium for major cultural expression. The vocabulary is far too limited to cope with writing or speaking about many of the aspects of the modern world of science and machines. Demands for new words seem to be met by drawing on Arabic or Persian roots and the resulting mixtures leave much to be desired. Many common words taken into Pushtu from Persian and Arabic undergo changes, this process of change and adaptation being called *mafghan*, or afghanization. For example, the Arabic (and Persian) words for tribe, *qum*, becomes *kām*. Those Afghans to whom Pushtu was not their native tongue view it with considerable reservations. They refer to the local description of the sound of the language as that of pebbles rolled around in a drum; they state that it is

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difficult to learn and insist that after a number of years of study in school they failed to master the language.

The grammatical structure is also more complicated and irregular than that of Persian. Nouns have gender and a system of two-case, two-number declension, of which the forms are quite varied. with numerous instances of homophony across categories and across declensional classes. The verb has a more elaborate system of inflection with tense and aspect forms and the exclusively passival construction of the past tense, characteristic of many Indic languages. Otherwise the observations made above about the structure of Persian apply generally to Pushtu, except for the position of adjectives: a large Arabic vocabulary (sometimes borrowed through Persian, often independently), compound verbs, postpositions, and word order.

The dialect situation calls for special comment. There is very wide variation in pronunciation, grammar, and vocabulary throughout the Pushtu area and several features of dialect difference in sounds seem worth noting here. The most striking difference in sounds is the pronunciation of the ṣ. This consonant in Qandahar is a sound like English *sh* but with a characteristic retroflex quality which differentiates it from the other *sh* sound of Pushtu š. In some areas, including Peshawar, it is pronounced like the German *ch* of *ach* and falls together with the *x*. In still other places it is pronounced more like the German *ch* of *ich* and remains distinct from the *x*. This phoneme occurs in the name of the language, and the variation in sound accounts for the variant transliterated spellings Pukhtu and Pushtu. This ṣ-x variation correlates with many other features characterizing the two great dialect areas, southwest-northeast, and the terms Pushtu-Pukhtu may be used as convenient labels for the two varieties of the language. The chief Qandahar-Peshawar consonant differences may be summarized:

Qandahar Pushtu	Peshawar Pukhtu
c	s
ẓ	z
ṣ	x
ẓ	g (not ġ as might be expected)

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Pushtu, like Persian, is written in the Arabic alphabet with additional letters. Pushtu makes use of the four special Persian letters, for p, č, g, and ž, and in addition has eight distinctively Pushtu letters for the consonants ṭ, ḍ, ṇ, ṛ, ṣ, ẓ, ç, ʒ not present in Persian or Arabic. Like the special Persian letters these consist of Arabic letters with diacritics and are placed in the alphabet after the letters they resemble; letters which occur only in Arabic loanwords are often listed separately at the end of the alphabet. Otherwise the comments given above for Persian orthography are applicable for Pushtu with several additional minor problems such as the added vowel possibility of ə. The spelling of Pushtu is much less settled than that of Persian, and efforts to standardize its orthography continue.

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CHAPTER 5

Religion

THE INHABITANTS of Afghanistan, almost without exception, are Moslem. About 80 percent of the Moslem population—including the Pushtuns, most of the Tajiks, the Uzbeks, and the Turkomans—belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. The Sunni sect may be considered the "orthodox" sect of Islam and most of the ruling dynasties in Afghanistan have been Sunni. Of the rest some eighteen percent are of the Shi'a sect and the other two percent of the Ismaili and a few more obscure sects.

The constitution states that "the faith of Afghanistan is the sacred faith of Islam, and the official religion and that of the population in general is the Hanafi religion." This statement may be clarified by explaining that the Hanafi religion, from its founder Abu Hanafa, is one of the four orthodox systems of jurisprudence of Islam. The Hanafite rite is concerned with the interpretation of the *shari'a,* the canonical law. Again, the constitution states that the king is to rule according to the *shari'a.*

The Shi'a sect, predominant in neighboring Iran since about 1500, is followed by the Hazaras, the Qizil Bashes, and the mountain Tajiks. Adherents of this sect believe that the spiritual leadership of Islam descends from 'Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet, through a line of twelve Imams. Those of the Shi'a sect who subscribe to the entire line of the Imams are called Jafarites—the Hazaras and the Qizil Bashes are Jafarites. The Ismaili branch of the Shi'as recognizes the authority of the first seven Imams: adherents are to be found among the inhabitants of the province of Badakhshan.

Other religions exist in Afghanistan but in each case the number of adherents is small. A few thousand Hindus live in permanent colonies, earning their living as merchants, shopkeepers in the cloth bazaars, and herb doctors. (The Hindus used to have to

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wear distinguishing garments but it has been years since this or similar injunctions have been enforced.) The long-established Jewish community, concentrated in Herat and Kabul, has been reduced in recent years to about six thousand by emigration to Israel. Also in Kabul, living together, are a limited number of Parsis or Zoroastrians. The very few Christians are found only as individuals at the foreign embassies and legations or as representatives of foreign commercial interests.

Non-Moslems are subject to legal and unwritten restrictions. The constitution defines them as *ahl-i-zimma,* or people under protection, whose rights are not guaranteed but are subject to the gracious protection of the Moslems. Non-Moslems are also divided into *ahl-i-kitab,* or people of the book, and *mushrikin,* or idolators. The people of the book include the Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians who, in common with the Moslems, possess revealed scriptures. The idolators are exemplified by the Hindus.

The government permits no proselytizing by followers of other religions or by those sects of Islam considered heretical by the Afghans. For example, the Ahmadiyas, also called the Qadiyani, are classed as heretical. However, for a number of years the government has allowed the Italian legation to maintain a chapel in charge of a priest, and more recently permission has been granted for a minister to serve the spiritual needs of the temporary Protestant community.

While the constitution states that the ruler must be a Hanafite and must carry out his duties in accord with the *shari'a* and the Hanafi code, his present role as the head of the church is far less important than in former years. Amir Abdur Rahman wrote a religious treatise upon the duties of a Moslem (published in 1896) which served to emphasize his position as the head of the church and of the state. At that time, as well as in more recent years, there was also a *khan 'alim,* or head of religious observances, while one important clerical family furnished the *qazi,* or principal judges.

Today the hierarchy of Islam is more loosely knit and appears to lack any organic, functional structure. About 1930 the government established a *jamiyyat-i-'ulema,* or council of the learned, composed of some fifteen to twenty respected religious leaders. This council was empowered to supervise the activities of provincial religious councils, to act on appointments in connection with mosques, and to determine if pending legislation was in accord with the *shari'a.* While the council has had a secretary and has been

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self-perpetuating, the government appears to have appointed no *ra'is,* or head. It may well be that the influence and prestige of the council is on the decline and that this decline is in accord with the desires of the government.

Most of the clerics active within the loosely organized hierarchy are associated with the approximately fifteen thousand mosques throughout the country. There are five grades of mosques, beginning with the *masjid-i-jami'* (the "Friday" or "congregational" mosque). In the earlier centuries of Islam there could be only one *masjid-i-jami'* in a community, but this distinction has gradually disappeared (Kabul has some twenty mosques of this rank in addition to the hundred or so less important ones). The clerics of the three highest grades are called *imams,* with the cleric in charge of the *masjid-i-jami'* further distinguished by the title *imam jomah.* Friday is, of course, the religious holiday of the week and the *imam jomah* may also be called *khatib* after his function of preaching the Friday sermon, the *khutba.* Mosques of the fourth grade are in charge of *muezzins* and the simplest or fifth grade is led by a *mulla.*

Religion reaches the farmer, the tribesman, and the town dweller through the *mullas,* who instruct in the principles of Islam, teach in the village school, and are in charge of the mosques. The *mulla* may or may not be well educated in theology or in general knowledge, and is accorded respect on the basis of personal qualities, such as his family background, piety, learning, and dedication to duties. Contributions from fellow villagers serve to support the *mulla* and his family. One other type of cleric active among the people is the *murshid* or spiritual adviser (also known as the *rahnama* or guide) who has no official status but advises on spiritual problems at the family level.

The structure presented above relates to the manner in which the principles and observances of Islam are conveyed to the believers. A separate system relates to the enforcement of the *shari'a,* through the machinery of the Ministry of Justice. Not only is the holder of this cabinet post always a member of a highly respected clerical family but most of his subordinates are clerics. The *qazi,* or judges, of the courts are civil servants and advance in position according to length of service. Two other offices attached to the court are those of the *mufti,* who acts as counselor to the judge and as prosecuting attorney and who may suggest the *fatwa* or religious precedent upon which a case may be decided; and of the

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mohtasib, an attendant of the court empowered to check upon observances of religious precepts and duties.

Among the nomadic tribes the *mullas* may limit their efforts to teaching the obligations of Islam and to instructing tribesmen how to write their own names. However, in thousands of farming villages the *mullas* conduct *maktabs,* or schools, in the mosques. Here boys between the ages of five and nine memorize and recite passages from the Qur'an, as well as study reading, writing, and arithmetic. The total number of these *maktabs* is not known, nor does their curriculum conform to any standard. Each school is supported by the parents of the pupils, though the Ministry of Education may furnish textbooks, desks, and writing materials. Those elementary schools conducted directly by the Ministry of Education offer four hours a week of religious education during the first six years and shorter periods during the next five years.

Specialized religious schools for the training of scholars and clerics have long existed in Afghanistan and continue to operate independently of the Ministry of Education, although some financial assistance comes from the ministry. Such schools are active on the secondary level at Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Maymaneh, and Jalalabad, with an enrollment of about five hundred students. Other specialized schools, called the Darul Hefaz, where the blind memorize the Qur'an and learn to recite in the traditional modes are in operation at Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Maymaneh, and Andkhui.

In addition, the Ministry of Education operates the largest and most progressive religious school, the Madrasa Ulum-i-Shari'a, located at Paghman, some sixteen miles from Kabul. This school, which currently has about four hundred pupils, was founded in 1943 to establish an equilibrium between the spiritual and material sides of life and to give rise to a modern and broad-minded class of priests which will be able to help in the general reform of the country. Its aim is to preserve the strength of religious and moral forces of the nation while taking into account the modern way of life. Boys enter at the age of fourteen for six years of instruction, during which time their board, lodging, and clothes are supplied at government expense. The curriculum includes religious dogma, principles of Islam, history of Islam, and Islamic law, plus a full schedule of such general courses as physics, chemistry, geology, geography, history, mathematics, and Arabic. The graduate of Madrasa Ulum-i-Shari'a receives a degree equivalent to Bachelor

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of Religion and is qualified as a religious teacher. The present trend, however, is for the graduates to continue their religious studies at Kabul University.

A Faculty of Theology, known as Facultah Elahiyyat, was brought into being at Kabul University about 1949 to foster the higher education and training of three types of religious leaders—judges, propagators of the faith (*tablighat*), and teachers. The course, comprising four years of general academic work followed by two years of specialization, leads to an academic degree but no particular religious title. In setting up this faculty there was a real awareness on the part of the heads of the government that the Moslem leaders of the future must be prepared to cope with a wide range of new problems—new in relation to the isolated past.

Religious endowments have long played an important part in the economy of Moslem countries. Such an endowment, called a *vaqf*, and the property comprising it cannot be taxed or alienated as long as the income is going to a pious foundation or to the descendants of the founder. Urban property and shops, villages, and farming land owned by pious foundations became the sources of funds for the construction and maintenance of mosques, religious schools, hospitals, etc. Over a period of time important mosques or sacred shrines became the beneficiaries of numerous endowments with the abundant income providing for general upkeep of buildings, for the support of the clergy, and for sums for charitable purposes.

The control of these endowments has, in several Moslem countries, been taken over recently by the civil government, usually being assigned to the Ministry of Education. It is noteworthy that this transfer was effected in Afghanistan, where the influence of religious leaders has remained powerful, years earlier than in other Moslem countries, where secular trends have in many respects been stronger. Thus, Amir Abdur Rahman wrote in 1896 that he had transferred all the land, property, and money that had formerly supported the clerics to the government treasury and that the treasury paid fixed monthly salaries to the various members of the hierarchy. As far as can be ascertained this situation still prevails and there are no important pious foundations in existence. However, at such important shrines as that at Mazar-i-Sharif, where there is an independent administrative organization, the *vaqf* tradition may survive.

Tombs of saintly men are the object of pious veneration by all

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Moslems. Most highly revered are those of the *sayyids,* or descendants of Muhammad; others may house the remains of *pirs,* or men of saintly life. Hundreds of such tombs and thousands of small shrines dot the Afghan landscape and these structures may bear one of several names, such as *marqad, gunbad, moqbareh,* and *turbat.* The term *ziaret,* or *ziaretgah,* is applied to a tomb that has become a place of pilgrimage, while the word *mazar* connotes a tomb around which hovers a tangible atmosphere of sanctity. Theologians ruled that visits to such tombs might be a means of blessing, and such sanction gave impetus to the repair or enlargement of these shrines.

The most sacred of the shrines of Afghanistan is that at Mazar-i-Sharif ("noble tomb") which has given its name to this commercial town. Sunni Afghans believe that the shrine shelters part, if not all, of the remains of 'Ali ibn abi Talib, son-in-law of the Prophet, while the Shi'as of Iran consider his tomb to be at Nejef in Iraq. Located near the center of the town, a circular avenue surrounds the exterior walls of the shrine. Within a vast open court are to be found a group of structures, some of which date to about 1480 A.D. Extensive surfaces are clad with bright, predominantly blue-green faïence tile. The shrine has an independent administration, operates a higher religious school, and makes its strongest impact upon the faithful at the time of the annual Red Tulip festival, forty days after the beginning of the New Year, when as many as fifty thousand pilgrims may flock to Mazar-i-Sharif.

At 'Aliabad, just across a spur to the west of Kabul, is the Ziaret-i-Sakhi, the reputed resting place of a saintly man whose vision is alleged to have led to the discovery of the remains of 'Ali at the site now called Mazar-i-Sharif. Thousands of people flock from Kabul to the slopes adjacent to the shrine on the first day of the New Year.

Qandahar has its Masjid-i-jami' kherqa mobarak, or Friday Mosque of the Blessed Cloak, which shelters a most holy relic, a cloak said to have been worn by Muhammad. Near Qandahar is the tomb of Shah Maqsud Baba which is a place of annual pilgrimage for the residents of the town. Herat takes honor from the presence of a number of venerable shrines, the finest being the Guzargah, with its gardens, complex of structures, and tombs of many notables of the earlier centuries.

Tombs and shrines tend to attract ascetics who, convinced of the futility of an active life, seek a place suitable for prolonged

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meditation. In earlier years there were far more such mystics, who would as a rule congregate in monasteries, called variously *khanqah, robat,* or *tekkah,* each headed by a *murshid,* a man of great piety. These monastic religious came to be known as dervish or devotees. While the dervish orders have largely died out in Islam, at least three survive in Afghanistan—the Chishti, followers of the *murshid* Mu'in Chishti, who lived centuries earlier; the Naqshbandi, who are concentrated at Mazar-i-Sharif; and the Jilani.

A conservative attitude toward changes of any kind, in either religious or civil matters, characterizes the important religious families of Afghanistan and their potential as well as actual influence in both spheres is great. Probably most important is the Mojadadi family, whose head bears the honorific title Hazrat Sahib Shor Bazaar and whose elder members have held high government posts. This family, which moved into Afghanistan about fifty years ago, claims descent from Shah Gholam 'Ali Naqshbandi of Delhi, disciple of Shaykh Sirhind, the great *mojadadi* or reviver of the faith. Moving to Afghanistan from India about the same time was the Jilani family, which became established at Chahar Bagh near Jalalabad and is at present headed by Shaykh Abdul Qadir Jilani with the title Naqib Sahib. Other religious families may be particularly influential in one region or in one sect. A good example is the Turkoman family, Qizil-ayagh, named for their town of origin near Bokhara, who fled to Afghanistan as the Bolsheviks took over the Bokhara region and have since become very influential among the Turkomans south of the Amu Darya river.

Certain titles indicative of respect or of special position in the community are associated with groups and individuals. A very few of the most respected religious leaders are addressed as *hazrat,* inadequately translated as excellency or as highness. All individuals of sound religious learning and long practical exercise employ the term *maulavi* in front of their names. For example, all judges and all members of the *jamiyyat-i-'ulema* are so addressed.

Sayyids prefer to intermarry with other similar families. While a *sayyid* is respected by the public, there are families of poor *sayyids* who may rank considerably below the wealthy landlord of their district. In the past, families of *sayyids* sometimes settled entire villages. It is believed that people claiming direct descent from 'Ali ibn abi Talib are known as *khwajah.*

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Relatively little literature dealing with the fundamentals of Islam has been published within Afghanistan. Religious instruction is based largely on earlier manuscripts and on works published in Iran, India, and other countries. However, between 1945 and 1949 the government printing press issued a three-volume edition of the Qur'an which gave the sacred text in both Arabic and Pushtu, and Persian manuscript translations are also available. The basic manual of Sunni observances is the *Makhzan al-Islam* (Treasury of Islam), compiled in Pushtu about 1615 A.D. by 'Abd al-Karim ibn Makhdum Ningarhari, Akhund Darvizeh.

Each child of a Moslem family is a Moslem from birth. The village *mulla* whispers the chosen name in the baby's ear and presides over the male circumcision ceremony, which is merged with the birth celebration. Male and female children are taught the prescribed prayers at an early age by parents or grandparents. Preschool boys, in addition to the profession of faith and the ritual of prayer, are instructed in the other obligations of Islam: charity, fasting, and pilgrimage. Prayer and fasting start officially with sexual maturity but in practice begin much earlier, the boys taking inconspicuous places in the mosques. Children learn that swearing and lying are against the Moslem faith and have obedience and truthfulness impressed upon them through stories from the life of Muhammad. Children are taught to hold the Qur'an in great respect; if there is one in the house it is carefully wrapped, boxed, and placed in an elevated position.

The village *mulla* aside from his many ceremonial duties also plays an important personal role in family life, occasionally joining the family for a meal, at which time he receives the principal seat of honor, or coming to read the Qur'an to the sick. The attitudes of the villagers usually reflect the beliefs and influence of the local *mullas,* such attitudes having crystallized during discussions in the local mosque. The mosque is regarded as the natural meeting place of the males of the village as well as the place where the precepts of Islam are put into practice through arrangements for self-help among the villagers on farming matters or for aid in family calamities. The influence of the *mulla* is most evident in local attitudes toward education. It appears that a majority of villagers oppose education beyond the elementary teaching of the *maktab* on the grounds that an educated person will not remain a good Moslem (educated young men have been called infidels when

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they returned to their villages wearing European clothes and going without turbans). Among the nomadic tribes where the *mullas* are much fewer in number their influence is noticeably less in daily life, but these *mullas* almost certainly bear primary responsibility for inciting the *jehad*, or holy warfare, against infidels.

The educated element, especially those Afghans who received their college training abroad, has acquired a decidedly humanitarian outlook and a broad sympathy for other beliefs. At the same time the individuals remain good Moslems, practicing what they now believe to be the basic principles of the religion, such as prayer and abstinence from alcohol and pork. They see no conflict between their faith and the acquisition of scientific knowledge: there is frequent reference to the message of the Prophet that learning is to be sought wherever it may be found. They are inclined to believe that Islam can be adapted to modern life in Afghanistan, and favor a broader education for the fledgling *mullas*.

Not too many years ago fanaticism toward infidels was expressed in a number of conspicuous ways. For example, the visiting foreigner might be cursed and spat at on the streets and would certainly be isolated at meal times, though the laws of hospitality would protect the infidel were he to penetrate into provincial or tribal areas (except during a period of actual warfare against foreign elements). Nowadays travelers to Afghanistan report the latent hostility toward the foreign infidel seems almost to have vanished, even in remote areas.

Although mystics have long had a role in Afghanistan, sometimes under the generic term of *sufi*, mysticism was far more prevalent in earlier years, when the dervish orders were very active, than it is today. *Sufis* are still to be found engaged in active lives or lost in isolated contemplation. Nonattachment to material things and concentration and meditation directed toward identification of the individual with the divine essence describes this type of religious experience. Its attraction persists and it is not considered unusual for a government official to give up his post and become a *sufi*.

Everyday religious expression centers around the execution of certain of the obligations of Islam, such as the five daily prayers, fasting, and charity. The Moslem prays in a mosque, in his home, or wherever he may happen to be at the set times. He may pray alone, he may be a member of an informal group, such as a bus load of passengers, or he may be a member of the congregation

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of a mosque, led by an *imam*. Facing Mecca as he prays, he creates his own island of privacy in the midst of noise and dust.

During the fasting month of Ramazan the Afghan neither eats, drinks, nor smokes from dawn until sunset. Tempers fray and the level of activity slows down, especially when the month, set by the lunar calendar, coincides with the torturing heat of summer.

Charity is dispensed through the clerics of various rank or directly to those in need. The measure of effectiveness of this pillar of Islam in Afghanistan is reflected in the fact that there is hardly a beggar to be found in the entire country. The normal course of daily activity offers outlets for religious expression. Verses from the Qur'an are frequently recited in appropriate connections, numerous work chants are based upon the repetition of the names of the *imams,* and the names of Allah and of Muhammad are frequently on the lips of the believers.

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CHAPTER 6

Social Structure and Education

UNLIKE INDIA, Afghanistan has no caste system. Both tribal society and Islamic tradition forbid such sharp distinctions in the value of different human beings and groups. In Allah's eyes all men are equal. In the eyes of men, however, there are social distinctions based on a variety of factors, and while they have no sharp delimitations and permit a certain amount of mobility, they fall clearly into the social pattern of the elite, the middle and lower groups, and those outside society.

The leader in tribal society is the *khan,* who is usually a member of the most aristocratic family group in the tribe, the *khan khel.* In most cases the *khan khels* have over the years increased their wealth as well as their prestige and collectively form a powerful sector of the Afghan upper class. Even within the settled areas and the towns it is generally these same families which have the highest position in the social scale. To them belong also the descendants of those who were rewarded by the nation's rulers with chief's titles and tribal lands in reward for loyal service or for political and personal reasons. To some degree comparable distinctions prevail among the village communities. The distinction of rulers and ruled shades off imperceptibly into that of the landlords and their tenants. But whatever the local variation the fact that some families or individuals have a special authority is recognized by the whole community.

Below the controlling groups are the common people. In tribal society these are by no means wholly subject to the leading families. Within some tribes they are very independent and jealous of their right to settle important issues, including the tenure of chieftainship itself, by the *jirgeh.* Others are accustomed

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to a more oligarchic type of management, and in some parts of the country the chiefs are recognized autocrats. But there is no real subject class among the tribes. Even the dependents (called *hamsayeh*) attached to some tribes and lacking the privilege of participating in the *jirgeh* are well treated by the tribes.

In the settled communities there are the usual distinctions of property ownership: some are small landowners, others have only subsistence acreage; many are tenants and some merely laborers. The storekeepers and artisans form a separate and fairly stable group. The beginning of a bourgeoisie as distinct from the working people can be discerned in the towns, where the distinctions between upper, middle, and lower classes have some significance. The middle class of traders, small-industry owners, shopkeepers, professional men, teachers, government employees, and specialists is growing slowly, along with a new class of servants and factory workers. These new groups form, however, a very small fraction of the total population. Except for the aristocracy and the few rich, who have their own means of transportation and are well attended by servants, there is little class consciousness among the townspeople. All use the same teahouses, ride the same buses, and attend the same markets and mosques.

The whole of Afghan society, in spite of its political aspect as an oligarchic state, appears to be permeated by a democratic spirit. In offices and shops there is a respectful attitude toward superiors, but overly polite and self-abasing figures of speech are not used. There is a general awareness of human dignity. Property rights relax before human rights in such customs as the exodus of families from Kabul on Fridays to picnic in orderly fashion in private and public gardens alike.

There are limited ways to display wealth. In rural areas, the symbols are abundant hospitality and fine horses; in towns, houses and gardens; in Kabul, automobiles and modern houses furnished with brightly upholstered, overstuffed furniture and expensive knick-knacks. Because social and class distinctions are not so rigid and depend on such a variety of factors, a strong personality has a wider field for self-assertion than in most underdeveloped states. Although the biggest handicap of the poor is lack of education, a bright boy of any social stratum is likely to be noted and given a chance for training at government expense. Even without that advantage, however, outstanding qualities are likely to lead to recognition and opportunity in this largely illiterate society.

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While Islam has had a singularly strong effect in keeping Afghan society free from rigid class distinctions, and tribal tradition has been mostly democratic in a primitive way, in the area of religion itself a development of prestige levels has taken place. From the simplest *mullas*, teaching the precepts of Islam in the villages and among the tribes, to the highest and most respected religious leaders, the spiritual hierarchy includes a social distance at least as great as that between a common school teacher or tradesman and a royal cabinet minister. The leaders of this hierarchy wield influence enough to be classed with the aristocracy of the country. By skillfully placing himself at the head of Afghanistan's religious community Abdur Rahman greatly enhanced the prestige of the crown. His successors lost some of this spiritual aura, but Nadir Shah restored it fully and emphasized it in the constitution of 1931 in a document which blends religious with national value-objects and religious rules of behavior with civic duties. It identified the ruler with a value-object on whose devotion and leadership all factions of the population are in basic agreement, who personifies their national unity, and who also represents the authority of Allah guiding them on earth.

Historians of Afghanistan are inclined to emphasize the supremacy of the Pushtuns over all other ethnic groups, and single out the Durranis as the tribe in which the supreme power is vested. This is true in a sense but may lead to the impression of an ethnically stratified society, with the Pushtuns as lords and the remaining ethnic groups their subjects. The fact that most high government officials are Pushtuns gives the latter a political advantage, but not absolute domination over other ethnic groups; at least no more than the Irish-Americans exercise over other Americans in some of our great cities. The political power of the Pushtuns and their cultural self-consciousness do, of course, provide special opportunity for individual advancement which other groups lack, due to a certain favoritism which slips into the choice of students for government training abroad, prized positions, and appointments to high office. But the competition from the very intelligent Tajiks is keen, and the government tries to give them and the leading members of other ethnic groups a chance to play a part in public life lest it lose their support.

Religion plays its role in whatever trace of ethnic stratification there is left in Afghanistan. Jews and Hindus are rarely found in important positions. But the antagonism of the orthodox Sunnis

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against the Shi'as is far less pronounced in Afghanistan than in most other Islamic states, and the Shi'a Qizil Bashes, for instance, are found in many government posts. The ruling clan does intend to retain control. If in high posts members of other ethnic groups are found, their status is representative, and secondary to that of the small circle of Muhammadzai Pushtuns who are the real rulers. The town-dwelling Tajiks, however, form most of the Afghan middle and upper-middle class, without whose cooperation Pushtun control could not be exercised in peaceful ways.

In urban society the bases and symbols of class distinction rest on money and power. The upper class consists first of the royal families of Nadir Shah and Amir Habibullah and then the high officials of the government, the great landlords, wealthy merchants, and powerful members of the religious hierarchy. Here the symbols of the elite are cars, money, and servants. The middle class includes civil servants, artisans and laborers, professional people, teachers, and clerks. The lowest group includes Hazara laborers, servants and musicians, and the garbage and waste collectors.

In the villages, prestige depends less on wealth and power, and more on the dignity of one's position. Here the upper class consists of the headmen, landowners, government officials, teachers, and merchants. The second class is that of the shopkeepers, who are a cut above the broad third class of the butchers, grocers, tenant farmers, carpenters, and masons. Below these classes are two groups still lower in scale, found with variations over the entire Middle East. Of the two, one is slightly higher than the other and includes the barbers, weavers, musicians, blacksmiths, well diggers, and coolies; the second, at the very bottom of the scale, contains the toilet cleaners and the gypsies. Such occupations are family affairs handed on, with the attached social stigma, from father to son. In the village age does not take precedence unless accompanied by another claim to respect, such as wealth, education, or personal worth. However, learning is a close contender with outstanding leadership in war, peace, or religion for the respect of the people. This need not always be formal schooling, but native intelligence and the wisdom that comes of experience.

Afghans seem to have ways of distinguishing a person's social status by his speech and his manner. Most Afghans go about in rather ragged clothing, from necessity and not from choice. Among many tribes, settled or nomadic, a wealthy man rarely

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dresses in much finer apparel than his fellows. Recently, however, Western clothes have become a sign of social distinction, as opposed to the national Afghan dress, and bear a direct relation to social and economic standing. In the streets of Kabul one may see every stage of the metamorphosis from the Afghan costume of baggy trousers, long shirt, and white turban, to a complete Western suit. First, a Western suit coat over the long shirt. Then, instead of the turban, a round, flat-topped karakul hat. Then, Western trousers with the shirttails tucked in. Finally, a necktie. This final stage of a European suit with a karakul hat is the standardized dress for government employees. In the villages, wearing a Western suit means that the person is literate. An illiterate man who wore one would be laughed at. On the other hand, if an educated man wore Afghan dress, his friends might laugh at him. In the government offices no one wears national dress, and most of the educated men wear it only in the country, on picnics, or on special national occasions. Among the urban women, Western dresses, nylon stockings, and lipstick are signs of social distinction.

The upper and upper-middle class homes are larger, better built, and better furnished than those of the others, though some religious leaders and important merchants live in great simplicity without any material sign of their status. The surest sign of social distinction is the behavior of others toward the individual in question, and his own bearing to them. The man with status, whether it be of authority or influence, is surrounded by people who are anxious to please him, carry out his slightest wishes, and pay their respects. On his side there is responsibility toward those who depend on him. A *khan* assembles his farmers in the morning to give orders; to those who need help on their own farms he sends his own employees. During the day, he makes the rounds of his property, inspecting and instructing. In the evening, he eats with his men in his own courtyard, where, after the meal, they all sit and talk and listen to the *khan's* radio. In his behavior toward inferiors, the man with status will be friendly but dignified. Afghan society favors familiarity between equals, but not between persons of widely different social levels. Respect for those distinguished by age, breeding, or achievement is inculcated from earliest childhood and rendered and accepted as a matter of course.

Another system of social stratification is found in tribal society. In each tribe there is generally recognition that one family group,

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the *khan khel,* provides the tribe with chiefs. Among the majority of the tribes chieftainship is hereditary. However, if the eldest son is considered unfit to lead the tribe in war and govern its affairs in peace, a younger brother or another member of the *khan khel* may be elected at the *jirgeh.* In some cases the chief may be selected from another family than the *khan khel,* and a few tribes choose an outstanding warrior apart from the chief to be their leader during a period of warfare. Although, therefore, the powers and privileges of khanship are limited and not necessarily permanent, a *khan* may take advantage of what he has to increase his own prestige, both by becoming as wealthy as possible himself and by boasting of the superiority of the tribe he leads.

Beneath the *khan khel,* in the endless ramification of clans and subclans, there is pride of tribal and clan affiliation. Some divisions carry more prestige than others. In settled communities tribal affairs often have little importance, but even here a person applying for identification papers must write down either his father's *khel* or his mother's—usually he chooses his father's. Often he will add his tribal name to his own, lest he be taken for a Tajik or a member of a less honored tribe.

The absence of clearly defined classes in tribal society naturally prevents intense class consciousness. The in-group is the tribe as a whole, and within that there often are clans and smaller subgroups in rivalry with each other, and even bitter blood feuds between families, but there is no distinct class consciousness.

Among the settled communities, those that have retained tribal organization have had their tribal sense of unity weakened by the increased power of their *khans,* who, as hereditary landlords, often develop an almost feudal relationship between themselves and the ordinary tribesmen. In the Tajik communities tribal organization has generally disappeared, and village organization has taken its place, usually along guild lines. There the *zamindars,* or landowners, are the natural leaders, but the people are generally on friendly terms with them and there is only limited exploitation of the population, many of whom own their own plot of land. Thus, instead of class consciousness there is a village or valley feeling of community. In the towns, where there is a beginning of class formation in the Western sense, class organization is still lacking. If there is anything that can be called class consciousness it might be that of the upper class which, like any aristocracy, is aware of its position and intends to hang on to it.

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In a society where classes are so rarely hostile to each other, one might expect a great deal of mobility and much contact between members of the different strata. There is no impenetrable wall between them, and except for the very top families of the society, it is relatively easy for tenants to get access to their landlords or for servants to approach their master or mistress with requests for help in their own troubles. But most social groups in Afghanistan are fairly self-contained as far as their social and marital contacts are concerned and each lives and moves primarily on its own level. The feeling of class distinctions finds its sharpest expression in the selection, by parents, of a marriage partner for a son or daughter. Men with long and distinguished pedigrees do not wish their sons to marry the daughters of upstarts, nor does the father of a wellborn daughter wish to give her to a husband of lower birth than hers. Wealth here often has no influence; there is a saying among the old rich that blood and bone are more valuable than material goods. In interclass marriages the general rule is that while men move up the social scale, women move down.

The self-containment of Afghanistan's class structure reflects the far older and more deeply rooted self-containment of the tribes, and of the ethnic groups to which they belong. Mobility from one ethnic group to another is rather low; although it has improved somewhat in recent times. The closest contact and mixing is between the Pushtuns and the Tajiks, both in towns and in the country. Between Uzbeks and Tajiks there has been a great deal of intermixture in the past, and in the settled districts of Qataghan and Badakhshan there are no sharp lines drawn between them. The government tries to minimize the differences between the ethnic groups, and constitutionally all race distinctions are abolished. The official position is that Pushtunwali governs social behavior in nearly all the ethnic groups.

The wealth of the country is already to a large extent concentrated in the hands of the big *khans* and *zamindars* throughout the land, and the merchants who control the country's major financial and industrial enterprises. Nevertheless, much wealth is distributed among large numbers of well-to-do pastoralists, many of whom are still nomads. The remainder of the population is relatively poor. Yet there is little protest against this uneven distribution of wealth, largely because Islam fosters a fatalistic attitude, and because the poor can conceive of no way of changing their situation.

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It lies in the nature of the country's economic development that the urban middle and working classes will increase in numbers far more rapidly than the upper class, and with this development a shift in their power relations is bound to take place. If the process is gradual the interests of the upper class may become increasingly identified with those of the upper middle class and conflict between the groups may be avoided. However, it is just as likely that political and economic power will become even more concentrated in the hands of a few as the nation's economic life comes under a regime of state capitalism.

In tribal society the primitive communalism geared to tribal organization is bound to become increasingly rare as tribal administration is replaced by government administration. Cooperative endeavors were not a part of Afghanistan's past and the development of voluntary associations and social organizations is of recent date. Informal groups, without organization but cohesive, have been in existence for some time. These include the followers who gather around individuals possessing reputations for religious wisdom and authority, and informal friendship groups. Members of the friendship groups meet in the bazaar to discuss mutual interests and hobbies, and since their association stems from daily contacts, some of these groups have the character of businessmen's clubs. More formal organizations are also to be found at Kabul. These include professional societies, social service organizations, literary societies, athletic associations, and the Afghan Boy Scout Association.

The foregoing discussion should make clear that the basis of social distinction in Afghanistan is almost invariably a combination of factors. Membership in a favored ethnic group or religious sect does not by itself give a man or a family social distinction. Wealth, if it is believed to be ill-gotten, may earn a man disrespect rather than prestige, and wealth unaccompanied by education or social graces may be an object of contempt. It is the intangibles of renowned ancestors, demonstrated capability, education, a reputation for piety, valor, hospitality, or character which carry high prestige among Afghans. If there is a combination of these with wealth or power, the basic factors are reinforced and prestige becomes firmly established, radiating out on family or even remote descendants. Education has traditionally represented the means by which a poor boy of a lower class could hope to rise to the middle class at least. It is significant that in recent years the expansion of

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facilities and opportunities has given education an importance in Afghan culture equal to, if not greater than, wealth and ancestry.

In the absence of any statistics, it is estimated that 10 percent of the males and some 2 percent of the females are literate, which would give an over-all figure of 6 percent. Until fairly recently education in Afghanistan was in the hands of the Moslem clergy, with emphasis upon learning passages from the Qur'an and becoming familiar with the moral precepts and practices of Islam.

In the local mosque schools the basic text was the *Panj Ganj* (Five Treasures) comprising sections devoted to moral lessons, to religious precepts and laws, and to the mildly didactic poetry of Hafiz, Sa'di, Shaykh 'Atar, Mahmud, and others. The use of the *Panj Ganj* meant, however, that children of six or seven were plunged directly into the lofty thought and involved metaphysics of the greatest poets and teachers of the older Moslem world.

Few of the pupils went on to the higher schools, or *madrasa*, which were located only in the larger towns. While the emphasis at the *madrasa* was still upon theology and its relation to life, there was considerable attention to philosophy and literature.

A turning point in Afghan education was the visit by Amir Habibullah to India in 1907. Impressed by the training in modern commerce, law, and similar subjects being given Moslem youth at Aligarh College near Delhi, Habibullah established a secondary school in Kabul, naming the school Habibiya for himself and instituting a curriculum that combined the traditional *madrasa* courses and those of European schools. Habibiya, which was to play a decisive role in training the generation now governing Afghanistan, had a predominantly Indian Moslem faculty. At the same time Habibullah founded a military school, with a faculty of Turkish officers. After World War I, the Ministry of Education, which replaced the original Council of Education, planned a rapid expansion. Amanullah founded three more secondary schools, each with a foreign language as its medium of instruction. The Istaqlal school, founded in 1922, had a French faculty. The Nejat school opened in 1924 with a German faculty, although it is now staffed by Afghans. The Ghazi school's original faculty was Anglo-Indian, but since 1942 British instructors have been employed, and in the same way American teachers have staffed Habibiya.

Currently the operations of the Ministry of Education are centralized at Kabul, but the ministry is represented in each of

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the fourteen provinces by a provincial director of education. The public school system functions on several levels—elementary, middle, secondary, vocational, and higher schools—offering free, and theoretically compulsory, education at all levels.

In 1960 there were 175,600 pupils in 1,110 elementary schools of whom 19,900 were girls. Nearly two-thirds of these schools are modernized versions of the *maktab* and go through the fourth grade, while the other elementary schools go through the sixth grade. The curriculum includes reading and writing Persian and Pushtu, arithmetic, religion, history, geography, natural sciences, handicrafts, practical agriculture, and physical training. In many areas the long vacation is scheduled for the period when the farm work is heaviest; in the mountainous regions, during the winter when snow abounds.

In 1960 some 11,300 students, of whom 2,500 were girls, attended seventeen middle schools and eighteen secondary schools. The middle schools take in grades seven through nine with a curriculum that includes Persian, Pushtu, Arabic, a foreign language, history, geography, economics, mathematics, religion, chemistry, physics, biology, handicrafts, and sports. The academic secondary schools, called *lycées*, prepare students for the university in grades ten through twelve, with a curriculum which is a continuation of that of the middle schools. These secondary schools are largely concentrated at Kabul which means that many students come as boarders from the provincial towns.

In 1960 there were thirty vocational schools with some 5,000 students, most of whom were young men. The Afghan government has pushed the development of this type of school in recent years; the majority are operated by the Ministry of Education, but a few come under other ministries. Included are normal schools, the Teacher's Training College (Dar al-Mu'allamin), the School of Agriculture, the School of Commerce, the School of Commerce and Administration for Girls, the Ibn Sina Experimental School, the School of Tradecraft, Schools of Mechanics, the Afghan Institute of Technology, and the School of Theology. Almost all these schools are in Kabul.

In 1946 the Puhantun, or the University of Kabul, incorporating a Faculty of Medicine which had been in existence since 1932 as well as several other faculties already operating, was established as an independent institution with its own rector, elected from among the deans of the faculties, and its own senate. The rector is

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responsible directly to the Minister of Education, rather than to that ministry's administrative machinery. Tuition is free and poorer students may receive free board and lodging. By 1960 some 1,700 male and female students were attending the faculties of Medicine, Medicine for Women, Law and Political Science, Literature, Literature for Women, Science, Science for Women, Theology, Agriculture, Engineering, Economics and Finance, Pharmacology, and the Institute of Education. A student pursues his entire four-year course with his chosen faculty (a six-year course in the case of the medical faculties), the curriculum of each faculty being complete and specially adapted to his needs.

Of the teaching staff of 171, some 48 faculty members were from foreign countries. Nearly all of the Afghan members of the Puhantun faculties are graduates of foreign colleges and universities. In addition, the Puhantun provides some thirty scholarships a year for members of its student body enrolled at universities abroad, and in any year there are at least 2,000 Afghans studying abroad. A considerable number of them are on scholarships supplied by foreign countries or by agencies of the government of Afghanistan. Convinced, however, that many of these young people go abroad at too early an age and with insufficient command of the foreign language of their studies, the government is moving toward a program in which the emphasis will be on postgraduate study in other countries for graduates of the Puhantun.

The extension of public education in Afghanistan is hampered by multiple problems, a number of which are economic. In spite of the fact that some 8 percent of the annual budget goes to the Ministry of Education, funds are lacking to construct schools in thousands of remote villages, with the result that only about 10 percent of the children eligible to enter the first grade are able to attend school. In addition, no provision is made for the education of the children of the nomadic tribes. School equipment is in short supply, and there is a great need for modern textbooks and library facilities. Teachers are in very short supply and so poorly paid that many look for extra jobs to supplement their incomes. Too much of the curriculum of the elementary schools is unrelated to the daily life of the people. Female education still lags way behind that of the males, and attrition features all education; only 3 percent of the pupils entering the first grade reach secondary school, and only one of every four secondary school students

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graduates. Finally, a program of adult education has been set up but is still in its infancy.

Keenly aware of its problems in education, the Afghan government has sought and received help from United Nations organizations, from private organizations, and from foreign countries. The United States, through the medium of the International Cooperation Administration (now the Agency for International Development), has made important contributions. Since 1955 staff members of Teachers College of Columbia University, working in Kabul, have aided in the development of the Institute for Education, sponsored English-language programs at secondary and university levels, supplied teachers of English, worked with the Ibn Sina Experimental School, and arranged to bring Afghan educators to the United States for specialized training. A team of specialists from the University of Wyoming has taken part in the development of the Afghan Institute of Technology, the School of Agriculture, and the faculties of Agriculture and Engineering at the Puhantun. Other assistance has come from the University of Illinois, which established an over-all relationship with the Puhantun, and the American aid program, which contributed half the cost of the erection of buildings on an extensive new campus for the Puhantun begun in 1960. UNESCO has also been very active in the fields of teacher training, fundamental education for rural areas, technical training, and science teaching.

In 1960 some 193,000 students were enrolled in schools in Afghanistan and abroad, a figure double that of a decade earlier. Over the last score of years higher education within Afghanistan and abroad has produced an impressive number of well-trained Afghans, the new intellectual class of the country, who are taking over more and more of the responsible, high-level posts in the government, but the numbers of this class must be greatly increased in order to meet the administrative needs of a developing economic system.

Qualitative training must stem from quantitative education, and the financial resources of the country militate against a much more rapid expansion toward the goal of universal education. In addition, a general philosophy of Afghan education requires formulation. In this field, unresolved questions include whether modern education is to be based upon Islamic principles, whether a spirit of free inquiry rather than an attitude of conformity is to be fostered, and whether education is to be concerned with preserving a static social system or preparing for social change.

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CHAPTER 7

The Role of the Family

MORE PERMANENT, enduring, and influential within the Afghan social structure than classes, interest groups, and social organization is the family, which in common with the family of all other tribal societies in the Middle East is extended, patrilineal, patrilocal, patriarchal, endogamous, and occasionally polygamous. The Afghan family is extended in that a household normally consists of the patriarch and his wife or wives, his unmarried children, and his married sons and their children. It is patrilineal in that descent is through the paternal side and family loyalty is to the paternal line. The married daughter of a family transfers complete allegiance to her husband's family. It is patrilocal in that the married sons live in the father's household rather than departing to establish homes of their own. It is patriarchal in that the eldest male possesses complete authority over the extended family. The family is endogamous to the extent that there is a preference for marriages within the extended family or with relatives of near degree. The family may be polygamous in that the male has religious sanction for marrying four wives; in practice most men have a single wife and very few men have more than two wives.

The Afghan family is the smallest unit in the expanding tribal structure, a structure that established the basis for settled, rural family organization. A family, called *khandan* (a Persian word) joins with its closely related families (*tabar* in Pushtu and *qum-o khish* in Persian) to form a clan. The clan bears the Persian name of *qabileh,* or is called *kam,* this latter term an Afghanization of *qum.* The clan joins with other clans to form a subtribe, which, in its turn, unites with other subtribes to form a tribe. The tribes and subtribes are called *ilyat* (Turkish), *khel* (Persian), or *zai* (Pushtu), and the second and third of these designations may form a suffix in tribal names.

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For centuries family names were not the type familiar in the Western world in which a fixed name descends through generations. Instead, the pattern was that of the Arabic (and Semitic) system of accretion of patronymics. That is, a man would be identified by the name of his grandfather, his father, and himself, each of whom had been given a Moslem name. Thus, Muhammad ibn (son of) Mahmud ibn 'Ali. His son would change this name as follows: Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Mahmud—dropping off the name of his great-grandfather. Position and prestige were indicated by adding Khan to the end of the name. This system of nomenclature remains in vogue: typical names of members of the National Council are Ahmad 'Ali Khan, Muhammad Musa Khan, and Muhammad Yusuf Khan. Obviously, identical names may be borne by a number of individuals in each of the larger towns.

However, influences are at work to establish standardized family names. According to one approach the individual selects the place of his birth as the permanent last name of his family: for example, Abdul Majid Zabuli. Another method is to adopt part of an older honorary title as the name: Muhammad Khan Nizami. A third method is the formal adoption of the tribal origin of the family as its name: Muhammad Bashir Ludin. A number of the Afghan students who have gone abroad have resorted to this solution, in spite of the fact that they themselves are two or three generations removed from tribal life. A final method favored by the younger generation of scholars and government officials is the deliberate choice of a name which has a special appeal to them, almost always with a poetical connotation, such as Ahmad 'Ali Kohzad, with the final word meaning mountain-born.

The extended family household normally includes a man or several brothers, their wives, married sons and their wives, and unmarried children. This patrilineal extended family exercises joint ownership over most property. Among sedentary peoples, joint family property consists of the dwelling or dwellings occupied by members of the family but also includes gardens and cultivated fields, livestock, the plows and other equipment needed to till the fields, as well as household furnishings and utensils. Among the nomads, joint family property consists chiefly of tents, livestock, household furnishings, and weapons.

Among the settled peoples the extended family occupies a single house or a cluster of houses within a walled compound. Each married couple has a room in the house or, if the family is pros-

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perous, a house within the family compound. In the country districts, this compound is often actually a small rectangular fort with watchtowers at each corner. The flat-roofed dwellings, usually one story high but often with two stories or even three, are backed against the surrounding wall and face a central courtyard. Usually meals for the extended family are prepared in common by the women of the family; occasionally each married couple has its own hearth and unmarried adults take their meals with one or another of the married couples.

Among the nomads, the size of the encampment varies according to the season. During the summer, when the nomads take their flocks and herds into the high mountain meadows for grazing, the encampment is the equivalent of the extended family household of the settled people. The father and mother and unmarried children occupy one tent, and each of the married sons has a tent for his wife and children. When a man has more than one wife, each wife occupies a separate tent. During the winter a number of related families set up their tents near one another.

Child rearing is based on experience, rather than on any system. Babies are breast-fed and never drink cow's milk. While he is nursing, he is allowed to suck his fingers and thumbs, or a rubber nipple filled with a sweet liquid. When he can chew, he may have a dry cookie. While a baby is eating soft food, his mother feeds him. When he is old enough to eat with the family, his father teaches him table manners.

Until they go to school, children go to bed when they feel sleepy and get up when they wake in the morning. From noon to three or four in the afternoon, nearly everyone naps, although children are allowed to play. The boys help their fathers in such matters as painting the house or cleaning snow from the roof, but they never work in the house. Little girls help their mothers and play with dolls. Boys make mud pies and play games. One popular game resembles blindman's buff, another both baseball and cricket. Boys will also ride sticks as horses, running with them and fighting. The older boys play marbles and ball games, fly kites, and roll hoops made of tire rims. The kites fly on strings to which pieces of glass are attached, the object being to do battle with other kites by cutting their strings.

When they are small, girls and boys play together. When they are ten years old, or so, they separate, the boys to play only with boys, and the girls with girls. Although Afghan culture does not

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provide for a period of courtship nor for casual friendship among boys and girls of marriageable age, meetings between adolescent boys and girls do take place. Since cousin marriage is preferred, prospective mates have often known each other from childhood. Although marriage is forbidden between cousins dwelling in the same joint family household, there is a good deal of visiting back and forth between related households, so that boys and girls have considerable opportunity to see each other from a respectful distance, and even to exchange glances of mutual approbation. There are also opportunities for establishing rapport outside the kinship circle. In the family, marriage celebrations and other ceremonial occasions permit young people who are related only distantly by blood or by marriage to see each other and form opinions. There are ways, moreover, for boys to meet girls clandestinely, although this is difficult, and, to the girl, dangerous. In the town a boy might wait for a girl outside her school and walk home with her. He may call her on the telephone and write letters to her. Afghan love letters are sentimental and poetic, filled with quotations from popular love poetry and decorated with flowers and pierced hearts.

The Moslem religion insists on virginity in marriage. The sentence for prostitution is so harsh that prostitution is rare, and where it exists, extremely furtive. A man who found that his bride was not a virgin would divorce her immediately. An illegitimate child is a terrible disgrace both to the girl and to her family, but though the girl might kill herself, she would never have an abortion. The punishment for female adultery is death, although the penalty is no longer inflicted in the urban areas.

Marriage is arranged by the family and among the townsmen is sometimes contracted between a boy as young as fifteen and a girl as young as twelve. More frequently, however, a man does not marry until the age of eighteen or twenty, a girl until the age of sixteen or eighteen. Because of the expenses involved in a wedding, men often cannot afford to marry until the age of thirty or forty, and an unmarried girl of twenty-five is not unusual. If a young man sees a girl whom he would like to marry, he speaks to his mother, who in turn broaches the matter to the father. If a family conclave finds the match suitable, the girl's family is approached; if they approve, a marriage is arranged. Usually, however, the women of the family of a marriageable young man inquire around for a suitable bride, and when they have fixed on one, the men

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approach the family of the girl and make cautious representations. If the girl's family demurs, asserting that she is too young for marriage, or that they cannot part with her, this means that they do not approve of the match, and the boy's relatives retire without loss of face. If, on the other hand, the girl's parents aver that they cannot make up their minds, this is interpreted to mean that they are agreeable, but do not wish to appear too eager.

Once the marriage has been agreed upon, negotiations over the marriage settlement are begun. The groom's family pays a bride price to the girl's family. Payment of a bride price is not to be interpreted as buying the girl as one would chattel. In Afghanistan, as in all Moslem countries, marriage is a contract, and the bride price is the consideration which validates the contract. The dowry which the bride receives from her family is also itemized in the marriage contract. This dowry, which is often equivalent in value to that of the bride price, becomes the joint property of the newly married couple, and is inherited by their children. Once these details are settled there may be an elaborate engagement ceremony and tea party, formal visits of the boy's family to the girl's family to arrange the wedding date, and visits to exchange gifts.

During the marriage ceremony conducted by a *mulla*, the bride and groom may be separated by a curtain and so would not see each other, but it is usual for the groom to see the bride's face at this time. After the ceremony the men leave for the groom's house, while the women bathe and dress the bride. At dawn the groom takes her in a ceremonial procession to his home.

At a country wedding almost the whole village will be on hand. All of them must be fed, and there must be music and entertainment. Since this is the general practice, a family which is not rich must go into debt to pay for such a celebration.

Under Islamic law a man is permitted to have four wives concurrently, and as many concubines as he wishes. Actually, because of the high bride price, most men in Afghanistan can afford only one wife. The prosperous head of an extended family group may have one or two supplementary wives, the widows of his brothers or cousins, whom he has married as an obligation. A man may take a second wife if his first wife is barren, or a young wife when the first one grows old. For the most part, however, a man has only one wife, and monogamous marriage is preferred by the educated upper class.

For a very long time the women of the towns of Afghanistan lived

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in seclusion and when they went out of their homes wore a veil, usually the *borqa'*, a tent-like garment that covered the entire body to the tips of the toes and permitted vision only through a net or embroidered panel in front of the eyes. In the summer of 1959 the government encouraged women to discard the veil, although it may still be worn should the woman and her family so desire. Now the urban women go out with a light shawl tied over their heads, and discard it indoors.

Women have subordinate status and are subject to their husbands, having to ask permission to go visiting and never going out to visit alone except to their parents' houses. In shops, they are waited on first; comparatively few go to the theater or to athletic events. Despite these restrictions Afghan women, far from being mere chattels and slaves of their lords and masters, have a voice in family affairs and may, through their husbands, exert considerable influence outside the home. The wife of a chief among some of the Hazara tribes occupies much the same position among the women of the group as her husband does among the men. She makes it a point to know all the women under his jurisdiction and to familiarize herself with their problems. Formerly, tribal women took an active part in warfare as commissariats for the troops, bringing up food and ammunition to their husbands and brothers. Occasionally, if the fighters were hard pressed, a woman might seize a gun and join in the fighting. There are records of women, the wife or sister of a chief, who in time of crisis led troops into action.

Most of the women in Afghanistan are illiterate; schools for girls are a rather recent innovation and only a few girls have had an opportunity to attend them. However, long before the opening of the first girls' school, some women received educations, either from father or tutor. Now many young women go from secondary schools to work in government offices, in stores, and in factories, or as airline stewardesses.

Under Islamic law, a husband may obtain a divorce simply by saying, "I divorce you." If he repeats the formula three times, he cannot remarry his wife until she has been married to and divorced by another man. Under certain circumstances, a woman can receive a divorce and the return of her dowry. However, divorce is not so easy as it may sound. Among some of the Hazara tribes, for example, divorce is not permitted at all. Elsewhere there is strong feeling against divorce which is reinforced by financial considerations, since divorce means loss of all or part of the bride

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price. In most parts of Afghanistan divorce is very infrequent because it is socially disapproved; it is resorted to only when no other solution seems possible.

Normally the joint family household includes only three generations: brothers, their sons, and their grandchildren. When a family becomes inconveniently large, the family property is divided more or less equally among the brothers or sons; the eldest retains the paternal dwelling, while younger brothers establish new households. Such a division normally occurs after the death of the head of the family. Among the Hazaras, where cultivable land is scarce, the family landholdings are frequently kept intact when the family subdivides; the elder sons continue to hold the land jointly and to occupy the ancestral dwelling, while the younger sons take their share of the family property in movable goods and go to seek their fortunes elsewhere.

A widow, according to Islamic law, inherits a ninth share of the family property. Actually, she is always assured of a home and maintenance from her deceased husband's brothers or from her sons. Among many of the peoples of Afghanistan a young widow normally marries the younger brother of her deceased husband, or some other near relative who will care for the children and administer the property of the deceased until the sons reach their majority. Some of the settled peoples allow the widow a choice in the matter. She may wish to marry the husband's brother, in which case he is obligated to marry her; she may choose to marry outside her husband's family; or she may prefer not to remarry. Whatever her choice, her husband's family stands ready to care for her and her children, and her deceased husband's share in the family property will pass to her sons when they come of age.

According to Islamic law a daughter's share of family property is half that of a son's but in Afghanistan there seems to be some flexibility in practice. Normally, when a daughter marries, she receives her portion of the family property in the form of a dowry which becomes the property of the new family created by the marriage. If a father dies leaving unmarried daughters, the family property is divided in a way which enables the eldest son to provide dowries for his sisters.

The joint family pattern among the pastoral nomadic tribes is similar to that among the settled people. The pavilion-shaped black tent of the southern nomads may be large enough to accommodate an extended family, or there may be small, single-family

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tents. The dome-shaped, felt-covered *yurt* characteristic of the tribes dwelling north of the Hindu Kush normally accommodates only a single family. As each son marries, he receives his portion of the joint family property; he is provided with a tent of his own, made for him by the extended family group, and he receives his share of the family livestock. His bride's dowry may include a tent as well as livestock and household furnishings, which represent her share of her family property. The new family, equipped with its own tent, livestock, and furnishings, normally remains in the encampment of the bridegroom's father. When the herds belonging to an extended family become too numerous for grazing from a single encampment, one or more sons or grandsons branch off to form a family encampment of their own. Thus, among the nomads, as each son marries a new household is formed, and there is a partial division of the joint property of his family. This does not, however, stop the larger extended family of the encampment from continuing to function as an economic unit.

The Afghan family is not only an economic unit, exercising joint control of productive property, it is also a tightly knit social unit. The eldest male, whether father or eldest brother, is head of the family; as such he is responsible for the administration of family property and for the behavior of all members of the family. The eldest female, who is usually the wife of the head of the family but who may, on occasion, be his widowed mother, directs the activities of the women of the household, holds the keys to the larder, and otherwise is responsible for the management of the home. Other members of the household are subordinate to these two individuals. The head of the family and his wife or mother are responsible for the day-to-day administration of family affairs. Critical decisions, however, are discussed by all adult members of the family—not only those residing in the household, but a wider circle of relatives. The choice of a mate for a son or daughter, the amount of the bride price or dowry, a decision to buy or sell land—all of these call for lengthy discussion among the kin. The head of the family may have a strong voice in the discussion, and he will act as spokesman in announcing the decision, but the decision itself represents a family consensus, and all members of the family are bound to share it.

Almost everything an individual does is a matter of concern to the family, for in this society the family is judged by the behavior of its individual members. A child is expected to be well-behaved;

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he must be quiet and respectful in the presence of adults. He must be polite to guests, and he must never lie or steal. Social conformity is achieved through such pressures as deliberate isolation or physical punishment. When an older child misbehaves, he is given a lecture in which it is stressed that his behavior reflects upon the good name of the family. To maintain the good name of the family is paramount, and this is instilled from childhood in every individual. The family is punished for the crime of the individual: it is jointly responsible for payment of fines or of compensation for injuries and a penalty of exile applies not only to the tribal criminal but to his family. All members of the family enjoy the prestige that accrues from the admirable behavior of one of its members.

Although there is comparatively little opportunity for individualistic activities in Afghan society, the individual does have the security resulting from family solidarity. His actions may be restricted by family pressures to conform, but his family also protects him and helps him. Nepotism is not looked on with disfavor in Afghanistan. It is taken for granted that if a man has connections he will use them to aid a relative. The Afghan without a family is indeed alone.

Family solidarity is reflected in interpersonal relationships. Some Afghan fathers are friendly with their children, some are aloof. All, however, demand complete obedience and respect. The father is a boy's companion from infancy. When a little boy is old enough, his father will teach him to play games and take him on picnics. Sometimes the relationship is deeply affectionate. One father might kiss his children, and another might feel shy at such demonstration. Nevertheless, boys stand in awe of their fathers and will not talk freely or joke in their presence. Among villagers and tribesmen the son, as soon as he reaches a certain age, works under his father's direction. In the evenings, particularly during the long winter evenings, the father may tell stories about the family ancestors or events of long ago. Hospitality is an important part of life in Afghanistan. If there are guests, the sons may listen to the stories or music which form the entertainment. Altogether, there appears to be a sharing of experiences between father and son which permits affection to lessen the distance imposed by respect.

The father is in charge of the discipline and punishment. For this reason the mother can be more indulgent, and the children may try to take advantage of her. The mother cares for the child from

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its infancy, although some families have nursemaids. She, or the father, might teach the child to read the Qur'an in the home and she will sing lullabies and tell stories. The mother appears to be closer to her children than the father, since she is with them more during their childhood, and is always at home when needed. Her interests being centered in the home and family, she is able to devote more time, attention, and sympathy to her offspring. Consequently it is usually to the mother that the son or daughter turns for support when there are family problems.

Relationships between brothers are tempered by age differences. A brother much older is a remote person: respect is due him and there is little occasion for companionship. Boys tend to play with cousins or other boys of their own age rather than with older or younger brothers, and as they grow older a latent feeling of rivalry seems to develop among the brothers who are heirs to the family property, and younger brothers may resent the eldest brother who will become head of the family.

The brother-sister relationship, on the other hand, is a very close one. After the death of the father the brother looks after the welfare of his married sister, and it is the brother's home which she visits with her children. These happy relationships between brother and sister and between brother and sister's children are traditional in Central Asian culture.

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CHAPTER 8

Art and Literature

THE CENTURIES-LONG HISTORY of Afghanistan is reflected in numerous standing architectural monuments, the important finds from excavations, and a quantity of carefully preserved objects of art. Several prehistoric sites, including some caves, have been partially excavated, largely by members of the French Archaeological Mission to Afghanistan. The material evidence is still too limited, however, to establish a clear picture of the earliest cultures and the interrelationship of such sites.

The oldest historic site is Surkh Kotal, situated in the north between Pol-i-Khumri and Baghlan. Four flights of stone steps lead up a hillside to a sanctuary, or temple, at the top, where a square structure, its roof originally supported by four columns, stood in a courtyard. Still in dispute is the date of a unique inscription in the Bactrian language, cut in Greek characters on a slab of stone, which tells of the efforts of a governor to create a supply of water for the sanctuary of Kanishka the Victorious, a ruler known as the builder of Buddhistic shrines.

Nearly all the Buddhistic sites of the country lie along, or adjacent to, the great Buddhist pilgrimage road from China to India, and in particular on that section of the route between Balkh and the Khyber Pass. However, near Qandahar is a rock-cut edict of the ruler Asoka, patron of Buddhism, of about 250 B.C. In the Buddhistic centuries the area from the Kabul valley to the Indus was known as Gandhara. The artistic and architectural remains of this region are commonly ascribed to the school of Gandharan art and called Graeco-Buddhistic from their apparent fusion of Hellenistic and Indian influences. With a Graeco-Bactrian king ruling at Hadda until 65 A.D. it is natural to expect Hellenistic influences, but scholars remain puzzled over the origin of the

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Buddhist iconography and the relative chronology of the various monuments.

Along the pilgrimage road from the Khyber Pass to Balkh the principal types of monuments were the *stupa*, or solid mound enclosing relics of the Buddha, and the *sangharama*, or monastery. The monasteries, which included chapels, a dormitory, and other service units, were usually built around an open court in the center of which rose a *stupa*. Rock-cut grottoes also served as chapels and living quarters for the monks. The many bas-reliefs decorating buildings, caves, and *stupas* were carved in schist (the local blue-gray granite) or plaster, both of which were originally painted in bright colors. Five miles to the south of Jalalabad at the important site of Hadda, French archaeologists have excavated at least six *stupas* and parts of their enclosing monasteries. From the monasteries at this vast site came literally thousands of plaster heads of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, soldiers, demons, monks, and donors. These heads came from figures that had stood as bas-reliefs within framing arcades and whose bodies had been constructed of molded earth coated with a thin wash of plaster. Certain of the pieces are extremely close to very much earlier Greek and Hellenistic prototypes, and it must be assumed that Graeco-Bactrian artisans had executed these prototype forms in the same manner for a long, long time. Some of the finds from the site have been ascribed to the third century A.D., other pieces may be from the fifth century.

Up in the Ghorband valley, the site called Fonduqistan overlooks the point where the stream of that name flows into the Ghorband river. Digging uncovered a Buddhist sanctuary in the form of a square hall of mud-brick, whose walls were lined with niches. The excavators cleared the debris from some ten of these niches to find that each had walls covered with mural paintings and one or more figures in high relief fastened to the rear wall with wooden dowels. These figures had been modeled on a crude wooden armature from a mixture of clay, horsehair, and straw. With wall surfaces and figures painted in tones of blue, red, green, white, and black, each niche displayed a harmonious composition. The faces of some of the figures appear to have been overlaid with gold leaf and the figures themselves offered a range of subjects, including seated Buddhas, female attendants, Bodhisattvas, Naga kings, and a man and woman reclining against cushions. Dated to the seventh century, the style of the figures shows little Hellenistic influence

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and those figures with wasp waists and exaggerated hips and breasts appear to be much closer to the post-Gupta work of India proper than to the work at Hadda.

Just across the Hindu Kush to the north is the justly renowned Bamiyan valley. Bamiyan was a logical halting place on the caravan route, but it owed its historical and cultural fame to the existence of a vertical cliff of conglomerate that was an endless challenge to the stone carvers of these centuries. Buddhist monks and converts seem to have enjoyed this site from the second through the ninth centuries and to have engaged actively in artistic enterprises from the second to the seventh. Visitors to the site are awed by the two huge rock-cut Buddhas and impressed by the long series of rock-cut grottoes. Most striking is the 170-foot Buddha. One hand was originally raised in the gesture of reassurance, but this hand is gone and the face and legs have been badly mutilated. Dowel holes are all that remain of the system by which a plaster garment was draped over the stone figure—a garment we know was gilded, for Hiuan-tsang, a Chinese monk, writes of the dazzle of gold it gave off. Some 400 yards to the east the second Buddha in its deep niche rises to a height of 115 feet. Its execution is less careful than that of the larger twin and it is assumed to be considerably earlier in date. Although the features are badly damaged there are traces of the blue and red color of the drapery. Fragments of paintings cling to the walls of the niche, the best preserved section being in the vaulted area over the figure's head, where a lunar god is drawn in his chariot by winged horses.

In addition to their mural paintings, the grottoes are carved with imitations of such functional elements of a freestanding building as cupolas, lantern roofs of overlapping beams, and wall arcades. The earlier work at the site is markedly Hellenistic, or Graeco-Buddhistic, in character, while the later decoration is strongly influenced by Sasanian themes and motifs. When this latter current of influence is very strong the works are said to be in the Kushano-Sasanian style. This style is epitomized at Dukhtar-i-Nushirwan, some twenty miles north of Bamiyan, in a mural depicting a princely hunter. In Qunduz, at the site of a settlement where Hiuan-tsang saw ten monasteries, a partially excavated monastery yielded seven plaster heads which appear to reflect stronger Hellenistic characteristics than the typical Gandharan art at Hadda.

From the seventh through the eleventh centuries the distinctive forms of Moslem architecture were evolving in many lands. In

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each country taken over by the Arabs, existing structures were summarily converted into mosques; near Balkh a mosque was built within the extensive complex of an idol temple. When the Moslems began to build permanent mosques they adapted the architecture in vogue in each land and employed local craftsmen. The essential elements of such a mosque included the open court with arcades on one or more sides, and the covered sanctuary area within which was the *mihrab*, or prayer niche, so placed that worshipers always face Mecca. Historians record the construction of a *masjid-i-jami'* or "congregational mosque" at Balkh in 742 A.D., and write that many towns had mosques of timber or of baked brick during the eighth and ninth centuries.

It was not until the beginning of the eleventh century, when Mahmud established the Ghaznavid empire, that Islamic art began to flourish in Afghanistan. Architecture now concentrated on palaces, mosques, and tombs. Mahmud's absorbing interest was in Ghazni, and in 1018 he ordered the construction of a mosque of granite and porphyry, as well as a library to house books brought from all parts of his realm. Connected with the mosque was a *dar al-fonon* (house of learning), provided with funds to support both teachers and students. He had a dam built on the Navar river to irrigate Ghazni and to provide water for his *bagh-i no* (new garden) and *takht-i firuzeh* (turquoise palace). He embellished other towns of his realm with mosques and gardens, and his palace at Balkh was decorated with murals portraying the Sultan feasting, girded for battle, etc.

Mahmud died in 1030, and his son Mas'ud erected a magnificent monument for his father in the small village of Rauza-i-Sultan, about two miles northeast of Ghazni. Only the tombstone has survived—a triangular prism of marble resting on a rectangular base and covered with a splendid Arabic inscription giving the exact day and hour of Mahmud's death. Along the road to the tomb are two minarets believed to have been erected by two of the final rulers of the line, Bahram Shah and Mas'ud III. Stellar in plan and enriched with decorative brickwork in a variety of patterns, these towers are nearly one hundred feet high without their crowning features, which have long since fallen.

In 1955 an Italian expedition, sponsored by the Center for Excavations and Archaeological Research in Asia, began excavations at Ghazni. Mud-brick walls of mosques, a palace, and a large private house have been uncovered, along with innumerable fragments of

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applied decoration in plaster and marble. Noteworthy are the marble slabs carved with a variety of pictorial scenes. Of great interest has been the amount and variety of glazed pottery found in the excavations of types common to Iranian sites but not previously found in Afghanistan in any quantity, including the so-called Nishapur pottery and the metallic lusterwares commonly associated with Ravy and Kashan in Iran.

At the juncture of the Helmand river and its important tributary, the Arghandab, some 300 miles southwest of Ghazni, lies the site of Bust, known today as Qal'eh Bist. Below the ruins of the Ghaznavid citadel stands a splendid arch of fired brick with decorative patterns of the same material—probably the only surviving element of an important mosque constructed in this period. Less than four miles to the north of Bust, near the modern town of Lashkari Bazaar, are the extensive remains of a winter residence and military camp of the Ghaznavid rulers. The French delegation's excavations continue there from season to season. Three fortified palaces, largely of mud-brick, border the Helmand. Excavations at the southernmost palace revealed a fully developed four-*ivan* plan. From the principal entrance, at the south, a spacious corridor leads into a vast open court. The mid-point of each side of the court is marked by an *ivan,* a long, rather narrow hall covered with a tunnel vault. The *ivan* on the north side of the court opens into a reception chamber which leads into the throne room, or audience hall, of the sultans. At one place is a small mosque, certainly for the ruler's private devotions, whose walls are decorated with patterns in brick and inscriptions from the Qur'an. The plastered surfaces of the inner rectangle once bore the painted figures of some fifty of the sultan's Turkish guard. All the features have been deliberately damaged at some later period, but the figures themselves are quite well preserved and bear a direct stylistic relationship to frescoes of the Buddhistic period in Afghanistan.

During the Timurid period, which began at the end of the fourteenth century, architectural masterpieces, monumental in scale and delicate in detail, reflected the personal interest of the reigning family. Timur himself, Shah Rukh and his wife Gowhar Shad, and Husayn Bayqara encouraged and supervised the artists and architects to such an extent that the cities of Afghanistan became brilliant with palaces, mosques, and shrines. Unlike the majority of the structures of the earlier Moslem centuries, which had been constructed within crowded quarters of existing towns, the Timurid

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tombs, mosques, and *madrasa* were designed to be admired from all sides. Two elements were standard features of such monuments: extremely tall minarets and bulbous domes raised on cylindrical drums. New materials and techniques appeared, some of them reflecting Chinese and Hindu influence, with marble, alabaster, granite, and jade being used to sheathe the structural fabric of the monuments. Pressed paper was applied to plaster and then painted with bright colors, or painted and gilded patterns were executed directly upon stark white plaster. Plaster stalactites hung in heavy clouds above the corner angles of square rooms and in the heads of lofty *ivans*.

Color was king, both in the painted interiors and in the polychrome mosaic faïence which sheathed the exterior walls. The task of cutting, fitting, and installing these mosaic faïence panels took several years for each structure, but the result was of amazing brilliance. Dark and light blue predominated but several other tones provided accents, and in the bright sun of the region surfaces sparkled and gleamed.

Under Shah Rukh and Husayn Bayqara, Herat was magnificently embellished. Shah Rukh rebuilt the citadel of Ikhtiyat, to the north of the town, and in 1428 reconstructed the shrine of Guzargah, the resting place of Khwaja Abdullah Ansari. The inner court is brilliant and sparkling, crowded to overflowing with intricately carved tombstones and grave slabs, some in white marble and some in a very dark gray granite.

Unique and productive was the long association of Gowhar Shad, wife of Shah Rukh, and the architect Qavam ad-din of Shiraz. In 1417 Gowhar Shad ordered construction begun at Herat on two structures of great size and elegance: a *musalla,* a structure or place for public worship, and a *madrasa.* Two lofty minarets flanked the front façade of the *madrasa,* and there was a minaret at each of the four corners of the *musalla.* The interior of Gowhar Shad's own mausoleum, which was skillfully fitted into one corner of the *madrasa,* consisted of a square chamber, with axial niches, crowned by a very shallow dome. All interior surfaces are decorated with lace-like patterns in blue and red pigment, and with gold leaf. A protecting brick dome covers the inner dome, and above it a third, exposed dome with organ-pipe fluting in blue faïence rises from a high circular drum. Eight Timurid princes were buried here, and finally Gowhar Shad herself. As late as 1885 these structures were fairly well preserved, but then all

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sections except the mausoleum and the minarets were deliberately razed to create a clear field of fire in preparation for a threatened attack on the town.

Husayn Bayqara, in his turn, ordered the erection of a hospital, a covered bazaar, and other less elaborate structures at Herat. Immediately adjacent to the *musalla* and *madrasa* of Gowhar Shad he built a *madrasa* of his own, with four minarets. Five of all those Timurid minarets at Herat still stand to heights of nearly one hundred and fifty feet.

In Balkh, repopulated to a limited degree after the Mongols razed it to the ground, there are two mausoleums of this period. One, the so-called tomb of Khwaja Aqa Shah, is badly ruined and its outer dome has fallen. The other structure was once part of a complex which honored Khwaja Abu Nasr Muhammad Parsa, a renowned mystic who died at Balkh in 1460. The arcades of the great court have vanished and the *ivan* portal which led into it is in ruins. The mausoleum opposite the *ivan* remains, impressive in size and brilliant in decoration, its colorful faïence slowly peeling away from the fabric.

At nearby Mazar-i-Sharif, a town named for its "noble tomb," is a magnificent and very extensive complex of buildings marking the alleged site of the sepulchre of 'Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. According to tradition all record and memory of the burial had vanished until the sepulchre came to light in the twelfth century. After the shrine erected at that time had been demolished, supposedly by Chengiz Khan, Husayn Bayqara commanded the erection of a splendid mausoleum, which has been completely enclosed by a series of later additions. In its present state the central mass of the shrine is surrounded by a very spacious open court bounded by a square of walls, each of which is pierced by an important gateway. All exterior wall surfaces are faced with tile, a light blue-green tone predominating. The effect is one of unparalleled magnificence, yet this vast shrine remains practically unknown outside of Afghanistan.

Arts other than architecture also flourished in the Timurid period. At Herat and other centers many artisans were active in turning out fine work in bronze, stone, and wood. Two bronze candlesticks, inlaid with silver and gold and bearing the name of Timur, have survived, one in the Louvre, the other in the Hermitage Museum. Many other unsigned and undated bronzes of the period are known. Stone carving was also important. It is certain that much of the

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output was the work of Hindu stonemasons assembled by Timur after the conquest of Delhi. Columns and colonettes of marble and alabaster were wrought for religious and secular buildings, and great care was given to the design and execution of tombstones. The exposed surfaces of these stone slabs bear allover floral patterns in which the peony and the lotus are most conspicuous. While the floral patterns stem from the Ghaznavid tradition of stone carving, the delicate detail and the emphasis on a flat frontal plane display the influence of woodcarving technique. Carved wood was employed for doors, and a contemporary historian has described a "carved mosque" which took its name from the fact that the walls and ceilings were adorned with Chinese designs formed from strips of wood carved and fitted together.

The marvelous development of book illumination and illustration was a major feature of the fifteenth century. Herat was the center of this work, and its production reflects the influence of individual masters of great technical skill. Compositions display a decorative rather than a realistic grouping of figures. Details of architecture, costumes, and growing forms are executed precisely and minutely. Although landscape is always treated as background for subject matter rather than as dominant motif, mountains, trees, and sky are painted with loving care. The subjects seem crystallized into static and unlifelike scenes, for the artists avoided true perspective, the use of shadows, and the plastic modeling of figures, and the faces are usually devoid of expression. In all these miniatures the colors are very brilliant and pure, and are applied in flat tones.

The greatest luminary of the miniature style, Bizhad, was born at Herat about 1440. After many years of production at the Timurid court he was taken to Tabriz by Shah Isma'il, the Safavid conqueror of Herat, and remained there as court painter and chief librarian until his death in about 1529. Countless miniatures were once ascribed to his hand, but recent scholarship has narrowed this field to a number of signed pages and to a few other pictures which bear the unmistakable mark of his personal style. A copy of the *Bustan* of Sa'di, now in the Royal Egyptian Library at Cairo, contains four miniatures, each signed by Bizhad, as well as a double-page frontispiece portraying a banquet held by Sultan Husayn Bayqara that is certainly by the master. A *Zafar nameh* written in 1467 for Sultan Husayn Bayqara contains six magnificent double-page paintings of such scenes in the life of Timur as the

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king enthroned in a garden or supervising the construction of a mosque. These paintings are unsigned, but are generally ascribed to Bizhad. He had great influence upon his contemporaries at Herat, and some work of one disciple, Qasim 'Ali, has survived.

Other miniaturists at Herat developed distinctive styles of their own. Among them was Nasr Allah Abu'l-Ma'ali, who illustrated a manuscript of the fables of the *Kalilah wa Dimnah* now in the Gulistan Palace at Tehran. A painting of surpassing charm is associated with the Herat school and possibly with the painter Amir Khalil, also known as Ghiyath ad-din. This painter, a member of an embassy sent by Shah Rukh to the court of China, kept a diary of his travels. The painting in question, done on silk, shows the meeting of the Prince Humay of Iran with the Princess Humayun of China in a garden bursting with fruit trees in blossom and a whole catalogue of exquisitely drawn flowers.

Although several artists did careful portrait drawings of their patrons, interest was concentrated on the illustration of historical and poetical works of renown. Such an illustrated manuscript was the joint work of the painter and the calligrapher. Calligraphy was, however, an art in its own right, and the master calligraphers took advantage of the infinite variety inherent in the Arabic alphabet to develop a number of different styles of flowing script. Such masters as Mir 'Ali, who was in the service of Timur, evolved the *nasta'liq*, more elegant, polished, and sophisticated than any of the earlier scripts, while *thulth* was considered most suitable for large-scale use, such as architectural inscriptions and royal decrees, Baysanghur being the master in the composition of *thulth* inscriptions.

Even as Afghan followers of Bizhad were developing Moghul painting at the Indian courts, artistic activity in Afghanistan itself began to decline and finally faded away. Fortunately, splendid collections of the artistic production of all the major periods of Afghan history are on display in the Kabul Museum.

Official concern for the state of the arts in modern Afghanistan found expression in the 1930s with the establishment of a School of Arts at Kabul which includes departments for creative training in weaving, painting, ceramics, and music. Of the serious contemporary painters, some draw direct inspiration from the Herat school of the Timurid period, others are influenced by Western styles. In the field of architecture, new mosques reflecting tradi-

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tional forms and decoration are built side by side with structures in the so-called international style. But handicrafts continue to provide the widest outlet for artistic efforts, and agencies of the government strive to improve the designs and the quality of such production. Hand-loom weaving is found in many regions. Fine silks and woolens are woven at Herat, at Mazar-i-Sharif, and in other towns to the north of the Hindu Kush, and decorated felts are made at Herat and Qandahar. Cotton cloth is also hand woven, but modern factories are serving to cut down the hand production of woolen and cotton cloth. Ghazni is famous for the making of *pustins,* sheepskin cloaks and vests. The fleece is on the inside of the garment, and the hide, dyed yellow, is gaily embroidered in yellow and orange silks.

Of the handicrafts, only carpets are exported to any extent. Most Afghan carpets are of the Bokhara or Tekke Turkoman type, characterized by parallel rows of geometric figures on a dark red ground. The carpet weaving region follows an arc across northern Afghanistan from Herat to Fayzabad. The finest are the Mawri carpets woven in the Maymaneh province.

Afghanistan has preserved a strong interest in music and the people love singing. Afghan music, like that of this entire region of the world, is monodic and modal, and has been much influenced by foreign music and imported instruments. Among the stringed instruments, the *robab,* with its six catgut strings, is believed to have inspired similar instruments in the Arab world, and to be the ancestor of the Western violin and cello. Most of the Afghan stringed instruments have a comparatively small sound box and a number of thin strings whose function is to provide resonance to the principal strings. Adaptations of Indian stringed instruments are common, such as the elongated *tambur,* so frequently illustrated in miniatures, with its round sound box. Other instruments which combine with the stringed ones to form an orchestra include the *santur,* a kind of zither, a hand-pumped harmonium, and a variety of drums, beaten with the palm and the fingers. Many of the orchestral pieces are variations on a single theme, developed by a steady increase in tempo and sound.

In the country the people sing mostly without accompaniment; the donkey-man with his donkey loaded with vegetables; the shepherd with his herd; the farmer returning from town with his companions. While walking, men often hum aloud their favorite

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songs. Mountain songs differ from city songs, the former being simple and virile, strong and clear; the latter reflecting Indian and Western influences.

The theater as known in the West was introduced to Kabul in the 1920s and has flourished in the last decade. Adaptations of European classics, such as the plays of Molière and Shakespeare, were early features, but the current trend is in favor of original comedies and didactic treatments of themes from modern life. Given either in Persian or in Pushtu, the recent wave of popularity of these plays may stem from the presence of attractive actresses.

As in many societies, public dancing in the open air has long been a feature in Afghan life. The *attan,* the so-called national dance, has spread from the Pushtun areas to many other parts of the country and is a feature of religious and national holidays, wedding celebrations, and the harvest festival. To the accompaniment of drums and pipes the dancers form a circle, taking each other by the hand or preparing to revolve in circles of their own. Most conspicuous are the younger men, all with guns slung across their back and a colored scarf in one hand, sometimes a sword in the other. Less frequently the women, colorfully clad, join in the dance. The dance starts with slow steps that gradually get faster and faster until it seems the performers must drop from exhaustion. However, the dance continues, sometimes for two or three hours at a stretch, with no breaks except a lowering of tempo or changes in the tunes and songs.

Literature in both the Persian and Pushtu languages had its origins in Afghanistan during the early Moslem centuries. Since then Persian and Pushtu literature has grown to a sizable body of poetry and prose, with a separate tradition in each language. Many authors in Persian also composed in Arabic, which had acquired special prestige as the language of the Qur'an, or in Turkic, but works in these two languages followed the Persian tradition. Thus, the mysticism and the polished elegance of Persian literature developed side by side with works reflecting the blunter attitudes and language of the tribes.

Pushtu, a literary as well as a spoken language, seems to have come into being during the first Moslem centuries, and to have been in current use at both the Ghaznavid and Ghurid courts. Unfortunately the earliest poems and fragments of epics have survived only in Arabic translations. The *Puteh Khazaneh,* published at Qandahar in 1729, includes Pushtu poems of the eighth

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and ninth centuries. Amir Kror, called Jehan Pahlavan, a ruler of Ghur in the second half of the eighth century, is said to have composed poems in Pushtu, and in the ninth century Shaykh Reza Ludi wrote poetry and Abul Mahmud Hashem wrote prose, both also in Pushtu. Finally, the seventeenth century produced the two greatest and most influential of the Pushtu poets, Rahman Baba and Khushhal Khan Khattak. Rahman Baba's verses are held in such esteem that they are used to take auguries.

The greatest of the Pushtu poets, Khushhal Khattak, was born in 1613. At twenty-seven he was chieftain of his tribe and an accomplished warrior. The Moghul emperor Aurangzeb imprisoned him for seven years, and when he returned, much embittered, to Afghanistan he founded the Afghan confederacy against the Moghuls. Going from tribe to tribe, he attempted to rouse his people to revolt. His poetry written at this time reflects his bitterness against the Moghuls and his contempt for Afghans less fiery than himself. Finally, in defeat, he fled to the Afridi country, where he died in 1690 at the age of seventy-eight. In addition to poetry he wrote books on philosophy, ethics, and medicine, as well as his autobiography, now lost. Famed as the "warrior-poet," he is considered the national poet of the Afghans.

During much the same period, beginning with the Ghaznavid era, scores of authors were writing in Persian. Sultan Mahmud, in an effort to make his court the focal point of distinction and glory, summoned all the renowned men of learning of the time to his court, including four hundred poets. Although Ansari was the most honored among the court poets, Firdawsi outshone him and all his brilliant contemporaries. Coming to the court for the first time when he had already reached middle age, he began to compose a great epic, the *Shah Nameh,* or "Book of Kings," completed in 60,000 rhyming couplets. The epic is a saga of four ancient dynasties. Two are legendary, drawn from the mythology of the Avesta, and even for the other two, the Parthian and Sasanian dynasties, there is more legend than documental history. The work abounds in romantic and heroic tales which have been a source of inspiration to later poets and writers. The *Shah Nameh* was copied and recopied in all later periods, many copies being illuminated with miniatures by the leading painters of the time. The language of the *Shah Nameh,* a vigorous, direct Persian containing relatively few Arabic words, has changed so little in the intervening years that the present generation can read it with ease.

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The second great literary period occurred under the Timurid rulers, and their poets and prose writers composed in Persian, Arabic, and Turkic. Certainly the figure of greatest renown was Nur ad-din Abdur Rahman Jami, known simply as Jami after the village in Khorasan where he was born in 1414. Before his death at Herat in 1492 he had won enduring fame as poet, scholar, and mystic. He is believed to have written at least forty-six major works in the fields of lyrical and romantic narrative poetry, mysticism, Arabic grammar, prosody, music, the lives of the Sufi saints, and exegesis of the Qur'an. No other writer of the period was pre-eminent in so many fields, or so fully expressed the mystical and pantheistic thought of Islam.

The principal friend and counselor of Husayn Bayqara, Mir 'Ali Shir Nawa'i, had a passion for literature. Admiring and encouraging the writers of his day, he himself composed much Turkic poetry, and was, in fact, the creator of Turkic literature. Katibi of Nishapur was famous among the composers of narrative poetry, and Ahi, active in the reign of Husayn Bayqara, was supreme among the writers of *ghazal*, or short love poems. Historians also flourished at the Timurid court. Nizam ad-din Shami wrote the *Zafar Nameh* or "Book of Victory," which was the only account of Timur's victories to be completed while the conqueror was still alive. For its material the author, who had taken part in fighting at Baghdad and Aleppo, was given access to official documents and records. The much better known *Zafar Nameh* of Sharaf ad-din 'Ali Yazdi, completed in 1424, is swollen with exaggerated praise of Timur, but based largely upon the preceding work. Hafiz Abru, who accompanied Timur in his campaigns, composed a "Universal History" entitled *Zubat at-Tavarikh*. Mu'in ad-din Muhammad Isfizar owes his renown to his work, "Garden of Paradise: History of the Town of Herat"; and, finally, a writer who used the literary name of Mirkhwand wrote the *Rawdat es-Safa*, a history of the entire period from the pre-Moslem kings to 1506 A.D. Since the Timurid period Persian literature has produced little of note in Afghanistan.

Pushtu literature maintained its influence because it embodied in verse the spirit of the tribes and especially that of the Pushtunwali. Many poets—Khushhal Khattak in particular—have made their verses a direct expression of the tribal code. Proverbs too are popular among the Pushtuns. These verses, songs, and proverbs,

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repeated for generations by both the educated and the illiterate, have made Pushtun literature a living force among the Afghans.

Persian writing, on the other hand, has been and still is the literature of the educated. Its influence begins in early childhood, when parents and teachers tell the children tales from the *Kalilah wa Dimnah,* a collection of animal stories very much like Aesop's fables. Later, when Pushtun children are hearing stories of the tribal heroes, children studying Persian read legends from the *Shah Nameh* and romantic tales of spiritual and heroic love. One such tale, *Adam wa Durko,* is a very ancient version of the Romeo and Juliet theme. Still later, they become familiar with deeply mystical Sufi poetry. Thus the two currents of Afghan literature—that of the people and that of the educated—tend to be mutually exclusive.

The natural concomitant of illiteracy is dependence on the spoken word. In Afghanistan this has produced a class of professional poets and minstrels, originally Indian Moslems, who move from place to place entertaining the villagers and travelers at the caravanserais with their songs and improvised recitations. The Afghans are naturally fond of singing, and when a song also conveys news or ridicules some well-known person it is doubly acceptable. It is these songs—rather than the ponderous histories or the abstruse verses of the learned poets—that represent the true "literature" of Afghanistan. They are characterized by great simplicity and directness and make up in spirited language what they may lack in imagination. The theme of the most popular ballads, which, incidentally, often contain a good deal of history, is war. Prowess in warfare against infidel foreigners is a favorite theme. One such example includes these lines:

> Whoever is a Moslem, whoever is of good faith in Islam . . . goes to the sacred war, gives up his life and goods for the law of the Holy Prophet, and is not afraid of the infidels.

Another celebrates a defeat inflicted on British forces in 1863 in these words:

> Some fled away on all fours: the Ghazis butcher the others; they will not reach Simla. They plunge into the thickets, but they will not be saved, the ruffians, the snakes. They dare not face the Ghazis in the fight; the Ghazis have made them flee into the valley. Islam has made a great feast upon them!

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Next in popularity to war are themes of love and jealousy and then religion and folklore. Not only the bards, but many a father or mother, or village patriarch or *mulla* transmit the Afghan hero tales that feed the imagination and provide inspiration for young and old. All are more or less tinctured with religious sentiment, and not a few instill courage or some other virtue.

At the present time a considerable literary renaissance is taking place in Afghanistan, encouraged by the Pushtu Tulena, or Afghan Academy. The Academy publishes the *Kabul Annual* in Pushtu and Persian and the Afghan Encyclopedia Society has published separate editions of its monumental work in Pushtu and Persian. The Afghan Historical Society, the Anjoman Tarikh-i-Afghanistan, puts out a monthly, *Aryana,* in Pushtu and Persian and a quarterly, *Afghanistan,* in English and French. The Historical Society arranges for the publication of works by the many writers who are doing important research on major periods of Afghan history, on the development of Pushtu literature, and on the historical sites and monuments of the country. The historical writing is of significance because it is based upon manuscripts and other documentary sources preserved within Afghanistan and because it presents the subject from the Afghan point of view in contrast to earlier writing in this field which was by British and other foreign authors. Some of these studies are published in English translation so that they are available to a wider audience. In addition, poets are composing in both traditional forms and modern free verse, while a new school of short story writers is very active. Much of the material described is reprinted not only in the magazines named but in the several periodicals issued by various agencies of the government so that it comes to the attention of a very large segment of the literate population.

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

Lofty minarets dominate the ruins of a complex of religious structures erected at Herat early in the fifteenth century.

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Following an age-old agricultural practice, a farm child guides a heavy sled drawn by bullocks in a circular path over sheaves of wheat, separating the grain from the stalks.

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

At an open-air restaurant at Doshi on the banks of the Qunduz river . . .

. . . footgear is removed while the men are eating.



The village of Baluleh, photographed here at sunrise, lies at the western end of the Shibar Pass, which is directly ahead.

Looking down from near the crest of the Shibar Pass the traveler surveys the Ghorband river valley far below.

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

This view of Kabul shows a crowded section of the older town. Conspicuous are the flat roofs where Afghan families congregate in the summer.

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Typical of many nomad encampments throughout the country is this group of tents in northeastern Afghanistan. The flock of sheep and goats comprise the major source of subsistence for the nomads.

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The driver of the Afghan Mail bus pauses with his assistants during a trip north of the Hindu Kush.

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The Afghan Mail bus is ferried across the Khanabad river, a tributary of the Amu Darya.

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At a mine near Taleqan, in northeastern Afghanistan, salt is quarried much as is stone into blocks of a convenient size and weight for transport.

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This partial view of the famed "Wall of the Buddhas" at Bamiyan shows a 105-foot-high statue of a Buddha (in the niche at the extreme left) and entrances to many chambers carved into the cliff.

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



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Young eyes are focused on the teacher at a village school as he gives a lesson in writing.

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Lying at the edge of a fertile plain is Kabul, capital of Afghanistan and a historic center of the country's civilization.

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A group of harvesters delight in the heavy stalks of ripe wheat.

A merchant, surrounded by spices and staples, waits in the bazaar at Ghazni.



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Lined up here is a typical group of passengers of the Afghan Mail.

Boys study model at the Motor Machine Workshop of the Kabul Mechanical School, a facility in an expanding system of advanced technical training.

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CHAPTER 9

Traditional Patterns of Living

THE INNER ATTITUDES, the basic values by which people live, differ less in Afghanistan than its heterogeneity of population would suggest. There are many ideas and concerns motivating the city dweller and even the settled villager that do not affect the nomadic herdsman, but the same cultural reservoirs provide the fundamental values of life: Islam and a tribal ideology which has survived the progressive breakdown of tribal society. The result is a fairly consistent outlook on life which may be said to apply to most Afghan nationals.

Afghans, as devout Moslems, believe in the basic goodness of man as a creature of God. Evil, personified by Satan, tempts man to deny his Creator and flout His laws, and because man is a free intelligence he may succumb to this temptation and choose evil instead of good. All men succumb to some extent, but the Prophet revealed how even man can restore the break thus created between man and God. The true way is Islam, or "surrender" of the individual will to the will of God, in all inward acts of life. This way alone brings peace to the soul, and insures the happiness of Paradise. God's laws have been communicated by the Qur'an and by the words and acts of the Prophet and man has only to abide by them to be safe for all eternity.

Although Sufism, a mystic philosophy and way of life prevalent among highly educated Afghans, represents a sophisticated and refined view of man and his relation to reality, most Afghans find philosophical speculation beyond their intellectual grasp, and simple observance of the prescribed rites and rules of behavior is their whole religion. There are few countries in the world, however, where these observances have sunk so deeply into the life of the

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people as they have in Afghanistan. Religious attitudes and phrases permeate all life and expression from high to low, urban and rural, official and private, settled and nomadic, in good fortune and in calamity, from birth to death.

This religious orientation has important consequences, as for instance in the supremacy of Islamic religious law, in the influence exercised by religious leaders, in the general sobriety of the people (Islam forbids intoxicating beverages and harmful drugs), in the absence of hurry, and in the calm endurance of adversity. It also offers considerable resistance to materialistic doctrines and to unfamiliar ideas or activities that cannot be readily fitted into their very limited experience.

Western ideas and practices are welcome in Afghanistan when they do not run counter to basic concepts and values. Thus, in material and practical fields of activity, the Western devices meet with little resistance. In medicine there is a similar readiness to accept what the West has to offer, but there is also a reluctance to part with native views of disease and local methods of treatment.

Islam has no quarrel with either nature or science. By knowledge and effort man can control the forces of nature, and by observing religious prescripts protect himself from its evil side. For there is an unseen world full of living beings, some of which are friendly and helpful to man, others evil or mischievous. In this unseen realm the natural and the supernatural meet, and Islamic theology is distorted by many hoary beliefs and practices of tribal, animistic origins. Like most preindustrial cultures, that of Afghanistan is teeming with references to unseen beings and forces, which are dealt with by magic, charms, spells, and divination.

Both tribal society and Islam prescribe the conduct of man to his human environment in so much detail that there is little room for individual variations. Tribal society in the nomadic or early settled stages is largely communal and attaches tremendous importance to the unwritten tribal code, which defines the way every tribesman should behave lest he endanger the cohesion and therefore the very life of the tribe. So completely is this code transmitted to each child born in the tribe that it becomes an ineradicable structural part of his personality and to depart from it is almost unthinkable. In addition, the penalties for violations are so severe that very few risk such consequences.

In Afghanistan the most important and significant of the tribal codes is the Pushtunwali, or the customs and ethics of the Pushtuns.

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It is of unknown origin and age but has functioned for a long time and penetrated many other aspects of Afghan social life, both rural and urban. The Pushtuns themselves prefer their tribal code to the *shari'a,* although in some aspects it has been influenced by Islamic teaching. It falls roughly into two divisions: the conduct of the tribe as a whole, and the relationships of the tribesman to his tribal brothers. Some of the features of this code are described in the following paragraphs.

Tureh is the word for sword in Pushtu. The sword was an important implement of warfare in Afghanistan for centuries, before it was replaced by the rifle. Even now in homes the sword is inherited property in many families. *Tureh,* by extension, also means bravery, and a man should be *turyali,* or brave and warrior-like. The following verses may be sung by a girl to her lover:

> I had rather see you shot with a rifle,
> Than hear that you were a coward, my lover.
> My sweetheart exhibited bravery in the battlefield,
> That is why all the girls envy me so.

To warn him against displaying cowardice she might say:

> My sweetheart failed to show *tureh*;
> I repent the romance I had with him last night!
> It is better to see bloodstains all over you,
> Than to see you coming back home safe and sound as a coward.

Khushhal Khattak had this to say about *tureh*: "I am enchanted by the art of swordsmanship, in which one exhibits his bravery in the open." He considered two characteristics of a leader to be the most vital ones and wrote: "Hospitality and *tureh*—by these two qualities the affairs of leadership can be administered."

Moulavi Abdul Majid Afghani explained the value of bravery in this manner: "The Pushtuns are not afraid of dying. They respect dying in the battlefield. If an Afghan dies in the battlefield and leaves behind a son who will raise his sword after him, then the women do not mourn for him. They say that the men are born to die; there should be mourning only when they leave behind no sons to raise their swords."

The Pushtunwali defines the rules and regulations for the conduct and the art of warfare. One rule demands that the dead or wounded should never be left on the battlefield to undergo any disgraceful

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treatment by the enemy. Even in the midst of the battle soldiers must rescue and carry away their dead or wounded. For the Pushtuns there are only two ways to quit a battlefield: to return as a hero with victory or to die as a hero on the battlefield. This idea is expressed in these words: "You will show *tureh* and bring back victory; if there is no *tureh* (victory) then men always die with *tureh* (sword)." A person who is killed while running away from the battle will receive no burial ceremony.

Dareh is a type of warfare in which the enemy is taken by surprise at nighttime. It is probable that the superiority of the arms and weapons of foreign enemies may have been responsible for the development of this technique of warfare. In this method the Pushtuns make their advances during the night and hold during the day the territory gained at nighttime.

Barmateh concerns a situation in which a person owes something to someone else, but is unwilling or unable to pay his debt. The creditor may take prisoner a member of the indebted man's family or seize something valuable, until the debt is paid. In earlier years when the British captured leaders of the Pushtuns, their followers tried to take British officers or valuable equipment as *barmateh*.

Nanawati is a means of resolving hostility, and enmity. When individuals or tribes are hostile toward one another and one element is defeated, if the defeated party wants to end hostilities, the formalities of *nanawati* are invoked. The weaker party sends an envoy, or a number of elderly people, to ask the victors to accept its apologies.

Badal, or the desire for revenge, is very strong. If they feel that they have been deprived of their rights, the Pushtuns will wait many years for a chance for revenge. The most serious cause for revenge relates to the loss of life. If a member of one family is killed by a man from another family, the injured family should kill a member of the other family, preferably a member of equal status. Sometimes revenge if not taken in one generation will be taken many generations later. A Pushtun proverb says: "A Pushtun took his revenge after one hundred years, and he said that he had hurried." *Badal* in the sense of reciprocation may also be related to the return of favors, since it is considered a great shame not to return a favor.

Ghaza, or holy war, is fought in defense of religion. On such occasions, determined by their religious leaders, men, women, and children all go to the battlefield, the sound of drums and shouts of warriors telling them where to gather.

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The *jirgeh,* or tribal council, is of great importance, and has existed for many centuries. The members of the *jirgeh* are elected by the tribesmen; each member expresses his opinion on the subject, and some *jirgehs* continue for several days before a decision is reached. At the close of a *jirgeh* a feast is held for members of the tribal group. A *jirgeh* may impose a fine upon a tribal offender, he may be required to give a community feast and ask forgiveness, or, in serious cases, may be banished from the tribe. After a joint *jirgeh* between two tribes on some controversial problem arrives at a decision, *rugheh,* or peace, is made. This peace is sealed by laying the *tizeh,* or the stone of peace.

A Pushtun makes an *'ahd,* or promise, and keeps it at any cost. Khushhal Khattak reflects this spirit when he writes: "Even if his head is cut off his body, Khushhal will never act contrary to the promise that he has given to his friend." Expressing the same spirit, another writer says: "The price of a broken promise can never be less than that of life. Therefore, the Pushtuns are ready to die in order to keep their promises."

Ghayrat, or honor, is a basic ingredient in family life, while *imandari,* or righteousness, derives from Islam, and entails devotion to sincerity and truthfulness, regardless of the consequences. An Afghan proverb boasting that "the *yes* of a Pushtun is *yes* and his *no* is *no*" reflects the qualities of *sabat* and *isteqamat,* or steadfastness and constancy.

The spirit of national pride is very strong among the Pushtuns, second only to that of religion. The national poet of the Pushtuns wrote: "For the pride and honor of the Afghans I raised my sword; I am the proudest of the time, Khushhal Khattak." Another Afghan poet expressed his pride in being a Pushtun in this manner: "After the pride of being a Moslem, just this one more pride, that I am a Pushtun, is sufficient for me."

Self-respect is a basic characteristic of the Pushtuns. A Pushtun poet has said, "Respect yourself, if you want others to respect you," and Sayyid Jamil ad-din Afghani wrote:

> Self-respect is the guiding light of the Pushtuns and they prefer death to loss of their self-respect by going under the rule and yoke of others, although they could have material well-being at the cost of their self-respect.

Truth and sincerity are part of Pushtunwali. Should anybody cast doubt on the word of a Pushtun, he would say, "For heaven's

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sake, you know I am a Pushtun." Flattery and smooth talking are not in the nature of the Pushtuns, who are simple and direct in their way of speaking. Their language contains few words of flattery, but their informal greetings may include the words "brother" and "friend," considered the best in the language. In some tribes the sons call their fathers by their first names. The highest title that a Pushtun leader can attain is *baba*, father or grandfather. This title was awarded to Ahmad Shah.

Informality features tribal relations. Sayyid Jamal ad-din Afghani wrote:

> The king of the Pushtuns does not possess the same glamour as those of other Eastern people. He differs very little from the other members of the government. Every citizen can discuss his problem directly with the king without any fear or formality.

Milmastia, or hospitality, is one of the outstanding characteristics of the Afghans. Every Pushtun considers hospitality an essential part of his way of life. Nothing makes a Pushtun more unhappy than losing a guest; there are scores of ways to say "welcome" and to greet a guest. The people of Qandahar greet their guests with the words, "Welcome! May God bring you here always." Other Pushtun greetings include "May you not be tired; you are very welcome" and "You are welcome; may you come here always . . . always . . . always."

In every village a *hujreh*, or guest house, can be found close to the mosque, with a stove or fireplace and several beds ready for guests. Every member of the village greets the guest, and each family brings in food that has been cooked for the evening. The youngsters of the village wait on him, and after the dinner is over the elders of the village chat with the guest until he is ready to retire. In the morning, each head of a family comes to the *hujreh* with a teapot full of hot milk in his hand and a loaf of bread under his arm, to greet the guest.

The major elements of Pushtunwali are taught very early. The children are given tests of courage and taught the manner of serving and of taking care of the guests in the *hujreh*. Fairy stories are never told to children, only tales of warriors and heroes. As they grow older, the boys are taught how to shoot a rifle and use a sword.

In contemporary Afghan life, in the settled communities, elements of Pushtunwali have been abandoned. Villagers and townspeople refer their disputes to the local courts and carry guns only

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for hunting or on national holidays. The village *malik,* or headman, makes decisions for his community without reference to a *jirgeh.* In such ways settled life has moved away from the tribal code. One of the most conspicuous deviations is in the training of children. In direct opposition to the Pushtunwali, many Afghan parents frighten their children into good behavior with stories of ghosts and devils, so that the children become timid and afraid of the dark. In addition, emphasis is placed upon obedience and respect, rather than on courage and independence.

Nevertheless, some of the elements of Pushtunwali survive in many communities. *Khans* still hold *jirgehs;* village elders still control community affairs through their election of the *malik;* and a man who receives a gift still feels obliged to give one in return.

The most universally honored tenet of the Pushtunwali, however, continues to be the principle of hospitality. In the country hospitality is a major factor in Afghan life, for the guest brings not only joy to his host's heart but prestige to his host's family. It would disgrace a man if his guest spent any money at all while staying with him, or if a friend came to his village and passed his house to stay somewhere else. In the country, hospitality is the basis of competition, and the two motives of increased prestige and genuine good will are very closely intermingled.

Throughout Afghanistan relations between individuals are direct, simple, unaffected, and quietly dignified. The primitive democracy of a tribal society is preserved to an astonishing degree in this autocratic, oligarchic state. To no small degree that preservation is due to the religious democracy of Islam. To the brotherhood of kinship, the basis of tribal society, is added the brotherhood of religion established by Islam. Just as in the case of conflict of loyalty between tribe and nation, the larger community of Islam may claim an allegiance that competes with national interests. However, in such competition Afghan nationalism generally wins.

Both tribal society and Islam emphasize cooperation over competition. The perennial dependence of Afghan life on the preservation and wise utilization of its water resources heavily underscores the need for cooperative effort in making and maintaining storage and distribution facilities for water. For these and other reasons Afghan society is far less competitive than many others. One of the reasons given for Afghan resistance to foreign influences is that the West's competitive spirit leads to ever-increasing conflicts and a splintering of the body politic, denying the brotherhood even

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of coreligionists. However, with the weakening of tribal autonomy and the accompanying cessation of tribal and intertribal feuds, Afghan society may become even more strongly cooperative.

The obligations of individuals to each other are carefully defined both by custom and by Islamic law. There are no doubts about the duties of sons to their father, of the latter to them and other members of the family, between all degrees of kinship, and between lord and subject, landlord and tenant, employer and employee, teacher and pupil, etc. So much in mutual obligations is unwritten or written law, that additional verbal commitments, contracts, or signatures are largely superfluous. Pushtunwali is explicit on the keeping of promises. However, for such matters as marriage, land transfers, adoption, and important business transactions, more and more Afghans are resorting to official documents.

In their warmer relationships Afghans lay great stress on friendship. It is not their custom to pass an acquaintance on the street; they like to stop and chat. There is a proverb: "When you shake a man's hand and say hello, you should remember him as long as you live." They like to know everyone around them and to be aware of all the affairs of the neighborhood. They believe that a man's friend should listen to his troubles, advise and help him, and even fight for him. Friendship implies generosity. A mean man is not a good one. Islam teaches that the man with money may spend enough on himself to live well, but that he must aid the less fortunate. Among friends a gift presupposes an equal return.

In Afghan society emotion is communicated in accepted, traditional ways. Nothing shows more graphically how emotion is forced into traditional channels than the marriage and funeral rites of the Afghans. While poetry and song give expression to the whole range of human emotions, it is often in veiled language. The Afghans severely condemn an uncontrolled emotional outburst. It is, for example, considered shameful for a man to cry, unless over a death, since men must not be softhearted. To some extent this habit of restraint holds good for all emotions. Since it is undignified to express anger by shouting, gestures, and so on, Afghans prefer to exchange a few well-chosen insults, although some feel that a return of insults is a coward's work and that a strong man must fight. Violent conflicts that flare up quickly die down if friendly intermediaries are at hand.

An Afghan's basic loyalties are to his faith, his family, his tribe, and his nation. Which of these comes first in a conflict of interest

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or of demands on him depends on his status, on his tribal affinity and the degree to which the tribal ethos survives in him, and on the seriousness of the nation's need for his service or sacrifice. Loyalty to friends, village, province, or government is likely to be secondary to these basic obligations, which in turn rest upon the inner loyalty to his religion and to himself.

Family ties are strongest where the joint family has survived and still performs the educational, social, and economic functions that in more sophisticated societies are taken over by outside agencies. The vast majority of Afghans have their personalities molded by this primary group of kin who live a communal life that satisfies and channels most of the individual's emotional and physical needs.

Tribal society is essentially an extension of this primary kinship group, and its ethics are most exacting among the smaller nomadic tribes, which have retained their tribal organization. For members of these still vital tribal units the tribe is their whole social and economic matrix, and loyalty to it has been inculcated so deeply that it has primary claim over all other considerations, even those of the nation.

On the other hand for the bulk of the people, urban and settled rural alike, the nation tends to replace the tribe as the supreme value-object in the field of human association. Afghans are intensely proud of the homeland, and for this reason will follow their ruler, the nation's supreme institution, against any foreign foes. To this feeling is added the sense of respect that surrounds the ruler as the crowned head of the nation, leader and defender of the faith, and therefore blessed by Allah. While identification with the village may be strong, especially in ethnically homogeneous villages, it is believed to be less compelling than the feeling of obligation to family and nation. And little, if any, sense of loyalty is connected with the province, which after all is only an administrative unit. In its place there is among the settled people a strong affection for their geographic area, a natural love of one's physical environment whether it be mountains, plain, or desert.

As in all traditional societies, conformity to the rules and customs of the group is expected and nonconformity is a serious breach. Only the coexistence of a great variety of dissimilar groups (ethnic, tribal, and occupational) each with its own standards of proper behavior gives to Afghan society the appearance of allowing wide individual variations of behavior; in reality the scope within each group is narrow. Moreover, there are certain basic patterns to which

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all are held rather strictly, such as the observance of fasting during Ramazan, and the taboo on discussing the female members of a man's household. To be thought of as ill-bred is sheer torture for members of "good" families.

The rules of etiquette are rather complicated, particularly in relation to table manners. In eating, the truly well-bred man will do nothing to excess; he will wait until everyone is ready to eat before he begins; he will start his meal with bread to indicate that bread alone is all he requires; and he will eat very little because the man who eats least is the best-bred man in the company. If there are many dishes, he will taste a little of each. It will be very bad if everyone has finished, and he is still eating. If he calls on a friend at mealtime, the host will ask him to eat. Refusal implies that the host's food is unclean, so he must taste at least.

Forms of address vary according to the dignity of the person addressed. There are two forms of the second person: *shuma*, the plural form, is the one most commonly used; *tu* is used to children, servants, and intimate friends. Everyone is aware of his dignity as an individual and bears himself accordingly. There is no cringing or fawning, although among the worker and servant classes there may be an exaggerated display of respect and desire to please before persons of rank or great prestige. This is largely a matter of form, a compliance with a traditional pattern of politeness considered seemly by all concerned.

In the towns there are introductions corresponding to those of Western society, but in country society there are no introductions at all. When a man goes to a village party, his host rises from his place near the door and greets him. Then the guest says the equivalent of hello to every man in the room, whether he knows him or not, and sits down. If there is a man present who does not know the newcomer, he will whisper to his neighbor to ask who he is. The newcomer, in his turn, will be whispering to his neighbor to ask who *that* man is. This is probably because everyone is supposed to know everyone else and an introduction would indicate to a man that his prestige was insufficient. A host does not try to establish a common ground of conversation between two guests. People try to find their own levels on social occasions: educated men are at ease with one another while a shopkeeper might feel unhappy in their company. Since parties are group affairs where everyone shares in the conversation, the life-of-the-party is very important and very much sought after.

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An Afghan is highly sensitive to the opinion of his neighbors and will maintain a certain standard of material and spiritual dignity, or *sha'n,* even if it costs him a lot of money. A man would lose the good opinion of his neighbors if he failed to have the large weddings and funeral parties expected of him, even though he must go deeply into debt to pay for them. The popularity of Western luxury items has added to this problem, since the average Afghan's wages are insufficient to feed and shelter his family and also buy Western-type furniture, clothing, a radio, and similiar furnishings.

In all Islamic societies there is great emphasis on authority and this is particularly true of Afghan society. Authority surrounds the individual and guides him from birth to death. It is both worldly and spiritual, but in either form it is impressed upon the individual with great force, although he is so accustomed to it that he is hardly aware of its pressure. It is only the general humaneness of Islam itself and the common-sense democracy of tribal society that set bounds to authority and prevent it from becoming tyrannical. Besides, those who exercise either worldly or religious authority have themselves been molded and directed before reaching their present status, and so have learned to wield their power with restraint.

This instilled obedience to authority works like an internal brake on conduct, which makes for a society with a minimum of friction. It is only the few who break through this inner structure, or who have deviant tribal mores, or who are abnormal physically or mentally with whom the law has to deal. For the vast majority the stimuli to "good" behavior and the deterrents to "bad" are very much the same: religious sanctions, custom, family prestige, family interest, and individual honor or the honor of the tribe. Ostracism is a terrible deterrent in a largely communalistic society, and tribal custom makes use of it only rarely. Prestige, on the other hand, is the supreme reward for those whose behavior exemplifies the Islamic and tribal codes. Reputation is worth far more than material reward in stirring most Afghans to action.

Belief in an invisible, supernatural world is deeply entrenched in the Afghan mind. The supernatural or extraordinary beings recognized in Afghanistan fall into five main classes: the *jinn,* or genie; the ghost, or *ruh* (the soul of the dead); the fairy, or *pari*; the giant, or *div*; and the angel, or *malak.* The Qur'an refers to *jinns* and angels, and to the survival of the human soul, so that most of these invisible beings are officially sanctioned and belief in the

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remainder is not considered sinful or unreasonable. Besides, popular imagination or psychism continues to make them momentarily visible to selected persons, and all of them are regarded by Afghans with a certain amount of dread.

Descriptions of *jinns* differ. One source describes them as spirits with sex characteristics, a family life, and human bodies distinguishable by round hands and feet. Another source says that they are creatures between angels and men, about a foot tall, with lovely faces, yellow hair, and eyes of flame. A third says that they are an invisible subterranean people who can assume any shape at will, in order to harass humans.

The visitation of a ghost is considered more serious than possession by a *jinn,* especially if it is of a person who died in a state of uncleanliness or failed to get a proper funeral. Ghosts will frequent a tree, a plain, or a ruin, but they stay away from population centers and never manifest themselves in daylight. A person can be frightened to death, however, by the appearance of a ghost. Minor ghosts may assume any form, animal or human, and change from one to the other instantaneously.

Fairies and giants associate with each other and both are able to fly. The fairies, always very beautiful, are dressed as women and are of the same stature as their mundane sisters. The giants, who protect the fairies from harm, are big and black, with horns like oxen, long tails, and a thick hide. The fairies often visit Afghan gardens in spring and summer, holding elaborate feasts away from prying human eyes. Many a shepherd or woodcutter has been awakened in the night by their enchanting music; some fortunate few have even seen them. Fairies and giants have a keen eye for human beauty and may spirit away a pretty young girl to their mountain abode and transform her into a fairy. To prevent this, the mother of such a daughter will forbid her to sleep in the open or wear clothing of distinctive colors.

There are good angels and bad: the good live in the sky; the bad are called *shaitans,* after their leader Satan, who sinned and fell into hell. Everyone has a good and a bad angel, whom he carries, one on each shoulder. The good angel writes down the good deeds, the bad angel writes the bad. The belief in the presence of these angels is a strong incentive to good behavior among Afghan children.

Afghans generally believe in witchcraft and magic. Witches are held to be in league with Satan, from whom they derive their

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powers, and no *saher* or necromancer can be a true Moslem. The art is learned from Indian fakirs or yogis, who cannot call superior beings such as angels and *jinns* to their assistance but rely on a *palid,* or unclean spirit. Witches are said to be able to assume any form or shape, and to live along lonely roads or even underground. Women in remote areas sometimes practice witchcraft. Sympathetic magic is most commonly used, such as sticking a pin into a crude doll of wax representing the victim, or holding the doll in some pungent smoke while reciting certain curses. To subdue a husband or a mother-in-law one should cause him or her to eat the flesh of an owl. (The owl is the opposite of a wise bird and to be called an owl in Afghanistan is like being called a donkey elsewhere.) Great caution must be exercised to prevent detection of the nature of the dish to be served, but if done properly the regular administration of roasted owl will lead to the conquest of the most intractable temperaments.

Afghanistan teems with beliefs and practices derived from religious and pagan traditions, many of which can be traced to India and Iran, while in the north they bear marks of Kirghiz origin. The Kabul area blends all of them, and the women of the country are their chief devotees.

Charms and spells in written form are a specialty of the *mullas,* who, in some parts of the country, produce little else for the spiritual comfort of the faithful. In a few districts *mullas* with additional qualifications act as village doctors as well. The art of producing effective charms and spells is secret and is communicated only to the most devoted disciples of the *mulla* in possession of it. An unquestioning belief in the charms written by the pious masters of this art is found among both sexes. Wrestlers fasten charms in a capsule of silver on the left wrist in order to win their contests. Women sew them into the garments of men going out on dangerous missions, for charms are a sure protection against wounds. Amir Abdur Rahman wrote that once at a review a soldier deliberately fired at him. The bullet passed through the back of his chair and killed a page boy who was standing behind him. "I used not to believe in charms," the Amir states, "but I owe my life to a charm which a *mulla* had given me and which I was wearing at the time. I tested the efficacy of it by tying it round the neck of a goat and firing several shots at him, none of which hit him." A bullet extracted from a human body is treasured, for if worn in a pendant it will act as a protection against all mishaps. In some districts charms

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are the only treatments available for the relief of pain. The charm is burned and the vapor inhaled by the patient, or it may be placed in water which the patient is made to drink. Charms are fastened on the arms before a journey is undertaken, and if it is going to be a long trip the Qur'an is held above the traveler and he kisses it as he steps out of his house.

Spells are of two kinds; *nuri,* related to celestial light, and *nari,* related to fire, in accordance with the belief that Allah created the angels from light and Satan from fire. Spells which utilize Qur'anic words or passages are *nuri;* those employed by yogis are considered *nari.* A Moslem should not learn *nari* spells but may use *nuri* ones for the gratification of his desires. Spells are not, like charms, confined to *mullas* or those authorized by them. Many spells are used to avert the evil eye.

Divination is practiced widely. The local shrine of each area is the focus of comfort to people in time of need. The graves of pious persons are regarded as having magical properties. Women tie little strips of cloth on the trees or upright poles near the shrine and express their wishes together with vows of gratitude if they are fulfilled. Offerings of sweets or flowers are made to the saints interred in these graves and butter or oil is burned in a lamp. In intertribal warfare the leaders visit the grave of a saint to obtain a blessing on the arms of their followers.

Besides these beliefs are a host of minor superstitions, many of which are similar to those of other countries. Certain days of the moon are lucky or unlucky. On the third night of the new moon, one must not catch a glimpse of the moon or bad luck will fall on him; and if, when he has seen the moon, he should glance at a young baby the child will have difficulty in walking. If a tea leaf floats on the tea, or if a lampwick falls by itself, a guest is coming. A twitch of the eyelid means good news, an itching right hand means money, and many Afghans will not walk in front of a black cat.

Among a people so saturated with belief in the supernatural, death is obviously not the end of personal existence, although ideas about the exact nature of the afterlife vary according to the degree of education of the believer. Among the least sophisticated, the vast mass of wholly illiterate people, the concepts of Islam are mixed with more or less vague beliefs derived from earlier religious and tribal tradition, usually of an animistic type. The better-

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educated are more inclined to shed these older beliefs and adhere strictly to the Islamic doctrines concerning death, heaven and hell, and resurrection. When parents explain death to children, they say that each person has a certain amount of time to live. If he is good and says his prayers, he may extend his time, but if he is bad he will shorten it. When he has used up his time, plus or minus his good and bad deeds, he dies.

To most Afghans the good life is the religious life, the life in which there is an inner surrender of man to God and to His laws. Even a man of the world is respected in the measure that he observes the religious life and neither power nor wealth alone can compel the admiration felt for a man of faith. Yet, the Afghan conception of a good Moslem is not of a passive or contemplative type. Tribal tradition and Islam both glorify the man of action, and this tradition imparts an unusual vigor to the popular conception of the good life. Afghan heroes are usually fighters, always virile. Courage is esteemed, cowardice despised; candor respected, hypocrisy detested. Ingratitude, immodesty, and intemperance are condemned. Greed is despised; so is bad temper. Decision and resolution are admired, but not recklessness ("do not take hold of sword grass, but if you do, grasp it tightly"). Industry is praised ("whoever loves, labors"), and courteous conduct sums up most of the ideas on the good life ("be it but an onion, let it be given graciously").

Holidays enjoyed by the Afghans are secular and religious in nature, with all but one of the secular holidays of recent origin. The major secular festival is No Ruz, the "new day," of ancient Iranian origin, which occurs on the first day of spring, March 21st or 22nd. Throughout the country the government offices and many private firms may be closed for several days. Calls are exchanged and new clothes displayed. Country people stream into Kabul, whole families on donkeyback, to gape at the wonders of the capital. Sports events and carnivals are held. Independence Day is celebrated on May 27th, and at the end of August, occurs Jashn-i-Isteqlal, or the "independence celebration," which lasts a full week and includes a military review, sports events, a display of arts and crafts, and exhibitions in pavilions erected by a number of foreign countries. September 10th marks the anniversary of the founding of the National Council and October 15th the birthday of Shah Muhammad Zahir. The next day, October 16th, is Nejat-i-Vatan, or "salvation of the homeland," marking the victory of Nadir Shah and

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his supporters over Bacheh Saqqo. These secular holidays are observed in the larger towns but, with the exception of No Ruz, are scarcely known in the villages.

The religious holidays are observed throughout the country following the lunar calendar. The first day of the fasting month of Ramazan is observed, while the Id al-Fitr, the first day of the month following Ramazan, is a time of great rejoicing. The anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, the 'Id-i-Moulud, is an important date as is the day of Ashura, the tenth of Muharram, the date of the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn. The Shi'as hold mourning rites at this time and present the traditional passion plays. The final sacred festival of the Moslem year is the 'Id-i-Qurban, or "day of sacrifice"; coming on the tenth of Dhu al-Hijjah, it commemorates the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son.

On Friday, the weekly holiday, most Afghans go to mosques for prayer and all government offices and most business places are closed. In the towns, during the winter, people either stay at home or visit friends for cards and conversation. In the summer, the inhabitants of Kabul picnic with their families and friends at Paghman, a favorite spot about sixteen miles from Kabul. There are also parks in the towns, which provide flowers, areas for games, and space for flying kites. In Qandahar a favorite picnic place is on a mountainside where the polished rock surface is suitable for sliding, either on the bare rock or on a folded blanket. Picnics are a favorite pastime of young boys, who, when school closes on Thursday afternoon, will make up a party, take their food, and hike to the mountains to camp through Friday. For the cultivators and nomads Friday is little different from other days. To the villagers, Mondays and Thursdays are important, because on those days the men go from the fields to the nearest market to trade their produce for other necessities, or sell or buy animals or poultry and their products. Thus, to the rural people who are also able to observe Friday as a holiday there are only four days of field work left in the week. This situation explains the difficulty encountered in obtaining factory laborers to work six days in the week.

Afghans are not strongly committed to daily labor and employers often find that on a lovely day a worker has decided to quit his job and enjoy the good weather, without any prior complaints about his salary or working conditions. Leisure is enjoyed in sports, playing cards, talking, drinking tea, smoking water pipes or cigarettes, playing or listening to music, singing, or just sitting, re-

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laxed, and looking at the world. Sports play an important part in the lives of the younger men. Soccer, hockey, volleyball, and basketball have become popular in the towns. School teams play each other, going out of town for important games. Wrestling is a popular sport and though schools have gymnasiums wrestlers often take advantage of any plot of ground. In all sports Afghans play for victory and feel humiliated by a defeat. A successful athlete is very popular with his fellow citizens.

Among the tribes games are often strenuous. Some have become national favorites and are played on special occasions, on parade grounds, and before festive crowds. Chief among these national games is Boz Kashi or goat wrestling, which can be very dangerous. A goat or calf is beheaded and the body thrown into a ditch, from which it is to be taken to the goal by any one of scores of swift-riding horsemen competing in teams. In this free-for-all many receive injuries and some have lost their lives by being thrown from their horses and trampled to death.

Ghosai is a wrestling game which may be played by an unlimited numbers of players, though the total is generally twenty, divided into two teams. The Ghosai is a player who tries to reach his goal by hopping on one leg, holding the other behind his back with one hand. The other players on his team try to protect him from attacks by the members of the opposing team seeking to prevent him from reaching the goal, with all the players holding one leg behind them.

In the settled communities, visiting, card games, and conversation are favorite diversions. The women visit during the day; in the large families with many women the work is soon done and they have no other resources for spare time. Afghan women are always prepared for unexpected guests; often a whole family of women and children will call on another family and stay to lunch. The men and boys visit in the evening after dinner, sometimes spending their time playing cards or gambling on cockfights and quail fights. A favorite game among the men is a guessing game played with small objects hidden under wooden cups on a tray. Chess also is popular. However, conversation is the standard form of entertainment. Men, women, and children talk, at home, at the houses of friends, in tea- or coffeehouses. If they have no favorite coffeehouse, men will go in the evening to a shop that has closed and where the owner is keeping open house. Very few people talk about politics, but religion is a standard topic.

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Music and dancing are other forms of group entertainment. Although professional musicians are socially of the lowest class, amateur performances carry no stigma. Many of the young men and boys play instruments, usually drums or stringed instruments. In the country men like to sing folk songs in the evening, either as solos or as antiphonal choruses. In Kabul, movies are very popular among all classes and ages. Many Afghans prefer Indian movies, because the language, music, and way of life are not too dissimilar to their own, but they also like American musicals, westerns, and cartoons.

In Afghanistan birth, family life, and death are surrounded with practices and ceremonies that have become essential ingredients of existence. The basic patterns of living connected with birth, puberty, and death here described are those common to the upper strata of society.

When a young woman feels that she is going to have a child she consults her mother or her mother-in-law. If the mother agrees, they consult the midwife. Sometimes a woman will have a doctor for the birth of a child, but usually women with experience in childbirth—mothers, grandmothers, and midwives—will have complete charge of the whole affair. Although midwifery is an hereditary occupation and requires no training in the Western sense, the women have become so experienced that usually a mother needs no other assistance than theirs. At the seventh month of pregnancy the midwife comes to examine the woman. This is an occasion for a festival among the woman's relatives and friends. There are some superstitions about prenatal influences: a pregnant woman must not touch her body during an eclipse, for instance, lest the child be marked on the part of the body that she touched; and she must not hold a knife during an eclipse lest the child be scarred or have a harelip. From approximately the eighth month the woman is confined to her room, if she is wealthy enough to have a separate room for the purpose, and is watched over by the midwife and her female relatives. As the time of the birth approaches, relatives gather for the great occasion. The grandmother prepares the baby's clothes and bed, a sort of hammock made of thick felt.

After the delivery the midwife bathes the baby in a special bath of herbs boiled in water, and swaddles it up to its shoulders. Then she puts it in its cradle, under a silk quilt over which is a white cloth inscribed with verses of the Qur'an. The relatives attend to the mother, giving her a nourishing soup to restore her strength.

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Servants are dispatched to bear the news to distant relatives. At the house the men fire their guns in the air, tom-toms are beaten, and musicians make a deafening noise, while everyone congratulates everyone else. The shots and drums scare all evil influences away, and the greeting, "Happy and prosperous be your days," brings blessing to all, including the newborn babe. Immediately the superiority of the male sex is asserted: for a girl, five or seven shots are fired, for a boy, fourteen or more! The noisemaking takes no notice of the time of day—it may be in the dead of night—but everyone in the village at least knows about the birth and needs no printed announcement. The time and day of birth are important omens, Friday being a lucky birthday, and a child born early in the morning being assured of success in life. A child born in a storm is likely to endure ill health or face other troubles. Sometimes a child is named after the month of its birth—for example, Ramzani, if the birth took place in the month of fasting, Ramazan. If the mother's milk is deficient, a wet nurse is engaged. This is a matter for careful deliberation, for the wet nurse should be of good parentage, have a brave husband, and be of fine character herself.

The *mulla* comes to perform the first ceremony for the child. In a loud voice he recites into the ears of the baby a prayer that makes the little one a Moslem: "God is great, God is great! I am a witness that there is no God but one God, and that Muhammad is His Prophet. God is great, God is great!" Then, when the child is a few days old the naming ceremony, with relatives present, is performed by the *mulla* or an elder, who slowly pronounces the full name. The custom is to give girls only one name, boys usually two (one for household use and one a literary or "birthdate" name). Another early ceremony, at about the second month, is that of head-shaving, performed by the family barber, who sprinkles the hair with rose water and uses a new razor. Friends and relatives attend the ceremony, and musical entertainment follows, during which the barber collects his fee in silver coins.

As the baby grows, special precautions are taken against the evil eye and evil spirits—especially on Thursday nights when they are particularly malicious—and against starlight, since stars have evil eyes. While the baby is still very young, a member of the family will take him for a walk in the city, showing him the sights and smells so that none of these can harm him when he is older. The bright sunlight at noon is shunned because vultures or other birds of prey may drop eggs or dirt on the child. Thunderstorms are especially

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dangerous, as lightning seeks to strike an only child. The gaze of beggars, criminals, and other persons of ill repute must also be avoided, so the face is veiled when the baby is carried outdoors. Just after the second year a party is given at which small boys assemble and sing in praise of the mother and invoke blessings on mother and child. Relatives also gather to celebrate when the child begins to cut his teeth. Milk teeth are thrown into a mousehole as they fall out so the permanent teeth may be sharp and strong as those of a mouse. Until about three years of age, the child remains on a milk diet. Then he is put on a "grain and hard diet," which event is again celebrated ceremonially with a gathering of relatives, a reciting of long passages from the Qur'an, and the hanging of charms or a sacred pendant around the child's neck.

Traditionally, a boy is circumcised when he is seven years old and this is an occasion for a great celebration, with the doctor who performs the operation receiving a large present. The little boy has not been told of what will happen so that he will not be frightened; he is merely told to look up at the golden bird, and he does not see the knife. The cut flesh is tied with aromatic herbs to his feet and he is put to bed and his mother stays with him all night. He has new clothes, new sheets, new blankets, and everyone brings him presents. Meanwhile there is feasting and dancing all night. From this time on the child is dressed as a man and wears a turban like his father's. He is an acknowledged Moslem and can go to the mosque school. However, among the urban Afghans, the trend is to perform the circumcision operation when the child is seven or eight days old, in which case the celebration becomes merged with the rejoicings over the birth. Little information is available on puberty rites, but it is said that boys are instructed by their fathers, girls by their mothers, in matters of personal hygiene.

Tradition governs the conduct of those left behind when an Afghan dies. As soon as it appears that a man will not live much longer, his relatives begin to collect. If the dying man has not yet made a will, he dictates and signs one. The women never speak about a will—it is equivalent to expressing an ill wish. When inquiring from the wife about her husband's condition they say, "We have heard that the enemies of your husband are indisposed." A man who knows he is dying will call his wife, sons, and daughters to his bedside. If he can, he says good-bye, and instructs them to live in peace and harmony as they have done during his lifetime. Placing his hand on his wife's head he asks her to be considerate

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to the children; then he appoints the eldest son as the head of the family. As all weep profusely, the dying man warns them that his soul will not rest in peace if they weep after his death or do not live together in harmony.

When death finally comes, someone sits near the body and reads from the Qur'an. The house is soon filled with relatives and friends arriving for the funeral. In the deceased's room a dim light is burning, while two or three men recite *suras* of the Qur'an in a low voice. Relations wash the body in a temporary grave, dug in the family garden and curtained off all around, while incense is burned. The big toes of the deceased are tied with a strip of white muslin, and a white sheet is used as a shroud and knotted at the head. On a wooden frame, resting on a white cloth and covered by two sheets, the body is transferred to the bier. Rose perfume is sprinkled over it, but no flowers are used. The burial takes place as soon as possible. There is no farewell touching of the corpse. No one touches a corpse unless it is necessary, and anyone who does so must wash immediately.

Before lifting the bier a short prayer is recited. The six nearest male relatives then carry the bier on their shoulders to the permanent grave, which is usually about six feet deep with a niche in one side wall. Anyone meeting a funeral procession is expected to accompany it for at least forty steps, repeating a prayer for the dead. The grave is so oriented that the deceased will face Mecca when he sits up at the sound of the last trumpet on the Day of Judgment. The corpse is buried without a coffin, unless the body has traveled a long way for burial. After the grave is closed, a small lamp is placed below a temporary gravestone; men are appointed to watch the grave, and after some further recitations from the Qur'an the mourners return to their homes. The relatives and clansmen assemble at the house of the deceased where the head of the clan addresses the womenfolk, counseling them not to grieve, for it was Allah's will that the man should die and that his soul should be accorded divine acceptance. Then the party is asked to dine and, after a prayer, they disperse.

During the initial mourning period, usually three days, the widow and female relatives wear no colored clothing and no ornaments; some widows continue indefinitely to wear white and forego ornaments. On the first Thursday evening after the funeral mourners are invited to dinner and to read the Qur'an for the dead. Similar functions are held on the fourteenth and the fortieth day after

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the death. On the fortieth day, called Chehelum, friends and relatives from near and far come to join in the mourning and all go to the grave to pray. After one year, a mourning called *sali* is held, at which all relatives go to the grave and spend the day. On Fridays after prayers, people visit graveyards, read a portion of the Qur'an, and invoke blessings on the souls of their interred relatives.

Rich Afghans mark the graves of their dead with slabs of stone or marble, on which are engraved the names of the deceased. The poor mark their graves with two stones, laid end to end for a woman and parallel for a man. The graves of pious persons are decorated with poles hung with ribbons or flags, and are visited by the faithful on pilgrimage. In general, Afghan cemeteries present a picture of neglect, but cemeteries are public property and every Afghan is sure of a plot.

The diversity of the Afghan population makes generalizations about Afghan patterns of living rather hazardous, and there are important group variations. The pure nomads have a different way of life from that of the seminomads, for instance. The former have no fixed abode and if they do any cultivating at all it is only some primitive food raising in whichever arable area they stay long enough to grow a crop, usually near the summer pastures. These nomads live in the open in tents or *yurts*, depending on their flocks for food and clothing, and on dried dung or brush for fuel. Their property is only what can be carried by man or beast, and the livestock which moves with them, including some fowl carried on camel-back. Occasionally the leader of such a caravan community has amassed enough wealth to invest in some land, which he has worked by tenants, but the average tribesman has few wants beyond a wife, a dog, and a rifle. He does not own land, and the taxes on his livestock are low. He hunts and tends the flocks, while his wife gathers fuel, carries water, cooks, weaves, sews, and makes handicraft articles for sale in the bazaars.

This nomadic life involves a strong group consciousness, a detachment from the larger secondary groups and associations formed by settled people, and a way of life in which the strong and fit survive. Domestic virtues, schools, hospitals, community services, and government have little meaning for these people. Nevertheless, they see more of the world than the villagers and most of the townspeople, and may spend enough time outside Afghanistan to

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absorb some elements of the foreign cultures with which they come in contact. There are three types of nomadic life, revolving around the three functions of trade, transportation, and stock raising. All use animals and animal products, but the stock raising nomads depend completely on their herds. Their movements are determined by the availability of good pasturage and they may find themselves pressed by a neighboring tribe or an expanding sedentary population, or by temporary climatic changes, into new territory. It is this same stock raising group, the largest of the three, which is least resistant to a change-over to seminomadic habits, once they obtain satisfactory winter pasturage. This seminomadic life is characteristic of the Hazaras and the Chahar Aimaks, of several Pushtun tribes, and of many pastoral groups in northern Afghanistan. However, the nomadic traders and the camel-train nomads, whose main business is to transport goods, are not easily diverted from a wandering life. Their best days may be over, as motor transport replaces the camel and pack trains to an increasing degree, but there are still many areas in and near Afghanistan that only these beasts of burden can travel.

The transition from seminomadic pastoralism to a settled village life can be observed throughout Afghan history. The seminomadic settler has his winter home in valley or plain and spends the summer in the highlands, sometimes moving for a brief sojourn to even higher altitudes where his herd grazes in Alpine meadows that are free from snow only during a few summer months. But once he is accustomed to call a place home, he is likely to start raising food and fodder crops regularly, and, as members of the community specialize in cultivation, the group becomes agricultural as well as pastoral, its life achieving the permanent rhythm of a settled community. It becomes more and more integrated into the sedentary agricultural culture which characterizes so much of the Middle East, as distinct from the pastoral steppe culture of Central Asia. In the village community, an occupational organization replaces the tribal one and the authority of the government becomes more important.

Both pastoral and agricultural Afghanistan remain contrasted, however, with urban Afghanistan. The village is characteristic of the rural way of life which, although integrated into the national life, affecting it, and being under its control, remains to a considerable extent autonomous and remote from the complex ways of the larger towns. The town with its schools, shops, factories, busi-

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ness and government offices, and the diversification of occupational and social groups breeds an Afghan way of life differing significantly from the equally Afghan way of life of the rural population. As in other countries, the more sophisticated townsman is inclined to feel superior to the village yokel, a fact observed by many travelers in Afghanistan. These same observers, however, almost invariably prefer the simplicity, friendliness, and directness of the rural people to the ways and habits of the townspeople. In villages still organized on a tribal basis different kinship groups have little interdependence and may even be at odds with each other, but those villages in which tribal affiliation has become of secondary importance become real communities with an elected or appointed administration bridging kinship differences. There are thousands of these small communities in Afghanistan, settled where both fertile soil and a good water supply make farming possible. Some are so remote and self-sufficient that the inhabitants have never been to a town, and the children have never seen candy.

Water is the major factor in Afghan rural life. The village depends on a water supply and the manner of its distribution. Water ranks with property and women as a source of dispute in Afghanistan. Where the supply is plentiful and justly shared, villages develop a high degree of cooperation and self-sufficiency, tightly bound by common interests. Many villagers are financially dependent on the landlord and look to him for help in time of stress or trouble. They work together in building roads, bridges, houses, facilities for trade and travel, and, above all, in the excavation and maintenance of irrigation ditches, and the *kariz*. All this collective effort in a relatively small community makes every member personally acquainted with everyone else; in this respect village life differs radically from urban living. One may become a member of the village community not only through birth, but also through participation in the economic, political, or cultural life of the community. Purchase of an interest, inheritance, marriage, or simply working as a laborer are sufficient grounds for admitting a newcomer to the village community, always provided there are enough means of subsistence for all.

Around the older, larger villages are the crumbling fortification walls left over from earlier, unsettled times. The newer villages, though without walls, still tend to cluster together, a compound of walled houses and gardens surrounded, in the open country, by the tilled fields. A road runs through the center, or

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passes close by, serving as the village's connection with the other villages and their bazaars.

The village will include a market center with a few shops, perhaps a teahouse, and a mosque. The larger villages have more than one mosque. There will be the village well and possibly water running through the lanes in narrow ditches. The number of shops varies with the size and importance of the village. If there is no teahouse, the shops will serve as meeting places where the men gather to drink tea and talk. The mosques also are social centers, a place for people to see their friends and perhaps ask for help on their farms or the loan of a tool. Around the village proper are walled gardens, cemeteries, shrines, and threshing floors. Beyond are the fields.

Inside the village, high walls front on the lanes. Behind the walls of mud-brick topped with brush, there will be a house, a small garden, a place for livestock, a pool, a cooking oven, and a latrine. The area and equipment of the household depends on the prosperity of the owner. The houses are flat-roofed, mud-brick, and only one story high, although the floor may be raised to provide room underneath for a cool cellar where the family will live on hot summer days, and where they will keep their perishable foods. A wealthy man will have at least one tower on his house, and a powerful *khan* might have as many as four. These are watchtowers, now unnecessary, but which have become a sign of wealth and property. They are high, cool, and pleasant in summer, and are used either as guest rooms or as sitting and sleeping rooms for the family. Almost every house will have at least two rooms, a living room and a reception room. There will be rugs on the floor, pillows and mattresses along the walls, perhaps a chest or two for household possessions, but no other furniture.

There are two types of village official. The first, found in every village, is the *malik* or *sardar*, a mayor elected by the villagers themselves, for a term whose length varies in different parts of the country. He is a member of the district government, and collects taxes, settles disputes, and refers difficult cases to the local governor. If there are official guests he entertains them at his own expense. The other official has the function of distributing running water to the fields and houses. He also is elected by the villagers, but in some places his office is merged with that of the *malik*. Some villages have night watchmen and village guards, others depend on watchdogs. A villager may also post a watch over his own fields

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and gardens. Village thefts are usually of household possessions or unharvested crops, since livestock is marked by the owner with a distinctive color dye.

The villagers wear sleeveless coats, turbans, and homemade—sometimes purchased—shoes. Styles do not change, though the international trade in secondhand clothes has introduced army overcoats and suit coats to the villagers. For special occasions they buy new clothes, which will be ordered from a town, usually through some neighbor who is going to sell fruit in the town. Otherwise they depend on the small shops and the village shoemaker and blacksmith. Since there is no public bath, they bathe in the river, standing on a little dock of stones. Women bathe privately at home. Shaving is still considered to be against religion, and only the modern young intelligentsia of the cities do it.

In summer, the farmers and their families leave their village houses and camp out in shelters in the fields. At night they sleep in the open, or, if it rains, in the shelters. If a man has a little money—enough to make him comparatively wealthy by local standards—he will buy some donkeys and will drive them up the mountain in the early morning to gather wood.

The villages have in common the simple face-to-face relationship between the members of the community, the absence of modern conveniences in most homes, the lack of public sanitation, and a rudimentary, uncomplicated division of labor. All have their mosque or mosques, and few are without some grave or shrine of religious significance. Some villages are local marketing centers and receive an influx of rural people twice a week; others are off the beaten track, stagnant and self-sufficient. In almost all life has been unhurried, traditional, and uneventful. Only in recent times has the radio begun to link these people with the hectic world outside.

The most modern and progressive city of Afghanistan is Kabul, and the influence of Kabul on village life is evident in several potentially significant ways. Farmers living near enough to the capital to ride there on trucks and buses come back to their villages with glowing accounts of the wonders of urban life and of Western civilization, talking for hours about luxurious cars with radios in them. Boys who have gone to Kabul to school return with tales of spring beds and electric lights, firing their stay-at-home families and neighbors with a desire to go see for themselves and to buy shoes or attend a movie there. Other Afghan towns, even with their

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government offices and improvements, are well behind it in the acceptance and use of Western technology and ideas.

Kabul is a picturesque city of no architectural pretensions, cut in two by the Kabul river and dominated by the spur on which the Bala Hisar, an old citadel of many historical and sinister memories, stands. The ancient city lies south of the river, rimmed by mountains which make expansion impossible. The old city was a densely packed mass of flat-roofed houses cut by covered bazaars and winding, narrow alleys. These houses were made of sun-dried brick, clay, and wood, with no windows on the street. Today much of this old section has been demolished, cut through by broad new streets lined with shops and business houses. Here are the bazaars, with the textile merchants, the spice vendors, the carpet sellers, the jewelers, and the leatherworkers each clustered together.

Through the wider streets horse-drawn *tongas*, trucks, automobiles, horsemen, loaded donkeys and camels, and an occasional flock of sheep move in orderly confusion, amidst the milling mass of shoppers, bicyclists, and children, none of them observing any traffic rules except the wheeled vehicles, which are kept to one side of the street by watchful traffic policemen. Here and there a shopkeeper is sprinkling water from the open gutter, which runs on each side of the street, over the soil in front of his shop to keep the dust down, or a fruit vendor may squat to throw handfuls of the same water over his basket of grapes to keep them looking fresh. European, Indian, Japanese, Russian, British, and American merchandise is offered together with every conceivable native product. Teahouses and iced-drink cafes are numerous.

The new town, north of the river, is different in character. Here, in Shahr-i-No, the "new city," are located the government buildings, the foreign embassies, the schools and colleges, the Kabul hotel, the banks, the royal palace, and the residences of many government officials and of the diplomatic personnel. New construction is going on ceaselessly. The streets are wide and asphalted and most of them straight; in the residential area they are lined with trees. Numerous villas and comfortable homes line the streets, but few are visible, as they are nearly all placed in gardens which a high wall hides from passers-by.

Obviously in this city, although it is small among the world's capitals, life has a very different tempo than in the villages. There is a large business community and a large corps of government personnel, civil and military, as well as thousands of students,

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businessmen, and officials. In the daytime many of these people meet and talk over their affairs, influencing each other and continually adjusting conflicting or alien points of view to their own. There is also a large population of servants, clerks, menials, factory workers, mechanics, and shop hands. However much isolated in space, Kabul is a door through which the air from abroad enters the long-closed mansion of Afghanistan. In this vortex of political, social, economic, and cultural crosscurrents no complete stagnation is possible for any but a hermit or a fanatic. Thus the city becomes a center of changes, of changing outlooks, and changing ways of living and doing things. The old traditions of individual and collective life meet a test here, and several succumb to the new influences.

In this welter of forces the Kabul citizen finds one refuge, his home. Whether he has maintained the joint-family way of life or has established his single family residence apart from the family homestead, he has privacy and quiet behind the high walls of his home, and within the culture of his group. Afghan tradition and Afghan ways of life continue to guide him. Even living in a house with a bathroom, beds, some modern furniture, a radio, a telephone, and water on tap does not radically change an Afghan's outlook or character. And such luxuries are only for the few. The bulk of Kabul's population has none of these conveniences, and does not live very differently from its predecessors a century ago.

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CHAPTER *10*

Political Dynamics

IN THE ABSENCE of political parties, many aspects of political dynamics as understood in the West simply do not exist in Afghanistan. The political awareness of the bulk of the population is rudimentary, if it exists at all. Most of the inhabitants are illiterate members of a tribal society whose mental horizon is extremely limited; in settled communities many have never been outside of their home districts. Elections are held periodically in the towns, but only a small percentage of the population shows an interest in them and those individuals expressing independent thought and activity are soon suppressed by the weight of authority. Nevertheless Afghanistan possesses a few focal points or concentrations of latent political power and the ruling oligarchy must avoid alienating these groups, which in combination could break its hold on the country. These groups may be defined as members of royal families, the individuals with great local influence who comprise the *loya jirgeh*, leaders of the Pushtun tribes, the capitalists, religious leaders, the educated officials, the growing middle class, and elements influenced by foreign ideologies or subservient to foreign direction.

The influence of the royal families pervades the civil administration and the military organization. The reigning Yahya Khel family dominates the political scene in the person of the ruler and his cousins, and their sons are being educated and trained to assume this same responsibility. The direct descendants of the Amir Dost Muhammad line through such recent rulers as Habibullah and Amanullah hold very important administrative, diplomatic, and military posts. These two royal families intermarry to a fantastic extent and through these networks of relationships stability of the government is promoted. That is to say, each member of

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MUHAMMADZAI DYNASTY



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these families is entitled to a ranking post and responds by supporting the regime. The nature of the relationships within a royal family is suggested by the accompanying charts of the Yahya Khel family and the Muhammadzai dynasty.

The *loya jirgeh*, as an institution, represents traditionally conservative interests. The most recent *loya jirgeh* was held at Kabul in November 1955 at which time its 360 members voted to support the policy and actions of the government with regard to the Pushtunistan issue. A perusal of the list of members gives no clue as to the standing of the individuals or whether they were chosen as presumed supporters of the government. It may be said that the ruling oligarchy would do well to summon this body at more frequent intervals for each time that it met and supported the position of the regime, even on such a subject as the rapid modernization of the country, such action would cut the ground from under dissident elements. In other words, the *loya jirgeh* could serve the cause of internal political stability. By the same token should the government alienate a number of the groups possessing political power their attitudes expressed in the *loya jirgeh* could force it to change its policies.

The leaders of the Pushtun tribes continue to possess latent power of great magnitude, both within their areas and as members of the parliament and the *loya jirgeh*, although this power is steadily declining. The influence of some of the leaders declines as the central government assumes their functions, and as the hold of the Pushtunwali weakens. More and more their sons seek higher education and leave the tribal lands to enter government service or engage in business. Some of the governors in these areas are men who were formerly the military commanders of these regions and know them well, but, in general, there are no individuals in the regime who have the relations with the tribal leaders cultivated and enjoyed by Muhammad Hashem and Shah Mahmud.

Substantial subsidies are distributed among the Pushtun tribes through the Department of Tribal Affairs, and it is believed such amounts are related to the nearness of the tribe to the frontier with Pakistan and to the tribe's active interest in the Pushtunistan issue. Army units act to prevent intertribal warfare and the government manipulates the existence of blood feuds and tribal rivalries to discourage a potentially hostile combination of powerful tribal leaders. The policy of settling loyal Pushtuns in other areas of the country upon good agricultural land continues to be a method by

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

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which possible disaffection among other ethnic groups is confronted by local force, but it also tends to remove reliable elements from the naturally turbulent areas of the country. The Pushtun tribes, although in need of constant watching and careful manipulation, are at the same time one of the regime's sources of strength. The good will and cooperation of the tribal chiefs are essential to the most vital functions of government: keeping order, raising revenue, and obtaining troops. Therefore as long as the bulk of them can be held loyal to the government and divided among themselves, the stability of the regime is insured to a considerable extent. If for this reason alone, the chiefs of the politically important tribes are treated with outward deference and given such emoluments, honors, and other inducements as are likely to bind them to Kabul. On the other hand, this situation which was valid until very recently has been drastically affected by the equipment of the Afghan army with Soviet weapons. Provided with Soviet jet planes, tanks, and artillery, forces loyal to the regime are now in a position to prevent any movement of dissident tribal elements on Kabul, and for the first time since 1747 the Pushtun tribes lack the capability of overthrowing the central government.

In many settled areas the *khans* have much the same position as had the old feudal landlords in medieval Europe. Obviously in such areas the *khan* is the political as well as the economic kingpin, and the people are politically impotent. The regime sees to it that the *khans* of such areas stay in line whether as friends or as subjects who know what is best for their interests.

A product of the changing scene of the last score of years in Afghanistan was the emergence of a group of capitalists. This element originated in the early thirties when a small group of merchants obtained a monopoly of the sugar trade under the government's newly inaugurated policy of economic development. The group thrived and founded the Afghan bank, the Bank Melli Afghan. With the government's blessing this bank embarked on an ambitious program of organized trade and light industry. Trading, import, export, and investment companies sprang up like mushrooms, many of them obtaining monopoly rights in their lines of activity.

The venture wrought a social change of considerable significance. Up to that time all saving had been hoarding; investment had been only in land and merchandise and the only form of money had been hard cash. Commercial credit had been unknown and transactions

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had been correspondingly small. No great companies or associations of interests had been organized; individualism and liberalism were guiding economic activity. When people were introduced to the idea of pooling their resources, and commercial credit was introduced, the effect was amazing: during its first six years the bank increased its capital a hundredfold, largely by new investment and by reinvestment of profits. Many people joined in this profitable way of doing business, and those who had started it became professional dealers in credit and investment and obtained key positions in the new group. By 1938 the government seemed to feel that this private enterprise was getting out of hand and moved to recapture its monopolies and to open a bank of its own, Da Afghanistan Bank. After 1950 the government further restricted the operations of local capitalists and entrepreneurs and from 1955 moved sharply in the direction of state capitalism, taking over the control and financing of factories, industries, and businesses which had been established with private funds. This squeeze on local financiers, together with the imposition of higher taxes on businesses and merchants seems to have aroused considerable resentment which has, however, no open channels of political expression, since this group no longer has representation in the Cabinet.

The importance of the Afghan religious leaders resides in their ability to arouse devout and suggestible followers on occasions when acts and policies of the government are regarded as offensive to Moslem faith and traditions. However, this ability is on the decline. Over a period of years the regime has striven both to placate this element and to separate the functions of church and state. In the first instance, Nadir Shah established the Jamiyyat-i 'Ulema, a body of religious leaders, which was to function as an enlightened body favoring progress that accorded with Moslem principles. On the other hand, the regime long refrained from taking the appropriate action of naming a very important religious leader as Minister of Justice so that it could proceed unhampered in a separation of the *shari'a* from the legal codes of Western origin.

In addition, the focal points of potential religious opposition to the regime have become increasingly impotent. Such families as the Jilani and the Mojadadi, which formerly had hosts of followers and direct channels of influence on a government, have become inactive as a result of official pressures and as their younger members lose interest in defending religious dogma and drift away into a materialistic way of life. No outstanding religious leader is bold

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enough to speak out openly in opposition to measures taken by the government, and expressions of religious hostility are quite localized. In the summer of 1959 religious leaders at Kabul protested strongly to the regime against its new policy of encouraging women to discard the veil; neither private representations nor a few efforts at public protest brought any concessions. Riots subsequently broke out in Qandahar, in December, which were inspired in part by local religious figures. However, harsh repressive measures destroyed the capability of these figures to engage in such activity, and it is most probable that only some extremely shocking action by the government against Islam could result in mass protest and effective reaction.

The educated officials are representative of a local intelligentsia which may number five thousand individuals. The outstanding members of this group represent the two generations of Afghans who have received specialized education in foreign universities. Only a few are the products of local educational institutions. While some of the intelligentsia are engaged in private business and the professions, most of them work for the regime as officials, teachers, or editors and directors of the mass media of the country. Most of the Cabinet posts and the highest administrative posts in the ministries are held by such individuals. However, they have responsibility without real authority, since all decisions are made and all policies determined by the royal family. In addition, many of them feel deeply frustrated by their arbitrary assignment to posts unrelated to their talents and training. Members of the intelligentsia as a rule feel that more institutions and societies of the type they saw in democratic countries in the West should be established in Afghanistan; a few think that state socialism should replace the feudal-monarchial structure of the Afghan government. However, they are not free to engage in a critical examination of existing institutions and ideologies, given the regime's reaction to its single experiment in encouraging liberal expression.

After Shah Mahmud became prime minister in 1946 the regime began to display a more liberal outlook, and members of the intelligentsia were quick to take advantage of this atmosphere. The National Council, which was elected in 1949 and remained in session until 1952, reflected a spirit of progressive activity and became known in intellectual circles as the "liberal parliament." Its liberal leaders, Muhammad Ghobar and Abdur Rahman Mahmudi, attracted enough support to encourage the National Council to

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take its duties very seriously. Members began to call Cabinet ministers to account for the conduct of affairs, and speeches by Ghobar and Mahmudi were critical of the foreign policy of the government. The National Council passed a press law which, though it contained certain restrictive provisions, created a situation in which independent newspapers could be published.

During 1951 three independent newspapers appeared at Kabul—the *Vatan* (Homeland), *Angar* (Imagination), and *Nida'-i-Khalq* (The Voice of Creation). *Vatan*, a biweekly produced by a duplication method, was issued in the name of Muhammad Ghobar as licensee, with Abdul Hay Aziz as its featured writer. Claiming a circulation of 1,500 copies—the capacity of its equipment—the paper supported the foreign policy of the government but printed articles calling for freedom of speech and the press, for withdrawal of the royal family from politics, and for holding ministers and other high officials responsible for their acts. The *Angar*, a biweekly in Persian and Pushtu, founded by Fayz Muhammad Angar, called for free elections, a government responsible to the National Council, and a monarchy that would reign but not rule. An article in this paper criticizing aspects of a plan to construct a shrine to house a hair of the Prophet Muhammad drew an emphatic reaction from the religious leaders. The *Nida'-i-Khalq*, also a biweekly, advocated the same principles as the other two papers, emphasizing that the backwardness of the country was due to the lack of a democratic system of government.

In 1950 and 1951 the royal family itself appeared to favor these developments and may have been considering transferring some of its authority to a broader based Cabinet and parliament. It sponsored the formation of a National Democratic party, which government employees were encouraged to join but which lacked the more direct appeal of the independent press and the liberal leaders. Their activity began to reach larger audiences as Mahmudi addressed the Kabul Student Union and criticized the government for failing to present a budget to the National Council and for tolerating graft, corruption, and other malpractices among the high officials. Alarmed by the increasing wave of critical activity, the regime in 1951 and 1952 closed down the independent newspapers and arrested their editors. In addition the Student Union was banned and some of its members arrested. After the session of the National Council came to an end in 1952 and preparations were being made for elections for the next session, the government moved

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to arrest or otherwise restrain some forty former deputies so that they could not be candidates.

Although the experiment had proven unsatisfactory to the regime, after 1953 Prime Minister Daoud did take steps to respond to some of the justified criticisms. Even some of the critics moved directly from prison to important posts in the government, and more recently members of the intelligentsia have been encouraged by the regime to enter the National Council. While it is probable that many of the educated officials agree on needed reforms—the creation of political parties, the selection of the prime minister from members of the National Council, a constitution under which the royal family would reign but not rule, free elections, free speech, a free press, and a Cabinet responsible to the National Council—there is no indication that the oligarchy intends to initiate them. There may well be feelings of ambivalence among this group. While they are inclined toward the ideals of democracy or socialism, they also recognize that Prime Minister Daoud is devoted to the very rapid economic development of the country and that by serving the regime they are advancing the basic interests of the country. Possibly the only channel presently open to this group to exert pressure upon the regime would be that of mass resignation from their posts.

Another element, that of the middle class, is still so small in numbers and so devoid of any influence that it has no impact upon the policies and actions of the regime, unlike many other countries where it represents the spearhead of popular, national feelings.

Elements influenced by foreign ideologies or subservient to foreign direction are not, of course, conspicuous on the Afghan scene. It is possible that the government of Pakistan encourages individual religious figures to oppose any action of the Afghan regime that may be interpreted as detrimental to the position of Islam. It is highly probable that the USSR works to recruit agents in Afghanistan and to win over individuals within the intelligentsia who are dissatisfied with the political situation in the country. A pro-Soviet interpretation is reflected in much of the mass media of Afghanistan and must stem from the attitude of individuals rather than of the regime itself. However, there is nothing to preclude, with the passage of time, the development of a Soviet-oriented fifth column of some magnitude.

National and local elections may be a major factor in the political dynamics of a country, but this is not the case in Afghanistan.

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Elections are governed by the provisions of the election law, known as the Act of 1931 Regarding Election to the National Council. This law gives suffrage to Afghan males over twenty-one years of age who have at least one year's residence in their electoral district. It excludes bankrupt merchants, persons sentenced for a crime, army personnel, and (in the locality of their service) members of the municipal police. To become a deputy, a candidate must be an Afghan of good repute, if foreign-born have resided in the country for ten years, be literate, and be between thirty and seventy years of age.

The law calls for an electoral college, or *jirgeh*, of electors to be summoned to the chief town of their electoral district by the local governor. Those who appear at the specified time and place are to "deliberate concerning the election" of their deputies and make their choice by general agreement in the presence of the local magistrate and the *shari'a* court. Nomadic tribes, as listed in the law's annex, elect a deputy directly by their own methods. For one week after the election complaints can be lodged with the local magistrate and the court. After the deputies have assembled at Kabul, a challenge of either an election or the ruling of the local court can be settled only by the National Council itself.

The Act of 1931 mentions no detailed mechanics, but Afghan officials maintain that voting is done by written ballot under impartial supervision, that the ballots are placed in guarded, locked boxes and carefully counted, and that anyone qualified may announce his candidacy. It is possible that in a few places experiments of this type have been made; it is certain that they do not apply to all parts of the country, least of all to tribal territory. Admittedly, the law is applied "wherever it is feasible to do so." The decision on this matter lies, of course, with the provincial governors.

Elections are held every three years for the National Council, every four years for municipal councilors. Apparently elections for provincial and divisional consultative assemblies are held concurrently with the national elections. The representatives of administrative areas below the national level seem to be elected by an informal type of indirect franchise. Although no precise information is available, it appears that villagers agree to send one of their leading men to a local meeting, which in turn selects one or two persons to represent the locality in a district meeting. From among these again one or two are chosen to represent the district in the advisory committee of the divisional administrator. Each division

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in turn is represented on the provincial governor's consultative assembly.

Municipalities are also represented on the provincial governor's council. In Mazar-i-Sharif, for instance, the consultative assembly meets once a week with the governor-general; it includes not only his official family, but elected representatives, one for each, of the province's three divisions—Shibarghan, Balkh, and Samanghan—and of the municipality of Mazar-i-Sharif, the capital. Municipal elections are the real laboratory for political democracy in Afghanistan. They receive good publicity and are based on a limited, but more concerned and alert, electorate.

Almost invariably only government-approved persons become candidates in any elections. The word is passed that so-and-so has the government's blessing, and rarely does anyone else get a place on the list of candidates. Candidates not sponsored by the government occasionally have managed to get elected, but their influence in a government-dominated legislature or provincial council is negligible. When a liberal group did form a more or less cohesive progressive body in the National Council the government restricted their influence by having its own candidate elected President of the Council. In many localities all pretense at popular elections is abandoned. The highest government official on the spot collects the *muyisafidan*, or the whitebeards, announces who is wanted for the vacancy, and this nominee is declared elected. On several occasions important elected positions have been filled in this manner by former opponents of the regime who were thought to have come around to a proper attitude.

Records relating to participation in the elections are difficult to locate and of questionable reliability. Possibly 500,000 votes are cast in a national election. Regardless of the interest of the government in assuring that the right men are elected, there are serious difficulties to the promotion of an expanded electorate: most of the people are quite indifferent to their rights as electors; many in remote areas would have great difficulty in getting to polling places; and the level of illiteracy works against an informed electorate. It may be said that the government does encourage a greater participation in district and municipal elections, giving such elections considerable publicity in the press, and given time and the growth of a responsible electorate the government may be expected to relax some of its supervisory controls.

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CHAPTER *II*

Theory and Structure of Government

AFTER THE EMERGENCE of Afghanistan as a nation-state in 1747 under Ahmad Shah Durrani, the existing feudal structure of relationships continued almost unchanged, dominated by a succession of natural leaders from the Durrani tribe. In 1818 this leadership shifted from the Sadozai clan to that of the Muhammadzai where it has remained. At Kabul these amirs struggled to maintain their authority against challenges both from within their families and from rebellious Pushtun tribes. Throughout much of the nineteenth century and the early years of the present one, the mounting pressures of the rival empires of Great Britain and Russia had centrifugal as well as centripetal effects: fostering internal intrigue and dissension but also enhancing a spirit of common unity against foreign influences and threats.

Not until Abdur Rahman came to the throne in 1881 did any of these rulers give serious, reasoned consideration to establishing a cohesive political structure. After, in his own words, making a united kingdom out of many independent states headed by separate chiefs Abdur Rahman went on to prepare the ground for constitutional government, while cautioning his successors to move slowly and only as education and experience prepared the people for steps toward this goal. Abdur Rahman arranged for representatives of various elements of society to meet with him at Kabul. One group represented the *sardars,* or hereditary lords, the second the *mullas,* and the third the *khawanin mulki,* or *khans* of the kingdom. Abdur Rahman referred to this third group as his House of Commons and its members were elected in two stages, first a larger number by the villagers and then a smaller number self-selected from the larger number.

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Habibullah, who came to the throne in 1901, ignored his father's recommendations for the gradual introduction of constitutional government, but did establish an advisory council composed of thirty high administrative officials who discussed necessary legislation and forwarded proposals to the ruler for royal assent. During World War I it became evident that Habibullah's policies and autocratic attitude were increasingly resented by influential elements in the country. There was much bitterness over his continuing loyalty to the British empire in the war, while Afghans who had witnessed or read of the Young Turk movement and of the constitutional movement in Iran advocated similar political reform through the medium of the Young Afghan Party. Unsigned letters called on the ruler to grant political freedoms and to cease his subservience to the interests of the British. Habibullah failed to heed these warnings and in February 1919 was assassinated.

Amanullah immediately issued a proclamation stating that the country would be completely independent, that measures of oppression would be ended immediately, and that reforms would be undertaken. In May 1919 Afghan forces moved across the frontier into India, and the British army retaliated. The warfare was localized and brief, but the subsequent Treaty of Rawalpindi indicated that Great Britain relinquished its former control over the external relations of Afghanistan. In 1921 treaties with England, Russia, Iran, and Turkey formalized and stabilized the country's position, and Amanullah turned his attention to political and social reforms. In these fields his father-in-law Mahmud Tarzi played a leading role. From exile in Turkey, he had returned to become the crusading editor of the weekly paper *Saraj ul-Akhbar* during the reign of Habibullah, and Amanullah appointed him Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In 1923 the text of the country's first constitution was issued. Based upon those of England and Iran, it had seventy-three articles which provided for a hereditary monarchy, a council of state, and a number of consultative councils. In 1924 Amanullah promulgated a *nezam nameh,* or legal code, apparently based upon Turkish administrative law. Sections which dealt with female education, a new system of military conscription, and qualifications for *mullas* were hostilely received, and a tribal revolt broke out in the south. In July 1924 Amanullah assembled a *loya jirgeh* at Kabul and in response to the views of its members retreated on the subjects of female education and of armed service. Undismayed, in 1925 he

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issued decrees advocating the adoption of European dress and the unveiling of women, as well as others which seemed contrary to the principles of Islam. In 1926 he took the title of *padishah*, although his predecessors had been satisfied with the less regal one of *amir*.

From December 1927 through July 1928 Amanullah and his queen toured twelve Middle Eastern and European countries. He returned more convinced than ever that Afghanistan must imitate the West, and was urged along these lines by a circle of advisers composed of individuals who were out of touch with popular feelings or who were following Soviet instructions to hasten the introduction of socialism. He decreed that women should be unveiled at Kabul and that all the inhabitants of the capital must wear European clothing and hats. In August he convened a *loya jirgeh* whose members hastily donned European dress to hear his plan to establish an elected National Assembly of 150 members. He also advocated universal education, the emancipation of women, and a separation of religious and civil functions in society. In October he opened the National Assembly and outlined in more detail his revolutionary program. Meanwhile the country's seething indignation was translated into revolt and provincial *jirgehs* demanded the abolishment of offensive laws and decrees. Amanullah yielded, setting up a fifty-two-member council to advise him on a new course, but it was too late. The capital was captured by hostile elements, and his reign came to an end.

With Nadir Shah's accession the tribal, religious, and dynastic traditions of Afghanistan were fused into a clear conception of the state and its government which the new ruler personified. He expressed his views in the Royal Declaration read at his formal coronation on November 16, 1929, in his inaugural address at the first sitting of the new Afghan parliament on July 6, 1931, and finally in the new constitution adopted by parliament and published on October 31, 1931.

In the Royal Declaration of November 1929 Nadir Shah announced his resolve to base the administration of his country on Islamic Hanafi law and so dissociated his regime from the frenzied modernism of Amanullah, while at the same time conciliating the Moslem clergy. In defining the position and role of Islam, Nadir Shah also sought to counteract the influence of subversive doctrines and the divisive tendencies of a multitribal population. Progress was not to be neglected, but was to be geared to the understanding, needs, and capacities of the people. The new ruler summoned a

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loya jirgeh composed of delegates from each tribe and province and numbering 286 persons. This body met in September 1930 to confirm the dethronement of Amanullah and the succession of Nadir Shah. From it were chosen 105 persons to form a National Council. In 1931 an Assembly of Nobles consisting of up to 45 "intelligent and farseeing" persons was created.

Although the new house of representatives, called the National Council, was allegedly to act partly as a consultative and partly as a legislative body, the delegates were selected in a manner that would ensure that the executive would not be hampered in passing measures deemed necessary for the welfare of the state.

A similar precaution was exercised in reforming the executive. Previously the rulers had been their own prime ministers. Nadir Shah created a Cabinet of ten members under a powerful prime minister, but selected his own brothers Muhammad Hashem and Shah Mahmud as Prime Minister and War Minister respectively. The remaining Cabinet members were chosen from among his own family or proven friends. At the beginning even this Cabinet was given little authority. A great paucity of intelligent and honest officials made it difficult to find administrators on whom Nadir Shah could rely. The consequence was a highly centralized administration which for the first two years of its existence ruled mainly by a mixture of conciliation and severity, while the country gradually returned to normalcy.

However, as Amanullah had called himself a constitutional monarch, Nadir Shah had no intention of appearing less up-to-date than his predecessor. Immediately after his accession he had repealed the constitution on which Amanullah's government had foundered, and set to work on a thoroughgoing revision. This resulted in the constitution of October 1931, which remains the legal foundation for the Afghan state. It has never been amended in any fundamental way, and the only additions include a minor provision concerning marriage with foreign nationals and one prohibiting foreigners from owning land in Afghanistan.

The constitution is divided into sixteen sections and contains 110 articles, to which the Addendum of February 1933 added only two. The religious tone of the document is most conspicuous. "In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful" is the very first sentence. The first section, General Principles, establishes the Hanafi rite of Islam as "the official and common sect," describing it as "noble" and "polished," and requires that the ruler be of this rite. Non-

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Moslems are assured of protection, "provided they do not infringe the ordinary rules of conduct and propriety." Article 2 implies the abolition of tribal territory as distinct from administered areas, for it claims that "no distinction is made between different parts of the kingdom." Kabul is named the capital in Article 3, and Article 4 describes the flag.

The next section is devoted to "rights of the ruler." Nadir Shah here recalls the circumstances of his accession to the throne, reasserts that he will rule "in accordance with the dictates of the expounders of the sacred *shari'a* of the Holy Prophet and the Hanafi rite" as well as with the constitution, and further states that the noble Afghan nation agrees to keep the throne in his family, succession to be "in accordance with the selection of His Majesty and the people of Afghanistan." No mention is made of the possibility that the people might disapprove of the king's selection. The next article prescribes the Oath of Accession, invoking the "blessing of the sacred spiritual force of the blessed saints" and promising protection of Islam, of Afghanistan's independence, and of the rights of the nation, and to strive for the defense, progress, and prosperity of the country.

Article 7 provides for the customary mention of the king's name in Friday sermons, for his imprint on currency, and for his control of the Cabinet, the civil service, legislation, jurisprudence, and the armed forces, for the power to declare war and conclude peace treaties, and for executive pardon or clemency to convicts. The final article of this section requires the national budget to provide an allotment for royal expenditures.

The remaining sections of the constitution are designed to make concessions to the democratic spirit of the age without yielding the substance of royal control. First comes a section on civil rights, then three sections on the organization, duties, and functioning of the National Council; followed by a section on the Assembly of Nobles, and others on central and provincial administration, courts, the army, and the privacy of mail. Several of these provisions indicate how strongly Nadir Shah had been influenced by Western political institutions during the years of his exile and were evidently intended as genuine steps in the direction of getting the people to participate in their own government.

The constitution provides for an Islamic state, governed by a modified constitutional autocracy. The essence of power is concentrated in the king and the prime minister he appoints. The

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modification of this centralized power lies in the rudimentary bicameral parliamentary system, or Parleman. Of prime importance is the lower house or Majlis Shura-i-Melli, the National Council, whose members are elected for a three-year term. These representatives, at present totaling 171, meet in regular or extraordinary session; emergency sessions may be held in reduced numbers. Fifty percent of the membership form a quorum, and decisions can be made either unanimously or by majority vote. Members enjoy parliamentary freedom of expression, and all ordinary debates are open to the press and the public. The Council has the usual legislative functions of a lower house, and theoretically controls the budget, foreign and domestic loans, public works, and all important economic operations and concessions. However, a minister may ignore rejection of his bills by the Council.

The A'yan Majlis, or House of Nobles, is a hand-picked body of as many as forty-five "experienced and farsighted persons" appointed by the ruler to confirm measures approved by the National Council. If the Nobles are not in session, royal assent alone suffices for a bill to become law. If this upper house passes a measure which the lower house has rejected, a select joint committee of both houses tries to iron out the differences. If no agreement is reached, the ruler decides.

The judicial branch of the Afghan government received little stimulus for development from Nadir Shah's constitution. Articles 87 to 96 confirm the supremacy of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence of the *shari'a* as it existed in the country, emphasize the freedom of these *shari'a* courts from any interference, and the public nature of the hearings. The existing hierarchy of courts and the judicial power vested in various executive departments of the government are confirmed. Appeals go up the line until they reach the summit of the whole judicial system: the prime minister, or the shah himself.

The constitution does not detail the structure of the provincial administration, except in providing for an Advisory Committee to assist the governors of all major administrative divisions. The basic principles of provincial administration are given: delegation of authority, allotment of duties, and fixation of responsibility. The civil service is a hierarchy centered in the ministries of the central government and the rights of civil servants are described in some detail.

Noteworthy among the economic and social provisions of the

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constitution are the provision for free enterprise under law (Article 12); protection of private property (Article 15); prohibition of confiscating the property of Afghan residents (Article 17) and of peacetime levies of money or forced labor (Article 18); abolition of slavery (Article 11) and of the rack and other kinds of torture (Article 19); compulsory primary education (Article 20); prohibition of religious education by foreigners (Article 21) and of publishing news by foreigners (Article 23). The constitution contains no provision for amendment, but by unwritten law only the *loya jirgeh* can make such changes. The interpretation of the constitution is not allocated to any designated authority. Presumably the courts could speculate and the National Council debate on any issue, but the Crown would decide, or in very important cases submit the matter to a *loya jirgeh*.

The constitution contains a limited bill of rights (Articles 9-26). *Shari'a* law is extended to all subjects (Articles 10 and 13) regardless of religion. Both articles add the jurisdiction of Statute Law to their mention of the Moslem Code. Since both *shari'a* and mundane law is administered under government control, the protection promised depends greatly on the disposition of the government toward the claimant. Article 11 not only forbids slavery, but states that "there is no interference with personal liberty." It also has the equivalent of a "due process" clause: "No one is imprisoned or punished without an order in accordance with the *shari'a* or the appropriate laws."

Articles 20, 21, and 22 deal with education, and primary education is declared compulsory. Article 21 insures that Islamic religious instruction shall be unfettered, but "foreign" creeds are not permitted to proselytize. Article 22 insures government control over all public schools but permits non-Moslems to educate their children in their own religion. Freedom of the press is limited by Article 23, and a Press Law enacted later contained restrictive clauses. Nonnationals are forbidden to publish news. However, the constitution permits free entry of foreign newspapers "which do not contain matter against religion and the policy of the Afghan government."

Article 24 appears to be an effort to abolish the murderous feuds which result from the tribal code of honor and revenge: it places the settlement of personal disputes and other matters in the jurisdiction of the courts of justice and the relevant government departments. The two final articles of this section on civil rights

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seek to protect the people from arbitrary taxation, by providing that fixed revenues and taxes can only be levied according to the rules laid down in the appropriate government codes. This provision allows for such changes in the codes as the central government may decide.

Women are not once mentioned in the Afghan constitution. Legally they could claim rights to active and passive franchise as "Afghan nationals" upon reaching adulthood, but by common consensus they are excluded from both. The suffrage rights of the Afghans are not provided for in the constitution, but in the Election Law mentioned in Article 30. The rights of assembly and organization are not explicitly stated in the constitution. Not only does the constitution appear to have rudimentary and inadequate aspects, but not all of its provisions have been properly implemented. The rudimentary nature of the constitution's bill of rights is a source of concern to some Afghans. In addition, they state that the constitution as a whole does not invite popular participation in the government of the country; that the three branches of government have no clearly defined, differentiated powers; and that even a "loyal opposition" is impossible at present, with outspoken criticism of policy made difficult by the aura surrounding the ruling group.

The common Western freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, the exercise of different religious practices, and protection from arbitrary power of the executive and judicial branches of the government are not yet enjoyed by Afghan citizens. The right of free assembly does not exist, and only organizations and societies sponsored or approved by the government are permitted. There is no independent press, the mails are believed to be censored, and foreign newspapers, periodicals, and books are subject to scrutiny and possible confiscation. Regulations restrict the freedom of private enterprise and trade. Police power is exercised without regard to guarantees and such actions as arbitrary arrests and imprisonment without trials are never reported to the public. Political parties do not exist, and although a critic of the government might be elected to the National Council, he would certainly not be re-elected. Only the consensus of a Moslem society on ethics and the tribal and Islamic traditions on the relations between rulers and ruled mitigate the rigors of living in a state with such an inadequate constitution.

The structure of the government may be likened to a pyramid with all the real power and authority concentrated near its apex. At its summit is the ruler who has very broad powers. The shah is the

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supreme head of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government and of the national army. He has no personal responsibility and is inviolable. The shah can declare war, make peace, contract treaties, and make laws in cases of emergency, subject to subsequent confirmation of the National Assembly. It is his prerogative to sanction and promulgate laws, to convoke, open, close, prorogue, extend the life of, and dissolve the National Assembly, to exercise royal clemency, to confer medals and orders, and to determine status and precedence. He appoints the prime minister and approves the appointment and removal of other ministers.

However, in practice the present ruler has delegated some of these powers to other members of the royal family. Nadir Shah's son and successor, Muhammad Zahir, was only nineteen years old at his father's death and an uncle, Muhammad Hashem, the prime minister, became the virtual ruler of the country, functioning firmly, ably, and selflessly in this task until 1946. Muhammad Hashem was succeeded by Shah Mahmud, who in 1953 resigned in favor of the present prime minister, Muhammad Daoud, son of Nadir Shah's brother Muhammad Aziz. Zahir Shah married a cousin, Omara, in 1931 and from this marriage have come a number of children, with the oldest surviving boy, Ahmad Shah, born in 1934. The affairs of the royal family are directed by a Minister of Court who is not a regular member of the prime minister's Cabinet. Formerly the royal families received a large income from landed property, but Nadir Shah restored these holdings to the state and today the royal income is derived from a sum stipulated in each annual budget and from investments in Afghan banks and Afghan stock companies.

The prime minister is appointed by the shah and in turn appoints the members of his Cabinet, but there is no doubt that contemplated appointments and changes are first discussed in the royal family-council. Cabinet ministers must be Afghan citizens and Moslems. They are responsible, theoretically at least, to the legislative branch and charges concerning their alleged misconduct in office may be presented to the Supreme Court. A Cabinet remains in office until the prime minister resigns or is dismissed by the ruler but individual members can be changed at any time. The majority of the present ministers and heads of departments are Afghans who have studied abroad at the graduate level—a situation contrasting significantly with that of a score of years ago when Cabinet posts

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were rotated among the limited number of people who enjoyed the confidence of the royal family.

There are twelve ministries and two departments, headed by presidents who attend Cabinet meetings. The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Planning, Interior, Education, Finance, Public Works, Health, Mines and Industry, Agriculture, Communications, and Justice; the departments are those of Press and Publications and of Tribal Affairs. In addition the prime minister may appoint one or more deputy prime ministers, who may or may not be Cabinet ministers. Full Cabinet meetings are held about once a week, but determination of national policies is largely concentrated in the hands of the prime minister, who is also Minister of National Defense, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Each ministry operates on a nationwide scale and has direct control over its provincial and local representatives throughout the country. It is well known, however, that almost all nonroutine questions, important or unimportant, require decisions at the center. With the exception of provincial governors, who are often Pushtuns from Kabul or Jalalabad, little initiative is left to the civil servants in posts outside Kabul. The only timesaver in this practice of referring even the most trifling matters to the "top" is the telephone. One might say that Afghanistan is a highly centralized state run by telephoned orders from Kabul to the provincial governors and by word of mouth to lower levels.

The Afghan parliament is composed of the shah, the House of Nobles, and the National Council. The House of Nobles appears to sit throughout the year, while the Council meets annually only from May to October. The Nobles are appointed for life, while the representatives of the Council are elected by adult male suffrage at the theoretical ratio of one member for every 100,000 inhabitants. Considerations other than numerical may play a role in the districting and the apportionment of members to a district, such as its importance from the point of view of the central government. Although elections for the Council are held regularly every three years, there is considerable variation in their application in different sections of the country. In the few more advanced urban areas there is growing popular participation and an election may actually resemble to some extent its Western prototype. In most rural and tribal areas elections are the concern of a few leading personalities only.

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Although the Council constitutionally has several important powers and functions, it is no match for the vast powers of the executive and has rarely opposed or blocked a measure introduced by the government. In the absence of a party system, Cabinet members are not, as a rule, members of, or much concerned with, the Council; so the latter does little more than give approval and editorial assistance to the ministers on the measures they want to see passed. It is, nevertheless, a body of considerable prestige. Measures passed by the ruler alone during recess of the Council must be presented to it as soon as it reconvenes. And on the death of the ruler it must meet within twenty days to secure the proper accession of the new king. Strict compliance with this rule after the death of Nadir Shah proved it to be of vital importance for monarchical stability.

Although Nadir Shah had intended to supplement the regular work of the legislature by consulting a *loya jirgeh* every three or four years, this practice has not survived him. During World War II a *loya jirgeh* was called to obtain nationwide support for the government's policy of formal neutrality and for the expulsion of Axis nationals as demanded by the Allied powers, and another in late 1955 on the Pushtunistan issue.

The judicial system in Afghanistan is based on the *shari'a*, which has no set codes and makes no distinction between civil and criminal law. This Islamic law must be interpreted and therefore is administered by theologians who have made it their specialty, rather than by trained jurists. There is also, however, a growing volume of statute law and executive regulations, all of which are supposed to be in harmony with the *shari'a* or they would not have been passed, as well as an increasing number of local lawyers trained at home or abroad. Afghan courts are expected to use both religious and secular law in their administration of justice, but in practice the bulk of the secular laws is administered by special divisions set up for this purpose in the various departments of the central government, each seeing to the enforcement of its own type of laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations. The regular courts therefore are primarily engaged in settling civil cases, although they will handle criminal cases when called upon.

At the lowest level Afghanistan has its primary courts, *mahkameh-i-ebtideh*, or Court of Innovation, roughly one in every district, and about 171 in all. In addition, there is a high court, *mahkameh-i-morafa'eh*, in every province and major town, nineteen in all.

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High courts have appellate jurisdiction but can also act as courts of first instance in serious or complicated cases. Finally there is in Kabul a Supreme Court, or *riasat-i-tamiz,* of final appeal, which differs from the *divan-i-'ala,* or Supreme Court, mentioned in the constitution. The latter court is set up temporarily to deal with certain cases, such as those of ministers or officials accused of improper performance of their official duties, and can be dissolved after the case is disposed of. The *divan-i-'ala* has jurisdiction on all levels, and even a minor official can appeal to it from a decision of the administrative court which has tried him. It is under the direct supervision of the prime minister's office.

In addition to the regular courts, certain judicial functions are exercised by the consultative assemblies of districts and provinces, and by the tribal *jirgehs,* where tribal law still prevails. Minor breaches of the law are disposed of summarily by police courts from whose decisions appeal lies with the governor. An example of executive jurisprudence are the commercial courts found in each province to administer the Commercial Code. Appeals from their decisions are handled by the provincial chamber of commerce, sitting as a permanent Board of Commercial Arbitration to deal with disputes of a commercial nature in each provincial center and at the capital. Similar powers are vested in the Ministry of Communications for violations of laws and regulations concerning mail and telecommunications, and in other ministries according to their special fields. Beyond the regular judicial system, beyond even the Supreme Court, personal appeals may be made to the shah, although nowadays this ultimate type of arbitration is rarely utilized.

The *qazi,* or judges are appointed by the Minister of Justice, a post that is usually held by a distinguished religious leader. To improve the quality of juridical personnel a School of Judges was established in Kabul, under direction of the Ministry of Justice, and there is a College of Law in Kabul University.

The Minister of Justice is supposed to consult a group of divines, called the Jamiyyat-i-'Ulema on the religious aspects of his work. This group was installed by Nadir Shah to placate the *mullas,* but is now relatively ineffective. From the original twenty members it has dwindled to about fifteen and it is believed to lack a *ra'is,* or head, who should be named by the government.

Afghanistan is divided administratively into seven major provinces (*valayat*) and seven minor provinces (*hukumat-i-a'ali*). The major ones are Kabul, Nangrahar, Paktia, Qandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-

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Sharif, and Qataghan. The minor ones are: Parwan, Ghazni, Girishk, Farah, Maymaneh, Shibarghan, and Badakhshan. The provinces are divided into divisions (*hukumat-i-kalan*), districts (*hukumat*), and subdistricts or cantons (*'alaqa*). At the head of each major province is a governor-general (*naib ul-hukuma*), and the minor provinces are administered by a governor (*hakim-i-a'ali*). The divisions are governed by a commissioner (*hakim-i-kalan*); the districts by a district-governor (*hakim-i-mahalli*), and the administrator of a subdistrict is called *'alaqadar*. As a group the administrative corps makes up a career service in the Ministry of the Interior: they are officials of the central government, liable to be transferred from province to province at irregular intervals. Most of the higher officials are drawn from Pushtu-speaking areas—Kabul, Qandahar, Paktia, and Nangrahar—and they rarely serve in their home districts. In each province the chief executive is assisted by an executive council composed of the principal functionaries of the unit, and a consultative assembly (*majlis mashura*). The consultative assembly will have the same number of members as the National Council has from the particular province and will include some such members of the National Council, local representatives of the various ministries, and some local dignitaries. These bodies are empowered to control the financial affairs of the province and of its municipalities, to grant public concessions to companies and individuals, and to pass upon proposals regarding local activities of the ministries.

Typical members of a provincial governor's staff include:

Financial Commissioner	Press Director
Commandant of Police	Director of Records
Commandant of Gendarmerie	Director of Communications
Director of Customs	Judge of the Appellate Court
Director of Education	Director of Agriculture
Director of Health	Director of Industry

The deputy to the governor is the *mustawfi*, or financial commissioner, and next in importance are the commandants of the police and the gendarmerie.

The present administrative system is a development of that established by Abdur Rahman and Habibullah, when provincial governments were headed by governors-general or governors, each assisted by his staff: the *qazi* with his subordinates; the *kotwal* with

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his police force, secretary, and officials of the passport department; the *kafila bashi* with a board of commerce, a revenue office, a tax-collector's office, a treasury office; and a local military force. The present system appears to run relatively smoothly, and to control all but certain of the tribal areas. There is even a type of official for the *kuchis,* a *hakim-i-kuchi,* who collects caravan and camp fees along the main routes of the nomads' movements. Cities with more than 10,000 residents have an elected municipal government of town councilors (*baladiyeh*) and a mayor (*ra'is*). Municipal elections are held every four years, according to the relevant election law. High officials admit that this development is still somewhat experimental, a step in the direction of popular participation, and workable in different degrees according to the local situation. The provincial government approves or vetoes the candidates for office.

In the tribal areas the government administration is less all-pervading. Numbers of the *khans* are drawn into the government in posts outside their home areas and their places taken by government officials who introduce centralized forms of administration. At the lower levels much of the local administration remains in the hands of tribal chiefs who collect taxes and round up conscripts for delivery at the proper time to traveling officials. In some instances officials of the government themselves travel with the nomadic groups.

There are ten grades in the Afghan Civil Service, with Grade 1 at the top. Career officials of Grades 1 and 2 are eligible for appointment to the rank of *vazir,* or Cabinet minister, which is a super grade. Within the foreign service the posts of ambassador and minister are also super grades. For entry into the lowest grades little more than literacy is required, but a higher degree of education, experience, and talent are necessary for promotion to the higher grades, which is determined by annual promotion boards. Wage scales are quite low, but a number of fringe benefits ease financial stringencies. Given the rather short history of this civil service it is not surprising to find that its quality is rather low. Bribe-taking is said to be fairly common, decisions must always be taken at the highest level, the system of record keeping is antiquated, and the concept of officials as servants of the public is quite unknown. However, in more recent years classes and courses in clerical work and public administration have made considerable impact upon the capabilities and attitudes of this group.

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Internal security and public order is a responsibility of the Ministry of Interior which has at its disposal the police, the gendarmerie, and the frontier guards. For many years, even for centuries, travelers in Afghanistan were often at the mercy of robbers, and security in the villages and towns was achieved at the price of paying for immunity from external attack or internal exploitation. The modern system for the maintenance of public order and security was primarily the creation of Abdur Rahman, who, finding the country in the clutches of innumerable rival cutthroats, decided to make it safe at all costs. He described the problem in these words:

> The first thing I had to do was to put an end to these numberless robbers, thieves, false prophets, and trumpery kings. I must confess that it was not an easy task, and it took fifteen years of fighting before they finally submitted to my rule or left the country, either by being exiled or by departing to the next world.

Under Amanullah corruption in the services increased and every official, including the members of the police force, was said to have his price. Nadir Shah placed the police under the Ministry of Interior, separating it from the army, and developed it into an effective agency of the central government. The police are responsible for the maintenance of peace, safety of roads, investigation and arrest of criminals, the serving of judicial summons, and traffic control. The police are also a reserve element of the army, and are therefore partly officered by army personnel who receive special police training. The police work closely with the Intelligence Department, an independent agency of the central government. The visitor to Afghanistan is soon convinced of the effectiveness of this combination; whether interpreted as operating for his protection or for that of the state, he finds that his movements may be known to the authorities even before his arrival at any place on his itinerary. The government is very concerned over the safety of travelers in the country, and such measures have proven to be very effective.

No information in the form of statistics or reports is available on the incidence of crime, but it is believed to be relatively low. In the urban centers the casual appropriation of small items of property by persons with access to households appears to be fairly common but, in contrast, breaking and entering for burglary seems to be quite rare. News of crime in the Kabul papers concerns the

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unusual and bizarre. Appropriate punishment for criminal offenses formerly stressed social retribution, but more recently the emphasis is said to have shifted to that of social rehabilitation.

The bloodcurdling tales customarily told about the eastern frontier area have given Afghanistan a superficial reputation for being a dangerous and wild country. The modern traveler finds, on the contrary, that he is among one of the most orderly, peaceful, and friendly peoples in the world, and after some time he feels safer traveling in remote and sparsely settled areas than in some of the large cities in other parts of the world.

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CHAPTER 12

Mass Media

PRIOR TO ABOUT 1950 the mass media of Afghanistan were so limited in number that each such outlet could easily be listed and described, but in more recent years there has been such a growth in their number and importance that attention must be centered upon the principal media. Most of the media fall under the management or supervision of the Department of the Press, headed by a director who enjoys Cabinet rank. The Department is in charge of the Government Printing House, Radio Kabul, and the Bakhtar News Agency, and has sections concerned with Cultural Affairs, General Publications, News Publications, the Journalist's Association, the Pushtun Academy, and the Historical Society.

Until very recently the great bulk of the printed material came from the Government Printing House (Matba'eh Doulati), formerly called the Government Central Press, but the Ministry of Education now has its own press, as well as special offset printing equipment, and the Ministry of Defense has its Military Printing Press which turns out work in both local and foreign languages. The balance of the printing is done on hand-operated presses located in the provincial towns, or on duplicating equipment. The level of this type of production is not high and quantities are very limited.

The first newspaper to appear regularly in Afghanistan was the *Seraj al-Akhbar* (Lamp of the News), founded in 1912 under Amir Habibullah. Written in Persian, it made a consistent effort to enlighten its readers and to cultivate nationalistic sentiments. When it became too outspoken for the ruler, opposing his policy of coming to terms with the British in World War I, Amir Amanullah replaced this official paper with a Persian-language daily of his own called *Aman-i-Afghan* (Afghan Peace), which for several years was edited by Mahmud Tarzi, a close associate of the ruler and an advocate of the rapid modernization of the country.

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Currently, the two most important daily papers, published at Kabul, are *Anis* and *Islah*. *Anis* (Companion) was founded in 1927 as a fortnightly but now appears every afternoon, with either six or eight pages of large format. Most of the material is in Persian but Pushtu is also used. Its circulation is said to be 15,000, with some 5,000 copies going to the provinces. *Islah* (Reform), founded in 1929, comes out in the morning in six pages, with about sixty percent of the paper in Pushtu, the rest in Persian. Its circulation is estimated at 18,000, with 5,000 copies going to the provinces. *Hiwad*, a daily published at Kabul in Pushtu, is largely concerned with the subject of Pushtunistan. In addition, there are daily papers at Gardez, Baghlan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Ghazni, Herat, Charikar, and Fayzabad, biweeklies at Maymaneh and Farah, and weeklies at Kabul and Girishk.

Anis and *Islah* place little emphasis upon the human side of the news, and only recently has news about crime been printed at all. A rather amazing amount of space is devoted to foreign news: reports from foreign capitals take up about three-fourths of the front pages of each issue of these papers, and on the inner pages are longer articles of topical interest about various countries as well as translations from foreign papers and periodicals. Local news stories feature the activities of the ruler and the prime minister, give heavy play to Pushtunistan, and include progress reports prepared by the several ministries. The daily features include one or more editorials, a column of poetry, an article on arts or handicrafts, a column about women and children, and a short story. On matters at issue between the Free World and the Communist bloc an effort is said to be made to present the views and opinions of both parties. However, although the United States and other Western powers may be severely criticized in local editorials and news stories, no material critical of the USSR or of the Chinese People's Republic ever appears. The official estimates of the circulations of *Anis* and *Islah*, given above, may be viewed with some reserve. Few advertisements appear in these papers, and they are believed to be heavily subsidized by the Department of the Press.

In the spring of 1962 the *Kabul Times*, a four-page English-language daily, sponsored by the Department of the Press, began publication. The major emphasis is on foreign news, supplemented by progress reports on developmental programs and cultural activities.

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All papers support the domestic and foreign policies of the government. Although the government does not, as far as is known, censor the press, effective control is maintained by naming the editors and principal staff members. A number of the editors have been selected from among the group of Afghan intellectuals who have written on the history of the country and, in general, have striven to firm up the cultural background of Afghanistan. Few of these individuals were trained as journalists and until journalistic talents are developed the press is liable to remain formalistic and unexciting. There is, however, no indication that the government is dissatisfied with the present state of the press, and it may well believe that it is fulfilling in adequate fashion its function of conveying public information on the activity, policies, and plans of the regime. Other sources of news are the limited number of the daily papers and weeklies published in Iran in Persian that reach Herat and Kabul, and a much smaller number of papers from India, Europe, and the United States which circulate among the high officials of the government.

More than thirty periodicals are published in the country, but since most of them are of small circulation and directed at specific audiences they are not true mass media and will not be listed separately. Monthly magazines are put out by several of the ministries, and there are monthlies devoted to sports, finance and economics, rural development, women's welfare, news of Kabul University, or literary developments at Herat and Balkh. Quarterlies are issued by the National Council, some of the ministries, the Afghan Air Authority, the Afghan Red Crescent, the Boy Scouts, and Kabul University, with others on economic studies and on sports. Nearly all of these periodicals reprint material from many foreign sources in translation.

The Bakhtar News Agency subscribes to the press services of United Press International, the Associated Press, Reuters, Tass, and the New China News Agency (Hsin-hua), and offers this material for sale to Afghanistan newspapers and Radio Kabul. It also sells locally photographs obtained from foreign sources, and sells local pictorial material abroad. It is the channel to the foreign press for all official statements and announcements of the government. Finally, it publishes the daily *Bakhtar News Bulletin.* Mimeographed in English, this bulletin is directed at the foreign community in Kabul and contains local news items, longer extracts from the press, and, more recently, some foreign news.

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The sole broadcasting station in the country is Radio Kabul. Experimental broadcasting began as early as 1925, and in 1940 a 20-kilowatt medium-wave transmitter began operations on frequencies of 454.5 and 660 kilocycles. In 1958 and 1959 two short-wave transmitters, one of 10 and the other of 50 kilowatts, came into operation at new installations at Yakatut, to the north of Kabul. These transmitters provide stronger internal reception and are provided with antennas directed at Europe, South Africa, Japan, and Indonesia. Owners of radio receivers are not required to obtain licenses, but the sets, of Dutch, German, Czech, and Russian make, carry high import duties and are rather expensive. Some 63,000 sets are in private hands and the government has also installed loudspeakers in all the larger towns.

Radio Kabul is on the air eleven hours a day: two in the early morning, one at noon, and eight during the afternoon and evening. In addition to its major programs in Persian and Pushtu, it broadcasts in English, French, Russian, Arabic, Urdu, and Baluch. One English-language broadcast is directed to Pakistan and India, another beamed for local consumption. Nearly half the total broadcast time is given over to music, and the staff of Radio Kabul and its consultants deserve great credit for their success in collecting material from all parts of the country and in developing instrumental and vocal groups. After music, news programs consume the most time, followed by educational programs. *Pushtun zhagh* (Pushtun Voice), is published monthly by Radio Kabul. Each issue contains the complete station program for the coming month as well as a number of articles in Persian and Pushtu. The government considers Radio Kabul its most powerful instrument of government propaganda, and represents as well a strong integrating factor in national life. In recent years more and more of the station's time has been devoted to promoting Pushtunistan, with material designed to inflame the auditors and exacerbate feelings toward Pakistan. How seriously the people take its news and comments and how great is its audience is not known. Since much of the material consists of variations on a single theme this audience may develop resistance or relative insensibility.

Books published within Afghanistan find a very small audience: a 2,000-copy edition of a historical study is considered large. However, the educated class does a lot of reading and, if the example of neighboring Iran is a criterion, the reading public should increase phenomenally within a few years. The number of books published

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annually in Afghanistan is not known but the total is probably less than 100 as compared with over 1,000 in Iran. Bookstores are few in number: Kabul has a store that handles the publications of the Government Printing House, and several shops in the bazaar stock the older lithographed works on theological subjects.

The majority of Afghans remain blissfully unaware of modern advertising and publicity techniques. Very few advertising posters and signboards exist along the highways, Radio Kabul has no advertising, and most of the advertisements in the newspapers are official notices. Pamphlets and leaflets are rarely used for commercial purposes but may be distributed in times of emergency or political excitement, though even then in the larger towns only. Important news is conveyed to the provincial and district centers by telephone, and special radio facilities of the Ministry of Communications link Kabul and each of the large towns at established intervals each day.

Whether at Kabul, or in town and village, news spreads with amazing rapidity through the "bazaar rumor." Such rumors grow with distortions and embellishments in proportion to the number of repetitions along the way. Many of these rumors seem to have their origin among the merchants in the bazaar who, in seeking to find reasons for a rising or a falling market, give substance to vague speculations about local or foreign politics. Villagers who come to the towns to sell and purchase carry the rumors home with them: strangers enter readily into conversation and there is no hurry about concluding a bargain and plenty of time for casual or pointed talk. The teahouses are another factor in the rumor mill and in these places the same story may undergo considerable change before it is passed on. Another class of rumormongers are the drivers of buses and trucks, who find a ready welcome all along the road since they are always newly come from the main centers. A final class is represented by the small traders who move slowly from one remote village to another or among the nomadic tribes. The government is concerned about the potentials of the bazaar rumor, and while the chief aspect of this concern may be to control rumors that could arouse religious fanaticism, the government is also interested in rumors directed against the regime. It is not known whether the government itself makes use of the planted rumor or whether other agencies or groups carry on this type of activity.

Several foreign governments make special efforts to reach the

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Afghan people. In the field of radio, the Voice of America beams programs at Afghanistan in English, Pushtu, and Persian, while Soviet stations at Tashkent and Moscow offer daily programs in Pushtu and Persian. Stations at New Delhi, Peshawar, Karachi, Colombo, and Peking are also heard. It is probable that the Russian programs are best tailored to the Afghan audience, since the items tend to praise the policies of the Afghan regime. The embassies of the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, West Germany, and the People's Republic of China distribute daily news bulletins, most of them in English. The United States Information Service maintains a 5,000-volume library and reading room, conducts classes in English, and sends out Afghan teams to show films throughout the country.

On the whole Afghans have access to only such information as their government thinks is good for them. Although the Afghan Press Law nominally authorizes a free press, the checks and controls contained therein enable the regime to suppress adverse opinion. It is alleged that the government maintains a spot-check of international mail and that incoming newspapers and periodicals may fail to be delivered. There is believed to be no widespread resentment, however, to the above real or alleged measures as the control of information has been traditional in Afghanistan.

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CHAPTER 13

Foreign Relations

AFGHANISTAN'S prime concern in its relations with foreign powers is to keep them at arm's length, preventing any one of them from becoming too influential in Afghan affairs, and to play them off against each other to its own advantage. Great emphasis is placed upon the country's neutral posture. This general policy is the result of historical experience. For over a century Afghanistan's major anxieties were caused by the imperialistic ambitions of Britain and Russia, the one pressing northwest from India, the other advancing eastward and southward through Central Asia. These two powers ceased to encroach upon Afghan territory over half a century ago and sealed their agreement to leave Afghanistan intact as a buffer state with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. But today Afghanistan is still a nerve center of world politics, not only on account of its geographical position but because Soviet Russia and the Western powers eye with mutual distrust every move of each other in regard to this strategically important country, with far-reaching consequences for the latter's development.

The international borders of Afghanistan were fixed only during the last century, and the demarcation of its most important boundaries was not achieved by agreements between Afghanistan and its neighbors, but by agreements between these neighbors or by arbitration, to which Afghanistan rulers willingly or unwillingly gave formal or *de facto* recognition. The northern and northwestern frontiers were fixed by agreements between Russia and England in a series of protocols at the following places: London, 1885; Khamiab, 1886; St. Petersburg, 1887; and Chehel Dukhtaran, 1893, at which for the first time an Afghan representative participated. The southwestern border was fixed by British arbitration

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in 1872 and 1905. The eastern and southeastern borders were imposed upon Afghanistan by the British in India. In 1877, Amir Shir 'Ali was simply told that he had no claim to Dir, Swat, Chitral, and Badjaur. After a long period of political struggle and unrest in the tribal border area the British persuaded Abdur Rahman to sign the Durand Agreement of 1893 by which the Durand Line, running from Chitral to Baluchistan, was fixed as the international border with India. The northeast borders were fixed in 1895 by the Pamir Agreement between Russia and England, which separated India and Russia by an Afghan strip of territory running to Chinese Turkistan and called the Wakhan Corridor. Since the achievement of independence, direct negotiations with Soviet Russia have straightened out some minor items in dispute so that from 1948 the Afghan state has been clearly defined in area as far as international law is concerned. The Afghan government, however, since 1947 has taken the position that the Durand Agreement of 1893 was forced upon Afghanistan, and has publicly repudiated the agreement.

Until the nineteenth century Afghanistan played no role in the political affairs of the Western world. As a Moslem state it belonged to a larger community, the Islamic world, which like the Christian world of Europe recognized a common religious ethos and maintained at least an appearance of friendly relations among its members. As British rule expanded through India and Napoleon looked eastward with envious eyes, the East India Company as Britain's representative in Asia, approached the "King of Caubul" for an alliance and concluded the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1809. Dynastic strife in the ensuing decades once more isolated Afghanistan, until Dost Muhammad took firm control and in 1837 appealed to the British for aid against Persia, which had besieged Herat with Russian approval and advice. The Amir was turned down on the ground that he had previously sought Russian and Persian support for the purpose of regaining the plain of Peshawar which the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, had occupied by force of arms. The British went so far as to replace Dost Muhammad by his exiled rival, Shah Shuja, in what is known as the First Afghan War (1838-42). Their occupation of the country aroused a tribal revolt and ended in utter disaster. Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia and Europe increased and as these two great powers moved closer and closer to Afghanistan from opposite directions, the main concern of the Afghans became to prevent their country from being swallowed up

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by either, or being crushed into oblivion between these "upper and nether millstones" of power.

In 1854 the Crimean War threatened and the British desired a resumption of relations with Dost Muhammad as an insurance against the threat of Russian ambitions in the direction of India. The result was a treaty of friendship and alliance, concluded in 1857. It was, in part, aimed at Persia, which incurred war with England in 1856 by seizing Herat. In March 1857, the Peace Treaty of Paris recognized both Persia and Afghanistan as independent and named England as the arbiter in all future disputes between these two Islamic states. During the next decade Russia advanced steadily southward and reached Samarkand in 1868, while dynastic troubles following Dost Muhammad's death laid Afghanistan wide open for foreign intervention. In the next year, after Shir 'Ali had finally established his position in Kabul as his father's successor, Bokhara became a vassal state. Russian influence had reached the Oxus, but British policy at the time was one of noninterference, and Shir 'Ali's request for British guarantees against Russian encroachment was refused, on the ground that by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873 the Russians had formally accepted the Amu Darya as the limit of their southward extension.

Anglo-Afghan relations deteriorated during the next half decade, and when a political shift in England inaugurated once again a "forward" policy of intervention threatening Afghan independence, Shir 'Ali sought help from Russia. His admittance of a Russian envoy and refusal to allow entry to a British mission led to the Second Afghan War with England (1878-80), which drove Shir 'Ali out of Kabul and once more brought Afghanistan under British occupation. The bitterly hostile population and the relaxation of Anglo-Russian tension in Europe made it advisable for the British to withdraw and leave the country to Shir 'Ali's able nephew, Abdur Rahman, after insuring their future control of Afghanistan's foreign relations. This was attempted first by the dictated Treaty of Gandamak in 1879 and then by personal negotiations with Abdur Rahman at Simma near Kabul in June and July 1880. The agreement with the new amir left him free to rule internally but bound him to follow British advice in all his relations with other powers. To the north of Afghanistan, Russian troops were on the march. In 1881 Khiva was annexed, Merv in 1884, and in 1885 the Russians invaded Afghan territory and occupied Panjdeh, opening the way to Herat and the Indian Ocean. The British rushed in with

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aid for the defense of Herat, and mobilized two army corps in India. For a while the two great powers were on the brink of war. Both then sought a way out, and in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of St. Petersburg, finally signed in July 1887, the Russians agreed to make no further advance southward. Once more in 1889 Russian military operations near the Afghan border caused the British to repeat the warning that an advance on Herat would mean war. Again tensions were relaxed by diplomacy. In the same way tensions over the Wakhan were removed by an Anglo-Russian agreement of 1895.

As Abdur Rahman pacified his country and with increasing success developed it into a nation-state, tension arose from time to time about the tribal border area straddling the Durand Line. By failing to subjugate and occupy the tribal area themselves, yet denying it to the nominal head of all Pushtuns, the British had created a problem that has defied solution to this day. For this territory is an area of political instability, a "prickly hedge" ill suited to serve as a border area between two friendly powers. The Durand Agreement of 1893 pledged each party not to interfere in the territories of the other lying beyond the Line, but both signatories repeatedly violated the spirit and sometimes the letter of this agreement.

Inveterate suspicions of foreign influence characterized every aspect of Habibullah's foreign policy, and Russia and Great Britain were made to feel impartially the effect of this attitude. While continuing to draw his father's annual stipend of 1.8 million British pounds, Habibullah in action repudiated his own obligations.

In 1904-05 a British mission under Louis Dane came to Kabul to discuss a variety of problems that had arisen. All the Dane Mission achieved was an acknowledgment by the Amir of the principles contained in the old treaty, while Habibullah won important concessions. The stiffening attitude of Afghanistan's ruler was partly due to the stirring effect throughout Asia of Japan's victory over Russia in 1904. This humiliating defeat of a great Western power predisposed Russia and England to seek a settlement in Asia. The agreement finally negotiated represented a comprehensive and final effort to deal with Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, and to end all causes of friction.

In the resulting Anglo-Russian Convention of St. Petersburg, signed in 1907, Afghanistan was formally recognized by both powers as a buffer state, whose integrity would be respected by

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each. An adjustment of the Wakhan Corridor frontier was effected so as not to give India and Russia a common border. Habibullah, incensed because he had not been consulted in these negotiations, refused to add his signature to the protocol. Nevertheless, Russia indicated in 1908 that it would honor the agreement, with or without the Amir's approval.

Nationalist movements and the rising struggle against autocratic systems of government, notably the Russian revolution of 1905-07, the Young Turk movement, the Persian constitutional movement of 1906, and the writings of such figures as Jamal ad-din Afghani and Muhammad Iqbal, were having a limited impact upon members of the Afghan elite. This impact crystallized in the Young Afghan party directed by Mahmud Tarzi, who had been exiled by Abdur Rahman but repatriated under Habibullah. Then, the preoccupation during World War I of the empires adjoining Afghanistan stirred Afghan hopes for complete independence. Nevertheless, Habibullah remained loyal to his pledge of neutrality and resisted the blandishments of a Turko-German mission which in 1915 had entered the country illicitly via Iran and tried to persuade the ruler to declare a *jihad,* or holy war, on "infidel" Britain. The strength of the Afghan nationalist movement induced Habibullah in 1916 to demand that Afghanistan be represented at the coming peace conference, and just before his death, in February 1919, he wrote the Viceroy of India, asking recognition by the Peace Conference of "the absolute liberty, freedom of action, and perpetual independence" of his country.

Amanullah was no sooner on the throne than he sent a letter to Lenin suggesting the opening of diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet government. In March the Soviets recognized the complete independence of Afghanistan, and in the fall of the same year representatives were exchanged. Informed that all India was on the verge of massive revolt against the British, Amanullah had proclamations calling for all Moslems to join in war against the infidels distributed around Peshawar and early in May Afghan forces crossed the Indian frontier. Although the war was brief and inconclusive, it did achieve its major objective in that the British recognized that Afghanistan should be "officially free and independent in its internal and external affairs." The Peace Treaty of Rawalpindi of August 1919 was followed by negotiations which led to the permanent Anglo-Afghan Treaty of November 1921, regulating the future relations between Britain

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and Afghanistan. The British mission negotiating this treaty found Kabul a hotbed of international intrigue: Bolshevist diplomats, a Turkish military mission, Italians, Persians, and even Indian revolutionaries competed with the British for the Amir's friendship. Only a combination of British diplomatic perseverance and Amanullah's determination to resist foreign infiltration finally resulted in the treaty that formally expressed the "neighborly relations" existing between the two nations.

In spite of its official relations with the Soviet government, Afghanistan was extremely disturbed over the fate of the Moslems in Central Asia, who had expected to win their own freedom as a result of the Bolshevik revolution. At Tashkent a Soviet had seized power in November and excluded the local Moslems from participation, while in February 1918 the Turkish nationalist government of Kokand had been wiped out by the Red Army. Throughout Turkistan, just to the north of Afghanistan, Moslems flocked to join the anti-Bolshevik Basmachi movement, and in March 1918 the Amir of Bokhara had repulsed an attack by the Red Army. The Afghans established contact with the Basmachi and sent artillery units and infantry to Bokhara. However, in September 1920 the Red Army captured Bokhara and the following spring the Amir found refuge in Afghanistan. Enver Pasha, hero of the 1908 Turkish revolution, joined the Basmachi in December 1921 and was in touch with the Afghan ambassador in Bokhara. Just as the movement was gaining strength, he was killed, in August 1922, in a skirmish and in November Amanullah yielded to Soviet demands that Afghanistan end its armed intervention in support of elements hostile to the Bolsheviks.

An Afghan-Russian Treaty of Friendship was concluded in February 1921 and ratified in August. According to its terms, the Russian government guaranteed the independence of Bokhara, promised the return of the Panjdeh district to Afghanistan, and offered an annual subsidy. None of the terms was fulfilled. With strong Russian encouragement, Amanullah had linked his country with two other Islamic nations, Iran and Turkey, in the Treaties of Friendship, Defense, and Neutrality of March 1 and June 22, 1921, respectively. In addition, between 1921 and 1923 Afghanistan concluded agreements and treaties with Italy, France, Belgium, and China.

At Kabul Soviet diplomats and agents were engaged in efforts to influence Amanullah and members of his entourage at the

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same time that other agents were spreading Communist propaganda in the north of the country. On May 2, 1923, Lord Curzon addressed a ten-day ultimatum on the subject of the anti-British activities of Soviet agents in Iran, Afghanistan, and India, with special reference to the operations of the Soviet ministers in Iran and Afghanistan. Raskolnikov, the Soviet minister at Kabul was recalled, but not before Amanullah presented him with his country's highest decoration and awarded him the title of Royal Afghan Prince. In November 1925, a Russian unit took by force the Amu Darya island of Urtatagai, chasing the Afghan garrison out. This dispute was settled in favor of Afghanistan by the Pact of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, signed at Paghman on August 31, 1926. But Afghanistan had seen too much of Russian methods and broken promises to believe in much closer ties, and from 1925 on even Amanullah shied away from too much cordiality with the Soviet Union. In fact, his foreign policy centered around the idea of getting Western technical aid without Western entanglements. To foreign seekers of concession in Afghanistan he made such impossible demands that they quit asking.

European assistance was indispensable, however, and Germany offered the best terms and seemed the least dangerous of the technically advanced nations able to provide what was needed. He therefore concluded an Afghan-German Treaty of Friendship on March 3, 1926. Anglo-Afghan relations suffered from the unending problems presented by the unsubdued tribes on the Indian frontier, and in 1926 Afghanistan protested formally in London that the "forward policy" of the new British government was incompatible with friendly Indo-Afghan relations. A conciliatory gesture toward Russia was made in 1927 when Afghanistan agreed to an air service between Kabul and Tashkent. Negotiations for a trade pact were begun at the same time. Before going on a foreign tour, Amanullah renewed ties with Persia in an Afghan-Persian Treaty of Amity and Security signed in Kabul in November 1927. An Afghan-Polish Treaty of Friendship was concluded in May 1928; four additions were made to the Afghan-Persian Treaty of 1927 in June 1928; and an Afghan-Finnish Friendship Treaty was signed in July.

As opposition to Amanullah mounted in the fall of 1928 the Soviet government became alarmed, apparently believing that the British were supporting some of the dissident elements. Soviet sources have described a meeting at Moscow between Stalin,

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Gholam Nabi, Amanullah's ambassador at Moscow, his brother Gholam Jilani, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a former Soviet military attaché at Kabul, as well as planning sessions held at Tashkent. After Bacheh Saqqo had taken Kabul, Gholam Nabi crossed the Amu Darya at the head of some eight hundred men, probably Russian soldiers disguised as Afghans. Supported by Soviet planes, this force seized Mazar-i-Sharif but local opposition halted its advance toward the Hindu Kush. After the final flight of Amanullah from the country, this force withdrew to the Soviet Union. Again, in 1930 a Soviet force penetrated some forty miles into Afghanistan in pursuit of a Basmachi leader who had been raiding across the frontier.

Certainly the British were anxious to see order restored within Afghanistan and looked with favor upon the activity of Nadir Khan and his brothers. Nadir Khan had been the most successful Afghan commander in the brief Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 but, later coming under suspicion from Amanullah, had gone into voluntary exile in France. His return to Afghanistan was both permitted and facilitated by the British, who aided his passage through India and granted him an interest-free loan of £175,000 in 1930.

Caution and tact characterized Nadir Shah's foreign policy. On July 24, 1929, Afghanistan signed the Kellogg Pact. In May 1930, Nadir Shah confirmed to Great Britain the full validity of the treaties of 1921 and 1923. In November 1930, Afghanistan concluded a friendship treaty with Japan and in December with Estonia. No important changes were made in Afghanistan's relations with Russia since Nadir Shah was profoundly hostile to Communism. However, a Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression was signed with the Soviets on June 24, 1931. Emphasizing the Islamic character of his regime, Nadir Shah concluded treaties with what is now Saudi Arabia in 1932 and with Iraq later in the same year. After his death, Muhammad Hashem followed up the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1931 with a comprehensive commercial and political treaty in March 1936 designed to safeguard each party from any encroachment or interference on the part of the other and to prevent the formation of any subversive group or activities hostile to the other's government. Accordingly, Afghanistan prohibited all anti-Soviet activities of Moslem refugees from Russian Turkistan in its own territory. Russia firmly supported the successful application of Afghanistan for membership in the League of Nations in 1934.

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A step toward the formation of a Moslem bloc was taken by the signing of the Saadabad Pact on July 8, 1937 by Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. It bound the contracting parties to observe non-interference in each other's internal affairs; to respect the integrity of each other's frontiers; to abstain from aggression against any member; to prevent groups and actions subversive to a member's government; and to consult with each other in such international conflicts as might affect them.

World War II put Afghanistan to a severe test. The signatories of the Saadabad Pact failed to consult on collective action. In 1941 Russia stopped all exports via Afghanistan's northern frontier, an action which caused great distress and bitterness among the Afghan people. India, however, came to the rescue with food, gasoline, and textiles, and even shipments of arms. This led to an improvement in British-Afghan relations and predisposed the Afghan government to act in compliance with the Allied demand for the ejection of Axis nationals while remaining neutral in the conflict. Prior to World War II the Axis powers had tried to supplant the traditional British influence. Commercial negotiations were initiated by both Germany and Japan, engineers and technicians from these countries were employed in the work of industrializing the country, and an Afghan mission visited industrial plants in Japan. The cooperation between the United States and Russia, and the increasingly major role of the United States on the international scene, deeply affected Afghan views. In 1942-43 diplomatic representation was established between Kabul and Washington. In 1944 China opened diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, signed a treaty of friendship, and began commercial negotiations. Relations with the Soviet Union improved through a frontier treaty of 1946, which created a Soviet-Afghan border commission for the demarcation of the boundary between the two nations. The result of its work was embodied in a treaty of September 1948, which settled all points that had given rise to dispute and awarded Afghanistan several islands in the Amu Darya.

In the period following World War II there have been important new developments in the foreign relations of Afghanistan: problems of relationships with Pakistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union, which have had interlocking complications, and the movement of Afghanistan toward a posture described as nonaligned neutrality. The first of these developments concerned the so-called Pushtunistan issue, an issue whose distant genesis had been the Durand Line. The nomadic and seminomadic tribes that straddle

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the Durand Line are a perpetual source of unrest and political instability. Every spring Pushtuns east of the border moved up into the pastures of the Afghan highlands, and every autumn Afghan Pushtuns came down to the warm plains of the Indus valley. Throughout the British era in India there were uprisings in one or another sector of the tribal territory, mostly against British, but at times against Afghan rule. Even after the revolt that swept Amanullah out and brought Nadir Shah to power there were serious disturbances: by the Afridis, Mahsuds, and Tochi Wazirs in 1930; the Mohmands from 1933-35; the Tori Khels, through the Faqir of Ipi, in 1936; the Wazirs from 1937 to 1939; and the Kurram valley tribes in 1945. Well-organized military force always won the upper hand in such rebellions, but it was a costly business. Between 1936 and 1938 the British kept one soldier in Waziristan for every tribesman. With most of the tribes, and most of the time, however, bribes and blackmail sufficed to keep them in line. The system of subsidies, continued to this day, has its dangers; on either side of the border money can be used to incite trouble as well as to insure peace.

Just before the partition of India, in June 1947, a strong political organization in the North-West Frontier Province, the Khudai Khedmatgaran, or Servants of God, demanded the establishment of an independent Pushtun state and declared a boycott of the referendum by which tribesmen were to indicate whether they wanted to join Pakistan or India. This group was led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, often called "The Frontier Gandhi." His "Redshirt" following was organized in military fashion and, for tribesmen, exceedingly well disciplined. The result of the boycott was that only 55.5 percent of the electorate voted on July 20, 1947. However, 55 percent of them voted in favor of joining Pakistan.

Even before partition became a certainty, Afghanistan had expressed an interest in the future of the Pushtuns of the North-West Frontier Province. On July 3, 1947, the Afghan government sent a note to Delhi and London declaring that the people of the North-West Frontier Province and of Baluchistan should be given the opportunity to determine for themselves whether to join Pakistan, or Afghanistan, or to become independent. The British replied that His Majesty's Government would abide by the Treaty of 1921, which acknowledged the Durand Line as the international border, and that, in accordance with international law, the sovereignty over this area would devolve from the British to the successor govern-

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ment, which in this case meant to Pakistan. The new government of Pakistan confirmed its authority over the area by agreements with individual tribal chiefs, promising continuation of the subsidies they were accustomed to receive from the British. The British reply of July 1947 was a bitter disappointment and was reflected in the Afghan representative's vote against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations on October 20, 1947, a vote which was soon officially reversed, however, as public opinion expressed astonishment at this attitude of one Moslem nation to another.

When diplomatic representations for an autonomous Pushtunistan failed to move the government of Pakistan, Afghanistan inaugurated a barrage of criticism of Pakistan and propaganda for "Pushtunistan" by press, radio, and official statements which has waxed and waned ever since. Pakistan from time to time has replied in kind and put economic pressure on Afghanistan, which was dependent on Pakistan's good will and transit facilities for its access to the sea and thus to the non-Soviet world. Without going into details it may be stated that Afghanistan for over a decade now has hammered away at the Pushtunistan issue with unbelievable persistence while Pakistan has at times been driven to anger and retaliatory action. The position of Pakistan has been that the tribal area is legally and by political referendum a part of Pakistan and that its relations with the tribes are its own business. Since the tribes seem satisfied, the Pakistanis say, Kabul can have no cause for concern. Shortly after partition Pakistan withdrew all regular troops from the tribal area and the Afghan border was guarded by local militia, thus removing a long-standing cause of irritation. Since then some regular troops have been stationed in strategic areas on the border, primarily to ward off raids from the Afghan side. There seems to be no question of a united demand by the tribes themselves for a separate state, which would have few resources and would lose subsidies and benefits from Pakistan.

Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have been marked by massive Russian economic aid, as detailed in another chapter, but they have also been intimately concerned with the Pushtunistan issue. The background for this development appeared in 1950 when Pakistan halted the transit movement of goods to Afghanistan, and the USSR offered free transit rights and a continuing supply of petroleum products and other essential items. In December 1955 Marshal Bulganin and Premier Khrushchev

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visited Kabul where, in concert with the Afghan regime, they signed a protocol prolonging the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression for ten years and extending $100 million in credits. Upon their return to Moscow Bulganin sounded a new note in an address to the Supreme Soviet saying that "the demand of Afghanistan that the population of neighboring Paktunistan should be given an opportunity of freely expressing their will is justified as well-grounded. The people of this region have the same right of self-determination as any other people."

A steady series of visits were exchanged. In 1958 Marshal K. Y. Voroshilov was in Kabul and in 1960 Premier Khrushchev returned to Afghanistan. Zahir Shah was in Moscow in 1957, Prime Minister Daoud and Foreign Minister Naim made separate visits to the Soviet capital in 1959, and Daoud was back again in 1960 and 1961. Each such exchange of fraternal greetings was followed by strong Soviet statements on the Pushtunistan issue. In 1961 the Soviet press quoted Khrushchev's statement that the Pushtun people should decide by a free plebiscite whether they wished to remain within the borders of Pakistan, to form a new independent state, or to unite with Afghanistan. In raising this third alternative he had gone beyond any statements made by the Afghan regime itself. Another article castigated Pakistan for conducting military operations in the area, stated that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to military provocations so close to the southern borders of the USSR, and added that aggressive imperialist circles were attracted by the dispute. In supporting Afghanistan on the Pushtunistan issue, the Soviet Union may be less concerned with Afghan interests than with attacking Pakistan, a member of CENTO and SEATO. While advocating a plebiscite in Pushtunistan, the Soviet Union consistently opposes the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir and sides wholeheartedly with the Indian position.

Encouraged by Soviet support, the Afghan regime has taken a harder line. Month after month the press and radio at Kabul castigate the reactionary and imperialistic government of Pakistan and blame the United States for supplying the arms used by Pakistan against the freedom-loving people of the region, adding that their blood stains America. Inspired groups within Pakistan raid installations and communications, and in the fall of 1960 Afghan irregular forces pushed across the frontier with Pakistan and were repulsed. In September 1961 Afghanistan broke off diplo-

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matic relations with Pakistan after it had been asked to close its consulates and trade agencies there, alleged to be the sources of hostile activity, and stated that Afghanistan would abandon the transit route through Pakistan until its representatives were permitted to resume their functions. Pakistan has been as intransigent as Afghanistan on the Pushtunistan issue. Meetings of the heads of these states have been fruitless, with Pakistan holding that there is no such issue and, even if there were, plebiscites should be held on both sides of the common frontier in case tribal elements now in Afghanistan wished to join Pakistan.

The United States is interested in aiding the rapid economic development of Afghanistan, in encouraging its continued internal stability and independence, and in respecting its neutral posture. At the same time, it maintains close ties with Iran and Pakistan, both members of CENTO. Daoud and Naim have each visited the United States, and in December 1959 President Eisenhower spent six hours at Kabul. Earlier that year Prime Minister Daoud had denounced the bilateral agreements concluded by the United States with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. While extending considerable economic aid to Afghanistan, the United States has not tried to match the amounts offered by the Soviet Union, unwilling to participate in a competitive game of economic coexistence. It has urged Afghanistan and Pakistan to strive for better relations, and in early 1962 persuaded the government of Afghanistan to bring in through Pakistan the supplies and equipment allotted for the program of American aid. In addition, it supported discussions between Afghanistan and Iran that culminated in an agreement for the transit movement of goods through Iran, although Iran and Afghanistan maintain a dispute of long standing over the disposition of the waters of the Helmand river. This latter agreement served to ease what had become a total dependence of Afghanistan upon the movement of all its trade through the USSR. Moreover, in the summer of 1962 the ruler of Iran visited both Afghanistan and Pakistan in a personal effort to mediate their dispute. In addition to the active interest of the USSR, the People's Republic of China has wooed Afghanistan, stressing mutual friendship and common cultural interests. There is, however, almost no trade or other relations, other than diplomatic, between China and Afghanistan.

On the broader international scene the government stresses its policy of neutrality, locally described as *bi-tarafi* or without a side. In holding to this position, Afghanistan has drifted into the so-called

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anti-imperialist and anticolonial bloc fostered by the Soviet Union. The information media of the country delight in labeling the non-Communist powers as colonial nations, including the United States among their number because of its alliances with Pakistan, and the Afghan delegation to the United Nations has consistently voted with the USSR in all matters on which the Communist bloc and the non-Communist world held opposing views.

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CHAPTER 14

The Economy and the Transportation System

REASONABLY reliable data on Afghanistan's economy are just beginning to become available. In 1961, Blackman and Yusufzai estimated Afghanistan's 1958-59 gross national product at factor cost to be 38,586.2 million afghanis, based on expenditure. (In this and the following chapters, hyphenated years indicate the solar year, which is used in Afghanistan as the fiscal year. Thus, 1958-59 indicates the period from March 21, 1958 to March 20, 1959, corresponding to the Afghan year 1337.) Consumer expenditure (37,493.1 million afghanis) dwarfed both government current expenditure of 921.7 million afghanis and gross capital investment expenditure of 1,970.5 million afghanis. Imports and income paid to foreign countries (2,710.7 million afghanis) plus indirect taxes (940.6 million afghanis) exceeded exports and income from foreign countries (1,852.2 million afghanis) and brought the total expenditure estimate down to the 38,586.2 million afghanis figure.

The estimate of gross national product based on income was 701.8 million afghanis higher than that based on expenditure, but still provides a very close check on the latter. Of the total income, earnings from employment including self-employment came to 36,248 million afghanis or about 93 percent, rents to 2,500 million afghanis or about 6 percent, and gross profits of companies to only 540 million afghanis or about 1 percent.

The analysis of personal income (see Table 2) is most instructive, since it indicates that 72 percent came from agricultural or pastoral activity, as compared to about 5 percent from industrial employment, cottage industries, and crafts. Since incomes in the agricultural and pastoral sectors are lower than those in industry and services, these estimates support the impressions of previous analysts

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that between 80 and 90 percent of the Afghan labor force derives its main support from farming or animal husbandry. Furthermore, data compiled by the Ministry of Planning indicate that there were only about 15,000 industrial workers in 1961. But in using such figures, allowance must be made for such groups as the Hazaras, who farm in the summer and take menial jobs in the cities for the winter. On the other hand, some of the factory workers leave their jobs at spring planting and harvest times. The fixed urban population probably numbers under one million, making its living in trade, industry, handicrafts, government, and services. There are, of course, greater variations within agriculture than within industry, and much of the production serves subsistence requirements directly, without being exchanged in the market. Indeed, exports probably make up the largest element in the national cash income, providing between 1.5 and 2 billion afghanis in recent years. Prior to the *de facto* closing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in September 1961, there was also a significant export of services of Afghan migrant workers to Pakistan. These services are reflected in the personal income sector but not in the above figure on exports.

The Afghan economy is not self-sufficient, although it could be in most agricultural commodities if processing facilities were expanded. As matters stand, the country imports over half of its textiles, two-thirds of its sugar, and in recent years has taken to importing wheat to meet actual or threatened shortages. As is to be expected, steel, chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, rubber products, and petroleum products have to be imported. Considerable progress is being made in cement production, and Afghanistan could easily reach self-sufficiency in most building materials. There is also hope that sufficient petroleum can be found to replace, or at least offset, imports.

On the export side, agricultural products are overwhelmingly predominant. Pakistan and India have for years depended on Afghan fresh and dried fruit as an important supplement to their meager diet. In recent years, when blockades have not interfered, dried fruit has been the leading category of exports by value. Exports of karakul fur occupy a unique position, both because they are valuable enough to withstand the cost of air transport and because they bring in convertible Western currencies (dollars, pounds sterling, marks) which are most useful for imports of machinery and equipment. Cotton usually ranks third in value of exports, much of it being exchanged for manufactured goods and equipment

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under bilateral or barter agreements with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, or West Germany.

Production other than wheat is highly localized, particularly in the geographical sense, but also in the sociological sense. Most karakul sheep are raised by sheepherders in the Andkhui and Maymaneh areas in the northern provinces, to some extent by seasonal nomads who own small flocks, graze them up in the mountains during the summer, and cultivate some land in the valley in the fall-spring period. Nomadic herds also deliver wool and dairy products, milk and butter being the most important. Wheat is produced almost everywhere. Large urban communities, such as Kabul and Qandahar, supplement local supplies from surplus wheat areas, particularly Herat. Cotton is produced primarily in Qataghan province and has only recently been introduced in the Helmand area. The Arghandab valley is known for its concentration on orchard production.

Industrial production is equally localized, except for the widely scattered cottage industries. Coal originates almost exclusively on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush. Silk, sesame seeds, and beet sugar also come from the north. Cotton textiles are produced in two regions, Qataghan province in the north and the eastern part of Parwan province near Charikar. Wool mills are located in Kabul and Qandahar. The better quality rugs come from the northwest.

Except for cotton textiles and cement, most of the industrial activities are on a modest scale and not yet geared to supply a national market. Both localization and small scale have been due to a lack of integration among various economic regions. Even today, one region may have surplus production (or at least unused capacity) for which it has no outlet, while another may suffer from shortages and be forced to import supplementary supplies from abroad. But although the economic organization of Afghanistan still resembles a wide sea dotted with islands of economic activities, recent and continuing improvements in transportation are altering this pattern. The new roads not only provide vastly improved connections with the points of entry on the borders but serve to tie the country together across and around the Hindu Kush range.

Ever since world trade shifted from the cumbersome overland transport routes between Asia and Europe to the ocean lanes and the route through the Suez Canal, communications across Afghanistan have lost their economic significance. Having remained out-

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side the territorial limits of the British Empire and Commonwealth, the country did not reap the benefits of strategic rail and road networks, as did its neighbor Pakistan. In fact, Afghanistan's involuntary role as buffer state between Russia and British India discouraged foreign companies and governments alike from contributing to the growth of modern communications within it. Its deeply rooted love of political independence deprived it of the technological reward of incorporation in a larger entity.

The unfavorable external circumstances, as far as transportation is concerned, were aggravated by two internal obstacles. In the first place, nature and climate have been, and still are, hostile to any road builder in Afghanistan, in comparison with other countries of similar economic resources. Whether he tries to link the terminal points of international rail routes (at Termez, Kushk, Torkham, or Chaman) or bring together Afghan business centers (Qandahar and Kabul, Qandahar and Herat, Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif) he must overcome high intervening altitudes, or narrow rocky gorges, or hot, dusty, and inhospitable deserts. For example, the main road to the north linking the capital with the important industrial and agricultural production centers in the northern provinces climbs to an altitude of 9,800 feet (Shibar Pass), and one section, blasted out of the perpendicular walls of a gorge, must cross the river seven times in a distance of forty-six miles (see the map, Road System).

Compounding such topographical difficulties are climatic factors. In the winter, heavy snows block roads and damage road surfaces. In the spring, a fast runoff of vernal rains and melting snow, due to denudation, courses from the mountains, carrying enormous quantities of debris and attacking all man-made structures with a force that must be seen to be appreciated. It is hoped the recent introduction of advanced road building techniques will result in roads better able to withstand these conditions.

Equally important as a retardant on the growth of transportation was the failure of a long line of governments to recognize the correlation between economic welfare and efficient transport facilities between producing centers. At times a *seer* (16 pounds) of wheat has sold for $0.35 in Maymaneh when the price in Kabul, four hundred miles away, was $0.80 to $1.00. The freight cost between the two points being prohibitive, Maymaneh grain went begging while Kabul lacked adequate supplies.

Now this situation is rapidly changing. Of the 2,300 miles of all-weather roads and 1,500 miles of seasonal roads at the start of the

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

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

ROAD SYSTEM

First Five Year Plan in 1956, some 1,300 miles are being modernized to the stage of asphalting. To replace the tortuous road over the Shibar Pass, a new 70-mile road is being built directly north from Jabal us-Seraj to Doshi. Construction entails digging a 1.5-mile tunnel under the 11,900-foot Salang Pass, but when it is finished the road will cut 125 miles off the journey to the north and it can be kept open in winter. This road, all the way from Kabul to Qizil Qala on the Amu Darya, is being built with financial and technical assistance from the Soviet Union. The Russians are also assisting in improving the roads in northern Afghanistan, particularly the 75-mile stretch from Mazar-i-Sharif to Khelif on the Amu, and in the west the 400-mile stretch from Kushka via Herat and Farah to Girishk. American assistance has been extended to pave the new 145-mile road the Afghans built from Kabul to Torkham at the

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Khyber Pass. The western part of this road, cut along the gorge of the Kabul river to avoid the Lataband Pass (6,900 feet), involved a great amount of blasting and earth moving with a minimum of foreign equipment or assistance. Most of the work was done by construction battalions of the Afghan army.

The United States has also extended aid for rebuilding and paving the 315-mile road from Kabul to Qandahar, and for paving the 65-mile stretch from Qandahar to Spin Baldak opposite the Chaman railhead of West Pakistan. The Spin Baldak road, built in connection with the Helmand valley project, is part of a network of high-speed roads which, although not yet paved, have already demonstrated the value of good roads to the intraregional economy —particularly in expediting the collection and export of fruit. The Ministry of Planning has estimated that in 1956-57 two-thirds of the tonnage transported over the Kabul-Torkham, Kabul-Qandahar, and Qandahar-Spin Baldak roads consisted of imports and exports, in roughly equal shares.

There are several entry routes into northern Afghanistan from Soviet Turkistan: along the Hari Rud at Zulfiqar; by railroad from Merv toward Herat, the line ending at the border at Kushk; along the Murghab river between Maruchak and Bala Murghab; and at several points along the Amu Darya, notably from the Soviet towns of Khelif, Termez, and Qizil Qala, all of which have rail connections on the Soviet side of the river.

In Iran's eastern provinces two towns are starting points for entry into western Afghanistan. From Mashhad a 240-mile-long motor route runs to Herat through Turbat-i-Shaykh Jam, and a somewhat longer route goes by way of Zulfiqar. These roads may receive increased traffic as a result of the Afghan-Iranian Transit Agreement signed in the spring of 1962. Coming out of the town of Nusratabad in Persian Sistan, twenty miles from the lower Helmand river and the Afghan border, a caravan route leads to Farah, which is connected by road with Herat, Girishk, and Qandahar.

From the east the age-old entrance to Afghanistan is through the Khyber Pass from Peshawar in Pakistan, along a modern highway. This road leads to Jalalabad and to Kabul. Next in importance is the road from Quetta to Qandahar. The terminus of a railroad line from Karachi is at New Chaman, on the Pakistan side of the Khojak Pass, some 85 miles northwest of Quetta. The distance from Chaman to Qandahar is only 65 miles by a good road. Southwest of Quetta lies Nushki, from which caravan routes lead through the desert into

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southern Afghanistan. Between Quetta and Peshawar several caravan routes lead through passes in the Sulayman mountains into Afghanistan, but they are not suitable for wheeled traffic. The same is true for the trails leading from areas north of Peshawar into the mountainous regions of Nuristan and Badakhshan, and of the caravan route along the Kokcha river via Fayzabad, from the Pamirs.

Inside Afghanistan the so-called "great circle" route leads from Kabul through Ghazni to Qandahar, thence to Girishk, Farah, and Sabzawar to Herat. From Herat the route continues northeast to Maymaneh, then to Andkhui, Shibarghan, Balkh, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Tashqurghan. There one branch continues east to Qunduz, Khanabad, Fayzabad, and Jurm. The main road leads southeast from Tashqurghan to Pol-i-Khumri and Doshi, and southwest through narrow gorges and valleys to the Shibar Pass (9,800 feet), thence east through the Ghorband valley to Charikar and from there south to Kabul. An east-west road from Kabul to Herat through the rugged central mountains is motorable only with great difficulty.

The Afghan government has also taken effective measures to increase the vehicle fleet of the nation. Aside from military vehicles, obtained from the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan has received 150 buses and a number of taxis from the Soviet Union as well as 100 coal trucks from the United States (under the $800,000 loan of June 28, 1957). The United States has also lent Afghanistan $2.45 million (on the same date) of which $1.7 million was allocated to importing 100 tank trucks for petroleum transportation plus 900 eight- and ten-ton truck chassis, on which the Afghans build their own bodies. The remaining $750,000 was allocated to imports of spare parts, as well as the materials and equipment needed to build repair and maintenance shops at Kabul and Qandahar plus a truck assembly plant.

In 1961-62, 125 buses imported from the United States were assembled at the shops in Kabul. The Russians have also lent Afghanistan funds to build a second vehicle repair shop at the Jangalak complex in Kabul as well as petroleum tank farms at Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif. The Afghan government, in 1954-55, set up a joint state-private transport company in Kabul to foster the import and operation of trucks. In addition, the government is offering strong inducements to establishment of similar facilities in other cities: by selling such companies foreign exchange at 25

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percent below the market price; by exempting new vehicles from import duties; and by exempting individual truck-owners from the income tax. In addition, the price of gasoline is held quite low and rationing has become nominal in recent years. Gasoline imports almost trebled between 1956-57 and 1959-60, while the number of registered trucks increased from 4,219 to 5,522 over the same period. Since some 3,751 trucks were imported during this period, it can be seen that the replacement rate was quite high, and that two-thirds of the fleet in 1960 consisted of relatively new trucks. The rate of deterioration should decline as the roads improve, and it is hoped that a fleet of 5,500 trucks plus 500 buses will be adequate for some time if 600 to 700 replacements are procured annually. It is also hoped to increase utilization from the present 30 percent of the truck fleet's capacity by doubling the present 50-mile average daily run and increasing the load factor.

Truck transportation seems best suited to the bulk-moving needs of Afghanistan's economy. The major bulk commodities now requiring transportation are coal, salt, rock, cement, cotton, and sugar. As has been suggested, these commodities are produced neither in the volumes nor in the concentrations necessary to justify railroad construction. The topography of the country also militates against railroads in many areas. It is possible, given amicable political relations, that the railhead at Chaman in Pakistan might eventually be extended to Qandahar to handle import-export trade, but it is equally possible that Afghanistan may escape the "railroad age" entirely. Certainly, a combination of vehicle transportation on improved roads, petroleum pipelines along certain routes, and internal and foreign air connections is the ideal transport "mix" for Afghanistan at this stage.

Air transportation serves a vital need within Afghanistan where distances between cities and productive nodes are great and topography an inescapable obstacle to direct and rapid surface movement. Enormous progress has been made since the late 1950s when both American and Soviet aid became available to Afghan aviation. The first national airline, Ariana Afghan Airlines, was established in January 1955 with two DC-3s as equipment. In June 1956 the United States extended through ICA both a grant of $9.56 million and a loan of $5 million for air transportation development. The projects included construction of the international jet airfield at Qandahar, the rebuilding of various provincial airports, communications, and navigation aids, organization and training for the

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Afghan Department of Civil Aviation, and equipment and support for the Ariana company. To carry out the project, a Civil Aviation team joined the ICA mission in Kabul. In April 1957 Pan American Airways purchased a 49 percent interest in Ariana, which became a subsidiary although the Afghan government holds a repurchase contract. Twenty-five Pan American technicians were sent to Afghanistan to provide managerial, training, and technical services. In January 1960 the United States made available an additional $2.6 million to carry the aviation program through June 1962.

Soviet assistance to air development in Afghanistan was at first concentrated on military airports, the provision of military aircraft, and the training of jet pilots. Two jet fields, one at Mazar-i-Sharif and one at Bagram, some twenty miles north of Kabul, were rushed to completion between 1956 and 1960. The unpaved field at Jalalabad was also improved to accommodate jet fighter planes. In 1957 the Russians undertook to enlarge the civil airport at Khoja Rawash, some five miles outside Kabul, to provide a 2,800-meter runway suitable for medium jet and turbo-prop planes. (Topographical conditions make it impossible to locate a long-range jet field this close to Kabul.) Funds were provided under the $100 million loan agreement signed by the USSR and Afghanistan in January 1956.

Thus Afghanistan now has one international civil jet field, at Qandahar, two military jet fields, at Mazar-i-Sharif and Bagram, and the following domestic civil airports which can handle the larger piston-driven planes as well as turbo-prop and medium-range jets: Kabul, Qandahar National, Herat, Maymaneh, Mazar-i-Sharif, Qunduz, and Jalalabad. Plans have been drawn for smaller airfields at Lashkar Gah, the headquarters of the Helmand Valley Development Authority, and at Baghlan in Qataghan. Emergency landing strips have been laid out at Jabal us-Seraj, Farah, and eight other sites.

In addition to providing all domestic service, Ariana has extended its foreign routes as far west as Frankfurt am Main. It also serves Prague, Ankara, Damascus, Jidda, Bahrein, Tehran, Amritsar, and Delhi. Foreign carriers serving Afghanistan include Aeroflot, which operates turbo-props from Tashkent to Kabul, Iranian Airlines serving Qandahar, and Indian Airlines operating between Kabul and Delhi. Afghanistan hopes that the excellent jet field at Qandahar will become a main stopover on flights from Europe to the Far East, since it offers up to 600 fewer air-miles over Karachi on cer-

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tain routes. Success will depend largely upon the efficiency with which refueling and servicing operations can be performed.

All-weather airports, supported by a modern system of meteorological and navigation stations in Afghanistan, will serve both to reduce effective distances within the country and to improve its contacts with the outside world. Air freight service is of great value in minimizing the time needed to secure spare parts or technical assistance which, in the past, has seriously delayed operations in various Afghan industries. The value to public health in being able to secure and distribute vaccines and personnel by air is inestimable. And, as we have mentioned above, certain exports such as karakul are valuable enough to be flown out to ensure on-time delivery or to take advantage of unusual marketing opportunities.

A final word may be added concerning access to the sea. Water transportation is of course the cheapest for long-distance bulk transportation. If landlocked Afghanistan is the "Switzerland of Asia" (a comparison of limited value in most respects), then Karachi is its Genoa. The Amu Darya, however, is not a Rhine, and can be used only for barge shipment of petroleum and a few other commodities as far as the Qizil Qala port. The Soviet Union provides transit privileges for shipments between Europe and Afghanistan, but this route is expensive and can be almost as time-consuming as shipment via Karachi. The conclusion of a five-year transit agreement between Afghanistan and Iran, in the spring of 1962, provides an alternative, though still costly, route from Herat to the railhead at Mashhad and, theoretically, would also permit Afghanistan to use the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas. There are, however, no adequate road connections to Bandar Abbas at present. The United States used its good offices with Afghanistan and Pakistan to secure transit privileges for Afghanistan across West Pakistan, both from Karachi and on the land route to Amritsar in India. A transit compact was actually signed in July 1958 between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it has fallen afoul of the Pushtunistan dispute. Pakistan insists that she is not "blockading" Afghanistan, but the endless delays, inspections, and disputes over collection and subsequent refund of customs duties have the same effect and as long as this situation continues Afghanistan is, in effect, paying exhorbitant transportation costs for heavy imports. Such costs represent a continuing drain on an economy that is already heavily burdened.

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CHAPTER 15

Labor

ALTHOUGH no comprehensive statistics on labor are available for Afghanistan, it is a well-known fact that the vast majority of the people are cultivators and pastoralists. In addition there is a sizable class of artisans living in the towns. The factory-type industrial labor force, which is slowly increasing, is estimated to comprise some 15,000 persons, and many thousands more are engaged in local handicraft industries. Another urban group is composed of merchants and traders, and still another of domestic servants. Distinct from these groups but also part of the working population are the managerial class, the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and, in the country, the landowners or tribal chiefs, who employ a considerable number of people on their estates.

Skilled factory labor has been almost nonexistent in Afghanistan and is being developed only gradually from the artisan class. Unskilled workers, too, have been difficult to find, due to the fact that the whole economy of Afghanistan is still primarily a subsistence economy, absorbing the mass of the people in traditional occupations which they are loath to leave. Of the 15,000 industrial workers the greater number are semiskilled operatives, engaged in spinning and weaving, for example, who require only the minimum of instruction for the manual processes involved. The numbers in the supervisory grades are small and those of the directing staff are very few indeed.

A large section of the people are self-employed farmers, or tenants who are not employees in the strict sense of the word since they do not work for wages. Yet their relation to the landlord or *khan* is often semifeudal and they do perform services for him from time to time, some with and some without payment—usually in kind. The same is true of many pastoralists; one cannot very well apply the name of "laborer" to a shepherd or goatherd if he is a

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member of a communal nomadic group. On the other hand, both farm and pastoral workers are sometimes hired for the busy season only. The reverse phenomenon occurs among the Hazaras, the majority of whom are farmers and pastoralists living in small villages in the central mountains. Thousands of them go to the towns each winter to earn enough as menials to keep their families alive, because the cold prevents them from doing any work in the fields during that season. A certain number of these people stay in the towns and make portering, gardening, and cleaning their trades, while their women work as domestics in the homes of the well-to-do. Yet all in all, they represent a small section of the labor force if in the latter we include all gainfully occupied persons. Employees in the commercial field are a minority also. No statistics are published on the number of men in the military services.

Perhaps it is safe to say that the gainfully employed in Afghanistan number between two and three million, almost all males. Prior to September 1959, the outstanding feature of the labor force was that women were not gainfully employed, except for a handful of nurses, airline stewardesses, women teachers in girls' schools, and a few thousand domestics of the Hazara type. An attempt to end *purdeh* by decree, as was done in Turkey and Iran, in the late 1920s met with fierce opposition from the clerics and helped to cause a revolution. Afghanistan's present rulers have moved more gradually and have cleverly used the popular example of Gandhi's elevation of women in India, along with the growing national consciousness of Afghanistan's image within Asia, to achieve a goal which had become economically essential as well as socially desirable. Great care was taken to present the ending of *purdeh* as a voluntary, individual action and to avoid any implied criticism of religion. A first step was the employment of a few women as announcers on Radio Kabul and as stewardesses on Ariana Airlines. Then, on the occasion of Prime Minister Nehru's visit to Kabul in August 1959, the Queen and the wives of various officials appeared unveiled at well-publicized receptions. The implicit message to the people was: "We are not trying to impress Westerners with our 'emancipation' but merely to bring Afghanistan into step with its Asian friends." Following this shrewd presentation, the police were instructed to protect unveiled women instead of arresting them. The women of Afghanistan, many of whom had been agitating behind the scenes for years, did the rest. Today, perhaps three-quarters of the women in Kabul go unveiled, although the propor-

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tion is lower in the smaller cities and towns. On the other hand, women in rural areas and in the nomad tribes never did wear the *chadri,* as it interfered too much with work and movement. Certainly for any activity from crossing the street to tending an automatic loom, the *chadri* was a menace to life and limb.

Expansion of the role of Afghan women in the labor force is bound to be a gradual one. Their main contributions will be in the fields of education, public health, communications (telephone operators, radio announcers), press and publishing, and as clerical or counter personnel in commerce, banking, and government offices. According to the 1960 *Survey of Progress,* there were 1,292 women employed by the public sector in Kabul in February 1960. Employment opportunities for women in light industry such as textiles and food processing are increasing, and the potential inability of the male population to keep up with the needs of industry was one reason behind the government's action. Women are already employed in the Omar rayon-weaving plant in Kabul, and in the Qandahar fruit cannery. Afghan women are probably better adapted than men for light, semiskilled, repetitive industrial work, and their rates of turnover and absenteeism may actually prove to be lower. But the requirements of the agricultural cycle will continue to affect the female as well as the male labor force.

Another large reservoir of labor is found among the nomads, who for centuries have migrated seasonally because they could find no year-round grazing land. The nomads' reluctance to settle on newly reclaimed land will be weakened by the offer of subsidies to help them get tools, seeds, and housing, as well as by the limitations put upon seasonal migration into Pakistan. The government hopes to offer the nomads property rights and tax privileges which are adapted to the patterns of their past life yet which fulfill their expectations for improvement. In the Helmand valley this resettlement program is under way. Once the nomads settle down, they are likely to provide some surplus labor which can be utilized in the nation's expanding industrial plant. The difficulty is to get them to stay. They find it very hard to adapt themselves to a settled life in a community. It seems to predispose them for various illnesses too, from which they do not suffer as nomads.

A more reliable but, so far, very small source of industrial labor is the children of the present factory workers. These are indeed already used as workers—in spite of labor laws—under the name of apprentices. In Pol-i-Khumri for instance, little boys from about

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eight or nine years up can be seen changing spindles in the cotton factory. However this will not solve the immediate problem. For instance, at Gulbahar a new cotton mill has been built with 43,000 spindles and 1,200 automatic looms. It will eventually require over 2,000 workers per eight-hour shift. But, although the area is rich in fruit and farmland, it is not rich in population. The thousands of factory hands needed for this mill will have to come mostly from elsewhere.

Improved agricultural methods will also release some manpower. Although Afghan farmers are skilled in using time-tested methods, these absorb enormous amounts of human energy. Tractors are a rarity, and chemical fertilizers are practically unknown. Cooperatives have not yet developed. Technical, social, and psychological changes are needed in order to release a considerable amount of manpower now absorbed in agriculture.

Seasonal employment is inevitable in some fields of industry, as well as in agriculture itself. Most migratory labor comes from the nomadic tribes, whose members are often employed as temporary farm hands in the busiest season. One of the two chief types of industry in the north, cotton and sugar, is also seasonal, as sugar beets must be processed when ripe and cannot be kept through the year. The sugar mill at Baghlan is therefore not able to develop full-time factory labor but must use many workers for its crushing season only.

Although Afghanistan has few factories and only a minute industrial labor class, it has, like most oriental countries, a specialized class of craftsmen. It is from these that the first industrial laborers have been drawn, and they may continue to provide a source for the still very rare skilled factory workers which will be in increasing demand as industry develops. The most important home industry is that of weaving. The government encourages hand weaving as it helps in the shortage of textiles from which the country suffers. Some five to seven million meters of material are annually produced by home weaving. Cotton is the most used, but wool and silk also figure prominently in some areas. A specialty of the home industry is the weaving of carpets. This is done mostly by the women and children in certain families, each of which has its own design and technique, transmitted from generation to generation. Of special articles made with carpet texture the donkey- and camel-bags deserve mention as among the finest articles produced in the country.

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There is of course also a sizable tanning industry for sheepskins and also for goatskins, which are used as water bags and inflated as the floating base of rafts used as ferries. Large numbers of rosaries, or strings of beads, so popular in Moslem countries, are made in Qandahar of a mineral called chrysolite, and are exported to India and Mecca. In the bazaars of all the bigger towns, but especially Kabul, one finds the usual copper- and blacksmith shops, occasionally a gold- and silversmith, and potters and basket-makers. Istalif is known for its painted and unpainted pottery, and Charikar for its silverwork and cutlery. In the towns one finds craftsmen making furniture, carts, and carriages. Carpenters, brick-makers, stonecutters, and blacksmiths are found in almost every town and in the larger villages. There are also tinsmiths, saddlers, harness makers, custom tailors, butchers, bakers, etc. Candles are made in a government shop which produces 100,000 candles and 15 tons of soap per week. There is also a recently rehabilitated match plant in Kabul which, using modern equipment from Germany and Japan, could make up to two million dozen matches per year. Production in recent years has been at roughly one-quarter that level, however.

Soviet assistance extended in 1954 made possible the construction of a modern flour mill and mechanized bakery in Kabul, with adjoining grain elevators. Popularly known as the "silo," this complex produces loaf-style bread, often employing wheat shipped from the United States. Other "silos" are planned for Pol-i-Khumri and perhaps Herat. Aside from these complexes, milling of grain is done by primitive water mills or by simple hand mills in the homes.

There are also a few sawmills, including the very modern plant in the Jangalak industrial complex at Kabul which has sufficient capacity to mill all the saw timber cut in eastern Afghanistan, if it could be transported to the plant. Yet, even in Kabul, one still sees logs being sawed into boards by two men using a draw-saw for hours on end. Far too much saw timber is wasted in Afghanistan by inefficient sawing or by use for fuel in Paktia and Nangrahar provinces. More is hacked up into fuel wood and transported into the cities. The fuel scarcity leads to the perpetuation of an old craft in the remote, wooded areas, that of charcoal-burning. The poorer people cannot buy charcoal and will spend half their lives digging up roots of wormwood and wild sagebrush, collecting weeds, and dried animal dung.

The whole artisan class and almost all the home industries of

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Afghanistan produce for the internal market only; only carpets and embroidered *pustins* are also made for export, as little else is of a quality that would sell abroad at a price high enough to cover the excessive cost of transportation.

By Western standards the quality of Afghan workmanship leaves much to be desired and, in general, Afghans are not lovers of work. Unlike the Germans or the Japanese, truly industrious people, Afghans work because they have to, rarely because they like to. The Hazaras alone seem to enjoy their chores, and they are capable of great feats of endurance and physical strength, especially in traveling with a heavy load. When it is a matter of working on their own land, however, Afghans put in long hours without fuss or complaint. In slack seasons they will equally calmly do nothing at all for days.

In the cities and on the roads a new flair for automotive mechanics has emerged; it seems that this is a field with which they become quickly familiar and at which they love to play, with astonishing ingenuity and success. This love of machinery is promising for the country's industrial future. Observing factory hands at work in a modern cotton mill, for example, one gets the impression that the younger ones are good at their work and proud of their agility in it. One also sees a number of very unhappy faces, of people who have been brought up in the country and to whom factory work is obviously a bore and a burden. The private artisan is, on the whole, a proud and happy man. His hours may be long but they are his own. Factory hours are rigid; the work is strictly disciplined, and Afghans hate discipline. This explains why there is a considerable turnover in factory personnel; and also why Tajiks are doing better in this respect than Pushtuns. Absenteeism is high, and sick leave is taken too frequently. One authority believes that the Afghan worker's low productivity is due to undernourishment, which may explain part of the problem. But even well-fed domestic servants may suddenly give notice of quitting their job when the weather is alluring; so the problem is not just a question of nutrition. One must realize that Afghans have only in recent times begun to shift from tribal life and outdoor pursuits, and that the blessings of indoor work by the merciless ticking of a clock have not yet become clear to them; for this they can hardly be blamed.

One encouraging aspect of the picture is that hand weaving is well established in the textile centers, so that the main mills have been able in half a dozen years to dispense with nearly all foreign assistance. In such fields as brickmaking, building, metal and wood-

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working, stone cutting, and toolmaking, manual skills have been developed over the centuries. The main problem is to develop people trained to handle and maintain complex machinery, and supervisors with managerial skill.

Although it is relatively easy to develop craftsmen, it is more difficult to train Afghans as good technicians. Yet these are badly needed, and the government is making sincere efforts to develop a corps of qualified technicians. The Afghan's love of mechanics and his ambition to see Afghanistan profit from modern technology should overcome the inherent psychological obstacles within one or two generations.

Seen from a different angle, adjustment of Afghans' working habits and their different valuation of human and material resources has often taxed Western organizational ability, with the result that foreign contractors have had to accept costly reorganization and rapid personnel turnover. The experience of Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan provides some specific material for an evaluation of the character of the labor market on the skilled level.

The company's policy called for the training of a limited number of Afghans for administrative positions above the level of clerk or interpreter. It was hoped that afterwards there would be left a pool of personnel able and willing to operate whatever organization the Afghans cared to set up at the end of the American contracts. But long before the main construction projects were finished, the government began siphoning off administrative personnel from Morrison-Knudsen, not just for the Helmand Valley Authority but for ministries in Kabul and for government enterprises in other parts of the country having no relation to the Helmand valley project. Morrison-Knudsen justifiably felt that it was being used as a training school, at considerable cost in time and money to its own operations.

The same thing occurred with respect to skilled and semiskilled laborers. No sooner would a young man be trained as an engineer's or surveyor's assistant, a mechanic, welder, or electrician, or a construction machine operator, than he was apt to be drafted into the army and put to work using his newly acquired skill in one of the engineering or construction battalions employed for public works. This situation grew even worse in 1957 and 1958, when the Helmand valley project was viewed with some disfavor in Kabul, but improved somewhat as Morrison-Knudsen turned to construction of the Qandahar International Airport.

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On the other hand, it should be pointed out that many construction workers trained by Morrison-Knudsen were absorbed into the Afghan Construction Unit, an organization under the Helmand Valley Authority. The Unit is responsible for the finishing operations on the irrigation areas, such as land leveling, the installations of drains, and the larger repair jobs. It maintains the interproject roads and has built several bridges between Girishk and Farah, as well as a number of public buildings and housing units at Lashkar Gah and throughout the project areas. In addition, other former Morrison-Knudsen personnel have been absorbed into the administrative and operating divisions of the Helmand Valley Authority, in the capacities although not in the numbers originally hoped for.

It may also be said that while Morrison-Knudsen-trained personnel may comprise the largest single pool of skilled labor in Afghanistan, not all of their skills can directly be utilized in industry. Mechanics, machinists, blacksmiths, welders, electricians, plumbers, carpenters, and masons can of course apply themselves directly either in the public or private sector. But construction workers have to be retrained if they are to be employed in the more highly organized and repetitive production skills associated with factory work. Regularity and precision in performance, and willingness to engage in repetitive operations, represent a combination of skills not easily acquired while driving bulldozers, tractors, scrapers, or dump trucks. This indicates the continuing importance of tapping rural craftsmen, including women and adolescent weavers, for work in the new textile plants and other light industries.

In the area of technical education, some progress has been made in recent years. The Afghan Institute of Technology was started some years ago, directed by an American engineer and furnished with modern machine tools and engine models from the United States. In 1954 a contract between the American government and the University of Wyoming provided for a long-term program of technical education in the course of which 23 American specialists thus far have been assigned to Afghanistan to expand the Technology Institute. Nevertheless, the best training will remain the actual practice on the job. This will have to be provided under the supervision of foreign technicians for some years to come.

Wages and working conditions vary a great deal. Until the 1920s a certain amount of slavery still existed in Afghanistan, mostly as a survival of the campaigns of Abdur Rahman in which rebellious

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tribes were crushed. Under the euphemism of *hamsayehs,* serfs were attached to various tribes and made to do the less pleasant chores. Much compulsory labor is still done for the government, in prisons, in the army, and by various villagers and tribesmen, in lieu of paying taxes on roads and public buildings.

Few statistics on wages are available. Wages vary widely, both according to the skill and tenure of the worker and the section of the country where he is employed. A loom tender in a woolen textile plant may earn from 300 to 400 afghanis per month; a semi-skilled factory worker from 250 to 500 afghanis; and a chief maintenance mechanic up to 3,000 afghanis per month. In Kabul, house servants in the homes of the foreign community earn from 600 to 1,000 afghanis per month, which is more than most government officials get and far more than teachers, especially those in the elementary schools, are paid. If any class is to be singled out as the most inadequately paid, it is probably the Afghan equivalent of our white-collar class.

As is true in many Western countries, public servants except in the top echelons are less well paid than persons doing the same type or level of work in private firms. They stay at their jobs for a variety of reasons: prestige, sense of duty, a sense of solidarity with the regime (a sort of nepotism in reverse), because the government has paid for their education, or, in the case of young men, especially teachers, to postpone or avoid military service. Nevertheless, a survey of the Kabul employment market conducted by the Ministry of Planning in February 1960 showed that, as compared to total employment, vacancies in the public sector came to 45 percent for nontechnical workers and 30 percent for educated and technical workers. Of course, tables of organization in the public sector tend to be somewhat inflated. In the private sector, total vacancies came to only 2.6 percent of the number employed.

This survey was based on a sample of some 22,973 out of an estimated 27,349 employees in the public sector, and some 3,368 out of an estimated 5,909 persons in the private sector. The private sector in Kabul was estimated to include an additional 10,500 workers in wholesale trade and small industry, at least 2,500 domestic servants, and over 3,110 persons indirectly employed. Thus, the total wage employment in Kabul, with a population of perhaps 250,000, would come to only 50,000 or 60,000 persons.

The public sector in Kabul, as in all of Afghanistan, has been expanding more rapidly than the private. Nevertheless, the fact that

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vacancies, and turnover, in the public sector are so much greater than in the private is an indication of comparative wage levels. Another advantage of the private sector in Afghan employment lies in the provision of "fringe" benefits. These range from furnishing a work uniform and a free midday meal to the operation of company stores where workers may buy food and household supplies at low prices. The cotton textile plants at Pol-i-Khumri and Gulbahar even provide good housing at nominal rentals, the most effective measure for reducing turnover and a major increment to the wages paid. In the governmental sector, only the Helmand Valley Authority and the Coal Union (a syndicate under the Ministry of Mines and Industries, not a labor union) are in a position to offer housing to their employees. Pension plans are now being developed in both private and governmental sectors and should serve to reduce labor mobility.

Afghan employers and employees alike appear to recognize the value of monetary incentives. Piecework is well established, except, of course, in the category of common labor. Most of the successful cottage industry enterprises compensate their employees on a piece rate basis. Whether it will be possible to provide such incentives in mechanized production will depend on the productivity of the employees.

Working conditions vary tremendously. In the older, smaller shops sanitary and safety conditions are usually absent, health requirements are ignored (poor lighting, ventilation, and spacing) and workers are not protected from occupational hazards. In the new, modern factories, order, cleanliness, good lighting, and ventilation, protective devices, and health services are provided. Legislation to improve working conditions for industrial labor is discussed below.

Relations with employers are on the whole humane, for Islam frowns on mistreatment of hired labor and even slaves, and in this preindustrial society a benevolent paternalism is expected of the employer. In the more impersonal relations of the larger factory this personal touch is in danger of being lost, yet there is a noticeable effort on the part of managing engineers and foremen to keep in touch with their men. There is certainly a desire among the leading groups in the country to avoid the inhuman sweatshop conditions that marred the earlier decades of industrialization in Europe. Moreover, the well-known love of freedom and self-respect which characterize Afghans in their individual lives may make it difficult

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to obtain the needed industrial labor unless work in factories is made and kept attractive by good wages and working conditions, and humane treatment. The government has translated these considerations into protective legislation.

A Royal Decree of January 16, 1956 brought into force regulations governing the employment of labor in industrial establishments in Afghanistan. This legislation is comprised in 8 chapters and 149 articles, preceded by the following preamble:

> The present regulations are based on two fundamental principles: 1. Freedom for each individual to choose his occupation: each individual is free to choose any legally authorized occupation, provided that he obtains written permission from the Ministry of Commerce and conforms in the exercise of his chosen occupation to the instructions of the public authorities. 2. Protection of workers by application of the following rules: (a) regular payment to workers of their full remuneration; (b) compensation for accidents occurring during work; (c) fixing of working hours in accordance with what is fair and reasonable; (d) weekly rest day; (e) accident prevention; (f) health measures.

There are no labor unions in Afghanistan, and it is questionable when they will be permitted to develop. From the Islamic view society is an organic whole, and to divide it into battling or even competing groups is evil. The relations between employer and employees should be humane and charged with mutual respect, for all are equal in the sight of Allah and the rich man or master has no special prayer mat in the mosque. Labor organizations to deal with employers are, therefore, unlikely in present-day Afghanistan. Yet strikes have occurred occasionally, if workers wanted to protest against some alleged or real mistreatment, or to call attention to a grievance or a need that had been ignored. This method however is not a class weapon; it was used by Kabul's shopkeepers not many years ago in protest against irksome government regulations.

The complete absence of labor organization may not be permanent. With the development of an industrial labor class it is quite possible that some type of organization will take place. There is a precedent in the craft guilds, which flourish in Tajik villages.

The whole subject of the Afghan labor force will be greatly clarified when the population census, now in preparation, is taken. In the meantime, the Ministry of Planning has created two de-

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partments to collect information relating to employment. The Directorate of Manpower is concerned with urban and industrial needs and resources, not just prospective quantitative requirements but desirable qualitative improvements that will result in higher efficiency and earnings. The Manpower Commission will perform the same function for rural areas. An employment service is also functioning at Kabul.

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CHAPTER 16

Public Health and Welfare

AFGHAN ADULTS are on the whole healthy and tough. They have to be, considering that they survive the most unhygienic practices. The country has long been plagued with a host of infectious diseases—malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, dysentery, typhoid fever, paratyphoid, typhus, cholera, syphilis, smallpox, leprosy, anthrax—and the high incidence of these ills has been attributed primarily to the absence of effective measures of public hygiene and sanitation.

There are no adequate statistics on birth rate, incidence of disease, and mortality rates for different age groups. It has been estimated, however, that 15 percent of the live infants born at Kabul die in their first year of life. The most common childhood disease is measles, with white diphtheria, contagious meningitis, and whooping cough also occurring sporadically. Diarrheal disease, both enteral and parenteral, is the chief cause of morbidity, and its sufferers fill the majority of the hospital beds.

Moslems perform ablutions before prayer, an obligation that insures cleanliness of face, hands, forearms, and feet. More extensive cleanliness follows a consistent pattern, centered on festival days or weddings when baths and new clothes are in order for all who can afford them. In personal hygiene, men are supposed to bathe before their morning prayer if they have had sexual intercourse. In the towns there are public baths where those who can afford it may bathe sociably among their friends in separate rooms for men and women. In the country the men bathe in the rivers and trim their hair and mustaches at the irrigation ditch; the women bathe in their houses.

In the towns men can be seen washing and even shaving with water from the *juy*, the water channel along the streets. The richer

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and more progressive city people use imported toothbrushes and tooth paste, but the peasants still use a little twig, the wood of which lathers like soap when it is crushed.

Those who are particular about their clothes wash them frequently, especially the baggy white trousers of the Afghan costume. Wednesdays and Thursdays are the washdays in Afghanistan, in order that the faithful will be clean on Friday. Unless the women of the family do the laundry themselves, they will send it out to washerwomen, or to companies of laundrymen who take the clothes outside the city to wash them on rocks in the river. But because these men beat the clothes so hard they soon wear out, their laundry service is not in favor with most Afghan women.

Toilet paper is unknown except in westernized homes and men are in the habit of cleaning themselves with a stone or with lumps of clay placed in the toilets. Since most elimination takes place outside, this practice is convenient. Human excrement may be found in the alleys and empty lots of towns and around every village. Local hotels have no sanitary facilities, nor do many of the village schools. The government hotels in the towns have bathrooms and toilets with running water, though even these are often out of order or incomplete as regards fixtures.

Town houses may have primitive toilets consisting of a board with holes set up over a conduit running under the house. These arrangements are cleaned by toilet cleaners, people who have been hired by farmers to bring human waste from the towns to fertilize the fields. Only at Kabul do the houses of the well-to-do have modern bathrooms, frequently tiled with local marbles, with porcelain fixtures and drainage to cesspools.

There is safe drinking water only in a few of the towns. An almost total lack of sanitary waste disposal in the towns has led to a situation in which the dry dust of animal and human excreta is constantly whirled about by the wind and the feet of the passers-by. Open irrigation ditches, which receive contamination from the soil, supply the water used for washing food, clothing, and human bodies. These conditions all contribute to the spread of pathogenic organisms and Afghans may thank their own inured constitutions and the brilliant rays of the sun for the fact that intestinal diseases are not even more rampant.

In the villages people long depended on local healers who acquired their medical lore from Persian and Arabic books now centuries old. Many put their faith in herbalists whose small shops

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are found in many bazaars. Today pharmacists from the towns may go to the villages in summer to act as doctors and to distribute medicine. Village dentists—usually the barbers—either pull teeth, not always the right ones, or fill them with a special gum. Pregnant women depend on midwives for prenatal care and assistance in childbirth.

Many people who fall ill go to their *mullas* who treat them with incantations and formulas. Barren women pray for children at mosques and shrines. That prayers and spells are sometimes followed by a cure is not surprising, considering that many ailments resolve themselves in time, and that many symptoms are psychogenic, arising from belief in jinns and witchcraft. Where the patient grows worse and dies, it is the will of Allah, the Merciful, since all afflictions are from Allah.

The development of modern health services began in 1931; in 1934 the Ministry of Public Health was established; and in 1956 the Institute of Public Health was founded. The initial emphasis was on the field of curative medicine through the construction of hospitals and the opening of outpatient clinics, including a number with X-ray equipment.

In 1960 there were 56 hospitals in Afghanistan with a total of 1,800 beds and with some 220 doctors attached to the hospitals. While the number of physicians in private practice is unknown, it seems probable that the total number of doctors in the country is not over three hundred. Each year the School of Medicine of Kabul University graduates about 35 new doctors, and a comparable number complete medical studies in foreign countries. Although a School of Nursing was established in 1936, there are only some 200 male nurses and 100 female nurses in the country. Given the scarcity of doctors and nurses and the difficulty of rapidly increasing their numbers, attention has been concentrated upon short-term training of medical aides and specialists. Special courses have been instituted for laboratory and X-ray technicians, midwives, male and female assistant nurses, assistant dentists, and pharmacists. In addition, fellowships are available for foreign training in some of these fields. The removal of the veil opened up new careers for young women in the public health services.

In more recent years emphasis has shifted to preventive medicine, in spite of the fact that large-scale campaigns in this field are more costly than the erection and maintenance of curative facilities. Efforts to control the widespread ravages of malaria began in 1940

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and in 1947 an ambitious five-year campaign was launched: marshes were drained and teams moved across the land to spray hundreds of villages and breeding places of the malarial mosquitoes with DDT. Trained malaria inspectors man eleven control centers, and malaria has been largely eradicated throughout the country. In these same years campaigns directed against epidemic diseases gained in momentum, with teams of trained vaccinators employing vaccines and serums produced in the Kabul Bacteriological Institute. Injections and vaccinations are given to all students, factory workers, and army recruits, while visiting teams of vaccinators find a ready welcome, contrary to some expectations, in the most remote areas of the country. As a result, remarkable progress has been made in diminishing the incidence of smallpox and good headway made against typhoid fever and typhus. All vaccines and serums are given without charge. The incidence of tuberculosis remains high, partly because Afghans seldom protect themselves properly from cold weather and partly because, although many of them appear hardy in the face of sudden temperature changes, the weaker ones can easily succumb to infection in crowded and unsanitary shops or offices. The Tuberculosis Sanatorium at Kabul has a capacity of 162 beds.

In a continuing effort to lead the people toward personal hygiene and proper sanitary practices, health education is carried on by means of films, radio programs, articles in newspapers and periodicals, pamphlets, and illustrated calendars, while rural development projects provide model sanitary facilities. The World Health Organization, an arm of the United Nations, has been very active in Afghanistan, particularly in the field of curative medicine. In the past few years it has maintained an average of seventeen foreign health specialists in the country and has a budget of close to $200,000 for its operations. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health provides milk, flour, vitamins, and soap to many school children, and factory workers are provided with nourishing meals. The bulk of all welfare activity in Afghanistan is still in private hands, and most of it is unorganized. The family and tribal organization of the people obviates in large measure the need for public charity. Poverty is so common and so generally accepted that it does not arouse strong pity, while at the same time it is not ignored. Afghanistan's towns have what would be called depressed areas, but they are more or less normal from the Afghan point of view. Absence of proper sanitation is still the norm, and this is what

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primarily impresses foreigners as the essence of a slum. But this customary way of life does not create antisocial conditions on the scale the slums breed in our society. Consequently one hears little in Afghanistan of excessive crime, juvenile delinquency, begging, or vagabondage, especially in rural areas.

Afghanistan presents a great contrast with some other countries of the region where beggars are often as thick as flies. Beggars do exist, but they are rare, and may be religious mendicants rather than professional beggars. This situation is due to the surviving family system, which absorbs the aged, the sick, the unemployed, and the handicapped as a matter of course. Where an individual has lost his family, the neighbors or the tribe take over. Mutual assistance helps people through childbirth, illness or temporary incapacity, and in emergencies a whole community cooperates to remedy the damage or loss sustained by any of its members. The insane, maimed, and deformed are afflicted by Allah, so that it is the duty of the devout to feed and care for them. It is only in the towns that this primitive but effective type of private welfare is in danger of weakening and disappearing, and only then the need for public, organized welfare activities becomes felt and is eventually met.

The equivalent to the charitable foundation in Moslem society is the institution of the *vaqf*, a bequest to support a pious or humane cause. The welfare organizations of the country include the Afghan Red Crescent Society, the Women's Welfare Society, and the Maristun. Although it was established a number of years ago, only recently has the Red Crescent Society actively solicited contributions throughout the country and begun to open branch offices. Its activities are reported in *Sereh Miyasht* (Red Crescent), a monthly publication. The Women's Welfare Society, founded in 1947, is the first and only general organization for women in Afghanistan. Since 1953 it has occupied its own large building in Kabul where it offers adult education classes for women, runs a kindergarten, sells women's handicrafts, and shows films. In 1960, in order to meet the sudden demand for female secretaries, it opened business courses which included instruction in typing in Persian, Pushtu, and English. This society puts out *Merman* (Ladies), a quarterly magazine. The Maristun, or Social Service Center, has its own quarters at Kabul where it maintains an orphanage and trains the growing boys and others in crafts and trades. It publishes *Barq-i-Sabz* (Green Leaf), a monthly periodical.

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CHAPTER 17

National Economic Goals

DESPITE the foreign aid which Afghanistan has been receiving in recent years, the development projects of the First and Second Five-Year Plans, beginning in 1956, have involved enormous outlays by the Afghan government itself. By 1958-59, actual government expenditures for both ordinary and developmental purposes had exceeded 1.6 billion afghanis, or four times the level of the first postwar years. Estimated public expenditures were to surpass the two billion afghanis level by 1960. Although the actual public revenue has exceeded actual expenditures in recent years, the government has borrowed heavily from the State Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank) founded in 1939. The outstanding balance of loans, including interest due, was 1.4 billion afghanis on March 20, 1960. To this must be added an outstanding public foreign indebtedness of $115,456,385, as of the same date. Converting the internal indebtedness into dollars at the official rate (20.25 afghanis to the dollar; the free market rate in March, 1960, was about 42 afghanis to the dollar), the total public debt amounted to some $186,972,677, of which slightly over 60 percent represented foreign indebtedness.

The real impact of this foreign debt began to be felt in 1961 when repayment of the $49,500,000 United States loans for the Helmand valley projects began, and will be intensified in 1964 and 1965 when repayments on the $100 million economic development and $25 million military security loans from the Soviet Union are scheduled to begin. Smaller amounts are owed to Czechoslovakia and West Germany.

As a result of borrowings from the State Bank, the assets of that institution have increased about as fast as the government budget. In 1958-59, the assets of the State Bank reached over 5.1 billion

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afghanis, as compared with three billion afghanis in 1955 (on March 20) and 1.5 billion afghanis in 1949 (see Table 3).

There are three smaller official banks, plus an industrial credit fund, whose assets are at the disposition of the government of Afghanistan. These are the Pashtany-Tejaraty or Commercial Bank (founded 1954), the Agricultural Bank (1954), the Construction Bank (1948), and the Industrial Credit Fund. All four institutions have been established primarily to make low-interest loans available to small businesses, farmers, animal breeders, cottage and home industries, builders, and small factory establishments. Their total foreign exchange holdings in March 1959 amounted to 70 million afghanis, of which 68 million were held by the Commercial Bank. Aggregate assets, including foreign exchange, amounted to 673.1 million afghanis on the same date.

These small banks were set up by the government in response to the feeling that the Bank Melli, the oldest bank in the country, was not interested in fostering the development of small enterprises. The Bank Melli, which was established in 1932 by Abdul Majid Zabuli, had provided financial backing for the Consolidated Cotton Company, the Textile Company, the Baghlan Sugar Company, and for Afghanistan's karakul trade. Many of the older members of the royal family became investors in the Bank Melli, and Zabuli himself served as Governor of the State Bank and as Minister of National Economy prior to 1950. But as the nation began to move from a laissez-faire system to one of "guided economy," the Bank Melli lost much of its influence. After Muhammad Daoud became prime minister, the government began to offer competition to the Bank Melli in both trade and finance. Faced with the loss of its profitable monopoly positions, the Bank Melli sold to the government its controlling interest in most of the major enterprises with the exception of the Textile Company. At the same time, the Bank Melli's former role in financing was assumed by the State Bank. The Bank Melli's assets still amount to almost one billion afghanis, half of which represent investments in private enterprises, but its hold over the Afghan economy has been broken. In March 1959, the Bank Melli's holdings of foreign exchange, a field in which it used to be dominant, had shrunk to less than two million afghanis.

The State Bank is now the only agency authorized to hold gold and silver and to issue bank notes. Foreign exchange may be held by other banks as well. There is a legal requirement that a cover ratio of one-third be maintained between the total gold, silver, and

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net foreign exchange holdings and the bank notes issued. Although holdings of gold and foreign exchange holdings actually increased, and silver remained stable, the cover ratio dropped from 60.6 percent in 1957-58 to 58.6 percent in 1958-59. The drop was due to an increase in the issue of notes, an unavoidable necessity as the Afghan economy continues to expand and to shift into a money economy from the barter economy which still prevails in some areas. There is still ample margin above the legal minimum to allow for a gradual increase in the money supply in ensuing years. Furthermore, it should be noted that the reserve holdings are conservatively valued at the official rate of exchange, which is only half that of the free market value of the afghani (*i.e.*, the gold, silver, and foreign exchange holdings could be converted into twice their nominal value in afghanis). Finally, there is already evidence that, as confidence in the monetary economy and banking system grows, bank deposits will increase more rapidly than the total money supply, so that currency in circulation may actually decline. Currency in circulation on March 20, 1959, was 1.811 billion afghanis, as compared with 1.083 billion afghanis in March 1955, and 412 million in March 1949. From March 1958 to March 1959, the currency in circulation actually declined 3.4 percent (while the total money supply increased 6.9 percent) due to increased bank deposits.

If this trend can be continued, it will represent a remarkable achievement for a country in Afghanistan's position. Students of the economics of developing nations are familiar with the pattern of spiraling inflation caused by the injection of large amounts of money as payment for wages and services long before the increased production of consumer goods can be achieved to take the pressure off prices. Afghanistan seemed to be heading down this primrose path up to the summer of 1958 when the free market value of the afghani fell to 60 to the dollar, a depreciation of fifty percent from the value four years earlier. But by the summer of 1960 the value had risen again to 40 to the dollar. Stringent fiscal controls, including a system of multiple exchange rates which forces exporters to sell foreign currencies to the State Bank at less than their free market value and which forces importers of nonessential or nondevelopmental items to buy foreign exchange at market rates, are largely responsible for the improvement of the economic position. The tariff system is also keyed to support fiscal stability. On the other hand, if there is serious, prolonged interference with Afghanistan's ability to export karakul, fruits, and cotton, there will be

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renewed downward pressure on the afghani, particularly as the foreign debt service and repayment mount in coming years. In recent years, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning, and the State Bank have profited from advisors provided through the United Nations Technical Assistance Mission, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Cooperation Administration. Systems of accounting and control have improved enormously since the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan in 1956.

The publication of the First Five-Year Plan represented the culmination of a shift in the Afghan government's attitude toward the economy which had been in the making for several years. It may be traced back to the resignation of Zabuli in 1950 following his failure, despite the maintenance of an "economic mission" in Washington, to get the U.S. Export-Import Bank to underwrite any of the Bank Melli's industrial projects, which included the expansion of cotton textile, sugar, and hydroelectric production in the eastern and northern parts of the country. This failure, and Zabuli's resignation, strengthened criticism of the Bank and of reliance upon private enterprise for economic development. The next turning point came in September 1953, when an uncle of the present king resigned as prime minister to be succeeded by Muhammad Daoud. Prime Minister Daoud belonged to a new generation of Afghans. His Cabinet members lacked their predecessors' interests in the Bank Melli. Of more importance, many of them have been impressed by the rapid industrial progress made in the Soviet Union, including Soviet Central Asia just across the Amu Darya from northern Afghanistan. They were also impressed by the fact that India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and other newly independent nations in Asia were adopting various versions of the planned economy. Prime Minister Daoud summed up the thinking of this influential group on February 5, 1954, when he said:

> My government's economic policy is based on the principle that both government and private enterprises should function for the benefit of the country and general welfare of the people. In the future, the full economic resources of the country, private and public, will function in such a manner as to provide maximum benefit to all sections of the population. Therefore, for the coordination of the country's economic activities it is necessary that the government, which represents all sections of the population, guide and regulate such activities. (Afghanistan Mission to the United Nations, *The Five-Year Plan of Afghanistan,* New York, 1956, p. 1.)

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One of Prime Minister Daoud's early appointees deserves special mention. General Abdul Malik, formerly quartermaster general of the Afghan army, became Minister of Finance and later Minister of National Economy as well. General Malik (who should not be confused with Abdullah Malikyar, the present Minister of Finance) had spent a number of years on duty in Turkey, where he was duly impressed with "etatism," the theory of the state-guided economy as practiced under Ataturk and Inonu. Malik moved rapidly to establish a planning and goal-setting agency within the Ministry of National Economy. At his urgence, other ministries rapidly drew up programs which were hurriedly issued late in 1956 as the Five-Year Plan of Afghanistan, effective retroactively as of the start of the solar year 1334 (March 21, 1956). But Malik overstepped himself. First of all, Afghanistan did not possess sufficient trained personnel to prepare reasonable goals, much less to integrate them and oversee their fulfillment. Secondly, Malik apparently entertained ideas of making himself tsar of the economy, if not of the country itself. At any rate, he was abruptly arrested and dismissed from his posts in July 1957. The Ministry of National Economy was restyled as the Ministry of Commerce, while its Planning Section was re-established as a new ministry under the close personal supervision of the Prime Minister himself.

The new Ministry of Planning then began the arduous task of creating a statistical system that could serve the purposes of economic planning in Afghanistan. Working hand in hand with the other ministries, advising but not dictating, carefully collecting, tabulating, comparing, and correcting estimates, the Ministry of Planning has performed invaluable service to the country. Its *Survey of Progress,* issued annually, forms the basis of most statistical data on Afghanistan as well as for Afghanistan's participation in the various specialized agencies of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and for the rational utilization and coordination of foreign assistance to Afghanistan. Most important of all, the new approach to planning made possible the revision of estimates in a realistic fashion from year to year. Some projects were postponed, some dropped outright. But when the First Five-Year Plan ended on August 31, 1961 (in the course of the Plan a new fiscal year, September to August, had been substituted), the accomplishments were impressive. The main projects will be reviewed in the following chapters on agriculture, industry, and domestic and foreign trade.

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CHAPTER 18

Agriculture

THE PLANT LIFE of Afghanistan is related to that of Iran and Arabia on the one hand, and to that of the Himalayas on the other. Forests are confined to a belt lying between 7,000 and 12,000 feet altitude on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush and the Safid Kuh, and the western slopes of the Sulayman mountains. Here are found oaks, several species of pine, fir, yew, and cedars. Somewhat lower are the walnut, wild almond, and myrtle. Between 4,000 and 6,000 feet the wild olive, privet, and several kinds of mimosa thrive, as well as the hazel, the Judas tree, the larch, the pistachio, the Norway spruce, and the wild peach in favorable locations. At lower altitudes there are alder, ash, arbor vitae, juniper, dwarf oak, dwarf laburnum, and tragacanth trees, their shade providing protection for a cover of many varieties of currants, gooseberry, hawthorne, honeysuckle, jasmine, rose, and rhododendron. The drier hills are sparsely covered with herbs, thorny and spiny plants like camelthorn, milk vetch, rhubarb, rue, and wormwood. Reeds and rushes grow in the marshes and on the banks of perennial streams. The desert regions support stunted brushwood, dwarf tamarisk, camelthorn, asafetida, and gum trees yielding tragacanth.

Grass on the steppes and wild flowers almost everywhere mark the coming of spring, when even the most desolate-looking slopes have a temporary carpet of red, white, and yellow flowers, tulips, lilies, hyacinths, daffodils, irises, and wild roses. Alpine flowers are common in the high mountains.

The forest products of the extreme northeast include timber, firewood, resin, asafetida, pistachio nuts, pine nuts, rhubarb, mushrooms, manna, and medicinal herbs. The ash, mulberry, plane, poplar, and willow trees are cultivated for their wood and shade; and in the case of the mulberry for its leaves needed in sericulture,

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and for its berries which—particularly in Kuhistan north of Kabul—are a staple food, eaten both fresh and dried.

Fruit trees, especially stone fruits, and grapevines are cultivated in carefully tended gardens. Orchards are filled with apricot, peach, pear, almond, walnut, and apple trees, and in the extreme south also date palms. Melons, watermelons, and cucumbers of excellent quality are grown wherever possible. Pomegranate growing centers at Qandahar, and Jalalabad is warm enough for orange groves.

The chief cultivated crops are wheat, barley, rice, corn, millet, pulses, clover, lucerne, vegetables, sesame, rapeseed, cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, sugar beets, poppy, turmeric, madder and a variety of fruits and nuts. Flowers are widely grown for their color and the gaiety they add to house and garden.

The fauna of the country is that of an area in which Eurasian, Indo-Malayan, and Ethiopian species meet. The larger wild animals are rarely seen, as they confine themselves mostly to remote mountain fastnesses. More commonly observed are mountain sheep, mountain goats and ibex, bears, deer, and gazelles. Jackals, wolves, foxes, and game birds are common.

The chief domestic animals are camels (200,000 to 300,000), horses and mules (200,000 to 250,000), donkeys (700,000 to 800,000), cattle (2 or 2.1 million), water buffaloes (perhaps 20,000), and yaks in the Wakhan panhandle region. In addition, there are 5 or 5.5 million karakul sheep, 13 or 14 million ordinary sheep (mostly of the fat-tailed varieties), and between 6 and 8 million goats. Cats and dogs abound, while poultry fowl, geese, ducks, pigeons, quail, partridge, pheasants, and song birds are bred.

Authorities disagree as to the amount of land under cultivation in Afghanistan. Estimates of the area actually sown to crops in a given year (as distinguished from that which is in fallow rotation) range from 2 percent up to 12 or 13 percent. Until this matter is cleared up by an agricultural census or by detailed interpretation of the aerial photos made for the Afghan government in recent years, we may accept the official estimate of 7.8 million hectares (see Table 4), with the important qualification that of the land in the "cultivated" category probably only one-third is cultivated in any given season. The remaining two-thirds has to be fallowed because of water shortages or to allow soil fertility to return. This qualification, of course, applies principally to the dry-farmed or *lalmi* land.

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If we accept the conservative estimate of 5.5 million people in the sedentary agricultural population, the government figures would yield slightly over 1.4 hectares or 3.5 acres per capita of cultivated land. But allowance for the land which must be fallowed in any given season reduces this to about 1.2 acres per capita. The 7.9 million acres of meadows and pastures support around two million nomads, through intermediary livestock.

A few official estimates are available for the crop production in Afghanistan. By averaging those for several recent years, and taking the most reasonable estimates where an average cannot be computed, we obtain the estimates shown in Table 5. The sum total of cereal food crops (wheat, maize, barley, rice) in recent years has averaged close to 78 million pounds. Assuming, conservatively, a population of 9 to 10 million, the per capita production of grain would be between 780 and 867 pounds per person, which is considerably above the per capita production of India or Pakistan. Although famines on the order of those experienced earlier in this century in the Indian subcontinent have never been recorded in Afghanistan, the government in recent years has imported wheat from the United States and the Soviet Union (50,000 and 40,000 tons respectively in 1959-60). The purpose of these imports is manifold: to ensure against shortages due to variations in weather or outbreaks of crop disease such as wheat rust; to ease the country's serious distribution problems; to release some land for technical crops; and to hold down the prices of grain, flour, and bread. The price of wheat in Kabul in 1959-60 ranged between 25 and 29.5 afghanis per seer (16 pounds) or about 3.9 to 4.6 cents per pound. Corn and barley are cheaper than wheat, rice more expensive.

Grains, and particularly wheat bread, form the backbone of the Afghan diet. They are supplemented with perhaps 100,000 metric tons of potatoes and with seasonal fruits and vegetables, production of which may amount to 600,000 metric tons and 400,000 metric tons, respectively. Large quantities of fresh and dried fruit are normally exported to India and Pakistan, and in recent years export to the Soviet Union has begun.

Meat consumption is rare, since meat is expensive: beef costs two to three times as much as wheat by weight, and mutton is half again as expensive as beef. Again in relation to the cost of wheat, milk, curds, yogurt, and fresh butter are comparatively inexpensive while cheese and boiled butter (ghee) are costly. Poultry and eggs tend to be cheap.

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It cannot be assumed that the rural diet is necessarily better than that in the cities, since the needs of farmers for manufactured or imported products (cotton cloth, sugar, tea, etc.) are often great enough to lead them to part with their meat and dairy products as well as with grain, fruit, and vegetables. Perhaps the best diet in Afghanistan, at least as far as protein intake is concerned, is that of the nomads who rely heavily upon animal products and who, until recently, were able to do quite a bit of importing on their own account in the course of their annual international migration.

Although vegetables are generally cheap, fruits, which require more labor and can easily be sold for export, are fairly expensive except in season. Nuts are particularly expensive by Afghan standards. Fruit growing and nut gathering are specialties in several regions. Like meat and dairy products, they help provide cash for the procurement of essential consumer items. Other major sources of cash income are cotton, sugar beets, sugar cane, wool, and *par excellence* karakul skins.

The pattern of production is determined by the availability of water. Where there is enough water, there are two growing seasons: from late fall to early summer (the winter crops) and from spring to autumn (summer crops). In the first season wheat, barley, lentils, beans, peas, and melons are grown; in the second rice, tobacco, cotton, and other fruits. Because of the harsh climate, only one harvest is possible in the higher regions. The quantity of nonstaple food crops and industrial crops depends on the wheat yield; that is, the area sown to these crops is determined by the wheat yield and acreage in the preceding season, unless wheat imports make up for the minimum food requirements. Conversely, when increased wheat acreage cuts down the sugar and cotton acreage, sugar and cotton imports tend to increase. This dependency on wheat is caused primarily by the uncertain rainfall and the lack of major water storage reservoirs, at least until 1952 when the large Kajakai and the smaller Arghandab dams were completed as part of the Helmand valley project. Another reason is the low wheat yield (8.5 to 11.5 bushels per acre on the average) due to lack of fertilizer and the absence of sufficient organic matter in many parts of the country.

Fruit production is generally more regular, and the control of the water supply in the Arghandab valley has further stabilized its growth, but not necessarily the income earned, due to the uncertainty of the export markets. Karakul skin production is dependent

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on the survival of sheep during the harsh winter climate, disease control, and the available stock feed. Overgrazing and the shortage of supplementary feeds (cotton seed) in recent years contributed to a reduction in the production of skins. Because not enough sugar beets are grown, the refinery at Baghlan has been operating below capacity for years, furnishing only one-third of the country's requirements. The Ministry of Agriculture, with assistance from the FAO technicians of the United Nations Technical Assistance Mission (UNTAM) is improving this situation by introducing better seeds and better cultivation practices. Irrigation improvements in the Baghlan area, to be discussed below, have also reduced curtailment of production due to interruption of water supply. In addition, a small sugar cane refinery at Jalalabad came into production in 1958 and will expand when the Darunta storage dam and irrigation network add some 30,000 hectares to the cultivated area around Jalalabad.

The pattern of food production of the nomads differs from that of the farmers. They own small livestock flocks. But the seasonal nomads also own land in the lower plains which they cultivate during the winter season (fall to early summer) while during the summer they move up to mountainous grazing areas. Decline of the grazing area and occasional droughts have reduced the livestock output of the nomads. Losses of sheep during the frequently severe winters are heavy. Protection of flocks and herds through water tanks, winter feeds, and control of animal diseases is inadequate.

The expansion potential of Afghan agriculture depends on a number of local factors which are peculiar to the region. The agricultural regions of Afghanistan may be roughly divided as follows:

(1) The well-populated and intensively cultivated eastern valleys where water supply and weather conditions permit cultivation of high-value crops, including rice, cane sugar, maize, citrus fruit, and vegetables.

(2) The northern plains, enjoying a continental climate, receiving adequate water from rains or rivers. Much of the area, especially in and near the foothills, is grazing land. The area bordering the Amu Darya river has not received enough water for some time and is wind-blown, the result being that farming is made difficult by shifting sand.

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(3) The western valleys around Herat, broader and less populated than the eastern valleys. They produce wheat and barley in abundance. Narrow irrigated strips along the river banks make possible production of rice and cotton.

(4) The Helmand and Arghandab valleys, hereafter referred to as Helmand basin or Helmand area.

The typical evil of most Middle East countries, oppressive landlordism, has not been a characteristic feature of Afghan rural life. The farms consist primarily of a large number of small holdings of individual proprietors, with the most frequent size ranging between five and fifty acres. Many of the larger holdings are cultivated by sharecroppers and cash tenants. A tenant gets the usual fifth of the produce if he provides nothing but labor. If he also supplies implements, his share will be forty percent; and if he has animals, he will get sixty percent. In several areas, the insecurity of the tenant's position is parallel to that of the peasant proprietor who has to borrow money for seeds and tools from moneylenders of the nearest city, paying as much as thirty percent a year. The creditor's method of collection is similar to that of the landlord in that he accepts part of the crop at harvest time in lieu of payment.

The following pattern of landlord-tenant relations was found to prevail in the relatively prosperous Arghandab valley.

The village selected is one of many located on the banks of the Arghandab or its tributaries, the Dori and Tarnak. The inhabitants depend almost exclusively on agriculture. Maize, potatoes, and beans are grown in the spring, and harvested in the fall. Winter crops, planted in October, include wheat, barley, and mustard. Because of favorable weather and abundant water supply, intermediate crops are grown, mostly a large variety of fruits and vegetables. Exports to Pakistan of grapes, melons, pomegranates, and, in years of abundant supply, wheat and barley, bring in welcome cash. In addition, each villager owns a few sheep and goats, oxen, and a cow, the oxen serving as draft animals.

The villagers live in houses of sun-dried brick with roofs made of adobe reinforced by twigs and timber. The water supply for the village is a small canal (*juy*) which takes off from the river and also irrigates the fields. Rich and poor alike share the canal, except that the very rich may have their own canals.

The village is self-sufficient insofar as the food supply is con-

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cerned. In addition, it supplies surplus over and above its needs to pay rent on the land, taxes, and interest on the money the villagers owe. With the cash, earned from sales to the town or city and from exports, villagers buy the essential consumer goods (textiles, soap) and tools.

In another village of this type, for example Badwan in the Panjwai district, four of the fifty male farmers own half of the forty separate fields of ten acres each in the immediate proximity of the village. The other half are owned by absentee landlords for whom some of the villagers work as tenants or hired hands. A good portion of these fields are cultivated by absentee tenants who live in other villages, perhaps miles away. The relation of the owners of the land surrounding the village to the village community is remote—just as remote as that of the absentee tenants. The landowners prefer to live in the town or city and send their agent or appoint a resident agent to collect the rent. The reason for the tenants living away from the fields they cultivate is the high rate of turnover among them. The decision as to who cultivates which field is in the hands of the landlord or his agent. The leases are generally on a yearly basis, giving either party the right to cancel them. Thus the tenant may be on the move every year and the village population may change as the landlords switch tenants from field to field or even from village to village. This system not only undermines the social unity of the village but may also divide members of the same family, who sometimes find themselves farming three different fields in three different villages.

Considerable tension and ill will is generated each time a tenant loses his lease, and efforts by the villagers to oppose the system are weak. Moreover, if the nearest village cannot accommodate the tenant, he may lose hours in walking to and from the field. The benefits of the system lie in the relative freedom of the tenant to look for the best landlord and land. Landlords compete among themselves for the most competent tenants, and tenants keep on the lookout for the rare opportunity to find a job in trade or industry. Incompetent tenants who, because of prestige or relations, enjoy a certain status, may never lose their tenancy, despite incompetence. While tenants are thus not tied to the landlord, their life is insecure and as a result the economic and political status of the village is seriously weakened. The bargaining power of the village vis-à-vis the higher authorities, local tribes, and particularly its landowners, is low. And since trade and industry in the valley

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do not as yet offer enough jobs to absorb farmers permanently, they remain tied to the system—until land tenure is instituted.

Because of limited financial resources and technological backwardness, villagers do practically none of the processing of their products, except for what they consume. Processing is done by specialists in the bazaars where the villagers buy their meager requirements. Thus the town (among whose inhabitants may be quite a few farmers) and the city depend on the villager for basic food and raw material supply; but his political and economic status vis-à-vis the city is so weak that few technological advances and capital funds flow back to the village. The loans the villagers have to take up are generally for consumption goods, rarely to help improve the land or the irrigation works, and are therefore unproductive.

What the villager needs most are extension services to teach him new techniques, to make simple processing facilities available to him, and above all to provide a cheap source of credit which would free him from the loan sharks and merciless rent collectors. To remedy some of the worst evils of the free tenant system the government established in 1954 the Agriculture and Cottage Industry Bank which charges half of the bazaar rates on its credits to farmers, but which has so far not proven conspicuously successful. With props of this and similar kinds, however, the tenant should gradually gain higher economic status and improve his bargaining power in contracting with the absentee landlord.

One of the primary reasons for the low level of income of the Afghan farmer as well as of the industrial worker and artisan is the tremendous technological lag which characterizes Afghan economic life. Because of the low level of technology the exploitation of resources has not kept pace with the rising aspirations of an adaptable and resourceful population. Millions of partly idle farmers and nomads lead barren lives amidst cultivable soils, an average climate, and ample though irregular water supply.

Just how backward the technology is and how drastic must be the changes needed to raise the country's productivity became evident when Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan launched its first surveys in 1946. The existing technology Morrison-Knudsen's engineers and agronomists found in the arid and semiarid areas of central and southwest Afghanistan was strongly influenced by climate, water supply, and soil fertility. The dams, frequently built by piling stones, brushwood, and sacks filled with earth, had to be rebuilt

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every year during the low-water season, since bypassing the dam site by diversion tunnels was unknown. They raised the flowing stream and diverted water into canals but did not store large quantities (the Helmand flow varied annually from 1600 cubic feet per second to 50,000 cubic feet from the spring flood). The canals were laboriously built by hand and most were narrow winding ditches, sometimes three and four parallel to each other.

Drainage practices were poor. Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan found marshy conditions in the lower regions, and elsewhere an accumulation of soluble salts in the topsoil caused by the high water table. Because the water supply was heavily concentrated in a few months, many of the soils had hard dense surfaces which broke into large hard clods. This tendency was intensified by the lack of cultivation after irrigation and the insufficient use of gypsum for making the soil granular and soft. In contrast, the ancient skill among irrigation farmers in the northern plains and western valleys had been successfully proved by the introduction of new crop varieties (including American cotton) and the opening up of new land for commercial crops by expanding irrigation facilities.

Morrison-Knudsen agronomists found Helmand agricultural practices primitive. Ninety percent of the cultivated land was grown to grain sorghum and wheat which required the least amount of water and yielded the largest number of calories per acre-foot of water. Only four percent of the land had pastural alfalfa and orchards. Wheat had the additional advantages of requiring only simple cultivation methods and fitting better into the irregular river supply pattern than did diversified crops which needed an even supply.

Wheat and barley, when grown in the winter-spring period, take two-thirds of their water during the Helmand's high-water season, the other third in the starting-up period, October to November. A diversified crop system, including pasture, alfalfa, row crops, and orchards, would require its major water supply evenly spread from February to August. Thus, the unregulated river water flow was a natural barrier to higher-level agricultural production. The persistently low yields of wheat (600 pounds per acre) held most farmers to subsistence levels.

Wheat was grown only every two or three years in an effort to keep fertility higher. With an unusually fertile topsoil or ample manuring and summer water, a summer corn crop could follow.

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Pasture consisted chiefly of natural vegetation; there were few irrigated pastures. Fruit and vegetable growing were highly developed where water was adequate throughout the year, but even for them fertilizers were lacking, chemicals being unavailable and much of the manure burnt for fuel. Since crop rotation was virtually nonexistent the only way to replenish the land was to let it lie fallow.

Farming was done by hand, the most common tools being the irrigation spade and the hand sickle. Seeds were broadcast on flat ground and not cultivated once the seedlings came through. Weeds were pulled by hand or cut with the sickle. Wheat was harvested with a sickle and piled in circular piles. Yoked cattle trod out the wheat in circular marches around the piles and the grain was separated by tossing the tramped mixture, allowing the wind to blow away the chaff. The wooden plow was the only piece of equipment not worked by man. Afghan farmers claimed, with good reason, that their hoe plow or forked-stick plow, which loosens rather than turns the soil, was better for unirrigated land than were the western moldboard varieties which encouraged excess moisture loss through evaporation.

Other studies concentrated on animal husbandry. Cattle, used as work animals as well as milk producers, tended to suffer from malnutrition because grain was withheld from them and there was not enough hay. Donkeys, adjusted to inferior pasture and straw, carried every sort of burden. Sheep and goats, efficient meat producers, found their nourishment on the ranges, reducing still further the sparse vegetation. In dry years farmers had to move to feed the animals which were essential to the family livelihood. Regularly on the move, up to two million nomads were adapted to arid conditions, as were their livestock, under an unregulated grazing system. But nomads and settled herd owners alike had failed to apply modern breeding techniques even to the country's greatest dollar-earner—karakul lambs. Quantity was even more highly valued than quality. Diseases took their toll as there was no veterinary center or vaccine supply to help the owners protect the animals.

Grazing surface was always inadequate either because water sources were not exploited or because there were no supplementary feeds and forage in the winter, such as wheat, barley, straw, and waste products of the sugar and cotton mills. Herds had to travel 100 miles a year between the high grasslands and the overgrazed desert ranges receiving only 6 inches of rain a year. With a weather

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eye cocked to the price differences between the meat of the fully grown sheep and the skin of the young lamb, breeders overstocked grazing areas whenever the fluctuating skin price was not attractive enough. The breeder was at a disadvantage also as against other producers for export as he had to deal with a fur trading monopoly obliged to deliver most of the exchange proceeds to the State Bank at less than the market rate. Thus he received only one-fifth the New York price of his skin. Grading at the time of purchase rarely went beyond a rough classification into four categories, with no premium for first-class skins. The first United Nations Mission reported of the karakul industry that there was no scientific management, that the pastures supporting the sheep were fast deteriorating, and that the Afghan product was being threatened in respect of quality by Soviet and South African karakul.

Since 1950 an aggressive drive has been under way, with the help of foreign experts sent by the Food and Agriculture Organization, to improve agricultural production. Among the more notable achievements are the following: cotton yields have been boosted by seed improvement and the successful demonstration of the use of the long-handled hoe; seeding in ridges or rows rather than broadcasting the seed has added to the yield increase. As a result cotton production, which before rarely exceeded 10,000 tons, has been above 15,000 tons and in 1955-56 reached 22,000 tons (all figures in lint yield). Early in 1954 a new cotton export corporation, sponsored by the government, undertook to spread modern cultivation methods and to improve seeds and the quality of the lint. Animal pest control has been under way since 1951 when serum production and large-scale inoculation of livestock was started. At the same time, supplementary feeding in feeding lots and supply of winter feeds helped to soften the impact of the winter weather. The government has attempted to set minimum prices for the farmers, who had previously been at the mercy of large trading companies. In 1955 the average price of 100 afghanis per skin was 30 percent higher than in 1954.

Karakul exports in 1954-55 amounted to 1.85 million skins. By 1957-58, exports exceeded 2.8 million skins, despite a drop in the price from over eight dollars to about seven dollars per skin. (The price decline probably did affect the drop in exports to 2.0 million skins in 1958-59.) Thanks to government intervention, the share of the breeder in the market price of karakul had risen to about one-third. The establishment of breeders' cooperatives, breed-

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ing stations, and purebred flocks was encouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture with assistance from the FAO and from the Wyoming University Team under ICA contract. These agencies have also taken a hand in developing new watering places on the karakul range lands and in improving grading procedures. Methods of treating skins for export by air are also receiving attention.

Similar improvements have been made in the production of wool in Afghanistan. Not counting the five million or so karakul sheep, Afghanistan has perhaps fourteen million sheep and between six and eight million goats. Although such breeds as the Arabi, Baluchi, Gadic, Ghilzai, Hazaraji, Qandahari, and Turki have been distinguished, most Afghan sheep may be grouped as fat-tailed types, providing *roghan* (a type of lard which is used as a substitute for butter) plus coarse wool. The wool has generally been so coarse, and so mixed in quality and color, that it restricted the production of the two woolen mills at Kabul and Qandahar to rough fabrics and blankets. Actually, most of the wool can be used only for carpet-making purposes, and much of this is exported. It is estimated that at least 25,000 metric tons of wool are clipped in Afghanistan each year, of which only 8,000 or 9,000 enter the commercial side of the economy, including 6,000 or 7,000 tons exported as carpet wool. A program is under way to rid flocks of nonwhite sheep, since colored wool brings one-third less than white wool on the market. Attention is also given to wool grading, washing, and baling methods. A wool laboratory was established by the Ministry of Agriculture with FAO assistance in 1959.

To expand exports, a Wool Exporting Syndicate financed by the Commerical Bank was established in 1955. To improve both the quality and quantity of wool production, the Ministry of Agriculture has imported Merino sheep and established a breeding station at Qandahar in 1958-59 with the aim of maintaining the Merino breeding stock, crossing Merinos with the local Ghilzai sheep, and trying to establish a pure breed of Ghilzai. The unimproved Ghilzai yields only five or six pounds of wool per year, while the Merino yield is twice as great. ICA introduced the Columbia breed, which yields up to fifteen pounds per sheep per year, into the Helmand region. These Columbia sheep are not as hardy as the local varieties, but they do well on saline or alkaline ranges. To improve the quality of ranges and fodder, the Ministry of Agriculture's experimental farm in Kabul is working with twenty-

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four varieties of grasses, as well as with legumes and sorghum- or corn-silage for cattle.

New varieties of cattle have been introduced as well: Brown Swiss by ICA, Sahiwal and Tharparka from India by the Helmand Valley Authority. Since the Afghans are more interested in dairy products than beef (mutton and goat's meat being preferred), the emphasis has been on improving the milk yield of the cows, especially those of the Qandahari breed. Artificial insemination and castration of inferior bulls have been introduced. Stronger draft bullocks are a valuable by-product of this program, since most Afghan bullocks are too weak to pull moldboard plows, especially the deep plows needed to turn under weeds and green manures on irrigated lands.

Veterinary medicine, especially of the preventive sort, has also received attention in recent years. The vaccine laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture now produces some two million doses per year for immunization against anthrax, black leg, rinderpest, and other diseases. Animal clinics have been set up in Nangrahar and Mazar-i-Sharif provinces, as well as in Qandahar and Herat.

Silk production, which had seriously declined from its importance in ancient Afghanistan, has been given a new stimulation by FAO sericulturists. Afghanistan apparently has special advantages in its dry climate and the absence of various diseases which attack both the mulberry trees and the silkworms in more humid regions. The mulberry tree is one of the most common Afghan varieties and is usually allowed to grow up to great heights in order to supply shade, wood, and the berries that are eaten directly or ground into a sort of flour in the eastern parts of the country. In 1953-54, 5,000 seedlings of three improved mulberry varieties were introduced from Japan along with various new silkworm breeds. The center for the FAO experiment was Baghlan, where the Sugar Company had previously encouraged sericulture as a sideline for its cooperating farmers. It is estimated that by 1960-61, over a million mulberry seedlings were planted in Qataghan province alone, to be grafted with the imported stock. The production of improved silkworm eggs as recorded by the central sericultural breeding station has increased from 6,000 grams in 1953-54 to 174,000 grams in 1959-60, and in the latter year the demand so far exceeded the supply that 2,000 additional grams had to be imported from Japan and China. These eggs are not given away; farmers must pay

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sixty afghanis per box. The fact that the revived industry has taken on so strongly bodes well for the future. Not that Afghanistan can expect to enter the silk-export market, but that sizable imports of silk could be replaced by the domestic product. Silk-breeding and processing make excellent sources of supplementary income for farmers, and provide off-season activity for all members of the family. To encourage the industry, the Afghan government has built new central breeding stations at Herat and Jalalabad to supplement the two private stations in Baghlan and Qunduz.

Farm implements are also being improved. FAO experts successfully demonstrated the advantages of the long-handled scythe, to replace the short sickle. Long-handled hoes and several thousand samples of other tools have been tested and demand has so far outrun available supplies. Mechanization, with its labor-releasing advantages, will be a slow process, however. Many factors militate against it: the physical limits of the small fields with their bunds or open canals and drainage ditches, the initial cost of power implements, the problems of maintenance and spare parts. On the larger cotton fields in the north, however, tractors have been in use since 1954, with the FAO training the drivers. In some areas, tractors have helped to increase cotton yields four to five times. In the Helmand project, also, the advantages of mechanical equipment have become apparent to the farmers, although few can afford their own machines. It is quite likely, however, that the Helmand Valley Authority will provide machine services not only for land preparation but for cultivating and harvesting field crops and especially for cutting or turning under the legumes and green manures which the project lands sorely need. Such procedures are being followed on the experimental farms in the Helmand region, and could easily be extended to the individual plots before they are hopelessly cut up or subdivided.

One of the most serious problems is the inadequacy of water supply in many potentially rich regions whose rivers carry millions of acre-feet to waste during the spring floods. Since 1939 the government has been engaged in extensive reclamation projects. One of the earliest was carried out in the northern provinces and in addition to helping stabilize agricultural production eventually made available enough acreage to plant a certain portion permanently to sugar and cotton. Diversion of this acreage to wheat or rice has become a thing of the past, except in years of serious drought.

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In the mid-1950s, irrigation experts of the FAO called attention to the lack of water storage and flood-control facilities on the Qunduz and Kokcha rivers in Qataghan province. Since runoff was unregulated, the spring floods often destroyed the crude diversion structures hand-built in the stream bed or, far worse, coursed into the irrigation canals, either breaking down their walls or filling them with coarse sediments. By the time the damage could be repaired, several precious weeks of the growing season were lost and frequently crops already planted were ruined.

Under the First Five-Year Plan, two important irrigation projects were carried out in Qataghan province. The Adjmir canal, the longest on the eastern side of the Qunduz river, watering some 30,500 acres from below Pol-i-Khumri to beyond Baghlan, has been rebuilt with a permanent intake facility and structures, including a bypass canal designed to prevent overflow by returning water to the river. On the Kokcha river, which flows directly into the Amu Darya above the mouth of the Qunduz, the Archi canal has been similarly improved. Twenty-five hundred laborers and local farmers participated in a 22-day self-help program, digging a half-mile-long diversion canal to prevent flood damage from the Kokcha river.

Still, there remain serious problems of irrigation in both valleys. The Qunduz river alone irrigates less than 200,000 acres, although the average annual discharge, measured at Pol-i-Khumri, amounts to some two million acre-feet. Assuming, as one of the FAO engineers did, an 85 percent efficiency in water use, the runoff could provide five acre-feet for up to 340,000 acres, an amount more than ample for such crops as cotton, sugar beets, and winter wheat, making allowances for evapo-transpiration losses and losses in distribution. But to take advantage of this runoff for irrigation, as well as for maximum hydroelectric generation, it will be necessary to provide storage reservoirs above Pol-i-Khumri. The same is true on the Kokcha river, which has the additional problem of flowing in a deep-cut valley, below the level of the terraces with good loessal soils which could be irrigated if storage capacity and pumps were provided. A barrage could supply both storage and sufficient hydroelectricity to operate the pumps. Siemens-Schuckert have estimated that the cost of such a facility for irrigating 125,000 acres would be as low as $2.5 million.

In total, the potential, reliably irrigated land in Qataghan province, including areas along the Qunduz river, its lower tributary the Khanabad, the Kokcha, and the areas directly irrigated

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from the Amu Darya, should be on the order of 550,000 acres, of which at the most some 400,000 are unreliably irrigated today. It would seem logical to build one or more storage dams incorporating large-scale hydroelectric facilities to support the region's burgeoning industry. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have agreed to construct a dam on the Amu Darya near Khelif and to share the irrigation water and hydroelectric power produced.

The irrigation potential in the Kabul river valley is concentrated around Jalalabad, below the gorge sections of the river, which offer excellent sites for storage and hydroelectric generation but little level land for cultivation. One existing dam, built by Siemens-Schuckert for hydroelectric purposes at Sarobi, already provides 22,000 kw. capacity and this can be increased by one-half when additional storage is available. Construction is under way on a much larger dam upstream at Naghlu. The 344-foot-high Naghlu dam, which should be completed around 1965, will create a reservoir of over six square miles, add a 60,000 kw. hydroelectric capacity of its own, and firm up the supply of water for power generation at Sarobi and other potential sites downstream, as well as for irrigation around Jalalabad.

The Jalalabad basin lies at about 2,000 feet elevation, sheltered by mountains to the north, west, and south. As a result, it enjoys a mild winter climate, and has a unique importance in Afghan agriculture, producing citrus fruits, sugar cane, and rice, all by irrigation from the Kabul river and its tributary the Laghman. To firm up the irrigation supply and to add some 30,000 acres of new land, construction began in 1960 on a 75-foot-high dam at Darunta, a site at the lower end of the Kabul river gorges below the confluence of the Laghman. This project which, like the Naghlu dam, is being constructed with Soviet aid under the $100 million loan of 1956 should be completed around 1964. It will have tremendous impact upon the agricultural economy of Nangrahar province, and will also provide some 10,000 kw. capacity for urban and industrial use in Jalalabad. But its importance to the national economy is small in comparison with what could be done in Qataghan province or what has already been done in the Helmand valley.

The Helmand valley project is the largest, and most controversial, multipurpose undertaking ever carried out in Afghanistan. Its origin dates back to the late 1930s when the Afghan government, with the assistance of engineers hired from Japan, undertook a relatively modest program of rebuilding the old Boghra canal on the western

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bank of the Helmand river near Girishk. The Afghans continued the work unaided during the war and by 1946 decided to irrigate not only the floodplain area below Girishk (the Shamalan area) but the Nad-i-Ali and Marja tracts on the old river terraces to the southwest. This plan required the use of modern equipment and engineering techniques far beyond what the Afghans themselves could supply (see the map, The Helmand Valley Development Areas).

In 1946, the Afghan government turned to the American firm of Morrison-Knudsen, not specifically for the Helmand project, but to carry out a series of public works throughout the country as part of a coordinated development program conceived by the then Minister of National Economy, Abdul Majid Zabuli. But the Morrison-Knudsen estimates for some of these projects appeared high, and the government began to realize the political ramifications of having Americans working north of the Hindu Kush. So, by 1948, Morrison-Knudsen was exclusively concerned with the Helmand region, where access to the railhead at Chaman was improved by a series of high-speed project roads. (Morrison-Knudsen established an affiliate, Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., to handle its work in Afghanistan. To facilitate this description, we shall employ the abbreviation MKA to designate this affiliate.)

When MKA began to investigate the irrigation potential of the Helmand region, it found that an excellent storage site existed upstream at Kajakai, where some 1.5 million acre-feet could be stored and, eventually, a 120,000 kw. hydroelectric capacity installed. Actually, the storage capacity of the Kajakai dam can later be increased to 2.5 million acre-feet thanks to the unusual site advantages. The idea for the storage dam on the Arghandab river, which impounds some 388,000 acre-feet and offers a 12,800 kw. capacity, originated with the Afghan government, which desired to improve the irrigation and power supply around Qandahar.

MKA's investigations also showed that the Nad-i-Ali and Marja terrace soils were shallow, underlain by dense gravelly subsoils, poorly drained and saline in places, while those of the Shamalan floodplain were afflicted in places by high water tables and surface accumulation of salts. It is extremely difficult to allocate the exact responsibility for continuation of the project in these areas after indications of salinity and poor drainage were found. MKA officials state that conditions were brought to the attention of Afghan officials who were further advised to postpone this part of the

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THE HELMAND VALLEY DEVELOPMENT AREAS



Source: Adapted from Tudor Engineering Company, *Report on Development of Helmand Valley, Afghanistan* (ICA, Washington, 1956), Plate 11, p. 19.

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project until surveys could establish that there was enough water to irrigate both the terrace and the floodplain areas. Officials of the Afghan government state either that no warnings were given or that they were minimized. Since only reconnaissance surveys had been made, it is probable that no one realized the extent of the saline and alkaline soils or how hard it would be to reclaim them due to the dense subsoil conditions. At any rate, the Afghan government was impressed with the flood-control and power potentials offered by the storage dams, as well as with the ability to firm up the water supply available for year-round irrigation along the Helmand and Arghandab. As the project grew, additional areas were added east of the Helmand (Darweshan), between the confluence of the Helmand and Arghandab (Seraj), and south of Qandahar (Tarnak).

To carry out this grandiose undertaking, the Afghan government has borrowed some $41 million from the United States, and has put at least that much of its own revenue into the project. When the project, in its presently contemplated scope, is completed, the total investment will probably reach about $120 million. In addition to the Export-Import Bank loans, the United States has granted $6 million to the project, and has devoted to it a large share of its technical assistance to Afghanistan. The Helmand Valley Authority has achieved the equivalent of ministry level within the Afghan government. But the arguments over the desirability and future of the project continue, and its success or failure seems inextricably bound up with American prestige in Afghanistan.

In attempting to evaluate the Helmand project, several distinctions must be made and borne in mind. First of all, a certain degree of control has been achieved over the runoff on both the Helmand and Arghandab rivers, thanks to the storage dams and reservoirs. This control, though far from complete, has already served to reduce damage to fields, crops, and irrigation systems from the spring floods. Secondly, the purpose of the storage system is not only flood control in the spring but the assurance of a firm water supply throughout the dry summer and autumn. In most parts of the project, it is now possible to grow two crops where there was previously only enough water for one, and no assurance of that. Thus, a major distinction to be made in assessing the benefits of the project is that between the effects of the new storage and distribution system upon lands previously cultivated and the effects upon lands newly brought into cultivation. In almost every case of the

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former type, the assurance of an adequate water supply has brought about an increase in the production on the old lands. This is particularly true of the areas irrigated from the Arghandab river in the vicinity of Qandahar, one of the great deciduous fruit producing regions in Afghanistan. Production in, and exports from, this region have practically doubled since the completion of the project facilities.

Turning to the newly cultivated land, a further distinction must be made between lands with good subsurface drainage and those that lack this essential feature. Particularly in Nad-i-Ali and Marja, possibly also in Tarnak, too much land with poor drainage has been incorporated into the project. The result is that the project now includes storage and distribution capacity for more land than can be or should be irrigated, at least for field crops, given the level of equipment and training of the farmers. Thousands of acres that were not fit for irrigation have been overirrigated, with the result that water tables rose, the soils became salinized, and costly reclamation works, including drains, have had to be undertaken. Land has actually been abandoned within the project, and the hoped-for rate of settlement has been curtailed.

One of the major reasons for the Afghan government's interest in the Helmand valley was to provide new lands for the settlement of the Pushtun nomads, who annually migrated across the border to spend the winter in the Indus valley of Pakistan. But the government failed to realize that one cannot turn a successful pastoralist into a successful farmer overnight. The need for retraining the nomads before settlement was disregarded. Furthermore, it was not realized that irrigation agriculture is the most difficult of all forms of farming. It requires more equipment and far more care than rainfall-farming or even dry-farming. Too much water is potentially more dangerous than too little, for a lack of water hurts only this season's crop, while a superabundance will not only ruin one crop but the soil itself, making it unfit for crop farming for years to come. In both the southwestern United States and in Soviet Central Asia, it took decades for this lesson to be learned. It is being learned the hard way, again, in the Helmand valley where modern technology, virtually overnight, put a tremendous water supply into the hands of people who for centuries had been accustomed to water scarcity. As a result, they used every drop they could, and most of it went into the water table, raising the salts until the land was ruined.

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This was particularly true in the later years when the government began to settle fewer nomads and to resettle more farmers, generally the poorer and less successful tenant farmers from other regions (in hopes that they would do better than the nomads). But whereas the nomad was unused to farming of any type, the displaced farmer was just as unaccustomed to having water for the asking. Now it is realized that assuring proper application of water is more important than providing the water. But proper application entails education of the individual farmer or ex-nomad, changing his whole outlook and methodology. This can be achieved only by a slow and painstaking program of training and community development. The HVA has begun this, but it will take years before the level of agriculture on the new lands approaches that in the older areas, and before a final verdict on the project can be reached.

One final distinction is worth making, however. We have indicated that the Helmand valley project has seriously affected American prestige in Afghanistan. This was inevitable from the start, although United States technical assistance was not extended to the project until June 1952, and did not begin to become effective until the spring of 1953 long after the nature and size of the project had largely been determined by the government and its American contractor. American Point Four technicians were sent into the Helmand only at the urgent request of the Afghan government, faced with the almost insuperable problem of settling nomads and displaced farmers on lands with serious tillage problems. They came to advise and recommend, but many of the Afghans did not distinguish between the Point Four technician who was supposed to "recommend" but not "do" and the MKA engineer who was supposed to "do" but not "recommend." This confusion is understandable, but it is also regrettable.

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CHAPTER 19

Resources and Industry

THE HISTORY of industrial development in Afghanistan, including the dominant role played by the Bank Melli up to 1953 and the shift to a "guided" economy under a series of five-year plans, has been discussed in the chapter on national economic goals. By the start of the Second Five-Year Plan in March 1962, the industrial economy of Afghanistan was certainly state-controlled, both through the government's holdings of majority interests in the principal enterprises (except for the Textile Company) and through the allocation of foreign exchange at different rates to support investment priorities established by the state. At the same time, Afghanistan had taken steps to encourage foreign private investment through the law of 1957. It is interesting that this "loophole" brought criticism from Soviet sources which characterize the Afghan economy as "state capitalism" just as the earlier transfer to government ownership of basic industries brought criticism from Western sources which saw Afghanistan moving into "socialism."

Rather than continue an analysis of Afghan industrialization in terms which are of distinctly limited value when applied to an underdeveloped economy, this chapter will address itself to an inventory of the resources available in Afghanistan and an analysis of what is being done with them by both government and private industry. (For some of the key indicators of recent progress in industrial production, see Table 6.)

Power resources are a key to Afghan industrial production. The country is well-blessed with hydroelectric potential and has good coal reserves on the northern flanks of the Hindu Kush. It is too early to form an accurate estimate of the petroleum and natural gas reserves, but these apparently exist in some quantity north of the Hindu Kush and quite possibly in the southwest as well. Wood

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for use as fuel is limited to the eastern regions of Afghanistan where it ideally should be saved for other purposes in view of the rather desperate forest situation.

Because of the highly seasonal rainfall characteristic of all of Afghanistan, production of hydroelectric power is contingent upon the construction of storage dams and reservoirs. Fortunately, the mountainous topography provides many excellent storage sites, and no part of the country is beyond the range of modern transmission systems from such a site. Hydroelectricity may well prove to be the greatest boon to industrial development, as is already being demonstrated at the Pol-i-Khumri and Gulbahar textile plants.

Of the 82.2 million kilowatt-hours generated in 1959-60, hydroelectricity provided 77.6, and of these 55.2 came from the Sarobi installation on the Kabul river and another 10.8 from the Pol-i-Khumri barrage on the Qunduz river. The 120,000 kw. potential of the Kajakai dam in the Helmand valley has not yet been tapped, although 2,500 of the 4,500 potential in the drop structure of the Boghra canal near Girishk was brought into operation in the spring of 1961. The key to the immediate needs for electricity in the Qandahar region (including the new fruit-processing plant and the industrial district) lies in the installation of half of the 12,800 kw. capacity of the Arghandab dam. This power should become available early in the Second Five-Year Plan. An additional 2,300 kw. for the Qandahar area is being provided by harnessing five of the drop structures on the Zahir Shah canal, including those at Filkoh and Baba Wali.

In the north, hydroelectric production from the 4,800 kw. station at Pol-i-Khumri has been supplemented by a new 9,000 kw. plant just downstream to serve the new cement mill at Ghori, the Kar Kar coal mine, and some of the urban needs of Pol-i-Khumri and Baghlan. A smaller structure on the Khanabad river, completed in 1960, provides 1,400 kw. for the cotton and cottonseed processing plant in Qunduz. The Qunduz and Kokcha rivers offer excellent hydroelectric potentials, but development requires an integrated approach which would also greatly increase irrigation potentials. A small amount of hydroelectric power will become available in Mazar-i-Sharif and Shibarghan provinces if the joint Soviet-Afghan project to build a dam on the Amu Darya at Khelif is carried out.

The Afghan government's efforts at power development have been concentrated on the Kabul river which offers a series of excellent sites close to the capital, the new industrial node develop-

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ing around Gulbahar and Jabal us-Seraj, and the Jalalabad oasis. The Kabul river is slated for development on a "cascade" basis, with two additional projects—Naghlu (60,000 kw.) and Darunta (10,000 kw.)—already under construction. Completion of these projects by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan will not only increase the Kabul valley's present hydroelectric capacity (28,266 kw., of which 22,000 kw. is from Sarobi) by 1.5 times but will make possible the installation of another 11,000 kw. in the present Sarobi powerhouse. Still further capacity could be added at Sarobi by constructing a new intake and powerhouse, and there are perhaps half a dozen additional sites of equal attractiveness between Kabul and Jalalabad, all of which can eventually be run as one integrated and highly efficient system. In fact, German engineers began surveys in October 1961 at one such site, Mahipar, 22 miles east of Kabul, offering a head of almost 1,000 feet.

Other streams in the north and west also offer attractive storage and generating sites. But for the time being such cities as Herat, Maymaneh, Andkhui, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Farah rely on diesel generators, which are also used as supplementary or standby capacity in other cities and in industrial plants. In 1959-60, diesel generators in Afghanistan produced about four million kilowatt-hours, with one old steam plant at Baghlan adding 685,000.

Coal, of course, offers an additional source of power, especially in industrial plants where power generation can be a by-product of steam generation for manufacturing purposes, as in sugar refining and textile finishing. Coal production in Afghanistan is still quite modest, but will have to be greatly expanded to support industrial and urban needs for fuel. The largest present demand comes from the two cement plants at Jabal us-Seraj (100 tons of cement per day) and Pol-i-Khumri (200 tons per day, but being doubled). Fortunately, the Pol-i-Khumri (Ghori) plant is within fifteen miles of the Kar Kar coal mine which produces most of Afghanistan's coal, and the best in quality. But since each 100 tons of daily cement capacity represents an annual requirement of about 8,000 metric tons of coal, Kar Kar's production (15,500 metric tons in 1959-60) cannot keep up with the demands of the cement mill at Pol-i-Khumri, supply the sugar beet refinery at Baghlan, and still send coal over the Hindu Kush to the smaller cement plant at Jabal us-Seraj and to the Kabul area. A smaller mine at Ishpushta, roughly halfway between Kar Kar and Jabal us-Seraj via the old Shibar Pass road, produces coal of inferior quality, much of which

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has to be briquetted for use in industry or for heating purposes. The solution to the coal problem lies in the Darra-i-Suf deposits, about 85 miles south of Mazar-i-Sharif, where earnest exploitation will begin under the Second Five-Year Plan. These deposits contain at least five million metric tons of good quality coal, some of it suitable for coking, in comparison to less than 400,000 metric tons economically obtainable at either Kar Kar or Ishpushta. To tap the Darra-i-Suf mines will require building a good road from the deposit to Doab or Doshi on the Salang Pass route, but this would seem to represent the only permanent solution to the coal needs of eastern Afghanistan.

Other good coal deposits exist in the northwest around Karrukh, some sixty-five miles northeast of Herat. Much of the northern Hindu Kush may contain coal deposits, but requires more careful exploration for determination of resources. Southern Afghanistan, including the Helmand valley region, has as yet shown no economically developable coal reserves, but can be supplied either from Karrukh or by imports from the Quetta region in Pakistan. Fortunately, it is here that hydroelectric potential (at Kajakai) awaits only demand and installation.

Petroleum exploration in Afghanistan has been pursued intermittently since the 1930s and intensively since the mid-1950s. The most encouraging results have been achieved in Shibarghan province, both at Sar-i-Pol and around Aq Chah. Test drillings were carried out with the aid of Swedish contract technicians from 1956 to 1958, and since then with Soviet assistance under a fifteen-million-dollar loan extended on July 30, 1957. Despite reports of a major strike in May 1960, the Ministry of Mines and Industries has been exceptionally quiet about petroleum developments. A small refinery to be built with Soviet aid was, however, tentatively included in the Second Five-Year Plan.

In the meantime, Afghanistan is importing increasing amounts of Soviet petroleum and on December 3, 1960, signed an agreement with Iran to purchase small amounts of petroleum products.

Afghanistan is also eager to develop metallurgical industries. There have been repeated reports of plans to establish a blast furnace, probably near Jabal us-Seraj where there is a thick vein of hematite. Soviet Techno-Export was investigating these deposits when, in September 1960, a French geologist reported a major find (perhaps 250 million tons of ore with 60 percent metal content) of crystalline hematite around Hajigak some eighty-five miles

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southwest of Kabul. Development of these ores would depend upon availability of coke and upon the domestic market, which still consumes only about 10,000 metric tons of iron and steel products per year. Since this total is composed of relatively small amounts of a great variety of forms, shapes, and manufactures, Afghanistan is hardly in a position to meet competition from specialized Soviet, West German, or American producers, even if uneconomically high tariffs were adopted. But the desire for self-sufficiency exists, and an iron smelter and foundry has been included in the Second Five-Year Plan.

If Afghanistan can develop an iron and steel industry, it would gradually provide a domestic market for the 180,000 metric tons of chromite of the Logar valley which has so far proven uneconomical to export. There is also some manganese in the lower Helmand valley, associated with iron in the Kuh-i-Khan Nashin deposits, and more iron ore (2 or 3 million metric tons of magnetite with 64 percent metal content) at Haji Alam, about thirty miles east of the Kajakai dam. Other ferroalloys will undoubtedly be found in the course of more intensive exploration of the country. The prospects for finding bauxite, which could provide a use for some of Afghanistan's hydroelectric potential, are less promising.

Nonferrous metal deposits include the beryl at Darra Nur in the Kunar valley, about forty miles northeast of Jalalabad, not of export quality; and widespread deposits of copper, lead, and zinc as well as silver and gold in the Hindu Kush and northeastern mountain ranges. The upper Kokcha valley of Badakhshan provides lapis lazuli, the best of which sells for $300 per kilogram and is often exported. The poorer grades of lapis, other semiprecious stones and alabaster are worked up in lapidary works in Kabul. The German firm of Hochtief has taken a fifty-year lease on the largest of these plants, and intends greatly to expand production.

Building materials are abundant, easy to locate, and usually easy to extract because of the paucity of vegetative cover. Gypsum and limestone for cement are common, and the Pol-i-Khumri cement plant has a particularly advantageous raw materials position since it adjoins the quarry. Brick clay is also common, but fuel is so scarce and expensive that most houses are built of sun-dried brick, adequate except under heavy rains and melting snow. Wherever there is a cheap source of fuel, as in the bagasse from the Jalalabad sugar cane refinery, one finds brick kilns. The better grades of clay and other materials for use in pottery and china industries are more

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localized, however, and the two chinaware plants in Afghanistan have to bring some of their raw materials from considerable distances. Nevertheless, the privately owned plant established in Kabul in 1957, which concentrates on production of table china, is gradually driving imports out of the market. The government-controlled plant at Qunduz, which produces heavy china plumbing fixtures, bowls, vases, etc., may eventually perform the same service.

There have been several attempts to establish a glassworks in Afghanistan, with Mazar-i-Sharif or Qandahar as the most likely site and Czechoslovakia as the most likely source of loan funds, equipment, and technicians. To an even greater extent than cement or ceramics, glassmaking requires cheap fuel. Since glass sand is abundant, a find of natural gas in the north would almost surely be followed by the establishment of a glassworks.

Other nonmetallic minerals of industrial significance include talc, from the slopes of the Safid Kuh in Nangrahar province, and sulfur, which occurs in Maymaneh, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Badakhshan provinces. Sulfur can form one base of a chemicals industry and tie in with the manufacture of superphosphate fertilizers. As yet, no important deposits of phosphates have been found, but conditions would appear favorable throughout much of dry Afghanistan. Nitrate deposits are less likely, but artificial nitrate plants can be built either in conjunction with coking ovens or by using hydroelectricity for fixation of atmospheric nitrogen. Most of Afghanistan's soils have sufficient potash, but nitrates and superphosphates are in great demand, particularly on the cotton-growing lands of the north.

The saline lakes and salt flats of southwestern Afghanistan provide an inexhaustible supply of sodium chloride, from which the industrial base, sodium hydroxide, and hydrochloric acid may be prepared. The former will be needed in glass manufacture as well as in making soap and in various refining operations. In addition, salt flats in many areas contain high percentages of sodium sulfate (Glauber's salt), potassium chloride, and magnesium chloride, other compounds of great value in an industrial economy.

Despite this significant array of mineral resources, and the determination of the Afghan government to make the most of them, it remains true that the preponderance of industrial production by value comes from the processing of agricultural and pastoral raw materials. The lead is taken by the cotton textile industry, which has been under strict government control since 1955. The first

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cotton textile mill in Afghanistan was built by the government between 1934 and 1938 at Jabal us-Seraj, alongside Afghanistan's first hydroelectric station (built 1914-18 to provide 1,600 kw.). The mill's annual capacity is one million meters of ordinary piece goods plus about 350,000 square meters of special-weave textiles made on hand looms.

In 1941, the Textile Company, backed by the Bank Melli, bought this mill to complement the production of the much larger plant which it was building north of the Hindu Kush at Pol-i-Khumri. The idea was that some of the white goods produced at Pol-i-Khumri could be sent to Jabal us-Seraj for finishing, dyeing, and sale on the Kabul market. In 1942, the Pol-i-Khumri plant went into production using 15,000 spindles and 550 power looms of British make. Production at Pol-i-Khumri rose gradually until it reached 9.9 million meters in 1952-53. In 1953, the Textile Company inaugurated a program of expansion with the installation of another 15,000 spindles at Pol-i-Khumri, bringing production up to 13.2 million meters in 1953-54 and to 16.4 million in 1954-55. Whether any, or how much, Textile Company stock is now owned by the government is unclear, but since 1955 wholesale prices and profit rates have been strictly controlled and the expansion of capacity has been coordinated by the Ministry of Mines and Industries. Today the Pol-i-Khumri plant has 45,000 spindles and 854 automatic looms, the newer equipment being of German make. This raises its theoretical capacity to 28 million meters per year, although 25 or 26 million is a more realistic estimate.

In addition, the Textile Company and the Bank Melli began, in March 1953, construction of a new and entirely modern plant at Gulbahar, a few miles to the east of Jabal us-Seraj. The Gulbahar plant, inaugurated on June 23, 1960, is really a self-contained town, including not only the factory buildings but housing, schools, a mosque, and shopping and recreational facilities for the workers. The spinning and weaving operations are contained in two huge, windowless, completely air-conditioned buildings, with a separate "waste" plant to process short-staple cotton and outlying warehouses, workshops, training sections, and office buildings. Gulbahar is the largest and most impressive industrial operation in Afghanistan. It includes 43,000 spindles and 1,200 automatic looms, and can produce 35 million meters annually on a two-shift basis. In addition to its own production, Gulbahar can finish and dye some 8 million meters annually from the Pol-i-Khumri plant until the

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latter builds its own finishing and dyeing sections. If the two plants are operated at capacity, they can produce about one-half of the estimated 120 million meters of cotton textiles annually consumed in Afghanistan, with corresponding savings in imports.

The main obstacle to capacity production is an insufficient supply of cotton. In 1959-60, before Gulbahar began serious operations, the total domestic production of cotton piece goods *fell* to 16.4 million meters from the 21.9 million of 1958-59 because of a lack of raw material to supply Pol-i-Khumri. This shortage was due to poor weather conditions in 1958-59 combined with a "strike" by the farmers who had not been issued the usual advance payments at the time of seed distribution. In 1960-61, with Gulbahar getting into production and a good harvest from the preceding year, production increased to 28 million meters. However, the operation of the Gulbahar and Pol-i-Khumri plants at capacity will require over 13,000 metric tons of ginned cotton per year. To supply these requirements, in addition to providing cotton for export under bilateral agreements with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and China, will put a serious strain on cotton production, which has never yielded more than 22,000 metric tons on a ginned basis. To achieve self-sufficiency in cotton textiles would require around 26,000 metric tons, and would leave no surplus for export.

Afghanistan's cotton textile plants and exports are supported by a series of cotton gins scattered throughout the northern provinces. Most of these are owned by the Consolidated Cotton Company of Qunduz (government controlled since 1955), although there is also a sizable private organization operating in Mazar-i-Sharif. The main plant of the Consolidated Cotton Company, at Qunduz, was greatly expanded during the First Five-Year Plan and now includes eight modern British cotton gins, each with a capacity of 1,500 pounds per hour. The plant also includes new storage facilities, presses for extracting cottonseed oil, and equipment to process this oil into cooking oils, hydrogenated margarine, and soap. The compound also contains the ceramics and heavy chinaware operations referred to above, and the Company is responsible for the 1,400 kw. hydroelectric station built on the Khanabad river to supply its needs.

In addition to the domestic market for cotton piece goods, there has been a rising demand in Afghanistan for artificial silk goods, principally rayon. Prior to 1958-59, this demand was met by imports, which amounted to some 300 million afghanis in 1956-57, or almost as much by value as those of cotton. In 1958, the Omayyed

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rayon plant in Kabul began production of rayon textiles, using equipment and filament imported from Japan. Although production was only some 197,000 meters in 1959-60, the capacity of the plant is 650,000 meters, and increasing production is beginning to make a dent in import requirements.

There are two woolen mills in Afghanistan. The one in Qandahar, established before World War II by Qandahar investors and the Bank Melli, had a nominal capacity of over 135,000 square meters of coarse wool cloth per year. But production was continually restricted by the poor condition of the equipment, by repeated breakdowns, and by delays in obtaining spare parts. Production here declined from 70,000 square meters in 1954 to 48,000 in 1956 before the Afghan government took a hand. With Polish technical assistance and equipment, the capacity has been raised to 270,000 square meters annually on a one-shift basis. Production has risen rapidly both here and in Kabul where the government's own mill, established during World War I for producing heavy, dun-colored cloth and blankets for the army, was if anything in even poorer condition than the one in Qandahar prior to the modernization under the First Five-Year Plan. Both woolen goods plants include facilities for grading, washing, and baling wool for export. We have noted earlier that Afghanistan could easily increase both its domestic production of woolens and the quantity and quality of wool exports by using the facilities of these plants, since less than one-third of the estimated annual wool clip enters the commercial sector for manufacture or export.

Another paradoxical situation is that with respect to hides, skins, and leather. With two million cattle and perhaps twenty million sheep (excluding karakul) and goats, Afghanistan imports both leather and footwear. Local cobblers produce approximately 375,000 pairs of shoes and boots by hand methods while in Kabul there is a well-equipped tannery and shoe factory with a mechanized assembly line. The situation in 1958 was similar to that two years earlier in wool and woolens. Only some 40,000 cattle hides reached the market each year, although some 200,000 were available through slaughterings and natural deaths. The Iqbal factory in Kabul could never get more than 10,000 or 12,000 hides a year, nowhere near its tanning capacity. As for the shoe assembly line, it had been out of operation since 1954 due to the lack of two or three key machines and of repair or replacement parts for half of the others.

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In 1958, this private enterprise was able to secure the services of a West German tanning expert thanks to credits extended by German manufacturers of tanning chemicals and equipment. The hope was to rehabilitate first the tannery and then the shoe production line, which could supply between 120,000 and 180,000 pairs a year. But the success of the program depends on close cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture since the collection program must go hand in hand with the education of farmers and pastoralists as to the value of hides and proper methods of skinning and flaying. The new Qandahar industrial district is to include a small, modern tannery, and others could well be established at Herat, Maymaneh, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Qunduz—towns which rely on the most rudimentary of tanning facilities. These modern tanneries would process not only cowhides for domestic use, to replace imports of leather, but the 1.3 million sheep and goat skins which are now exported each year either crudely tanned or just salted. In addition, there may be up to 5 million skins available for domestic purposes, or additional exports, on the basis of normal slaughterings in herds of this size. The problem is again one of organization and capital, areas in which Afghan private enterprise now finds itself at a disadvantage in comparison to the government. Karakul skins usually bring in more export revenue than cotton, but since these are not industrially processed in Afghanistan as yet, often being exported on a "wet" basis, we need not consider them here.

Fresh and dried fruits represent another major agricultural product for both export and domestic consumption. Processing here is of increasing importance, as Afghanistan strives to obtain higher prices, reduce spoilage, and eliminate waste through better grading, dehydrating, packaging, transportation, and distribution. The processing and marketing of fruits has heretofore been in private hands, notably Pushtoon Industries in Qandahar and Ittihadiya in Kabul. But neither of these firms controlled very much of the market, and after repeated failures by the private sector to organize and modernize itself the government has built, with Czechoslovak assistance, a new fruit canning and preserving plant at Qandahar. This plant has the capacity to handle 155 metric tons of fruit per day, and can either mechanically dry it or pack it into 1 or 1.5 kilogram cans. Similar plants, whether built by private or government interests, could easily be supported in Kabul and Jalalabad, and perhaps in some of the towns of the north. The main emphasis must be on better methods of drying tree fruits, cur-

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rants, and raisins, and on processing fruits into the more valuable forms of preserves, syrups, and candies. Recurrent shortages of sugar have interfered with these operations.

Afghanistan has two sugar mills, one at Baghlan based on beets, the other at Jalalabad based on cane. Neither one comes close to meeting the nation's requirements. The plant at Baghlan has a rated capacity of 60,000 to 70,000 metric tons of beets, which is above the operational optimum but has never been put to the test since no more than 45,000 metric tons of beets have ever been grown. Although irrigation capacities in the Qunduz valley have recently improved, sugar beets have to compete with wheat and cotton for water and land. In 1955, when the 45,000 metric tons of beets were available, the plant produced 6,050 metric tons of sugar, or about half of the average annual imports of this commodity. The cane sugar mill at Jalalabad, with a capacity of 100 tons of *sugar* per day, cannot get enough cane from its district to operate for more than a few weeks. It is hoped that with increase in the irrigated area made possible by the Darunta project more cane will be grown, but sugar cane will have to compete with rice, a more lucrative crop, in the Jalalabad region.

The above-described extractive and processing industries are supplemented by a growing number of service industries in Afghanistan. Of these the most important is the transportation industry, described earlier, without which the assembly, processing, distribution, and export of materials and products would be impossible. Transportation represents the core of the "infrastructure" of the Afghan economy. Closely related to transportation are the workshops established to assemble, maintain, and repair motor vehicles, two at Kabul and one at Qandahar. By importing chassis and building their own truck and bus bodies on them, and later by importing parts and subassemblies, the Afghans will be able to save a great deal of foreign exchange. The same holds true for the manufacture of some spare parts made possible by the facilities in these workshops. Other Afghan cities are now developing modern vehicle service and repair centers.

In both Kabul and Qandahar, there exist agglomerations of plants which may best be described as "industrial districts" or "industrial parks." The one at Kabul, called Jangalak, was originally built by the Unimac firm of Austria for the Textile Company, primarily to make spare parts and to repair equipment. It has been taken over and expanded by the Minstry of Mines and Industries. Jangalak

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now includes a well-equipped lumber mill for slabbing, planing, and sanding timber brought in by truck from Paktia and Nangrahar provinces, a woodworking shop which converts this lumber into anything from fruit crates to office furniture, a forge, smithy, and metalworking shop, and a small plant for making cement blocks. (The Soviet-supplied vehicle workshop and truck body plant are located in this compound. The American-supplied vehicle and body shop was built in Zindabanan on the opposite side of Kabul.)

The Qandahar industrial district was designed by ICA to aid small, private industry by providing a series of complementary service industries in adjoining plants. The initial cost of the project was 1.5 million dollars, including local Afghan investments. Though slow to get started, the district is to include a small forge and foundry, a metalworking shop, a woodworking mill, a tannery, and a shop for the manufacture and repair of simple electrical fixtures. It is the site of another American-built motor vehicle shop, this one including facilities for the assembly of vehicles.

Along with a congeries of small bazaar industries making hardware, saddlery, water pipes, straw articles, etc., the above represent the present industries of Afghanistan. It can be seen that the country enjoys a reasonably good resource base, and has made a good start in utilizing the known resources. Fortunately, industrial development usually compounds itself, and an increasingly large number of Afghans will receive its direct and indirect benefits in the coming years.

Before directing our attention to domestic and foreign trade, a few words may be added concerning tourism in Afghanistan. This activity is sometimes referred to as an "industry," and it certainly does represent a means of exploiting natural resources, although without diminishing them if proper safeguards are taken. It may also be considered an "invisible export" since it brings in foreign exchange with no material resources leaving the country. The only material resources consumed within the country are fuel for transportation and food, laundry soap, postcards, etc., all of which are amply paid for by the tourists. Most countries have found tourism to be a profitable adjunct to service industries and trade.

Afghanistan certainly possesses the raw materials for tourism. Both the natural and the archaeological wonders of the country are extraordinary. Various explorations have uncovered priceless finds from the Graeco-Buddhist, Kushan, and Islamic periods. Not only can the best of these be inspected in the Kabul museum, but in most

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cases it is possible to visit the actual digs, many of which are still in progress. The ruins of the Ghurid and Ghaznavid periods at Qal'eh Bist and Ghazni have barely been touched, while added to them are the shrines of the later Islamic period, notably the mosques at Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

As for natural assets, the scenery of the snow-capped Hindu Kush and its outliers, the beauty of the forested areas in Nuristan, and the views of cultivated fields from many mountain roads are exceeded only by the incredible lakes at Band-i-Amir, high in the central plateau. Fortunately, these lakes are conveniently located with respect to the great Buddhas carved into the cliff at Bamiyan, so that tourists can easily combine both into one excursion from Kabul. A new and more direct route has been built, mostly by local initiative, from Kabul to Bamiyan, and the government has improved the hotel and camping accommodations at the latter place so that it can serve as a base for explorations into the central plateau region of the Hazarajat. The new Hotel de Kabul and the Aryana Hotel are vast improvements over the old hotel at Kabul, and the provincial and roadside hotels are slowly being brought up to international standards. In addition, there are now acceptable public restaurants at Kabul, and record shops which sell Afghan music.

Afghanistan has had a Tourist Bureau since 1958. This organization cooperates with the Press Department, the Kabul Chamber of Commerce, and the Ariana Afghan Airlines to publicize Afghanistan's tourist attractions and to arrange accommodations and tours in its own buses and cars. Recent improvements to the roads greatly facilitate touring. The principal bottleneck remains the procurement of travel permits, and the inflexibility of the itinerary once the permit has been issued.

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CHAPTER 20

Domestic and Foreign Trade

THOUGH trade occupies a relatively small portion of the total economically active population, traders and their employees are believed to earn as much as 12 to 14 percent of the total national income. The official government estimate puts the share at 8 percent (refer to Table 2). Freedom of domestic trade prevails except for a few government monopolies and controls. No ethnic group has a monopoly over any part of trade, although before 1932 Hindus and Jews dominated some trade channels and still have a share of the imported consumer goods market.

Local distribution of foreign and domestic products is made difficult for five major reasons:

(1) Imported merchandise enters the country through only three major customs points, all at a considerable distance from the largest consuming areas. Some of the more important products, tea for example, enter the country through just two customs bureaus —Chaman and Torkham. The result is that the burden on the distribution and transport system is heavy. Exportable domestic products also heavily tax the distribution system. For example, karakul skins must be collected in the northern plain areas, wholesaled at Mazar-i-Sharif, commissioned in Kabul, and exported by air or through Torkham or Chaman to New York. If transit facilities through Soviet territories become permanently preferable, the distribution burden inside Afghanistan would be lighter for raw cotton, wool, and skins, but not for fruits and nuts.

(2) The production of domestic commodities with marketable surpluses is highly localized due to special physical conditions. Areas with adequate water supply to support both their resident population and markets farther afield are widely scattered and frequently at considerable distance from consuming centers in

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need of supplemental supplies. Herat's marketable surplus grain supplies, for example, have a long way to go to reach Qandahar or Kabul or foreign markets. Much the same holds for the raw cotton supply of the north and the fruit supply of the Arghandab valley. Equally important is the isolation of the production centers from the financial and administrative centers where traders could obtain financial and government assistance.

(3) Physical obstacles make distribution costly and risky. High rugged mountains, deserts, unfordable rivers, and severe winters make transportation and communication extremely costly. Market information on prices and supplies reaches producers and consumers too late or in garbled form—if disseminated at all. But even if the interchange of commercial information were more efficient, the costly and slow means of transport, apart from the main highways discussed in chapter 14, would make it difficult for supply to adjust to commercial intelligence.

(4) There are not enough storage facilities for either domestic or foreign products. Only since 1954 has the government, mostly with the assistance of Soviet technicians, succeeded in erecting gasoline and grain storage facilities in Kabul, Herat, and in the north.

(5) An unfavorable institutional framework has hampered domestic trade in several respects. In the first place, relations between contracting parties have had no clear and enforceable basis in law. Instead of firm legal rules, usage, differently interpreted by judges, and arbitrary decisions by courts have imparted a large element of uncertainty to the conduct of business. As a result, the opinion of the party with the better economic status has tended to dominate the implementation of contracts.

Complaints about the legal uncertainty of business became more numerous as years went by, while plans for the enactment of legislation or other measures designed to correct the situation remained in the planning stage, until in 1954 the government put into force a Commercial Code, patterned on the Turkish code which in its turn derives from the Swiss and German prewar models. In addition, the government is promoting legislation providing for streamlined court proceedings in business cases, for trade-mark protection, and for uniform arbitration procedures.

Domestic trade has been hampered by a lack of uniformity for measurements of length, area, and weight, since units are in use which may have different values in different parts of the country

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or when applied to different commodities. Officially the country has adopted the metric system but in practice the "Kabul" system of weights predominates among large business units and in the eastern part of the country. This system consists of the following units, which for convenience are given with approximate equivalents in pounds:

1 khurd	.25 lb.
1 paw (4 khurds)	1.00 lb.
1 charak (4 paws)	3.90 lbs.
1 Kabul sir (4 charaks)	15.69 lbs.
1 khawar (80 sirs)	1,255.00 lbs.

Closely related to the absence of universal units of measurement is the lack of uniform quality grading standards which in an advanced commercial society are tied to physical specifications. This deficiency introduces a high degree of uncertainty into the cost of production of a product such as wool or rugs, and into the valuation of a product by a consumer. Long-distance ordering of merchandise which could be made from different grades of raw material or with varying qualities of workmanship is, under these circumstances, a risky business. Personal acquaintance with the maker or seller of the product tends to provide the only protection for the buyer—a factor that makes trade cumbersome and slow and restricts the volume of turnover. The government has recognized this need and has promised to assist the new cotton, wool, and karakul export companies in introducing scientific quality control standards.

A logical by-product of the lack of standards is the lack of incentives for producers to produce quality products. The price differences between grades of the same product vary from region to region and thus have little effect. To some extent, the wholesale buyers are responsible for the lack of quality premiums. The buyers of wool, cotton, and fur prefer mixed quality assortments because they can thus maximize their net margin in markets in which quality differences command price differentials—as in the United States. Probably the present "lump-buying" practice protects the bargaining position of the buyer vis-à-vis the farmer or herd owner. The government has recently tried to remedy this situation by setting price floors for karakul, wool, and cotton.

The distribution system is underdeveloped. Only in the capital

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and Qandahar are wholesale and retail functions discharged in a manner comparable to that in more advanced countries. The rest of the country clings to traditional channels of distribution. In these two centers, the distribution of the major cash crops is in the hands of *shirkats* or companies, most of which have access to the credit facilities of Bank Melli or, since 1954, the Tejaraty Bank. Storage facilities at the disposal of the *shirkats* have enabled them to turn over considerable quantities. In the rest of the country, the volume of trade is small, primarily because the marketable surplus in other than the leading export commodities and wheat is small.

Next in importance are large proprietary traders with funds of their own or easy access to credit facilities. They are far more numerous than the *shirkats*, and form the backbone of the mercantile middle class. Most of them operate in cities and large towns, never in villages, and rarely in small towns. Most of them have warehouses at their disposal.

Wholesalers in small towns make up a large proportion of the occupants of the shops in the bazaars. Their scale of operations is smaller than that of the proprietary houses in the cities, but they hold enough inventory to last them a season. Many of them run a repair shop on the side. The smallest operator is the trader who opens shop for three days a week and who has scanty funds and an inventory that may not last more than a week. He borrows money at the inflated bazaar rates.

The large city bazaar in Kabul or Qandahar is the principal point of trading, storage, or assembly into larger or dispersion into smaller lots. On the whole the turnover is low so that the profit per individual transaction is high. Half of the lendable funds for the bazaar traders emanates from the bazaar moneylenders. Bazaar prices fluctuate widely, as does the spread between wholesale and retail quotations. Wide fluctuations can occur only because inventories are either too low or because traders tend to hold on to inventories and "sit out" a price rise or fall. When supplies available to the market are low, the slightest change in market condition—a rumor about a wheat shipment from the United States, for example—will produce the most violent reaction in prices. Monthly price quotations issued by the Kabul Chamber of Commerce show that the seasonal prices of many common commodities, especially such perishables as meat, fresh fruits, and vegetables, may vary as much as 50 to 100 percent or even more in the course of a year. In recent years, the government has imported quantities of wheat

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in order, among other reasons, to have enough in storage to even out the price fluctuations that formerly afflicted even this nonperishable.

Because of his isolation, his inexperience, his lack of financial resources, and his preoccupation with nontrading activities, the villager is generally at the mercy of the bazaar trader, although he is the producer of most of the commodities that enter trade. In centuries past, part of the domestic and international trade has been carried on by the large number of nomads who in the fall left their cold and snowbound grazing grounds in Afghanistan's mountains for the warmer plains of India, adjacent to the Indus river. During their stay abroad they not infrequently accept work as laborers and return in the spring to their summer domicile, freshly supplied with consumer goods. A secondary, but important occupation of the nomads has been trading on a commission basis and moneylending. This so-called *powindeh* trade has accounted for as much as 30 percent of all interregional and international trade. *Powindeh* is a generic term, deriving from the Persian word *parvandeh*, or bundle (of merchandise). Most of the *powindeh* are Ghilzais, and the Sulaymankhel group is particularly active.

Trade relations between the *powindeh* and the villager were built primarily on personal and kinship bonds, which assured fulfillment of the reciprocal obligations during the long trek of the trader. Payment for the Afghan products sold on commission to the *powindeh* took place in Indian merchandise. Products exchanged in this way have included skins, wool, cotton, rugs, dried fruits, and grain against sugar, tea, salt, and cotton textiles. However, since the political difficulties with Pakistan first arose in 1951 and then intensified in recent years, the movement of nomads across the border has been restricted. The requirement instituted by Pakistan in 1961 that these nomads present passports or other acceptable documents of identity may mark the beginning of the end of this activity.

The average Afghan trader who operates on a meager volume and small capital can ill afford to tie up funds in purchases of futures or of future deliveries—even though the farmer or herd owner has been willing to pay high interest on advances. Transactions between most traders, too, are on a cash or barter basis. The growth of *shirkats* in the early thirties, accompanied by a widening of the scope of the market economy, brought an increase in the financial resources of a substantial number of traders, and at

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present a considerable volume of trade is carried on on a credit basis. The proprietary trader in the bazaar frequently doubles as moneylender, especially in small towns, but with the opening of the Pushtun Tejaraty Bank new credit facilities have become available to the trader and farmer.

For a variety of reasons, the government has increasingly taken a hand in wholesaling and retailing transactions. The intervention has taken a variety of forms as follows:

(1) Setting price floors at the producer level. For instance, to protect karakul growers, the new government set an initial average price of 120 afghanis for a certain variety of skins for 1953 and 1954. The problems created by such floors may be illustrated by transactions in karakul in 1954 in New York. The average price for skins in New York was then between $6 and $7. At the exchange rate at which the karakul exporter had to surrender his dollar earnings (21 afghanis per dollar) the trader obtained only between 126 and 147 afghanis for each skin. It was difficult for the trader to pay for transportation and incidental cost of shipment to New York when he had a margin of only 6 to 27 afghanis per skin. The result was evasion of the price floor since herd owners would rather sell at lower prices than not sell at all. After 1955-56, when the floor was raised to 130-160 afghanis per skin, the exchange rate applicable to karakul exports was raised to 24.36 afghanis per dollar.

(2) Regulation of foreign exchange rates. As is obvious from the karakul example above, the regulation of exchange rates by the State Bank affects traders in several ways. Traders selling to export markets are faced with different exchange rates applicable to different products. This determines the margin over purchase cost they can expect. If the product is sold on the domestic market as well, an exchange rate set too low may divert trade from export markets to domestic channels. A rate set too high may have the opposite effect. For traders buying imported articles, the exchange rate set by the government directly determines his cost and in an elastic market, indirectly determines the volume of sales. In this way, the government can control the amount of trade business in various commodity categories. For example, by offering importers of trucks exchange below the free market rate (at 32.35 as compared to about 40.50 afghanis per dollar), the government has encouraged the importation of trucks and the establishment of transportation companies.

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(3) Government monopolies. In the case of sugar, petroleum, tobacco products, and automobiles, the government operates an import monopoly. The new gasoline and grain storage facilities are government property and may be offered to private firms for a fee. Domestic production of minerals is in the hands of the government.

(4) Close supervision. By the enactment of an appropriate law in March 1956, the government has obtained the power to appoint its representatives to each of the *shirkats* where they may participate in and determine the policies affecting the entire business of the company.

Private trade circles predict that once the government has gone as far in its intervention as is indicated by the above list, it will control all major trade transactions. There would be no serious objection to complete government control if it could find an adequate number of experienced traders to help in the administration of trade controls. As long as the number remains small, inefficient and ineffective handling of trade matters may well be expected.

Turning from the government to the individual, being in trade runs in the family so that at least one son will go into business. His first venture will be an independent one with family capital, possibly going from his town to Kabul to buy merchandise, renting a truck for the return trip, and then taking a local profit. Small merchants may prefer to sell inexpensive articles and make many such sales rather than sell a few expensive items. The reputation for selling cheaply is sought after and a shopkeeper may, at intervals, sell below cost price to establish and maintain such a reputation.

The bazaar merchant opens his small shop in the morning and usually eats there, the lunch being brought from his house. In the warm weather he will spread cotton sheets over the merchandise and sleep through the early afternoon, closing up at sundown. He is not above being public-spirited in an inconspicuous manner if he can afford to do so: for example, a druggist receiving prescriptions from a doctor may charge according to an agreed system of marks on the paper, charging little to poorer patients. In so doing he fulfills religious obligations.

The shopkeeper expects to bargain with his customers but this bargaining is restrained and moderate compared to the long-drawn-out haggling common to certain other Middle Eastern coun-

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tries. The Afghan would feel it beneath his dignity to go to such lengths. The buyer will look at several shops until he gets some idea of what a final price should be and then goes back to the shop that had the item he liked best for the final bargaining. However, in Kabul there is an increasing tendency toward fixed prices, a tendency favored by the consumers.

Fledgling merchants may go into the transport business through the means of buying a truck, hiring a driver, and setting out in search of cargo in much the way the camel caravans still travel from town to town. Or the truck driver himself may buy or rent a truck from capital derived from private deals and fares for carrying passengers on top of the loads of cargo. In a few rural areas landlords have begun to establish family *shirkats* to provide their tenants with banking services. Thus, the tenant may borrow in order that he himself can buy and sell at a profit and pay 50 percent of his profits to the *shirkat*. An extension of such a service and of cooperatives will help to free the peasant farmer from the domination of the wholesalers, mentioned in earlier pages.

Islam proscribes usury but in modern times the government and banking systems of the Moslem countries have found it necessary to overlook this restriction. In only a few Moslem countries is there entrenched local religious feeling against taking interest. The methods for avoiding the collection of interest for the use of money are frequently ingenuous and specious—Allah is not deceived. A commonly employed device in Afghanistan is for a shop or house owner to borrow a sum of money in return for which his creditor earns the right to make whatever income he is able to from the property until the face value of the loan is paid back. The income from the property is not applied against the principal, and thus may be considered a form of interest. Such arrangements may end in the sale of the property to the creditor for a sum in addition to the initial loan. Funds borrowed on property are expended largely on local industry and trade, but more recently there has been a wave of speculation in land in and around Kabul.

Although recorded values for exports may amount to only ten or twelve percent of Afghanistan's national production, several major qualifications apply to such estimates. Except in recent years when friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan has resulted in a more or less effective closing of the border to the nomadic *powindehs* and semilegitimate smugglers, the unrecorded trade may

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have amounted to as much as 20 or 25 percent of that recorded. Furthermore, prior to March 1957, the value records kept at the customs houses reflected the multiplicity of exchange rates applicable to various commodities, and records of trade by volume were equally inconsistent, some being in metric tons, others in gallons, units, pairs, boxes, etc.

In 1957, the Ministry of Planning took a hand in the tabulation and recording of foreign trade statistics. Data back to March 1951 were re-examined, corrected wherever possible, arranged according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) code, and published. Starting with the solar year 1336 (March 1957 to March 1958), foreign trade data have been presented not only in afghanis but in terms of the foreign exchange involved, and machine-tabulating methods have been introduced for handling the data. Better instructions and forms issued to the customs houses have brought the reduction in the "unspecified" category of exports from 78 million afghanis in 1956-57 to zero in 1958-59, and from 303.2 million afghanis in "unspecified" imports to 31 million over the preceding period. (For trends in Afghan foreign trade from 1951 to 1958, see Table 7.)

These trade data should, of course, be corrected for the changing value of the afghani over this long period, as well as for various exchange rates applied to the different commodities involved. But the main features are clear enough: rapid growth in total foreign trade over the eight years; rapid and almost uninterrupted growth in imports; and a more hesitant growth in exports. The decline in exports from 1957-58 to 1958-59 was a real decline, due primarily to smaller quantities of cotton and wool exports and lower quantities as well as lower prices received for karakul.

Five commodities—dried fruits, karakul furs, fresh fruits, raw cotton, and wool—consistently account for 80 or 85 percent of Afghan exports by value. By considering the average earnings of these five commodities for the last three available years, and comparing them with the earnings in 1951-52 as a base year, we can even out the effects of a bad year such as 1958-59 or a very good one such as 1957-58 (see Table 8).

To offset still further the distortions of changing currency values and exchange rates over the period, Table 9 presents the same data as the preceding but in quantitative terms.

Tables 8 and 9 furnish an adequate basis for comparing changes in quantities exported and values received from the base year

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1951-52 to the three-year period 1956-57 to 1958-59. Although the average quantity of dried fruits exported did not increase, the value received increased almost 1.5 times. Fresh fruit exports showed a slight increase in quantity and another 1.5-fold increase in value. Karakul exports increased substantially (they went as high as 2.8 million skins in 1957-58), but the value received increased three times as much as the quantity exported. Most of this was due to inflation in the world karakul market over the base year, partially offset by a decline in prices in the last two reported years.

The exports of raw cotton increased enormously, more than trebling in value and quadrupling in quantity. This was true despite the falling-off of exports in 1958-59 to about 40 percent of their level in the previous year due to poor weather and the farmers' "strike" mentioned in chapter 19. Wool exports increased by about 50 percent in quantity but only 30 percent in value over the period, due to the poor competitive position of Afghan wool in the world market. Wool and cotton are less likely to be affected by inflation because there is considerable competition among producing nations and from rival fibers of synthetic origin. Karakul prices, although susceptible to changes in fashion and competition from Southwest Africa and the Soviet Union, were directly affected in this period by the inflationary spiral in such purchasing nations as the United States and the United Kingdom.

The 1.5-fold increase in the value of Afghanistan's fresh and dried fruit exports, unaccompanied by corresponding increases in quantity, must be held to reflect inflation in the principal markets, India and Pakistan, rather than an increase in price level due to improved quality, which would be more desirable. It is fortunate in a way that the two export commodities least likely to rise in price on the world market, cotton and wool, are the two most needed by Afghanistan's domestic processing industries. Thus, the diversion of these commodities from the export market, which should be characteristic of the early 1960s before the cultivation of cotton and the collection of wool catches up with increased demand, will not hurt Afghanistan as much as the diversion of karakul or fruits would. On the other hand, diversion of cotton and wool exports has certain effects on bilateral trading, which we shall consider below.

In terms of rank by value among Afghanistan's exports over the entire period 1951-52 to 1958-59, dried fruits held first place in all but two years, in one of which they yielded to raw cotton and in the other to karakul. Fresh and dried fruits combined would easily

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have taken first place in all eight years. Karakul furs were in second place in five out of the eight years, placed first in 1956-57, tied with cotton in 1953-54, and fell to fourth place in 1952-53 when there was an upsurge in wool exports.

Wool usually occupies fourth or fifth place and has failed to make the consistent advances in total revenue characteristic of dried fruits and karakul. Cotton exports also fluctuate widely, depending upon agricultural conditions as well as on conditions in the world market. Cotton may rank anywhere from third to fifth place among the major export commodities by value.

Other leading Afghan exports, given roughly in rank order by value, are carpets and rugs, untanned hides and skins, medicinal herbs, oilseeds and spices, and sausage casings (the entrails of sheep and goats). Rather than analyze in detail these commodities, which at most total 20 percent by value of Afghan exports, it will be more enlightening to pass on to a discussion of where Afghan exports go and what types of currency they bring in.

In 1958-59, seven countries took 97.6 percent of all Afghan exports by value. In rank order, these countries were India (35.7), United States (21.3), USSR (17.1), United Kingdom (11.7), Pakistan (5.9), West Germany (5.2), and Czechoslovakia (0.7). The dominance of these seven customers is quite characteristic of the entire eight-year period. India is consistently Afghanistan's best customer. The United States and the USSR have exchanged second and third places. No secular trends can be determined from the export data of these eight years. Even the position of Pakistan has fluctuated violently, depending upon the state of diplomatic relations; it has not followed a steady decline over the period. Nor has the Soviet Union's share exhibited a steady rise; it reached a high of 27.6 percent of Afghanistan's export trade in 1956-57, but fell off in the two ensuing years.

Which commodities do these customers buy? For the *1960 Survey of Progress,* the Ministry of Planning tabulated the major commodities bought by each of the seven main customers, as shown in Table 10.

Note that in most cases, the commodities listed in Table 10 account for over 90 percent of the customer nation's total imports from Afghanistan. An equally informative picture emerged when the Ministry of Planning ranked the customers for each of the ten main export commodities in terms of the values taken as percentages of the total values exported. At least 80 percent of the

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exports of each commodity by value in 1958-59 are accounted for in Table 11.

Although there were changes over the eight-year period in the portions of any commodity taken by a particular customer (note particularly the reversal of the positions of India and Pakistan as purchasers of fresh fruits) there was a high degree of consistency with respect to which nations were interested in a particular commodity. This is an advantage to Afghanistan, since it can tailor its production and marketing channels to serve certain well-known customers.

Other fundamental questions with respect to Afghanistan's exports are what the country receives for them and what it does with the money so received. By reporting exports after 1957-58 in terms of the foreign exchange received as well as in afghanis, the Ministry of Planning avoids the confusion inherent in the multiple exchange rate system and provides the answer to the first of these questions (see Table 12).

The answer to the second question, how Afghanistan uses her foreign exchange receipts, will lead us to the import side of the trade ledger. But, in making that transition, let us emphasize that some imports on government account, paid for with foreign exchange obtained by compulsory surrender (and exchange at multiple rates) of receipts for all exports except fruit and medicinal herbs, or with loan funds from foreign obligations, are not included in the import statistics, especially in the earlier years of the eight-year period. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the bilateral or barter trade with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, although accounted for in terms of dollars or pounds sterling, does not involve the actual use of any currency unless the swing margins are exceeded. Thus, most of Afghanistan's cotton exports, and sizable shares of her wool, hides and skins, oilseeds, spices, and dried fruit exports do not bring in foreign exchange but are bartered for machinery and equipment, raw materials, petroleum, and other commodities on the basis of annual lists drawn up under the bilateral trading agreements. Finally, the distinction should be drawn between the convertible currencies—dollars, pounds sterling, West German marks, Swiss francs—and the nonconvertible rupees earned by Afghan exports to India and Pakistan which, in effect, have to be used to buy imports from those countries rather than at will on the world market. The convertible currencies, both because they are convertible and because of the nature of the

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economies of the nations using them, are far more valuable for the purchase of capital goods for Afghanistan's development programs.

Turning, then, to imports (see Table 13), we find a much larger range of commodities than among Afghan exports. This is to be expected of a nation in the early stages of industrial production. The Ministry of Planning has, however, segregated five main categories which comprised about two-thirds of Afghan imports by value in recent years. The average expenditures on these categories in afghanis have been computed for the three most recent years, as have indices on the base of 1951-52, to facilitate comparison with the export data given in Table 8.

Again, it is essential to refer to quantitative data to put these value figures into perspective, especially in view of the serious inflation of industrial equipment and product prices over the eight years in question (see Table 14).

Changes in the product mix within each category vitiate comparisons of value and quantitative data. In cloth imports, for example, quantities of cotton piece goods fluctuated widely over this period while imports of rayon mounted quite steadily until their value reached over half and their quantity almost one-third those of cotton imports. The figures on motor vehicles vary widely from one year to the next and do not distinguish among imports of passenger vehicles, trucks, or chassis. Perhaps the only really comparable data are those on sugar and tea, direct consumption items which are practically essential to the Afghan diet. Average sugar imports increased almost three times as much in value as they did in quantity over the base year. Tea imports increased 1.5 times in value, but only 40 percent in quantity. This inflationary indication is all the more regrettable since Afghanistan could probably be self-sufficient in sugar if more land were devoted to beets or cane and if the existing refineries could be used to capacity.

Data on petroleum products imports are not strictly comparable because of the lack of 1951-52 figures for kilogram imports. Since the kilogram imports are, however, those coming from the USSR, which now supplies the lion's share of Afghan petroleum, it can be estimated that the quantity of petroleum imported has increased at least as much as the value index indicates (almost triple the base year). The value of the quantitative index for the period 1957-58 to 1958-59 was pulled up by the kilogram imports of petroleum in 1958-59 which were about ten times those in either of

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the two preceding years. The fluctuation of kilogram versus gallon petroleum imports directly reflects the state of political relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

To round out the import picture, value and quantity data for six other major commodities are presented in Table 15. Since figures are presented for only two years (only one for wheat), there is no point in presenting indices, but percentages of total imports by value are included, bringing the percentage of all such imports accounted for in this and Tables 13 and 14 to about 82 percent.

From what has been said in the chapters on agriculture and industry, it is apparent that Afghanistan should be able to eliminate imports of such items as yarn and thread (except rayon filament for local weaving), footwear, and wheat. The clothing category represents mainly secondhand clothing, resold in local bazaars. Once fabric production (cotton, rayon, wool, and silk) is well established within Afghanistan, this item should also dwindle. It will, however, be many years before Afghanistan can produce much of its own machinery or rubber manufactures. In this regard it is worth noting that iron and steel forms and shapes, essential to the construction and machinery industries, do not yet appear among the first eleven import categories.

Although Afghanistan's imports are much more diverse than her exports, the list of major suppliers is not much longer than that of her customers, and includes the same nations with the notable addition of Japan. The seven trading partners which accounted for 93.1 percent of Afghanistan's imports in 1958-59 were the Soviet Union (27.1), Japan (19.5), United States (18.8), India (12.4), Pakistan (8.2), West Germany (4.2), and the United Kingdom (2.9). Czechoslovakia and Poland are of increasing importance. The order given above differed from that for 1957-58 only in that the United States and Pakistan exchanged places. The position of Pakistan as a supplier to Afghanistan shifts radically depending upon the state of diplomatic relations from year to year. But the United States had never provided so large a share of Afghanistan's imports; in the seven years preceding 1958-59, the American share was never more than 12.8 percent (1952-53) and dropped as low as 2.9 percent (1955-56).

Although an analysis of Afghanistan's imports over the eight-year period does not reveal any consistent secular trends, the very recent decline in India's position is noteworthy. In 1951-52, India

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supplied 39.6 percent of Afghanistan's imports; then India's share fell off to about one quarter in 1953-54 and 1954-55, recovering to 31.6 percent in 1956-57. But in 1957-58 and 1958-59, India supplied only 11 and 12 percent, respectively. India has not only lost first place to the Soviet Union, but has dropped to fourth or fifth place among suppliers. This change in India's position cannot be explained in terms of transit difficulties, since the variations in India's trade with Afghanistan do not correspond to the years of the blockades or to the variations in Pakistan-Afghanistan trade.

One explanation, offered by the Ministry of Planning, is that with increasing accuracy in identifying the correct country of origin, India has lost credit for many items re-exported to Afghanistan. (The same should apply to trade with Pakistan.) Another explanation is that the increase in cotton textile production in Afghanistan has curtailed imports from India, which offers the same grades, rather than from the USSR or Japan, which offer either higher grade cottons or artificial-fiber piece goods. The value of cloth imported from Japan increased four times between 1956-57 and 1957-58, and by 1958-59 stood at over six times the 1956-57 level. The value of cloth goods imported from India was cut by half over this period.

Table 16 shows where Afghanistan purchased her main import categories in 1958-59. In each case at least 87 percent of the imports are included; in most cases almost 100 percent are accounted for. Since the data in Table 16 do not cover the entire period from 1951-52 to 1958-59, they indicate neither secular trends nor the great fluctuations which may occur from one year to the next. These fluctuations are accentuated in the case of machinery imports, since a single year's figures may include the entire equipment for a new factory or installation shipped by the USSR, the United States, Japan, or Czechoslovakia.

With respect to petroleum products imports, however, the data are an accurate indication that Afghanistan has become almost entirely dependent upon two sources, the Soviet Union and Pakistan, although shipments from Pakistan represent re-exports. This dependence for such a key item—petroleum products are needed not only to run the entire modern transportation system but for supplementary diesel power generation and domestic, especially rural, lighting by kerosene lamps—creates some concern in Afghanistan. We have mentioned both the 1960 Afghan-Iranian petroleum

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agreement and the intensified efforts to find domestic petroleum reserves as well as to build a small refinery under the Second Five-Year Plan.

In concluding this discussion of Afghanistan's foreign trade, the nation's dependence upon transit rights through its neighbors' territory must be emphasized because of its direct bearing upon the quantity and direction of such trade. Afghanistan's problem of access to the sea is common to other landlocked nations, which joined with her in a special meeting prior to the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea held from February 24 to April 27, 1958. On the recommendation of a special committee on landlocked nations, the Conference included in its Convention a permissive article encouraging specific negotiations between landlocked nations and their more favored neighbors with coast lines and ports. Later that year, upon urging by the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan concluded a transit compact envisaging a customs-free zone in Karachi where Afghan imports could be transferred from ships to railway cars and sealed for transshipment to the Afghan border at Chaman-Spin Baldak. The United States agreed to make funds available for improvements on the Chaman branch of the North Western Railway and to construct a spur with unloading facilities across the border at Spin Baldak in Afghanistan. But both the compact and this program were brought to nought by events in the summer of 1961 which led to the closing of the Afghan-Pakistan border.

The series of informal "blockades" by Pakistan of Afghanistan, in 1950, 1953, 1955, and from September 1961 to the time of writing, results from Afghan agitation for an independent but affiliated "Pushtunistan" including the Baluchistan coast and perhaps the port of Karachi. The motivations behind this claim, which are discussed elsewhere in this book, far transcend the question of access to the sea. Nevertheless, Afghanistan needs access routes across West Pakistan not only to take advantage of cheap sea transportation to Karachi but to reach its best export markets for fresh and dried fruits in India.

As an alternative to shipment via West Pakistan, Afghanistan obtained transit privileges from the Soviet Union, informally in 1950 at the time of the first "blockade" and formally by the treaty of June 28, 1955. Afghanistan also negotiated a transit agreement with Iran in 1962, and there have been discussions concerned with

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building a road from southwestern Afghanistan to the port of Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman.

Costly land transportation by rail across the Soviet Union is no substitute for cheap sea transportation to Karachi, even for goods moving to Afghanistan from the western parts of the USSR which can be shipped from Black Sea ports. With regard to Afghan trade with Western nations, there are political as well as economic handicaps to transportation via Soviet land routes. Only West Germany has agreed to ship via the Soviet Union rather than via Pakistan. Thus it can be seen that if the present situation continues, or is repeated in the future, Afghanistan will be placed in an increasingly disadvantageous competitive position for all trade that cannot withstand the cost of air transportation. A reorientation of the composition and direction of Afghan foreign trade under these circumstances must be regarded as inevitable.

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CHAPTER 21

National Attitudes

SINCE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS are unknown in Afghanistan, material relative to national attitudes must derive from official statements, from articles in the semiofficial press, and from individual expression. It may be said that there is a lack of well-defined popular national attitudes. The inhabitants of the country view the world around them in terms of loyalty to Islam, identity with their ethnic groups, and a strong sense of attraction to their local habitats. Only the official elite and the intellectual group are internationally minded, or concerned with Afghanistan's role in the world and with the impact of that world upon their country.

The national symbols are charged with the one ideology that almost all Afghans have in common and that is their deepest source of values: Islam. The Afghan coat of arms represents a mosque, containing a *mihrab* (prayer niche) and *mimbar* (pulpit), with a banner on each side and below the date 1348, the year of the Moslem era in which the late Nadir Shah was elected to the throne. The whole is surrounded by a wreath of ears of wheat, in commemoration of the election of Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was crowned with ears of wheat at Qandahar.

The Afghan flag shows this emblem in white on a background which is one-third black on one end, one-third red in the middle, and one-third green at the other end. The music of the Afghan national anthem is played upon occasion, but there is no accompanying text. Official emphasis is placed upon Independence Day, May 27th, and upon the Independence celebrations which are held at the end of August. This latter week-long affair attracts more and more Afghans to Kabul, and the military review, sports events, and great fair held at this time do serve to foster a national identity among the participants. In addition, the government celebrates Pushtunistan Day as an annual national holiday. No pictorial

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symbols or cartoons are used to personify either the Afghan nation or the Afghan citizen in the way that the image of the eagle and the figure of Uncle Sam are employed in the United States.

Muhammad Iqbal, poet and philosopher of India, defined the three most striking qualities of the Afghans as their deep religious spirit, their complete freedom from distinctions of birth and rank, and the perfect balance with which they have always maintained their religious and national ideals. This idealized image offers only a very general background for an understanding of national attitudes. It may be said that among the various ethnic groups there is no overt hostility, but little communication. Few citizens of the country identify their interests with a geographical entity, or feel a sense of loyalty to the ruler, to the flag, or to a spirit of national pride. They tend to coalesce only when Islam and their traditional beliefs and way of life seem threatened by foreigners.

Many Afghans do take pride in what they consider to be the glorious and heroic past of their country, and all would resent being considered members of a backward or uncivilized nation. Yet, today their government cheerfully subscribes to the use of such labels as "backward" and "underdeveloped" to describe the country's state and to incite its citizens to participation in and support of the economic development program. The royal family itself appeals directly to the people to work hard in the mutual interests of all, and hopes, in this way, to create a national identity of interests.

The royal family and the ruler himself are held in respect as the defenders of the Moslem faith, but they are not regarded with deep awe and admiration. There have been too many rulers and too frequent shifts from one dynasty to another in the last century to permit such loyalty to become deeply ingrained. Certain crystallizing national attitudes stem from the desires and decisions of the royal family itself. One such is the drive, recently slackening in intensity, to replace the Persian cast of the culture of the country with a Pushtun character in language, literature, and background. Another is the basic foreign policy attitude: that of neutrality, nonalignment, and nonparticipation in military alliances.

The older elite made up of the *khans,* tribal chiefs, and religious leaders is gradually being replaced by the growing number of intellectuals whose views are bound to create new national attitudes, reflective of their familiarity with the Western world and its institutions. Many of them believe that a democratization of political

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and social institutions is essential, while a small number feel that the monarchy itself is an anachronism and that real progress can only be made under state socialism as practiced to the north of the Amu Darya. However, there is no opportunity for public expression of a nature that might serve to shape new national attitudes; the present elite and the emerging one is largely employed by the government and must, of necessity, subscribe to the views of the regime.

Fortunately, Afghanistan displays none of the aspects of emotional, extreme nationalism, now so conspicuous throughout much of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Foreigners never got a foothold in the country so that there are none to throw out: no oil companies, no banks, and no foreign-owned land and industry. Nor is the cancer of irredentism present, except among the most ardent advocates of Pushtunistan, who do not reflect the official position on this subject.

National attitudes toward foreign nations are based upon several factors: their earlier relations with Afghanistan; their concern for aiding in the economic development of the country; and their attitude toward the Pushtunistan issue. No foreign country has a perfect score in all these fields. There is a deep distrust of Russia, based upon past experience and Communism, yet the Soviet Union grants massive economic and military aid and strongly supports the Afghan position on Pushtunistan. The official attitude is that the USSR is a sincere friend of Afghanistan, and no criticism of any of its international actions is permitted in the Afghan press. The United States is a comparative newcomer to the Afghan scene and was highly regarded until the government discovered that it would not take sides in the Pushtunistan issue, and would not forego its growing ties with Pakistan. Currently, the Afghan press and radio are very critical of the United States, not only with respect to the subjects just mentioned but as to its alleged international role as a colonial power and an associate of oppressive colonial powers. The national attitude toward Great Britain is not precisely defined. There is a heritage of antagonism, but the British play no role in Afghanistan's economic development and relations between these countries are not of great importance to either party. Pakistan is, of course, branded as the enemy of Afghanistan. Germans are much admired for their industry and thoroughness, while the French position has declined as Afghanistan sides with other members of the anti-imperialist and anti-

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colonial bloc in condemning French policy in Algeria and elsewhere. India is regarded as a friend; its government favors Afghanistan on the Pushtunistan issue and Afghanistan responds by supporting India on Kashmir—this in spite of the fact that Afghanistan wants a plebiscite in Pushtunistan, while India refuses to permit one to be held in Kashmir.

In venturing into the delicate field of the development of national attitudes, it may be suggested that one institution, that of the *loya jirgeh*, might be convened at more frequent intervals. Each such earlier convocation resulted in a review and discussion of the policies of the government, in particular those concerned with relations with other countries. It would also seem reasonable for the regime to consult with the *loya jirgeh* as to the relative degree of urgency with which political and social reforms should be implemented, since such consultation might well clarify national attitudes on issues which are of vital importance to the future of Afghanistan.

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Tables

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Table 1. SPOKEN LANGUAGES OF AFGHANISTAN [a]

	Number of speakers in Afghanistan	*Total number of speakers in the world*
IRANIAN LANGUAGES		
Persian	2,780,000	17,000,000
Pushtu	5,000,000	10,000,000
Baluchi	20,000	800,000
Pamir languages		
Shughni-Roshani **Wakhi** **Munji-Yidgha** **Ishkashmi**	45,000	75,000
Other		
Ormuri **Parachi**	2,000	.....
DARDIC LANGUAGES		
Kafir languages		
Kati **Waigeli** **Ashkun** **Prasun**	60,000	.....
Other		
Pashai **Gawar-Bati** **Tirahi**	8,000	.....
TURKIC LANGUAGES		
Uzbek	820,000	5,000,000
Turkoman	200,000	800,000
Kirghiz	30,000	.....
Karakalpak	2,000	.....
OTHER		
Mongolian **Kurdish** **Arabic** **Lahnda** **Brahui**	13,000	.....
Total	9,000,000	.....

[a] The figures given here are only suggestive approximations and may be far from the facts. They serve, however, to give a rough idea of the relative sizes of the speech communities as far as this can be inferred from available sources.

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Table 2. PERSONAL INCOME BY SECTOR, 1958-1959

(*in percent*)

Earnings from industrial employment	.34	
Earnings from government employment	.94	
Earnings from agricultural employment	8.21	
Earnings of nomads	9.85	
Earnings of the armed forces	1.29	
Total income from employment		20.63
Professional persons and traders	14.94	
Farmers	53.59	
Cottage industry, crafts, etc.	4.39	
Total income from self-employment		72.92
Rents, dividends, and interest		6.45
Total		100.00

Source: Calculated from Table 2, "Personal Income and Expenditure," in Warren J. Blackman and M. Baqi Yusufzai, *Gross National Product for Afghanistan, 1337* (Kabul, U.S. Operations Mission, 1961), p. 10.

Table 3. BALANCE SHEET OF THE DA AFGHANISTAN BANK AT THE END OF 1337 (March 20, 1959)

(*in million afghanis*)

Assets		*Liabilities*	
Gold	828.7	Bank notes issued	2,875.1
Silver	149.5	Treasury notes issued	180.0
Cash		Demand deposits	
In afghanis	1,178.4	In afghanis	788.3
In foreign currencies	761.4	In foreign currencies	491.5
Loans		Time deposits	
In afghanis	1,473.8	In afghanis	202.0
In foreign currencies	49.3	In foreign currencies	....
Investments		Advance and credit	
Participations		In afghanis	....
In afghanis	664.9	In foreign currencies	55.5
In foreign currencies	1.0	Capital	240.0
		Reserves	81.9
Buildings	4.9	Undistributed profit	113.3
Equipment and other	1.8	Other liabilities (branches)	86.2
Total[a]	5,113.8	Total	5,113.8

(a) Totals may not add exactly because of rounding.

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* Tables I-A and I-B, "Money and Banking," prepared from data submitted by the Da Afghanistan Bank.

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Table 4. ESTIMATED LAND USE[a]

	Million hectares	*Million acres*	*Percent of total*
Waste lands and built upon	49.50	122.3	76.3
Meadows and pastures	3.20	7.9	4.9
Forests and woodlands	1.00	2.5	1.5
Cultivated land:			
River irrigated (rud-i-bar land)	3.38	8.4	5.2
Spring irrigated (cheshmeh sar land)	0.87	2.1	1.3
Irrigated from underground water tunnels (karizi land)	1.06	2.6	1.6
Dry-farmed, dependent upon precipitation (lalmi land)	2.49	6.2	3.8
Additional land planned for cultivation	1.10	2.7	1.7
Further unused area suitable for cultivation	2.30	5.7	3.5
Total	64.90	160.4	100.0

(a) For further discussion of the various estimates, and an excellent account of Afghan agriculture in general, see Johannes Humlum, *La geographie de l'Afghanistan*, Copenhagen, Gyldenal, 1959, pp. 164-66 and chaps. XIII-XVIII.

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1959, 2, 1.*

Table 5. ESTIMATED AVERAGE CROP PRODUCTION

	Production in metric tons	*Area sown in hectares*	*Yield in metric tons per hectare*
Cereal crops (four years' average)			
Wheat	2,210,000	2,220,000	1.0
Maize	696,000	470,000	1.5
Barley	330,000	350,000	.9
Rice	308,000	210,000	1.5
Technical crops (two or three years' average)			
Cotton, unginned	58,000	54,000	1.1
Sugar beets	39,000	4,000	9.8
Sugar cane	50,000	1,800	27.8

Source: For 1954-55, Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance report to ECAFE; for 1955-56, Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1959, 2,* 5 (Table III); for 1958-1959 and 1959-1960, *ibid. 1960, 2,* 1; and for supplementary data, Royal Afghan Embassy (London), *Afghan Progress in the Fifth Year of the Plan*, London, 1961.

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Table 6. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1955 to 1961

	1955-56	*1956-57*	*1957-58*	*1958-59*	*1959-60*
Electric power generated[a] (million kilowatt-hours)	24.3	29.3	.....	71.4	82.2
Installed generating capacity[a] (kilowatts)	.....	.....	.....	40,965	41,115
Coal production (metric tons)[a]	22,180	28,908	19,648	33,746	41,400
Cement (metric tons)	.....	.....	.....	20,951	34,038
Chinaware (pieces)	.....	.....	104,442	97,752	174,835
Matches (1,000 dozen)	83.4	201	168	608	484
Sugar (metric tons)	6,047	4,787	4,793	4,723	4,475
Cotton piece goods (million meters)	17.4	15.4	19.8	21.9	16.4
Cotton yarn (5-kilogram bundles)	52,100	112,800	123,100	61,500	26,450
Rayon (meters)	.....	.....	.....	38,850	197,000
Woolen piece goods (sq. meters)	208,300	243,300	218,650	240,170	333,000

(a) According to speeches by Muhammad Yusuf, Minister of Mines and Industries, and Abdul Hai Aziz, Deputy Minister of Planning, at the Jeshyn celebrations of August 1961, electric power generated in 1960-61 reached 118 million kilowatt-hours, installed generating capacity 51,800 kilowatts, and coal production 52,000 metric tons.

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960*, pp. 112-15; *ibid. 1959, 3*, 1.

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Table 7. TRENDS IN AFGHAN FOREIGN TRADE, 1951 to 1959

(*in million afghanis*)

	1951-52	*1952-53*	*1953-54*	*1954-55*	*1955-56*	*1956-57*	*1957-58*	*1958-59*
Exports	731.4	805.7	949.9	1,439.7	1,351.6	1,499.8	1,984.5	1,722.7
Imports	646.0	726.9	1,036.1	1,026.6	1,255.1	1,623.6	1,966.3	2,532.8
Total	1,377.4	1,532.6	1,986.0	2,466.3	2,606.7	3,123.4	3,950.8	4,255.5
Balance	+85.4	+78.8	−86.2	+413.1	+96.5	−123.8	+18.2	−810.1

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 197.

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Table 8. COMPARISON OF AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS OF FIVE KEY EXPORT COMMODITIES: 1951-1952 AND 1956-1957 THROUGH 1958-1959

	1951-52		*1956-57 through 1958-59*	
	Value in million afghanis	*Percent of total exports by value*	*Average value in million afghanis*[a]	*Average percent of total exports by value for the three years*
Dried fruits	198.3	27.1	479.4	27.5
Index	100.0		241.8	
Furs (mainly karakul)	163.5	22.4	438.1	25.4
Index	100.0		267.9	
Fresh fruits	67.9	9.3	170.9	10.0
Index	100.0		251.6	
Raw cotton	64.6	8.8	215.3	12.2
Index	100.0		333.3	
Wool	124.2	17.0	161.5	9.2
Index	100.0		100.0	
Total of above groups	618.5	84.6	1,465.2	84.3
Total of all exports	731.4	100.0	1,735.7	100.0

(a) Index is average for three years.

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 198 (Table IV and calculations therefrom).

Table 9. COMPARISON OF AVERAGE ANNUAL QUANTITIES OF FIVE EXPORT COMMODITIES: 1951-1952 AND 1956-1957 THROUGH 1958-1959

Commodity	*Quantity unit*	*1951-52*	*1956-57–1958-59*[a]
Dried fruits	million kilograms[b]	27.9	27.0
Index		100.0	96.9
Furs (mainly karakul)	million skins	1.5	2.4
Index		100.0	157.8
Fresh fruits	million kilograms	32.3	33.8
Index		100.0	104.7
Raw cotton	million kilograms	2.8	11.8
Index		100.0	422.6
Wool	million kilograms	4.3	6.5
Index		100.0	151.2

(a) Index is average for three years.
(b) "Million kilograms" may be read as "thousand metric tons."

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 199 (Table V and calculations therefrom).

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Table 10. COMMODITY BREAKDOWN OF EXPORTS TO SEVEN MAJOR CUSTOMERS, 1958-1959

Commodity	*India*	*United States*	*USSR*	*United Kingdom*	*Pakistan*	*West Germany*	*Czecho-slovakia*
Dried fruits	61.1[a]	7.9	33.7	...	53.9	...	...
Fresh fruits	25.5	...	...	...	36.5	...	...
Karakul furs	...	75.9	...	83.3	...	...	...
Raw cotton	...	...	40.6	...	...	18.2	57.6
Wool	...	15.4	15.9	...	...	...	...
Carpets and rugs	...	...	...	9.1	...	42.1	...
Untanned hides and skins	3.4	...	7.5	...	...	...	...
Medicinal herbs	4.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
Oilseeds and spices	3.1	...	...	...	...	...	21.2
Sausage casings	...	...	...	...	...	19.6	...
Totals	97.9	99.2	97.7	92.4	90.4	79.9	78.8

(a) Percent of total exports to country by value.
Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 206 (Table X).

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Table 11. MAJOR EXPORTS BY COMMODITY AND COUNTRY, 1951-1952 AND 1958-1959

	1951-52	*1958-59*
Dried fruits		
India	84.4[a]	65.2
USSR	8.6	17.2
Pakistan	6.7	9.4
United States	0.4	5.1
Fresh fruits		
India	18.7	80.9
Pakistan	81.3	19.0
Raw cotton		
USSR	17.5	80.1
Czechoslovakia	. . .	4.9
Oilseeds and spices [b]		
India	0.3	51.8
USSR	97.7	33.6
Medicinal herbs		
India	. . .	78.8
Switzerland	. . .	9.7
Pakistan	. . .	8.8
Karakul furs		
United States	75.9	59.1
United Kingdom	22.9	35.7
Wool		
United States	45.6	48.3
USSR	51.8	39.9
Carpets and rugs		
West Germany	. . .	59.7
United Kingdom	22.7	29.0
Hides and skins		
USSR	24.1	47.4
India	40.6	44.6
Sausage casings		
West Germany	2.9	53.5
Switzerland	1.5	21.1
Netherlands	1.5	12.4
United States	13.0	7.3

(a) Percent of total value of each commodity exported.
(b) Data on oilseeds and spices for 1951-1952 refer to sesame seeds only.
Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 208 (Table XI).

Table 12. FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS FROM EXPORTS, 1958-1959, GIVEN IN FIVE MAIN CURRENCIES

(*in thousands*)

Commodity	*Indian rupees*	*Pakistan rupees*	*U.S. dollars*	*Pounds sterling*	*Deutsche marks*
Dried fruits	38,537	7,792	2,787	40	. . . .
Furs (mainly karakul)	979	. . . . .	4,891	1,106	824
Fresh fruits	15,443	5,158	. . . . .	. . . .	. . . .
Raw cotton	. . . . .	46	2,490	55	153
Wool	. . . . .	. . . . .	1,984	51	49
Carpets and rugs	. . . . .	43	554	168	399
Untanned hides and skins	2,041	. . . . .	449	. . . .	83
Medicinal herbs	3,041	527	83	. . . .	. . . .
Seeds and spices	1,875	361	230	. . . .	. . . .
Sausage casings	. . . . .	24	610	. . . .	66
Total of above	61,916	13,951	14,068	1,420	1,574
Total of all commodities	61,992	14,367	14,178	1,440	1,609

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 201 (Table VI).

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Table 13. COMPARISON OF AVERAGE ANNUAL EXPENDITURES FOR FIVE KEY IMPORT COMMODITIES: 1951-1952 AND 1956-1957 THROUGH 1958-1959

	1951-52		*1956-57 through 1958-59*	
Commodity	*Value in million afghanis*	*Percent of total value*	*Average value in million afghanis*[a]	*Average percent of total value for the three years*
Cloth[b]	300.1	46.5	778.3	38.8
Index	100.0		259.3	
Motor vehicles	21.0	3.3	156.7	7.4
Index	100.0		746.3	
Sugar	11.0	1.7	167.9	8.5
Index	100.0		1,526.4	
Petroleum products	39.8	6.2	117.6	5.6
Index	100.0		295.4	
Tea	52.5	8.1	129.8	6.5
Index	100.0		247.7	
Total of above groups	424.4	65.8	1,350.3	66.8
Total of all imports	646.0	100.0	2,040.9	100.0

(a) Index is average for three years.
(b) Includes cotton and artificial silk piece goods.

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 202 (Table VII and calculations therefrom).

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Table 14. COMPARISON OF AVERAGE ANNUAL QUANTITIES OF FIVE KEY IMPORT COMMODITIES: 1951-1952 AND 1956-1957 THROUGH 1958-1959

Commodity	*Quantity unit*	*1951-52*	*1956-57–1958-59*[a]
Cloth[b]	million kilograms	5.1	9.7
Index		100.0	191.0
Motor vehicles	units	532.0	2,091.0
Index		100.0	393.0
Sugar	million kilograms	4.9	28.9
Index		100.0	589.7
Petroleum products	million kilograms	5.2[c]	29.0[d]
Index		100.0[c]	557.6[d]
Petroleum products	million gallons	4.1	13.8
Index		100.0	336.6
Tea	million kilograms	2.4	3.4
Index		100.0	140.3

(a) Index is average for three years.
(b) Includes cotton and artificial silk piece goods.
(c) 1956-1957.
(d) Average is 1957-1958 and 1958-1959; index is this average divided by the 1956-1957 base.

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 204 (Table VIII and calculations therefrom).

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Table 15. SECONDARY IMPORT COMMODITIES BY VALUE AND QUANTITY, 1957-1958 AND 1958-1959

	Value in million afghanis and percent of all imports				*Imports by Quantity as Reported in the Units Indicated*		
	1957-58	*Percent*	*1958-59*	*Percent*	*Units*	*1957-58*	*1958-59*
Machinery (mining, construction, industrial)	21.8	1.1	101.3	4.0	million kilos. 1,000 units	0.2 6.0	0.1 73.0
Rubber manufactures (mainly tubes and tires)	54.1	2.8	87.2	3.4	million kilos 1,000 units	0.5 49.0	0.1 289.0
Yarn and thread	46.1	2.3	63.6	2.5	million kilos.	0.8	1.2
Clothing	53.9	2.7	56.9	2.3	million kilos. 1,000 pieces	1.1 16.0	1.2 250.0
Footwear	55.4	2.8	56.3	2.2	million kilos. 1,000 pairs	0.4 81.0	0.2 853.0
Wheat			158.9	6.3	million kilos.		40
Totals	231.3	11.7	524.2	20.7			

Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960*, p. 202 (Table VII) and p. 204 (Table VIII).

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Table 16. MAJOR IMPORTS BY COMMODITY AND COUNTRY, 1951-1952 AND 1958-1959

	1951-52	*1958-59*
Cloth		
Japan	14.0[a]	46.6
USSR	17.5	24.6
India	63.9	20.8
Pakistan	0.4	3.6
United Kingdom	1.0	1.3
Czechoslovakia	. . .	0.7
Motor vehicles		
United States	99.1	76.9
Czechoslovakia	. . .	12.9
USSR	.9	6.7
India	. . .	1.6
Pakistan	. . .	0.6

	1957-58	*1958-59*
Machinery (mining, construction, industrial)		
USSR	6.4	61.8
United States	0.5	23.2
West Germany	17.9	4.7
Japan	43.6	4.5
Czechoslovakia	14.7	1.5

	1951-52	*1958-59*
Tea		
India	53.3	49.4
Pakistan	26.3	25.5
USSR	. . .	12.1
China	. . .	10.7
Japan	20.3	2.1
Sugar		
USSR	92.7	99.1
Petroleum products		
USSR	46.2	73.3
Pakistan	30.9	23.1
Bahrein	. . .	2.3
United States	. . .	0.4

	1957-58	*1958-59*
Rubber manufactures		
United States	50.3	48.7
Japan	14.4	24.3
Pakistan	4.4	5.4
India	7.6	4.8
United Kingdom	14.2	4.0

(a) Percent of total value of each commodity imported.
Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1960,* p. 212 (Table XIV).

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